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Introduction
Svante Norrhem and Erik Thomson
Historians have long recognized that the early modern period formed 
a pivotal moment in the development of European warfare, states, 
and diplomacy, with profound effects upon global history. As might 
be expected when rulers and occasionally subjects sought to gain 
glory by taking up arms to vindicate the justice of their claims – 
whether dynastic, customary, or historical – in a political system 
widely conceived as hierarchical, warfare was nearly endemic.1 
The intractable theological disputes that followed the Reformation 
added grounds for debating the nature of justice. The ubiquity 
of warfare created an intense and persistent pressure to gain a 
significant advantage, driving an evolutionary process of state-
building characterized by punctuated equilibria; these moments of 
rapid change were occasionally revealed by battlefield victories or 
civil wars. Cannon founders, gunsmiths, architects, and shipwrights 
experimented with new techniques. Princes and other military leaders 
refined tactics and sought to increase the effectiveness of their forces 
with advantages in numbers, discipline, and supply. Ambassadors 
and theorists invented more elaborate methods of demonstrating the 
justice of their sovereigns’ claims. They also devised new forms for 
sovereigns to co-operate. Tax-collectors, projectors, bankers, and 
entrepreneurs proposed new ways to provide the money and resources 
to sustain these wars, usually by increasing the taxes and other 
impositions demanded of subjects who often had meagre margins of 
survival.
1 Johannes Burkhardt, ‘Die Friedlosigkeit der Frühen Neuzeit: Grundlegung 
einer Theorie der Bellizität Europas’, Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung 
24 (1997), 509–574.
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Money was so central to these changes that the English historian 
Mark Greengrass has claimed that ‘money was the dissolvent of 
Christendom’, providing Europe’s states with resources and motives 
to engage in destructive conflict with one another.2 Historians have 
created an extensive and rich literature on European fiscality. They 
have examined constitutional battles about the control and amount 
of taxation, theories of finance, the development of public debt, and 
the organization and corruption of tax and revenue administrations.3 
Much less attention has been paid to the manner in which resources 
were shared among sovereignties, and the manner in which diplomacy 
rested upon allies promising to share money and grant access to 
resources as a prominent part of diplomacy, military provision-
ing, and the construction of early modern states. Subsidies were 
ubiquitous features of diplomatic and military history throughout 
the early modern period, although such payments could assume a 
wide variety of names and forms. The early modern era also saw 
numerous variations of subsidy alliances. The most frequent as well 
as important subsidizers – in terms of sums – were France, Spain, 
the United Provinces, and England. On the receiving end Sweden, 
Denmark, the Swiss confederation, the United Provinces, and a 
number of German and northern Italian states stand out.4 The 
2 Mark Greengrass, Christendom Destroyed: Europe 1517–1648 (London: 
Allen Lane, 2014), p. 101.
3 Richard Bonney and W.M. Ormrod, ‘Crises, Revolutions and Self-sustained 
Growth: Towards a Conceptual Model of Change in Fiscal History’, in 
Crises, Revolutions and Self-sustained Growth: Essays in European Fiscal 
History, 1130–1830, ed. by Mark Ormrod, Margaret Bonney, and Richard 
Bonney (Stamford: Shaun Tyas, 1999), pp. 1–21; Economic Systems and 
State Finance, ed. by Richard Bonney (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995); The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, c. 1200–1800, ed. by Richard 
Bonney (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); and The Rise of Fiscal 
States: A Global History, 1500–1914, ed. by Bartolomé Yun-Casalilla, Patrick 
K. O’Brien, and Francisco Comin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012).
4 Derek McKay and H.M. Scott, The Rise of the Great Powers, 1648–1815 
(London and New York: Longman, 1983), p. 26; Peter H. Wilson, German 
Armies: War and German Politics 1648–1806 (London: UCL Press, 1998), 
pp. 63, 87, 107, 179, 206–207, 228, 267–269; Dwyryd Wyn Jones, War 
and Economy in the Age of William III and Marlborough (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1988), pp. 8–11; Jeremy Black, ‘Parliament and Foreign Policy 
in the Age of Walpole: The Case of the Hessians’, in Knights Errant and 
True Englishmen: British Foreign Policy, 1660–1800, ed. by Jeremy Black 
(Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd, 1989), pp. 46–47; C.W. Eldon, 
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England’s Subsidy Policy towards the Continent during the Seven Years War 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1938); Christopher Storrs, “ ‘Große 
Erwartungen”. Britische Subsidienzahlungen an Savoyen im 18. Jahrhundert’, 
in Das ‘Blut des Staatskörpers’: Forschungen zur Finanzgeschichte der Frühen 
Neuzeit, ed. by Peter Rauscher, Andrea Serles, and Thomas Winkelbauer 
(Munich, 2012: Historische Zeitschrift, Beiheft, vol. 56, 2012), 87–126; 
Stanley J. Stein and Barbara H. Stein, Silver, Trade, and War: Spain and 
America in the Making of Early Modern Europe (Baltimore and London: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), pp. 52–53; Hildegard Ernst, ‘Spanische 
Subsidien für den Kaiser 1632 bis 1642’, in Krieg und Politik 1618–1648: 
Europäische Probleme und Perspektiven, ed. by Konrad Repgen (Munich: 
R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1988), pp. 299–302; Gottfried Lorenz, ‘Schweden 
und die französischen Hilfsgelder von 1638 bis 1649’, in Forschungen und 
Quellen zur Geschichte des Dreißigjährigen Krieges, ed. by Konrad Repgen 
(Münster, 1981), pp. 98–148 (p. 99); Stuart P. Oakley, War and Peace in 
the Baltic, 1560–1790 (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 41; 
Patrik Winton, ‘Denmark and Sweden in the European Great Power System, 
1720–1765’, in Revue d’histoire nordique (2012), ed. by Erik Schnakenbourg, 
pp. 39–61; Patrik Winton, ‘Parliamentary Control, Public Discussions and 
Royal Autonomy: Sweden, 1750–1780’, in Histoire & Mesure, XXX.2 (2015), 
51–78 (p. 57); Knud J.V. Jespersen, ‘Danmark og Europa 1648–1720’, in 
Dansk udenrigspolitiks historie, ii: Revanche og Neutralitet, 1648–1814, 
ed. by Carsten Due-Nielsen (Copenhagen: Gyldendal Leksikon, 2002), pp. 
99, 102, 106, 114, 125; Ole Feldbaek, ‘Helstaten 1720–1814’, in Dansk 
udenrigspolitiks historie, ii: Revanche og Neutralitet, 1648–1814, ed. 
by Carsten Due-Nielsen (Copenhagen: Gyldendal Leksikon, 2002), pp. 
275–278; Christian Windler, ‘ “Ohne Geld keine Schweizer”: Pensionen 
und Söldnerrekrutierung auf den eidgenössischen Patronagemärkten’, in 
Nähe in der Ferne: Personale Verflechtung in den Außenbeziehungen der 
Frühen Neuzeit (Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung, Beiheft 36), ed. by 
Hillard von Thiessen and Christian Windler (Berlin, 2005), 105–133 (p. 112); 
Martin Körner, ‘The Swiss Confederation’, in The rise of the fiscal state in 
Europe, c. 1200–1815, ed. by Richard Bonney (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999), pp. 327–357; Martin Körner, ‘Der Einfluss der europäischen 
Kriege auf die Struktur der schweizerischen Finanzen im 16. Jahrhundert’, 
in Proceedings of the Seventh International Economic History Congress, vol. 
2, ed. by Michael Flinn (Edinburgh, 1978), pp. 274–281; Martin Körner, 
Luzerner Staatsfinanzen 1415–1798: Strukturen, Wachstum, Konjunkturen 
(Lucerne and Stuttgart: Luzerner Historische Veröffentlichungen, 1981); 
Philippe Gern, Aspects des relations franco-suisses au temps de Louis XVI 
subsidies could make up large proportions of the state revenue of 
not just the receiving countries but also the subsidizers. Subsidies 
served early modern diplomacy as a major structure, that is to 
say a series of rules and resources, which conditioned discourse, 
practice, and agency in a consistent manner over a long period of 
4 Subsidies, diplomacy, and state formation
time.5 Subsidies also played complex roles in the internal politics of 
states irrespective of whether they were receiving or paying subsidies; 
for such transfers of resources could both prompt and still political 
debates, favour particular social and political groups within states, and 
either accelerate or slow the construction of durable state institutions.
By ‘subsidy’ we mean primarily the payment of money by one 
sovereign to another in return for military and political aid, typically 
agreed upon by means of a formal agreement and even treaty. We 
do not think it is useful to circumscribe the definition of the word 
too narrowly, for early modern statesmen could use many different 
words including pensions, gratifications, gifts, favours, and other 
terms relatively loosely to refer to obligations to furnish money or 
other resources in return for political considerations or military 
co-operation. Nor did all transfers of resources from one sovereign 
to another in exchange for money entail subsidies. Monarchs could 
purchase a naval vessel or weapons, for example, without the same 
sort of political associations that subsidy arrangements entailed. 
The authors of the chapters in this book aim to illuminate different 
aspects of the role of subsidies in early modern political history. 
Most of the chapters focus on France, and on the consequences of 
the subsidies that formed a crucial part of its alliances from the 
Thirty Years’ War until the end of the reign of Louis XIV. While 
France was far from the only power to pay subsidies in the early 
modern period, French diplomats created what amounted to a distinc-
tive system of alliances in which ‘subsidies’ played a large role. 
(Neuchâtel: Editions de la Baconnière, 1970), p. 151; Andreas Suter, ‘Kor-
ruption oder Patronage? Außenbeziehungen zwischen Frankreich und der 
Alten Eidgenossenschaft als Beispiel (16.–18. Jahrhundert)’, in Korruption: 
Historische Annäherungen an eine Grundfigur politischer Kommunikation, ed. 
by Niels Grüne and Simona Slanička (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
2010), pp. 167–203; Philippe Rogger, Geld, Krieg und Macht: Pensionsherren, 
Söldner und eidgenössische Politik in den Mailänderkriegen 1494–1516 
(Baden: Hier und Jetzt, 2015); Stephan Karl Sander-Faes, ‘Die Soldaten 
der Serenissima: Militär und Mobilität im frühneuzeitlichen Stato da mar’, 
in Militärische Migration vom Altertum bis zur Gegenwart (Studien zur 
Historischen Migrationsforschung, vol. 30), ed. by Christoph Rass (Paderborn: 
Ferdinand Schöningh, 2016), pp. 111–126; Egidio Ivetic, ‘The Peace of 
Passarowitz in Venice’s Balkan Policy’, in The Peace of Passarowitz, 1718, 
ed. by Charles Ingrao, Nikola Samardžić and Jovan Pešalj (West Lafayette, 
IN: Purdue University Press, 2008), pp. 63–72.
5 William H. Sewell, Jr, ‘A Theory of Structure’, in his Logics of History: 
Social Theory and Social Transformation (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2005), pp. 124–151.
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Consequently, not only was money Christendom’s dissolvent but it 
might serve as a political adhesive that diplomats could use to bind 
sovereigns together, despite their different identities, interests, and 
even faiths.
French subsidies played a central role in European politics from 
Charles VIII’s invasion of Italy in 1494 until the French Revolution. 
The Valois kings had emerged from the Hundred Years’ War with 
what were probably the largest revenues and army of any European 
monarchy and with an extensive set of dynastic claims that the 
members of the Valois family sought to pursue, despite the resistance 
they provoked amongst other monarchs, and particularly the 
Habsburgs. Maximilian of Habsburg thought Charles VIII’s continued 
claims to Burgundy unjust; Maximilian would be further provoked 
by Charles’s claim to Naples and Milan, and he was moved to 
organize a coalition against France which included not only the 
pope but the father of his son Felipe’s new wife Joanna – Ferdinand 
of Aragon, who also claimed Naples. Although Charles VIII possessed 
excellent cavalry and artillery, he lacked infantry; and in 1495, his 
agents at Turin entered into an agreement with the Swiss, who had 
turned to his father against the Burgundians nearly two decades 
earlier, to provide twelve thousand soldiers for his service in return 
for subsidies. France’s attempts to control the Swiss cantons, both 
for geopolitical reasons and because the cantons were seen as a 
recruiting ground for soldiers, established a pattern for making 
financial considerations an important part of a treaty of alliance. 
The practice spread across the continent and beyond in the sixteenth, 
seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. Machiavelli, famously, referred 
to the Swiss as mercenaries in The Prince and thought the French 
unwise to rely on the troops of allies paid for their service rather 
than on native troops.6
Yet money’s role in European politics would increase, rather than 
decrease, as Maximilian’s grandson Charles created a composite 
monarchy that combined the Burgundian inheritance, the Low 
Countries, the office of the Holy Roman Emperor and the Habsburg 
Austrian homelands, and the Spanish kingdoms with not only 
Aragon’s contentious Italian claims and possessions but also Castile’s 
territories in the New World. Where his grandfather Maximilian 
had financed his struggle against Charles VIII and Louis XII with 
6 See The Prince, chapter 13. On this subject, see Jérémie Barthas, L’argent 
n’est pas le nerf de la guerre: Essai sur une prétendue erreur de Machiavel 
(Rome: École Française de Rome, 2012). 
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loans from financiers such as Jacob Fugger secured on silver from 
the Tyrol from the Habsburg homelands, Charles could rely not 
only upon the expanded tax base of all the different states he ruled 
but also on an additional supply of precious metals from the New 
World as well as on the Quinto real, the 20 per cent tax levied 
upon them. The combination of the geographic dispersion of Charles’s 
states and the new creditworthiness of his crown created a new 
financial moment as financiers drew up loans and moved money 
between the different states of Charles’s empire to suit financial 
need, joining together financial markets in a new way. Bills of 
exchange from Seville, Madrid, and Medina del Campo were drawn 
in Genoa, Antwerp, the fairs of Besançon, and correspondents of 
the Fuggers in Ausburg, Vienna, and Prague. The dynastic ambitions 
of Charles and his successors depended upon international bankers 
capable of using his realm’s revenues to raise credit from private 
capital holders in a variety of financial centres both inside and 
outside his jurisdiction and finally using specialized bankers to move 
these funds to realms where he could pay his armies.7 These mecha-
nisms could be used to pay subsidies – including to the Guise early 
in the French wars of religion and the French Catholic league in 
the 1590s.
French kings from François I to Louis XIV attempted to frustrate 
what they viewed as a Habsburg bid to pursue universal monarchy 
without mines of silver to rival Potosi. Commentators sympathetic 
to France in the sixteenth and seventeenth century were fond of 
referring to the fields of France as the French king’s mines, and 
trusted that grain and wine were necessities for all of France’s 
neighbours. While modern estimates of premodern GDP figures, 
and perhaps particularly for France, ought to be treated with caution, 
these numbers suggest that France predominantly relied upon its 
large population to raise money, as French per capita GDP seems 
to have been somewhat lower than those of many of its monarchs’ 
rivals, and, indeed, many of the states to which it paid subsidies.8 
7 Giovanni Muto, ‘The Spanish System’, in The Origins of the Modern State 
in Europe: 13th–18th Centuries: Economic Systems and State Finance, ed. 
by Richard Bonney (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), pp. 231–259.
8 We follow ‘The Maddison-Project’, www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/
home.htm, 2013 version, accessed 20 October 2017. Extrapolating from the 
French data using a constant growth rate, French per capita GDP looks to 
have been less than half that of the Netherlands in 1650, and less than that 
of Sweden. The ‘Maddison-Project’ draws upon Lennart Schön and Olle 
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Ultimately, French subsidies, as all of the expenditures of the crown, 
came from revenues raised overwhelmingly from comparatively poor 
peasants and farmers. In France, these taxes were both direct taxes 
such as the taille, a name for a variety of taxes on land collected 
in various forms in different parts of France, or indirect taxes, such 
as the gabelle, a tax raised on salt, usually from its sale by a govern-
ment monopoly. Monarchs began to borrow money from merchants, 
either as individual bankers or in consortia. They continued to draw 
significant sums from this form of borrowing, particularly from 
financiers who advanced money in return for collecting taxes. During 
the reign of François I, the king also began to raise consolidated 
debts in the form of rentes sur l’hôtel de ville de Paris, based on 
municipal revenues which were viewed as more credible than direct 
obligations based on royal promises. These were initially modest, 
but ballooned along with other debts – including debts to allies 
such as the Swiss and the English crown – during the religious wars 
of the second half of the sixteenth century.9 The financial turmoil 
associated with the Wars of Religion largely persuaded the Italian 
and other foreign bankers, who had been major creditors of the 
crown until that point, that the French crown was not worth the 
risk. The French crown largely turned to domestic sources of capital, 
and to fiscal expedients such as increasing sales of offices.
Despite the crown’s dire fiscal state and outstanding debts to 
allies, Henri IV would pay subsidies to opponents of the Habsburgs, 
notably the United Provinces. During the seventeenth century, the 
Krantz, ‘The Swedish Economy in the Early Modern Period: Constructing 
Historical National Accounts’, European Review of Economic History 16 
(2012), 529–549. The French estimates seem to be unmodified from those 
provided in Angus Maddison, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspec-
tive (Paris: OECD, 2001), Table B-21, p. 264. France is not included in 
Stephen Broadberry et al., British Economic Growth: 1270–1870 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015); Leonardo Ridolfi, L’histoire immobile? 
Six Centuries of Real Wages in France from Louis IX to Napoleon III: 
1250–1860, Laboratory of Economics and Management Working Papers 
Series, Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna, Pisa, 2017/14 (June 2017), suggests 
how much remains to be learned of French premodern macroeconomic 
data – without reversing Maddison’s gloomy estimation of low French 
growth rates. While aimed at global historians, the cautions about such 
figures expressed by Morton Jerven, ‘An Unlevel Playing Field: National 
Income Estimates and Reciprocal Comparison in Global Economic History’, 
Journal of Global History 7 (2012), 107–128, are relevant in this context. 
9 Richard Bonney, The King’s Debts: Finance and Politics in France, 1589–1661 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981).
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French monarchy would embrace the payment of subsidies on a 
different scale than previously, using alliances in which subsidies 
played a prominent role to pursue crucial aspects of royal policy. 
Louis XIII made alliances promising subsidies to support the United 
Provinces’ resumed war against the king of Spain, and for the Danish, 
Swedish, and various German princes to fight against the Holy 
Roman Emperor.10 Louis XIV continued some of these subsidies 
and used subsidies as a tool in order to implement his own politics. 
When Louis XIV appeared to Dutch and some English statesmen 
as aspiring to universal monarchy, the Dutch and particularly the 
English used the tool of subsidies to frustrate the French monarch.11 
During the eighteenth century, principally the French and the British, 
but also the Austrians, used subsidies to procure allies and attempt 
to maintain the balance of power. Some powers, such as Prussia, 
became important recipients of subsidies. Even after the purchase 
of internationally liquid public debts became a way of supporting 
allies, statesmen continued to find treaties articulating promises of 
subsidy payments in return for political and military service a useful 
part of the repertoire of diplomacy.
When Immanuel Kant advocated a clean break with previous 
and present theories and practices of diplomacy in his ‘Zum ewigen 
Frieden’ (‘Of Perpetual Peace’) of 1795, he criticized subsidies as 
one of many practices that encouraged war.12 Kant argued that 
there was a necessary connection between the constitution of a state 
and whether it is bellicose or pacific. A despot who spoke on behalf 
of unrepresented subjects could easily make war, because ‘a war 
will not force him to make the slightest sacrifice as far as his banquets, 
hunts, pleasure palaces and court festivals are concerned … He can 
decide on war … as a kind of amusement, and unconcernedly leave 
10 Lucien Bély, L’art de la paix en Europe: Naissance de la diplomatie moderne 
XVIe–XVIIIe siècle (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2007), pp. 
157–179, and Peter H. Wilson, The Thirty Years War: Europe’s Tragedy 
(London: Penguin, 2009), pp. 379–381 and 464–465. 
11 Janine Fayard, ‘Attempts to Build a “Third Party” in Northern Germany’, in 
Louis XIV and Europe, ed. by Ragnhild Hatton, trans. by Geoffrey Symcox 
and Derek McKay (London: Macmillan, 1976), pp. 213–240, and Jonathan 
Israel, The Anglo Dutch Moment: Essays on the Glorious Revolution and 
Its World Impact (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
12 ‘Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch’, in Kant: Political Writings, ed. 
by Hans Reiss, trans. by H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2nd ed. 1991), p. 103. 
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it to the diplomatic corps … to justify [it] for the sake of propriety.’ 
Therefore, Kant reasoned, all states must have republican constitutions 
where ‘the consent of the citizens is required to decide whether or 
not war is to be declared’, for this would mean that those who 
declare war would feel all its miseries.13 He began the essay with 
prohibitions against specific diplomatic practices in order to nullify 
what he called the ‘three powers of the state’, the ‘power of the 
army, the power of alliance, and the power of money’. Kant thought 
subsidies particularly odious. Like acquiring states by marriage or 
purchase, subsidy payments mistook a state – which Kant thought 
was a ‘society of men which no-other than itself can command’ – and 
‘made it into a commodity’. Thus he thought subsidies were a kind 
of perversion, arguing that ‘when the troops of one state are hired 
to another to fight an enemy who is not common to both … the 
subjects are thereby used and misused as objects to be manipulated 
at will’.14
Historians have showed only limited interest in subsidies and 
the transfer of resources between allies as distinct and central 
problems of early modern diplomacy. There is not an extant list, 
for example, of all the payments promised from one sovereign to 
another in early modern Europe, and still less a record of whether 
the payments were made. The words ‘subsidies’ and ‘pensions’ are 
not in the indexes of recent surveys of diplomatic history in German, 
French, or English, and the subject does not receive systematic 
treatment in any of them.15 Recent works by Anglophone historians, 
often grouped together under the heading ‘New Diplomatic History’, 
have tended to focus on the close reading of diplomatic correspond-
ence, art, and other documents to enrich detailed portrayals of a 
single diplomat’s career, the course of a single peace-treaty negotiation, 
13 Ibid., p. 100.
14 Ibid., p. 94. 
15 Heinz Schilling, Konfessionalisierung und Staatsinteressen: Internationale 
Beziehungen 1559–1660 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2007); Claire 
Gantet, Guerre Paix et construction des états, 1618–1714: Nouvelle histoire 
des relations internationales, vol. 2 (Paris: Seuil, 2003); Jean-Pierre Bois, 
De la paix des rois à l’ordre des empereurs, 1714–1815: Nouvelle histoire 
des relations internationales, vol. 3 (Paris: Seuil, 2003); Matthew Smith 
Anderson, The Origins of the Modern European State System, 1494–1618 
(London: Longman, 1998); Jeremy Black, A History of Diplomacy (London: 
Reaktion Books, 2010). See, however, Lucien Bély, ‘Subsides’, in Dictionnaire 
de l’ancien régime, ed. by Lucien Bély (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 
1996), pp. 1178–1179.
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or even a single ceremony or painting.16 The new diplomatic history’s 
close cultural reading and sense of nuance came at the cost of a 
more diffuse focus on what had been the centre of the older scholar-
ship on diplomatic history, explaining how powers made fundamental 
choices about how to relate with others over time, whether through 
peaceful alliances, treaties, and institutions, or through war.17
Historians interested in subsidies’ role in diplomacy must resort 
to older scholarship, or to more recent, often German-language, 
studies of particular alliances and subsidy contracts, and studies of 
military or fiscal history. Some classic studies echoed Kant’s moral 
condemnation of subsidies as a form of corruption, in which sov-
ereigns entered into agreements against the interests of their state. 
For example, Max Braubach’s 1923 study of the role of subsidies 
in the Spanish War of Succession criticizes French and British 
interference in German politics as something that rendered Germans 
‘mercenaries’.18 Sometimes broad claims regarding the alleged cor-
ruption of subsidy systems focused on individual people who profited 
from bribery or peculation, as in Ragnhild Hatton’s chapter on 
gratifications to Swedish politicians in Anglo-French diplomatic 
rivalry during the Age of Liberty.19 Still others examine how subsidies 
entered into the formulation of grand policy in a classic sense. 
Lossky,20 Fayard,21 and Frey22 all write that France paid subsidies 
16 See Tracey Sowerby’s review of the field, ‘Early Modern Diplomatic History’, 
History Compass 14.9 (2016), 441–456, and John Watkins’s programmatic 
‘Toward a New Diplomatic History of Medieval and Early Modern Europe’, 
Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies 38.1 (2008), 1–14. 
17 Karl W. Schweizer and Matt J. Schumann, ‘The Revitalization of Diplomatic 
History: Renewed Reflections’, Diplomacy and Statecraft 19 (2008), 149–186. 
18 Max Braubach, Die Bedeutung der Subsidien für die Politik im spanischen 
Erbfolgekriege (Bonn and Leipzig: Kurt Schroeder Verlag, 1923), pp. 41, 
71, 186–190. 
19 Ragnhild Hatton, ‘Gratifications and Foreign Policy: Anglo-French Rivalry 
in Sweden during the Nine Years War’, in William III and Louis XIV: Essays 
1680–1720 by and for Mark A. Thomson (Liverpool: Liverpool University 
Press, 1968), pp. 68–94. 
20 Andrew Lossky, ‘La Picquetière’s Projected Mission to Moscow in 1682 and 
the Swedish Policy of Louis XIV’, Essays in Russian History: A Collection 
Dedicated to George Vernadsky, ed. by Alan D. Ferguson and Alfred Levin 
(Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1964).
21 Janine Fayard, ‘Les tentatives de constitution d’un tiers party en Allemagne 
du Nord 1690–1694’, Revue d’Histoire Diplomatique 79 (1965), 338–372.
22 Linda Frey, ‘Franco-Prussian Relations, 1701–1706’, Proceedings of the 
Annual Meeting of the Western Society for French History 3 (1976), 94–105.
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in order to buy the allegiance of northern Europe and steer the 
Nordic countries and North German states away from anti-French 
alliances, with the hope of strengthening France’s borders with the 
Holy Roman Empire.23
The most important international studies of recent vintage are 
of the subsidies France paid to the Swiss cantons in the sixteenth 
century: at times, French subsidies accounted for between 15 per 
cent and 65 per cent of an individual canton’s revenues, which left 
its mark economically, socially, and politically by benefiting a 
Francophile elite.24 Similar figures can be shown for Hesse-Cassel, 
where no fewer than thirty subsidy treaties were signed between 
1702 and 1763 and the subsidies amounted to between 40 and 50 
per cent of the economy.25 Subsidies can also be seen as part of a 
number of strategies used by France to create alliances. Tilman 
Haug has studied how France acted in order to gain control over 
the two electorates Mainz and Cologne in the mid-seventeenth 
century, by patronage towards civil servants within the political 
centre of the two electorates.26 The intention was to create a division 
within the Holy Roman Empire by allying parts of the Empire with 
France. In an earlier study, Richard Place has shown how France 
tried to buy out German allies of the Emperor from the anti-French 
coalition in 1687–1688. Even though this attempt failed, it forced 
Emperor Leopold to make offers to Bavaria that he probably would 
not have had to do otherwise.27 A similar attempt, as shown by 
Linda Frey, was made towards Prussia during the War of the Spanish 
23 Georges Livet, ‘International Relations and the Role of France, 1648–60’; see 
also Livet’s ‘The Decline of Spain and the Thirty Years’ War, 1609–1648/59’, 
in vol. 4 of The New Cambridge Modern History, ed. by J.P. Cooper 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 411–434. Geoffrey 
R.R. Treasure argues along the same lines that France primarily wished 
to strengthen its north-eastern and eastern borders; see Treasure, Mazarin: 
The Crisis of Absolutism in France (Abingdon: Routledge, 1995).
24 Windler, ‘ “Ohne Geld keine Schweizer” ’ [see p. 17, n. 40], pp. 105–133. 
For further references, see note 3.
25 Jörg Ulbert, ‘Französische Subsidienzahlungen an Hessen-Kassel während 
des Dreißigjährigen Krieges’, in Frankreich und Hessen-Kassel zur Zeit 
des Dreißigjährigen Krieges und des Westfälischen Friedens, ed. by Klaus 
Malettke (Marburg: N.G. Elwert Verlag, 1999), pp. 159–174.
26 Tilman Haug, Ungleiche Außenbeziehungen und grenzüberschreitende Patron-
age: Die französische Krone und die geistlichen Kurfürsten (1648–1679) 
(Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2015).
27 Richard Place, ‘Bavaria and the Collapse of Louis XIV’s German Policy, 
1687–88’, The Journal of Modern History 49 (September 1977), 363–393 
(pp. 378–393).
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Succession. Louis XIV then, among other things, promised subsidies 
in order to tie Prussia to France.28
The works by Peter Wilson and Charles Ingrao served as pioneering 
efforts to demonstrate how subsidies strengthened princes’ dynastic 
ambitions and influenced politics within their own realms.29 They 
show how subsidies considerably strengthened the position of German 
states such as Hesse and Württemberg in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries: their armies became major employers and 
offered opportunities for advancement (especially to the lower 
nobility), taxes could be kept low, and a focus on commercial activity 
was made possible. This gave the Württembergian and Hessian 
princes a distinct propaganda advantage, along with the chance to 
pursue their own dynastic ambitions in competition with other 
groups. The surplus from the subsidies could also be used for luxury 
consumption – palaces, art, expensive ceremonial – which in turn 
became part of a status competition with other princely dynasties 
throughout the Holy Roman Empire and beyond. The arguments 
against subsidies made by opposition groups included the very high 
mortality rates among young fighting men and a worrying overde-
pendence on the subsidizer. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, 
new Enlightenment ideas encouraged this resistance, especially when 
the British began to use German armies in North America.30 In a 
study of Saxony-Gotha, Andrea Thiele notes that the gains in provid-
ing soldiers to the United Provinces were a stronger grip on politics 
in Saxony-Gotha’s own territory as well as higher prestige within 
the international community, together with a financial profit. The 
28 Frey, ‘Franco-Prussian Relations’.
29 Peter H. Wilson, War, State and Society in Württemberg, 1677–1793 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Charles W. Ingrao, The 
Hessian Mercenary State: Ideas, Institutions, and Reform under Frederick 
II 1760–1785 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
30 Frederic Groß, ‘Einzigartig? – Der Subsidienvertrag von 1786 über die Aufstel-
lung des “Kapregiments” zwischen Herzog Karl Eugen von Württemberg und 
der Niederländischen Ostindienkompanie’, in Militärische Migration vom 
Altertum bis zur Gegenwart (Studien zur Historischen Migrationsforschung, 
vol. 30), ed. by Christoph Rass (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2016), pp. 
143–164; Lothar Höbelt, ‘Vom militärischen saisonnier zum miles perpetuus: 
Staatsbildung und Kriegsführung im ancien régime’, in Krieg und Gesellschaft, 
vol. 2, ed. by Thomas Kolnberger and Ilja Steffelbauer (Vienna: Mandelbaum, 
2010), pp. 59–79; Hans-Martin Maurer, ‘Das württembergische Kapregiment: 
Söldner im Dienste früher Kolonialpolitik (1787–1808)’, Zeitschrift für 
Württembergische Landesgeschichte 47 (1988), 291–307.
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risks were considerable, though: the dukes of Saxony-Gotha became 
entrepreneurs and had to pay for recruiting soldiers without knowing 
when the money was going to be repaid.31
Illuminating as this work has been, subsidies also offer an oppor-
tunity to engage with recent work in adjoining fields. For example, 
alliances and the transfer of resources have been the subject of work 
in the theory of international relations, as well as in the burgeoning 
field of war and economics, drawing upon game theory. Beginning 
with the work of the American economists Mancur Olson and 
Richard Zeckhauser, economists have tried to devise formal models 
to explain how changing economic and strategic conditions shape 
decision-makers’ choices, and under what circumstances alliances are 
formed.32 These studies suggest that alliance expenditures can prompt 
larger and wealthier participants in alliances to bear a disproportion-
ate part of the common burden of the alliance, both in respect to 
the expected benefits of the alliance and the two countries’ different 
resource bases and fiscal capacities.33 Olson’s and Zeckhauser’s model 
was devised to analyse the postwar alliances of the United States, 
relying on assumptions that may not easily transfer to early modern 
conditions; it regards states as units making rational choices. Yet the 
model suggests that alliances can endure with stronger and richer 
countries contributing a disproportionately large share of the total 
resources, and thus that subsidy payments and other transfers often 
favour smaller states over long periods of time.
Both the ubiquity of subsidies in early modern diplomacy and the 
economic theory of alliances suggest that some revisions should be 
made to the sophisticated accounts of state building that sociologists 
and historians have developed over the last three decades. Scholars 
such as Charles Tilly have placed war at the centre of their models 
31 Andrea Thiele, ‘The Prince as Military Entrepreneur? Why Smaller Saxon 
Territories Sent “Holländische Regimenter” (Dutch Regiments) to the 
Dutch Republic’, in War, Entrepreneurs, and the State in Europe and the 
Mediterranean, 1300–1800, ed. by Jeff Fynn-Paul (Leiden & Boston: Brill 
2014), pp. 191–194.
32 Mancur Olson, Jr and Richard Zeckhauser, ‘An Economic Theory of Alliances’, 
The Review of Economics and Statistics 48.3 (August 1966), 266–279, and 
for a more recent review of the literature, Todd Sandler, ‘The Economic 
Theory of Alliances’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution 37.3 (September 
1993), 446–483. For an international-relations point of view, see Glenn H. 
Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). 
33 Olson and Zeckhauser, ‘An Economic Theory of Alliances’, esp. p. 269. 
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of state-formation, and Tilly articulated this orientation pithily by 
asking ‘How War Made States, and States Made War’. In passing, he 
suggested that, during the transition period of intensifying military 
cost and the effort to develop the financial systems to pay for it, 
some princes, who were poor but skilled in mustering the forces 
of coercion, ‘rented’ their armies to other states who were rich in 
capital. Even so, the transfer of resources from one sovereign to 
another plays little part in his accounts of sovereigns bargaining 
with their subjects or in his account of the development of state 
systems.34 Rather than looking at the state of politics at a given 
moment, scholars interested in state building often privilege the 
development of the military, fiscal, and bureaucratic institutions 
that allow a state to survive in the long term. Their analysis tends 
to privilege the negotiation between a sovereign and their subjects, 
and the development of state capacity that allowed sovereigns to 
extract resources from their own territories and populations. Tilly and 
other theorists of state formation scrutinize such features of state as 
constitutional forms, ideological quality, bureaucratic sophistication, 
capital richness, forms of military organization, and homogeneity of 
leadership as significant factors that condition the ability of states 
to support the increasing burden of wars.35 While scholars have 
devoted significant attention to certain forms of transnational transfers 
of resources, such as military expertise, arms, and loans whether 
mediated directly from bankers to sovereigns or in the international 
purchase of state debt, subsidy payments have attracted less atten-
tion from the writers of state-building literature. This probably 
reflects doubts that subsidies strengthened the states that received 
them, doubts which seem logical enough on the surface. One could 
34 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990–1990 (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1990), p. 81. 
35 One could go back to Otto Hintze, ‘Military Organization and the Organiza-
tion of the State’ (originally 1906), in Historical Essays of Otto Hintze, ed. 
by Felix Gilbert (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 178–215; 
Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, I: A History of Power from 
the Beginning to A.D. 1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); 
Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States; Jan Glete, War and the 
State in Early Modern Europe: Spain, the Dutch Republic and Sweden as 
States, 1500–1660 (London: Routledge, 2002); Wolfgang Reinhard, Geschichte 
der Staatsgewalt: Eine vergleichende Verfassungsgeschichte Europas von den 
Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1999), pp. 305–387; Harald 
Gustafsson, Makt och människor: Europeisk statsbilding från medeltiden 
till franska revolutionen (Gothenburg: Makadam, 2010). 
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argue that states which were provided with external resources had 
less incentive to develop effective institutions of their own, and 
might even allow monarchs to avoid the political quarrels that 
often accompanied the creation of new systems of taxation, for 
instance.
Even if one accepts the odd premise of the state-building litera-
ture that early modern sovereigns should be considered as rational 
institution builders who attempted to maximize the power they 
were able to project, the argument that subsidies are irrelevant or 
even detrimental to the development of states seems overly hasty. If 
in some cases subsidies only allowed states with too few resources 
to survive the increase in military scale and expense to defer their 
eventual absorption into larger polities, in others subsidies afforded an 
opportunity to react to immediate political crises while still consider-
ing reforms on a longer time-scale. Institutionally unsophisticated 
and revenue-poor states could use subsidies to establish relations 
with international financial circles who otherwise might well have 
had little cause to engage themselves, providing an opportunity for 
the transfer of knowledge of financial practices. By paying subsidies, 
the French monarchy avoided controversies that might otherwise 
have provoked earlier and more profound resistance. Participation 
in the French system of subsidies neither necessarily accelerated nor 
necessarily retarded state development; but such participation could 
undoubtedly change political dynamics, the creation of institutions, 
and the form of states that would emerge.
In order to explore the Reformation’s implications for international 
relations, Daniel Nexon has recently suggested that it is useful to 
view early modern international structures as ‘networks of networks’, 
and that even the composite monarchies of early modern Europe 
can usefully be modelled as interlocking patron–client networks 
centred on the monarch, bounded by nested networks settled in 
different bounded polities, and disrupted by religious networks that 
resisted patronage and unsettled relations between provinces.36 
Nexon’s stimulating suggestion that dynastic agglomerations could 
be seen as networks of social elites – including local intermediaries, 
a transnational class of substitutable elites, and the local ‘ordinary 
people’ – provides one way of analysing the role of transnational 
networks based on the transfer of resources such as subsidies. Rather 
36 Daniel H. Nexon, The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe: Religious 
Conflict, Dynastic Empires, and International Change (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2009), for ‘network of networks’, p. 48. 
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than seeing early modern states as mustering the resources of neatly 
bounded polities, Nexon’s model calls attention to the importance 
of bargaining for resources over the boundaries of polities, with 
ample room for ideological opposition as well as the accommodation 
of both elites and more common people.
Nexon’s emphasis on bargaining and networks provides a manner 
of analysing more profound changes in early modern politics than 
had been captured in previous processes of state formation, but it is 
supported by a great deal of empirical research into the organization 
of early modern warfare, politics, and states. Many scholars have 
shown how relations among early modern – and indeed all – polities 
rested upon a wide range of interpersonal contacts on a variety 
of levels. Many scholars have shown how ‘private contractors’ or 
‘entrepreneurs’ organized large domains of early modern statecraft, 
from armies, through the financial system.37 Given that many of these 
contractors could be transnational, or, to articulate their status in 
terms more germane to the early modern context, could be actors 
who sought the favour and business of many confessional and 
dynastic rulers, this suggests important ways in which administrative 
expertise and resources could flow across the boundaries of states. 
Among the important factors that conditioned dynastic monarchs’ 
behaviour was access to capital and expertise that could easily 
cross the boundaries of individual polities. Subsidies were only one 
form of access to transnational resources which could inflect the 
forms of early modern politics, giving access to expertise, resources, 
and capital beyond the neat boundaries of the ‘state’ and allowing 
monarchs to compete for resources on the basis of confessional 
location, dynastic reputation, and, perhaps, even bureaucratic and 
military efficiency.
Given the importance of these transnational influences, one could 
argue that the efficiency of the links to pan-European markets for 
goods, military power, and capital and credit was as important as, 
and doubtless in some way correlated to, the efficiency with which 
37 David Parrott, The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military 
Revolution in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012); The Contractor State and Its Implications, 1659–1815, ed. 
by Richard Harding and Sergio Solbes Ferri (Las Palmas de Gran Canaria: 
Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, 2012); War, Entrepreneurs and 
the State, ed. by Jeff Fynn-Paul; and Rafael Torres-Sánchez, Pepijn Brandon, 
and Marjolein ’t Hart, ‘War and Economy: Rediscovering the Eighteenth 
Century Military Entrepreneur’, Business History 60.1 (2018), 4–22. 
Introduction 17
a state exploited its own resources.38 That argument should encourage 
efforts to explore and document how early modern polities drew 
upon pan-European and even global networks for resources, money, 
and credit. Richard Ehrenberg’s Das Zeitalter der Fugger: Geldkapital 
und Kreditverkehr im 16 Jahrhundert thus remains a foundational 
book.39 Not only does it show the deep embeddedness of European 
diplomacy in the financial networks of the sixteenth century; it also 
brings out the vital importance of the transfer of resources to the 
functioning of early modern states and diplomatic relations more 
generally. The money provided by subsidies was often of peculiar 
importance because of its provision in ready, fungible cash in major 
financial centres, the ‘hubs’ of early modern finance and commerce. 
This allowed the recipients of subsidies to make payments for armies, 
diplomats, and other goods in particularly liquid forms, where 
bargaining within their own boundaries was often constrained by 
the liquidity of the assets they could offer – which often required 
significant investments of capital and expertise.
The payment and receipt of subsidies could have consequences 
that went far beyond the military and fiscal effects commonly referred 
to, affecting public opinion, political and economic relations, and 
social mobility.40 Yet in older histories of diplomatic relations or 
war finance, the subsidies’ part in state formation is usually discussed 
as a peripheral phenomenon in the context of a wider examination 
of particular diplomatic missions, or as one element of the factors 
that helped create alliances. Focusing on subsidies allows us to 
perceive the importance of access to international expertise, organiza-
tion, and capital to early modern statecraft, and to see how access 
to foreign resources could create the possibility of altering domestic 
constitutions, politics, and patronage relationships.
Subsidies were a source of political conflict between competing 
power groupings. Perhaps the most explicit example of these dynamics 
was the secret Treaty of Dover between Louis XIV of France and 
Charles II of England, Scotland and Ireland. Louis XIV’s offer of 
subsidies was intended not merely to draw Charles II’s territories 
38 One thinks of the work of Edward Barbier, Scarcity and Frontiers: How 
Economies Have Developed through Natural Resource Exploitation (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
39 Richard Ehrenberg, Das Zeitalter der Fugger: Geldkapital und Creditverkehr 
im 16. Jahrhundert, 2 vols (Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1896). 
40 Ingrao, The Hessian Mercenary State, pp. 164–174; Windler, ‘ “Ohne Geld 
keine Schweizer” ’, pp. 105–134; Wilson, War, State and Society, pp. 28–42.
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into a coalition against the United Provinces but also to undermine 
Parliament’s efforts to limit its monarch’s prerogative, and the identity 
of the Anglican Church and Presbyterian Churches and the monarch 
and putative head. James II sought subsidies from France in order 
to be able to ignore the British Parliament, which held the nation’s 
purse strings. When Louis XIV refused, James II had to fall in line 
with Parliament’s foreign policy, which in turn undermined French 
interests. The upshot was that Louis XIV reconsidered, and subsidies 
were paid on condition that British troops were withdrawn from 
the United Provinces.41 In the 1690s the English Parliament in conflict 
with William III decided to dissolve most of the army – of which 
the majority were paid foreign soldiers – something that prevented 
William from taking active part in Scandinavian politics.42 Thus, 
debates about taking subsidies – which, as Olson and Keckhauser’s 
model would suggest, often involves smaller partners taking richer 
allies’ money – frequently raise not only issues of autonomy and 
dependence but also questions concerning the very shape and content 
of the constitution itself. As a result, subsidies could hardly escape 
becoming a major subject of debate, particularly in those polities 
whose foreign policies and even survival were acutely dependent 
upon aid from another sovereign.
The English examples illustrate how subsidies were not always 
paid by a substantially stronger state to a substantially weaker state. 
Subsidies were sometimes a result of a need for countries like Spain 
or the United Provinces to hire troops in order to be participants 
in a war.43 The subsidy system also stemmed from a need to find 
allies who could not only provide troops but also act more or less 
on behalf of the subsidizer in war – as Denmark and Sweden did 
from time to time on behalf of France. Subsidies could be a fleeting 
response to a particular need for troops and political support at a 
particular moment, or become a longer-lasting ‘structural’ element 
of European diplomacy. For example, French and Swedish statesmen 
came to view the payment of subsidies as almost a traditional element 
of their crowns’ relationship, doubtless because of the frequency 
with which France paid subsidies to Sweden; not only did Sweden 
receive subsidies from France for eighty-nine of the years from 1631 
41 Robert H. George, ‘The Financial Relations of Louis XIV and James II’, 
The Journal of Modern History 3 (1931).
42 See Stewart P. Oakley, William III and the Northern Crowns during the 
Nine Years’ War, 1689–1697 (New York and London: Garland, 1987).
43 Thiele, ‘The Prince as Military Entrepreneur?’, p. 170.
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to 1796 but occasionally these subsidy payments occurred for periods 
of more than twenty consecutive years.44
Subsidies prompted significant debates about the legal, political, 
and moral implications of the payment of subsidies. In a time when 
religion supposedly played an important role in all politics, and 
indeed war was sparked off by confessional differences, it is striking 
how many subsidy treaties were in fact signed between parties of 
different faiths. The French subsidies paid to the two Lutheran 
countries Denmark and Sweden to defend Lutheranism during the 
Thirty Years’ War is only one such example; the ones paid to Anglican 
England to go to war against the Puritan United Provinces is another. 
Hesse-Cassel provided troops to both England and France, and 
Sweden accepted subsidies not only from France but also from 
Spain, the United Provinces, and England – all countries of another 
confession.
The Belgian legal historian Randall Lesaffer has noted how Roman 
ideals of amicitia or ‘peaceful friendship’ came to be central conditions 
in true alliances.45 These ideals conferred obligations as if both parties 
to the treaty were equal and autonomous moral agents who could 
freely enter into a contract, even though they occupied different 
places in the hierarchy of dynastic precedence that constituted the 
Society of Princes.46 Early modern treaties conferred different rights 
and privileges upon different parties to them, while those parties 
44 For example: in 1738 members of the Swedish Council of the Realm spoke 
about how the relation between France and Sweden had become hereditary 
and, in 1774, an instruction for a new French ambassador to Stockholm says 
that the relation between the two countries had been formed by nature: ‘la 
nature elle-même semble l’avoir formée’. See Carl Trolle Bonde, Anteckningar 
om Bondesläkten, Riksrådet Grefwe Gustaf Bonde III (Lund, 1898), p. 285, 
and La Courneuve, Archives diplomatiques (AD), Memoire et documents, 
Suède, 25 (Instructions for comte d’Usson before travelling to Stockholm 
as ambassador 1774).
45 Randall Lesaffer, ‘Amicitia in Renaissance Peace and Alliance Treaties 
(1450–1530)’, Journal of the History of International Law 4 (2002), 77–99. 
46 Lucien Bély’s La société des princes, XVIe–XVIIIe siècle (Paris: Fayard, 
1999); Wolfgang Weber, ‘Interne und externe Dynamiken der Frühneuzeitli-
chen Herrscherdynastie: ein Aufriss’, in Bourbon und Wittelsbach: Neuere 
Forschungen zur Dynastiengeschichte, ed. by Rainer Babel, Guido Braun, 
and Thomas Nicklas (Münster: Aschendorff, 2010), pp. 61–77; Wolfgang 
Weber, ‘Dynastiesicherung und Staatsbildung: Die Entfaltung des frühmod-
ernen Fürstenstaats’, in Der Fürst: Ideen und Wirklichkeiten in der europäi-
schen Geschichte, ed. by Wolfgang Weber (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 1998), 
pp. 91–136.
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continued to be viewed as freely choosing autonomous moral agents 
who sought peace for reasons of friendship and mutual interest. 
Hugo Grotius was adamant that the only legitimate reason for 
war was a just cause, whether or not that war was on behalf of a 
sovereign, an ally, or even the cause of humanity, and consequently 
that a sovereign who declared war for economic benefit would be 
worse than a common mercenary, for ‘[d]id they sell only their own 
lives it were no great Matter: but they sell also the Lives of many an 
harmless inoffensive Creature: So much more odious than Hangmen, 
by how much it is worse to kill without a Reason, than with one.’ 47 
But if it would be criminal to go to war only for money, Grotius 
concludes, it would be completely acceptable and even praiseworthy 
to accept monetary support from a friendly prince for a just war. 
Theorists and practices differed, however, as to whether paying 
a subsidy entailed an act of war. Some manifestos included the 
payment of subsidies among the grounds for a just war, and certain 
treaties explicitly forbade the continuation of subsidy payments as 
a condition of peace, although powers evaded such conditions by 
continuing to pay subsidies. Other theorists, however, argued that 
princes were free to bestow gifts on whomever they chose, and that 
these gifts could not be interpreted as constituting grounds for war. 
Some subsidies were in fact so widely known as to be considered 
public knowledge, without this entailing war between the power 
who paid the subsidy and its ally’s enemy.48
Study of the early modern state requires documenting not just 
how states raised resources to make war but also how access to 
transnational resource-transfers reshaped the practices, discourse, 
and constitutional form of early modern states. As such, subsidies 
are not just a subject for the ‘new diplomatic history’, particularly 
47 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, ed. by Richard Tuck (Indi-
anapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005), book II, chapter XXV, p. 1165. 
48 For example, Louis XIII’s subsidies to the Swedes and the Dutch were 
mentioned in pamphlets by Richelieu’s dévots opponents, and were mentioned 
in anti-French pamphlets after the outbreak of open war; see Caroline 
Maillet-Rao, La pensée politique des dévots Mathieu de Morgues et Michel 
de Marillac: Une opposition au ministériat du cardinal de Richelieu (Paris: 
Honoré Champion, 2015), pp. 326–343; Randal Lesaffer, ‘Defensive Warfare, 
Prevention and Hegemony: The Justifications for the Franco-Spanish War 
of 1635 (Part II)’, Journal of the History of International Law 8.2 (2006), 
155–157, and [Cornelius Jansen], Le Mars Francois ou la Guerre de France: 
En laquelle sont examinées les raisons et la justice pretendue des armes & 
des alliances du roi de France (n.p., n.pub., 1637), pp. 436–437. 
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if that field only interests itself in the formation of a diplomatic 
culture without aspiring to analyse what caused war and peace, or 
participate in the analysis of deeper structural changes in the relations 
between polities. Scholars should consider subsidies as a major 
feature in the formation of the early modern state.
Content of the volume
Though the volume contains a wide variety of chapters covering 
different perspectives of the early modern subsidy system, its aim 
is not to be all-encompassing but to provide in-depth case studies. 
However, the authors have been careful to place each case study in 
a wider European context so as to make it clear to the reader how 
the individual example relates to a larger whole. We make no claims 
to have covered all aspects of the French use of subsidies, not to 
mention other important powers who engaged with subsidies in the 
early modern era. Rather, the chapters in this volume aim to suggest, 
rather than exhaust, different aspects of early modern history that 
can be engaged by examining subsidies as a central problem.
France, being one of the major providers of subsidies in the early 
modern period, and its capacity of giver are at the focus of Anuschka 
Tischer’s chapter, which examines France’s use of subsidies in politics 
and diplomacy in the seventeenth century. Subsidies were an important 
factor in the French struggle against the House of Habsburg, a 
resource that was made possible by the fact that the realm was 
quite advanced in the state-building process, and that the king thus 
had a solid income from taxes. Placed in a larger context, France, 
by using subsidies, influenced the state-building process in other 
territories and contributed to the formation of a balance between 
Protestants and Catholics in Germany and in Europe.
Tryntje Helfferich discusses how French subsidies to German 
states during the Thirty Years’ War were understood by the recipients 
and what this can teach us about the war. Helfferich shows how 
subsidies, although they were primarily seen and described as neces-
sary to maintain armies, were perceived as posing a threat to a 
prince’s honour, independence, and power, as well as to German 
culture. Such fears, Helfferich argues, reinforced a process towards 
calls for the creation of a unified German nation centred on a shared 
linguistic-cultural inheritance.
Peter H. Wilson places subsidies in the broader context of what 
he terms ‘Fiscal-Military Instruments’, or a wide variety of ways in 
which resources needed for war were transferred among states, both 
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by statesmen and by various kinds of entrepreneurs. Wilson argues 
that subsidies must be viewed not only as part of a diplomatic and 
political history of states interacting with states but as part of what 
he calls a European Fiscal-Military System, distinguished by the 
flow of money, weapons, and men needed for wars through a diverse 
set of channels, determined by basic forces of geography, demography, 
economy, and politics.
Sweden is in focus in two chapters by Svante Norrhem and Erik 
Bodensten. Norrhem argues that France as the main supplier of 
subsidies over a lengthy period promoted Swedish state formation 
in various ways: subsidies were a prerequisite for war; they helped 
maintain an army, and they funded military building projects and 
thus increased the demand for military, administrative, and other 
expertise. Looking at the long eighteenth century, Erik Bodensten 
shows that the receipt of subsidies caused a variety of strategic 
problems, dilemmas, and challenges for the receiving party. With 
Sweden as his point of departure, he argues that a decrease in 
demand for subsidy troops posed a major challenge for minor powers 
as the states system of Europe changed.
Another example of the impact of payments from a stronger 
party on a weaker one is given by Philippe Rogger, who has inves-
tigated the Franco-Swiss relation during the sixteenth century. 
Individuals, Rogger argues, benefited from foreign-policy relations, 
and resources amassed as a result of French patronage were fun-
damental to the ruling elites’ accumulation of political power.
In his chapter about the principality of Waldeck in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, Andreas Flurschütz da Cruz shows how 
even very small European states could gain considerably from subsidy 
deals with states such as Venice, the Netherlands, and Great Britain. 
Waldeck thus serves as an example of how subsidies could help 
secure smaller states’ place within the Holy Roman Empire and 
build their positions within the noble hierarchy of Europe. Tilman 
Haug, while discussing the often difficult position in which a ruling 
prince in a small German state was placed when he received subsidies 
from France or England, looks partly beyond the state. Alliances 
between smaller and larger states were often brokered by what he 
terms cross-border networks or clients of foreign powers within the 
Empire. Through three case studies, he investigates the role that 
such cross-border networks or clients played in negotiating subsidy 
treatises, especially within the Holy Roman Empire.
Erik Thomson and Marianne Klerk in their respective chapters 
both supply examples of the workings of and the central role played 
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by non-state actors for the procurement and transfer of resources 
for war-making. Following Wilson’s model of a Fiscal-Military 
System, Marianne Klerk has studied how the handling of subsidies 
along with other war-making resources was organized in specific 
urban European centres, which she terms ‘fiscal-military hubs’. 
Amsterdam, Hamburg, and Genoa became the most important such 
hubs for the flourishing war-organization industry because they 
attracted wealthy merchant-financiers. She particularly focuses on 
how Dutch and Swedish merchants attempted to use copper and 
other goods from Sweden to support the Swedish crown’s credit, 
in various kinds of mercantile relations which bridged the gap between 
support and taking profits. The role of hubs is important for our 
understanding of the wider context of individual fiscal-military 
agents, Klerk argues, and she offers further insights into the relation 
between the business of war and European state formation. Erik 
Thomson focuses on the Hoeufft family, who remitted French subsidy 
payments to many of France’s allies during the Thirty Years’ War, 
including Sweden and the Dutch Republic. Thomson reveals how 
the skills and connections of Jean and Mattheus Hoeufft, acquired 
during years of large-scale arms dealing, were necessary to the 
remittance of the subsidies, but also how subsidies came to play a 
central role securing their business, as diplomatic pressure was 
enlisted to make the French crown pay them quickly. At this dip-
lomatic moment the Hoeuffts made political power and mercantile 
credit act in parallel, serving their own Calvinist political goals as 
well as the aims of the most Christian monarch.
Money may have been one of the forces that served to dissolve 
Christendom; but money also proved a powerful reagent which 
shaped the reactions that caused the new states and system of states 
to arise. The prevalence of subsidy payments might be seen merely 
as a sign of the transitory brokerage phase of early modern state 
building. It might simply be regarded as a moment when sovereigns 
who were rich in capital ‘rented’ armies from those who had the 
ability to make war. Subsidy payments might be seen as a corrupt 
system which reduced those princes and states to the roles of 
dependents of those who paid them. They can be condemned as a 
method of finance that slowed or even prevented the emergence of 
modern states, delaying but not preventing the destruction of states 
that lacked the fiscal capacity and institutional strengths to survive 
until the modern age.
The chapters in this book, however, suggest that the role of 
subsidies was more complex. Subsidies were paid only after careful 
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consideration that the receiver would actually provide whatever the 
giver needed – military strength or neutrality, or access to land, 
fortresses, harbours, or people. In addition, the volume highlights 
the ways in which states and dynasties were strengthened by resources 
that offered prestige and military, and sometimes financial and 
cultural, power. Subsidies allowed both those who paid and those 
who received money a degree of flexibility and choice in making 
institutional reforms; and, if not every sovereign took advantage of 
time and opportunity, that is not necessarily the fault of the mecha-
nism of subsidies. Through attracting subsidies and using them 
wisely, lesser German princes could rise in the intricate web of 
princely hierarchy within Europe. Moreover, the book goes beyond 
the state level to seek out the mechanisms that made the subsidy 
system function, and to show how the practices of early modern 
diplomacy influenced a wide range of commercial and financial 
relations. This book has brought together experts, each of whom 
has contributed to a volume that aims at introducing studies of 
subsidies as an important field of research which contributes greatly 
to a new understanding of early modern diplomacy and of European 
war-making, dynastic ambition, and state formation.
1
The role of subsidies in 
seventeenth-century French foreign 
relations and their European context
Anuschka Tischer
The focus of this chapter is on the notion and practice of subsidies 
in French politics and diplomacy in the seventeenth century. It begins, 
however, with some general observations on the subject concerning 
the notion and practice of subsidies to demonstrate what I see as 
the desiderata, relevant issues, and methodological problems. I then 
continue with a short overview of the French practice of subsidies 
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and finally present some 
examples of how the notion and practice were used and described 
in relation to French diplomacy at the Congress of Westphalia.
General observations
As was pointed out in the Introduction, subsidies are one of those 
political notions and practices common in the early modern period 
that are yet to be systematically researched. The methodological 
problem can be compared to the notion and practice of protection, 
which has also only recently been put on the scholarly agenda.1 
The comparison is useful as protection and subsidies have several 
common features and are, in fact, entangled in their use in the early 
modern international system. Research on protection could thus 
1 Protegierte und Protektoren: Asymmetrische politische Beziehungen zwi­
schen Partnerschaft und Dominanz (16. bis frühes 20. Jahrhundert), ed. by 
Tilman Haug, Nadir Weber, and Christian Windler, Externa: Geschichte der 
Außenbeziehungen in neuen Perspektiven, 9 (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2016); 
Rainer Babel, Garde et protection: Der Königsschutz in der französischen 
Außenpolitik vom 15. bis zum 17. Jahrhundert, Beihefte der Francia, 72 
(Ostfildern: Thorbecke Verlag, 2014).
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serve as a kind of model for research on subsidies in diplomatic 
and political terms. There are a number of particular connections 
between the two: there is no clear concept, but the notion is used 
in multiple ways; the notion is used for personal or state relations, 
for a practice inside political communities, and for external relations; 
the notion and practice do change during the early modern period, 
and this change is significant for the state-building process and for 
an understanding of the sovereign modern state; the practice is 
significant for asymmetric relations, as these were customary as 
long as societies and state relations were regarded as hierarchical; 
the practice was theoretically delegitimized on the basis of the notion 
of sovereignty and equality of states. However, the political practice 
of protection and subsidies did not end with the modern state, and 
one might even discuss whether there are still relics of this practice 
to this day.
In general, a subsidy was offered as assistance or support for 
war. In the first place, a ‘subsidy’ was an extraordinary form of 
support that subjects gave to their prince in times of war. That is 
how the notion is used in Jean Bodin’s Les six livres de la République, 
where the right to raise subsidies from subjects is listed as one of 
the signs of sovereignty.2 As no regular tax was established in the 
Holy Roman Empire, the financing of war continued to be based 
on a subsidy system.
As a result of further developments, a ‘subsidy’ came to mean a 
form of support in terms of money or troops that one power gave 
to another for a war or at least in a conflict. Such cases were usually 
regulated by a treaty and thus took the form of an alliance. The 
French subsidies in focus in this analysis were part of alliances. 
2 ‘Sous cette même puissance de donner et casser la loi, sont compris tous les 
autres droits et marques de souveraineté: de sorte qu’à parler proprement 
on peut dire qu’il n’y a que cette seule marque de souveraineté, attendu que 
tous les autres droits sont compris en celui-là, comme décerner la guerre, ou 
faire la paix, connaître en dernier ressort des jugements de tous magistrats, 
instituer et destituer les plus grands officiers, imposer ou exempter les sujets 
de charges et subsides, octroyer grâces et dispenses contre la rigueur des 
lois, hausser ou baisser le titre, valeur et pied des monnaies, faire jurer les 
sujets et hommes liges de garder fidélité sans exception à celui auquel est 
dû le serment, qui sont les vraies marques de souveraineté, comprises sous 
la puissance de donner la loi à tous en général, et à chacun en particulier, 
et ne la recevoir que de Dieu.’ Jean Bodin, Les six livres de la République: 
Un abrégé du texte de l’édition de Paris de 1583, ed. by Gérard Mairet 
(Paris: Librairie générale française, 1993), p. 101.
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There was, however, a difference if France paid money to an ally 
to fight the war (i.e. a proxy war for France) or if France and its 
ally or allies fought a war together, where every partner contributed 
what they could best provide, be it money or military forces.
Finally, there is yet another use of the notion of subsidies: troops 
hired from one power to another were also called subsidies or 
subsidy troops. Obviously, this was a different form of bilateral 
relation from an alliance. Thus, subsidies can mean different things 
in the early modern period.3 The difference between the various 
practices of subsidies is not always clear, in particular when we 
compare political entities with completely different structures and 
constitutions. The estates of the Holy Roman Empire could support 
the emperor in two ways: by troops or money approved by an 
Imperial Diet (Reichshilfe) or by an official alliance with the emperor. 
In both cases, they could impose conditions for their support. On 
the other hand, the estates were in both cases not really free to 
refuse any support to the emperor. The estates were vassals, and 
the emperor could claim to represent and defend a common cause.4 
The Holy Roman Empire thus represents a remarkable case in terms 
of how the notion and practice of subsidies could move in multiple 
directions.
France represents another, and completely different, case. It was 
one of the largest payers of financial subsidies in the early modern 
period. The king of France had an established right to claim regular 
taxes inside the country. The kings of France had an elaborate 
concept regarding their own authority and sovereignty, and in the 
French view it was somehow disreputable or at least humble to 
3 Michael Busch, ‘Subsidien’, in Enzyklopädie der Neuzeit, ed. by Friedrich 
Jäger, vol. 12 (Stuttgart: Metzler Verlag, 2010), cols 1210–1212.
4 When the League of Rhine, concluded in 1658, deliberated about military 
support for the emperor against the Ottoman Empire in 1663, members of 
the League spoke explicitly of subsidies, and they discussed a long list of 
conditions they wanted Leopold I to fulfil. See the Protocollum In Consilio 
Fœderatorum circa subsidium contra Turcam in the Haus-, Hof- und Staats-
archiv in Vienna, Mainzer Erzkanzlerarchiv, Friedensakten, vol. 64, file 1. 
Neither in their separate negotiations nor in the Imperial Diet, however, 
could they finally refuse subsidies for this traditionally well-established cause, 
although the estates knew that Leopold pursued his very own interests in 
Hungary. See Anton Schindling, Die Anfänge des Immerwährenden Reichstags 
zu Regensburg: Ständevertretung und Staatskunst nach dem Westfälischen 
Frieden, Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Europäische Geschichte Mainz, 
143 (Mainz: Verlag Philipp von Zabern, 1991).
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accept money, as we see further below in this chapter with regard 
to the time of the Peace Congress of Westphalia. The French policy, 
however, operated for about two centuries, for a long time because 
other powers did not share this view and accepted French money. 
Thus, it would be overly simple to brand the French policy as 
modern in contrast to those of other powers. In fact, France, or at 
least the French policy as we know it, depended on the subsidy 
system: the early modern struggle of the French kings and politicians 
against the House of Habsburg could hardly have been undertaken 
in a direct military confrontation or by France alone. After Cardinal 
Richelieu had exposed France to this struggle, the greatest fear for 
the French was to be without allies during an attack by Spain and 
a subsequent war.5 Thus, the struggle against the House of Habsburg 
and its alleged universal monarchy formed alliances of convenience 
in which France had the money, whereas its partners had the military 
means.6
The French military system could hardly stand alone prior to 
the reforms at the time of Louis XIV.7 Despite its long coastline, 
the country had no considerable naval fleet, and the war against 
Spain between 1635 and 1659 would have been impossible without 
Dutch and later English military support at sea. Moreover, for its 
army, the populous realm of France needed foreigners and thus 
subsidies in the sense of subsidy troops. Cardinal Richelieu had his 
doubts that the French mentality in general was fit for serious fighting 
5 Anuschka Tischer, Französische Diplomatie und Diplomaten auf dem 
Westfälischen Friedenskongreß: Außenpolitik unter Richelieu und Mazarin, 
Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der Neueren Geschichte e.V., 
29 (Münster: Aschendorff Verlag, 1999), p. 186.
6 For the political stereotype of a Monarchia Universalis, see Franz Bosbach, 
Monarchia Universalis: Ein politischer Leitbegriff der Frühen Neuzeit, 
Schriftenreihe der Historischen Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie 
der Wissenschaften, 32 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988); 
Peer Schmidt, Spanische Universalmonarchie oder ‘teutsche Libertet’: das 
spanische Imperium in der Propaganda des Dreißigjährigen Krieges, Studien 
zur modernen Geschichte, 54 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2001).
7 For the unsatisfactory state of the French military during the time of Richelieu, 
see David Parrott, ‘French Military Organisation in the 1630s: The Failure of 
Richelieu’s Ministry’, Seventeenth­Century French Studies 9 (1987), 151–167; 
David Parrott, Richelieu’s Army: War, Government and Society in France 
1624–1642 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). For a more 
general overview, see John A. Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle: The French 
Army 1610–1715 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
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and saw it as essential that the French army included foreign forces.8 
When, however, Louis XIV later emphasised the close tie between 
sovereignty and the performance of war, this simultaneously implied 
a pursuit of autonomy in warfare.9 While Richelieu was successful, 
because France rather paid than fought, Louis XIV promoted the 
idea of a vigorous warrior king who consequently went to open 
war – although the king’s diplomacy and its use of money remained 
an important additive to his wars.
Notwithstanding the complex political and military system of 
which subsidies usually constituted a part, they first of all fulfilled 
an economic purpose: one power funded the expenses of another. 
Thus, funders had a political interest in what they paid for; and 
vice versa, the one accepting the money of another power might 
not have been able to act the way they did without this money. The 
financial value – or more precisely, the value of what the money 
could buy – evidently served as the leading factor of subsidies. This 
is in clear contrast to diplomatic gifts, which had a strong symbolic 
dimension and were means of communication, no matter how 
expensive they were.10 It was impossible to simply sell such a gift 
and buy something ‘useful’ or to use the money to pay off debts.
However, this does not mean that subsidies were purely economic. 
Early modern society was essentially based on honour, reputation, 
and symbolic acts. Thus, there was a symbolic dimension already 
when subsidies were given or accepted. Like any symbolic act, the 
giving and taking of subsidies could be perceived in different ways, 
and the perception could have political consequences. As we shall 
see, French diplomats and politicians were uncertain regarding the 
impression caused by the French subsidies. Was it the impression 
that the French allies needed money or, vice versa, that France had 
to buy its allies? Nevertheless, French money in combination with 
8 Testament Politique de Richelieu, ed. by Françoise Hildesheimer (Paris: 
Société de l’Histoire de France, 1995), pp. 305–306.
9 Joël Cornette, Le roi de guerre: Essai sur la souveraineté dans la France du 
Grand Siècle (Paris: Éditions Payot & Rivages, 1993).
10 For the wide range of diplomatic gifts and material exchange in foreign 
relations, see Materielle Grundlagen der Diplomatie: Schenken, Sammeln 
und Verhandeln in Spätmittelalter und Früher Neuzeit, ed. by Mark 
Häberlein and Christof Jeggle, Irseer Schriften: Studien zur Wirtschafts-, 
Kultur- und Mentalitätsgeschichte new series, 9 (Constance and Munich: 
UVK Verlagsgesellschaft, 2013). Cf. also several chapters in Medien der 
Außenbeziehungen von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart, ed. by Peter Hoeres 
and Anuschka Tischer (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2017).
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French protection in general had quite a positive impact on French 
reputation during the Thirty Years’ War.11
The reasons why political powers supplied one another ranged 
from economic interests to proxy wars and joint wars, and thereby to 
common political interests. There were, however, few purely economic 
subsidy relations. The Swiss Confederation was the first and only 
long-term political power to organize subsidy troops for money and 
not pursue a foreign-power policy. However, even the Swiss had some 
foreign interests, and those who hired Swiss mercenaries also had 
to combine their financial efforts with diplomatic ones, because the 
Confederation would only leave its troops in a war for one conflicting 
party, and as a political community it would not act against its 
own political interests. The position of the French ambassador in 
Solothurn was crucial. He solemnly represented a traditional good 
understanding of both powers and would try to convince the Swiss 
that they shared common interests with the French.12
Studies on subsidies usually focus on one aspect concerning the 
notion and practice related to this phenomenon. Some thorough 
studies exist on subsidies in a military context, which present statisti-
cal material and military aspects.13 If we take a look at subsidies 
11 Cf. Tryntje Helfferich, Chapter 2 below.
12 Thomas Lau, ‘Fremdwahrnehmung und Kulturtransfer – der Ambassadorenhof 
in Solothurn’, in Wahrnehmungen des Fremden: Differenzerfahrungen von 
Diplomaten im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert, ed. by Michael Rohrschneider 
and Arno Strohmeyer, Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der 
Neueren Geschichte e.V., 31 (Münster: Aschendorff Verlag, 2007), pp. 
313–341; Andreas Affolter, Verhandeln mit Republiken: Die französisch­
eidgenössischen Beziehungen im frühen 18. Jahrhundert, Externa: Geschichte 
der Außenbeziehungen in neuen Perspektiven, 11 (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 
2017). For the Swiss case, also see Philippe Rogger, Chapter 6 below.
13 See, for instance, Hildegard Ernst, Madrid und Wien 1632–1637: Politik 
und Finanzen in den Beziehungen zwischen Philipp IV. und Ferdinand II., 
Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der Neueren Geschichte 
e.V., 18 (Münster: Aschendorff Verlag, 1991); Gottfried Lorenz, ‘Schweden 
und die französischen Hilfsgelder von 1638 bis 1649: Ein Beitrag zur 
Finanzierung des Krieges im 17. Jahrhundert’, in Forschungen und Quellen 
zur Geschichte des Dreißigjährigen Krieges, Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung 
zur Erforschung der Neueren Geschichte e.V., 12 (Münster: Aschendorff 
Verlag, 1981), pp. 98–148; Jörg Ulbert, ‘Französische Subsidienzahlungen 
an Hessen-Kassel während des Dreißigjährigen Krieges’, in Frankreich und 
Hessen­Kassel zur Zeit des Dreißigjährigen Krieges und des Westfälischen 
Friedens, ed. by Klaus Malettke, Veröffentlichungen der Historischen Kommis-
sion für Hessen, 46 (Marburg: Elwert, 1999), pp. 159–174; Max Braubach, 
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in a wider political and diplomatic context, there are still further 
problems of definition, delimitation, and coherence with other notions 
and practices. Thus, subsidies are not clearly separated from pensions, 
although subsidies are usually regarded as part of an alliance of 
equals, whereas pensions indicate some kind of patron–client relation-
ship. When Jörg Ulbert analysed the French subsidies for Hesse-Cassel 
during the Thirty Years’ War, he referred to pensions as ‘subsidies 
in disguise’ (verkappte Subsidien).14 It is remarkable that Sweden 
used at least 14 per cent of its French subsidies not for military but 
for diplomatic expenses, in particular for financing its delegation 
during the peace talks in Osnabrück.15 On the other hand, in an 
earlier study on the role of subsidies in the War of the Spanish 
Succession, Max Braubach referred to them as a ‘substitute’ (Ersatz) 
for pensions, a judgement made on the basis of a short overview 
of the historical development and function of the two.16 Both views 
have their pros and cons and should be discussed further.
Moreover, subsidies represent a form of support with money or 
soldiers, but they should also be regarded in relation to symbolic 
capital, not only because they themselves were seen as symbolic 
but because they were entangled and competed with other values 
that were less material or practical in nature. This is very well 
illustrated by the case of Braunschweig: during the Nine Years’ War, 
Duke Ernst August received subsidies from France, which hoped to 
neutralise the duke from the conflict. Actually, however, the French 
support strengthened the duke’s position vis-à-vis Emperor Leopold 
I, who promoted the territory of Braunschweig-Lüneburg to a new 
electorate in 1692. By this act, the new elector finally became a part 
of the imperial alliance against France. Lucien Bély mentioned this 
specific case in an overview over subsidies in the Ancien Régime 
as an example of just how unpredictable the outcomes of subsidies 
were with regard to political calculations.17 Moreover, in this case it 
was the emperor’s decision that brought the Wolfenbüttel branch of 
Braunschweig to accept French subsidies and thereby join a French 
alliance, as Wolfenbüttel did not accept that the internal balance 
Die Bedeutung der Subsidien für die Politik im spanischen Erbfolgekriege 
(Bonn and Leipzig: Schroeder, 1923).
14 Ulbert, ‘Französische Subsidienzahlungen’, p. 166.
15 Lorenz, ‘Schweden und die französischen Hilfsgelder’, p. 99.
16 Braubach, Die Bedeutung der Subsidien, p. 7.
17 Lucien Bély, ‘Subsides’, in Dictionnaire de l’Ancien Régime, ed. by Lucien 
Bély (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1996), pp. 1178–1179.
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of the House of Braunschweig was destroyed by the creation of 
the new electorate.18
The case of Braunschweig gives us an idea of the complexity of 
the means of giving and taking in early modern society and state 
system, in particular when we keep in mind that the political condi-
tions of the great powers were completely different: France had a 
comparatively well-functioning tax system, which allowed the king 
to hire troops and pay subsidies. At the same time, however, an 
elaborate concept of the king as a sovereign prince existed. It would 
have been impossible for a French king to accept subsidies other 
than hired troops on a purely economic basis. This may be compared 
to the fact that it would also have been impossible for a French 
king to accept a protector and protection, even during his minority 
reign. Thus, a French king could not have been ‘supported’ in a 
war in the same way as he himself supported, for instance, Sweden 
or Hesse-Cassel during the Thirty Years’ War: What might have 
blemished the honour and reputation of a king of France was for 
others just a useful means of foreign policy.19
Unlike the situation in France, the emperor had no income or 
military basis ex officio. When he asked for subsidies, he did so 
based on the original meaning of the notion: he had to ask the 
members of the Holy Roman Empire for extraordinary support. As 
the Imperial Estates were international actors at the same time, the 
emperor was in competition with international actors even when 
he asked for ‘internal’ support, as demonstrated in the case of 
Braunschweig. On the other hand, the emperor was part of the 
House of Habsburg, which often provided him with a solid basis 
of troops and money, either from his own hereditary lands or from 
his Spanish cousins.20 In addition, the emperor also had ex-officio 
access to an enormous symbolic capital and could offer status 
improvements and enhancements. The creation of a new electorate 
for Braunschweig is a spectacular example, but Leopold I in particular 
used this means in many ways. Thus, the money and troops of 
Louis XIV also competed against the symbolic capital amassed by 
the emperor.
When we finally ask why subsidies were spent, it is evident that 
the one giving money to someone else wanted to attain a political 
18 Braubach, Die Bedeutung der Subsidien, pp. 59–60.
19 For the functional view of the receivers on subsidies, see Tryntje Helfferich, 
Chapter 2 below.
20 Cf. Ernst, Madrid und Wien.
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or military objective or at least had the impression that there was 
an objective to which he should contribute.21 This indicates a further 
difference between subsidies and gifts, as gifts were usually not 
given to reach a specific objective. Subsidies, however, were not just 
a price paid by a power to then get what it wanted. There remained 
a lot of uncertainties, in particular since a political actor who took 
money did not become a service provider as a result, but still remained 
an independent power. He could disappoint the hopes of the payer. 
In the worst case, the subsidies helped a power to acquire a form 
of authority that could frighten the one who was paying for it. The 
relationship between France and Sweden in the Thirty Years’ War 
serves as a good example of this: from the very beginning, France 
was not able to calculate or control the Protestant power it supported 
with money, and the growing Swedish success aggravated the situ-
ation. French politicians were confronted with the fact that they 
paid for Sweden’s unwanted war against Denmark in 1643 and, 
even worse, for Sweden’s strong pro-Protestant politics at the Congress 
of Westphalia, all of which were not the reasons for paying out the 
subsidies.22
The more subsidies became an established system, the more 
there were political actors who more or less expected pensions 
or subsidies, even if the money did not influence their policies in 
any significant way. The elector of Mayence, Johann Philipp von 
Schönborn, is an example of a minor political actor who received 
money from both France and the emperor, but who nevertheless 
balanced quite well between the two. Emperor Leopold I judged in 
21 See, for instance, the statement by the French ambassador Abel Servien 
who negotiated on the Franco-Dutch alliance in The Hague for some time 
during the Congress of Westphalia and wrote to Cardinal Mazarin on 9 April 
1647: ‘Je croy tellement que sans miracle on ne fera rien cette année avec 
les armes du costé de cet Estat, qu’une des plus nécessaires applications que 
nous devions avoir, selon mon advis, est de profficter des troupes qui sont 
entretenues du subside de France, qu’on est sur le poinct de licencier.’ Acta 
Pacis Westphalicae, ed. by Max Braubach, Konrad Repgen, and Maximilian 
Lanzinner, series II B (French Correspondence), vol. 5, prep. by Guido Braun 
(Münster: Aschendorff Verlag, 2002), part 2, p. 1019.
22 For the French government’s insistence on the view that their subsidies 
were meant to pay for the war against the emperor, not against Denmark, 
see Acta Pacis Westphalicae, II B, vol. 1, prep. by Ursula Irsigler (Münster: 
Aschendorff Verlag, 1979), pp. 266, 301. For the further difficulties between 
France and Sweden during the time of the Westphalian Peace Congress, see 
Tischer, Französische Diplomatie, pp. 295–310.
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1671 that it was necessary to pay money to the elector, although 
he was already separated from France owing to the political 
situation.23
Subsidies in French politics
In 1552, Henri II of France initiated a significant policy of subsidies 
with the Treaty of Chambord.24 He concluded an alliance with 
several Protestant German princes against Emperor Charles V, which 
was the climax of a French policy of trying to win over imperial 
estates against a suspected universal monarchy of the Habsburg 
ruler. According to the Treaty of Chambord, the German princes 
raised troops, whereas the French king promised them 70,000 écus 
per month plus an initial sum of money. The Treaty of Chambord, 
which allowed the king to occupy the imperial cities of Metz, Toul, 
and Verdun, was also the beginning of the modern French policy 
of protection.25 This highlights the entanglement between the 
practices, an entanglement which was, however, soon interrupted: 
after the 1559 Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis, by which France accepted 
the Habsburg predominance, the French kings focused on the realm’s 
23 ‘Kurmainz zeigt sich guet und ganz abgesondert von Frankreich, also ist wohl 
vonnöthen, ihn nit stecken zue lassen … Idem faciat Pötting und sehe, dass 
man aufs wenigste etwas thue. Dann revera, ohne Geld erhalten wir diese 
Leut nit, und nehmen sie nochmals Frankreichs Geld an, so heißt es, oleum 
et operam perdidimus.’ In: Privatbriefe Kaiser Leopold I. an den Grafen 
F.E. Pötting. 1662–1673, ed. by Dr Alfred Francis Pribram and Dr Moriz 
Landwehr von Pragenau, part 2, Fontes Rerum Austriacarum, Diplomataria 
et Acta LVII (Vienna: In Kommission bei Carl Gerold’s Sohn, 1904), p. 
197. For the elector’s relations to France, see Tilman Haug, Ungleiche 
Außenbeziehungen und grenzüberschreitende Patronage: Die französische 
Krone und die geistlichen Kurfürsten (1648–1679), Externa: Geschichte 
der Außenbeziehungen in neuen Perspektiven, 6 (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 
2015).
24 For the treaty text, see Politische Korrespondenz des Herzogs und Kurfürsten 
Moritz von Sachsen, ed. by Historische Kommission bei der Sächsischen 
Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig, vol. 5, prep. by Johannes Herrmann, 
Günther Wartenberg, and Christian Winter (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1998), 
pp. 574–585.
25 For the occupation and its further consequences, see Christine Petry, ‘Faire 
des sujets du roi’: Rechtspolitik in Metz, Toul und Verdun unter französis­
cher Herrschaft (1552–1648), Pariser Historische Studien, 73 (Munich: R. 
Oldenbourg Verlag, 2006). For the development of the French protection 
politics of this period, see Babel, Garde et protection. 
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internal problems and pursued no noteworthy foreign policy for 
several decades.26
When France returned to the international stage with Henri IV, 
it faced the problem of a lack of money. Money was the key to the 
success of French foreign policy before Cateau-Cambrésis, and later 
for the foreign policy of Richelieu; but the debts of the French 
crown to Swiss mercenaries from the time of the Wars of Religion 
became a serious obstacle to the financial credibility it needed for 
its future foreign policy. The first payments at the end of the sixteenth 
and beginning of the seventeenth centuries were solemn events 
purporting to restore confidence. Yet, although France would have 
debts to the Swiss of up to 70 million livres for a long time, the 
realm was quite successful in recruiting further mercenaries and 
also in building up a network of political powers receiving French 
money.27 This was important to French foreign policy during the 
Thirty Years’ War. Obviously, subsidies did not necessarily represent 
an immediate cash flow; they could also be a promise in relation 
to a distant future. In this case, credibility was crucial, not liquidity, 
which required a partner who accepted subsidies although he did 
not have any immediate need for the money.
France once again started to finance the enemies of the House 
of Habsburg – and in particular, once again, the Protestant enemies 
– at the beginning of Cardinal Richelieu’s government in 1624. In 
the same year, Louis XIII concluded the Treaty of Compiègne with 
the States-General of the United Provinces, in which the latter received 
a loan that was to be repaid after a peace with Spain.28 Starting in 
1630, Louis gave them one million livres annually for their war ‘as 
a gift’ (en don).29 With the Treaty of Bärwalde in 1631, France was 
26 For the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis, see Bertrand Haan, Une paix pour 
l’éternité: La négociation du traité du Cateau­Cambrésis, Bibliothèque de 
la Casa de Velázquez, 49 (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2010).
27 For the debts and payment, see Lau, ‘Fremdwahrnehmung und Kulturtransfer’, 
pp. 315–316.
28 A reproduction of this treaty with further information can be found in the 
database Europäische Friedensverträge der Vormoderne online of the Leibniz-
Institut für Europäische Geschichte in Mayence: www.ieg-friedensvertraege.de/
treaty/1624%20VI%2010%20Allianz-%20und%20Subsidienvertrag%20
von%20Compi%C3%A8gne/t-958-1-de.html?h=1, accessed 5 November 
2017.
29 Renewal of the alliance from 17 June 1630: www.ieg-friedensvertraege.de/
treaty/1630%20VI%2017%20Erneuerung%20der%20bestehenden%20
Allianz/t-964-1-de.html?h=1, accessed 5 November 2017. The subsequent 
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obliged to pay one million livres per year to Sweden, whereas Sweden 
had to raise an army.30 The French policy thus more or less adhered 
to the model of 1552. However, it went further in a different way: 
it took decades until the war and the subsidies came to an end. 
From 1630 onwards, France paid subsidies for eighteen subsequent 
years. Moreover, there was not just one but several subsidy arrange-
ments – those with the Dutch Republic and with Sweden followed 
an agreement with Hesse-Cassel, which cost France an additional 
500,000 livres per year.31 Finally, this war soon became more than 
a proxy war for France; so from 1635 onwards, the realm had to 
pay its own war expenses in addition to the subsidies.
France could use subsidies in its foreign policy because it had 
the money to do so. As a member of the French government, probably 
Cardinal Mazarin himself, would say in the summer of 1648, when 
the parties of the Thirty Years’ War were increasingly exhausted: 
‘It is not that we have much more money, but we still have more 
than our enemies.’ 32 The reason why France usually had more money 
for foreign policy than its enemies was found in the fact that it was 
particularly advanced in its state-building process and the establish-
ment of taxes. At the same time, France had more inhabitants, and 
thus tax-payers, than any other European country. The good material 
conditions of the French foreign policy were proved by the fact that 
France, unlike its costly allies Sweden and Hesse-Cassel, did not 
ask for any financial satisfaction during the Congress of Westphalia. 
Hence, the French claim to have fought the war for German liberty 
was probably more credible for the German estates that had to pay 
the money Sweden needed for the compensation of its military. The 
French government’s generosity outside its own country came with 
risks: in 1648, the very year of the Peace of Westphalia, the revolt 
of the Fronde broke out, starting with protests against new fiscal 
laws whereupon state bankruptcy followed.
alliance treaty was concluded on 15 April 1634: www.ieg-friedensvertraege.de/
treaty/1634%20IV%2015%20Allianz-%20und%20Freundschaftsvertrag%20
von%20Den%20Haag/t-1079-1-de.html?h=1, accessed 5 November 2017.
30 Treaty of Bärwalde: www.ieg-friedensvertraege.de/treaty/1631%20I%20
13%20Allianzvertrag%20von%20B%C3%A4rwalde/t-1293-1-de.html?h=1, 
accessed 5 November 2017.
31 Ulbert, ‘Französische Subsidienzahlungen’, p. 167.
32 ‘Ce n’est pas qu’on veuille dire que nous ayons beaucoup plus d’argent, 
mais tousjours en avons nous plus que nos ennemis.’ Quoted from Tischer, 
Französische Diplomatie, p. 199.
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The transfer of money to foreign powers remained an important 
element of French foreign policy after Westphalia.33 Nevertheless, 
the main instrument of the power politics of Louis XIV was the 
military means under the direct control of the state (i.e. a strong 
standing army and fortresses). During the War of the Spanish Suc-
cession, France paid subsidies to the grandson of Louis XIV, Philippe, 
who claimed the Spanish throne, as well as to French allies, the 
most important being the electors of Bavaria and Cologne. At 4–6 
million livres annually, the French subsidies for Philippe were high; 
however, compared to the 70–90 million livres annual overall cost 
of the war, the subsidies represented a relatively small expense.34
In an overview, I would say that the peaks of the French subsidy 
policy were in the 1550s and again in the 1630s and 1640s with a 
long interruption due to internal conflicts. The French subsidy policy 
started in 1552 with a relatively high engagement of 70,000 écus 
(i.e. about 210,000 livres per month), which meant more than two 
and a half million livres per year. Even if we take currency changes 
into consideration, this seems impressive compared to the same sum 
paid to the Dutch Republic, Sweden, and Hesse-Cassel combined 
during the Thirty Years’ War, in particular as the income of the 
French crown had increased since the sixteenth century. On the 
other hand, in 1552 France won Metz, Toul, and Verdun immediately, 
whereas in the Thirty Years’ War it faced long-term financial obliga-
tions and finally its own involvement in the war. This makes it 
difficult to compare the two most relevant cases of French subsidy 
policy. I would argue, however, that these mark a period of an 
international entanglement of France with parallels in the French 
politics of protection, a period which ended with the Peace of 
Westphalia. In the future, France would pursue a modern state 
policy, that is, a policy relying substantially on institutionalized 
means which the government could control, such as a standing 
army or fortified borders. Nevertheless, unpredictable means like 
protection and subsidies depending on co-operation with foreign 
powers – and not necessarily geared to any material advantage for 
France – were also still in use, but they no longer formed a central 
element in France’s foreign policy. It is worth discussing whether 
33 For the relations to the electors of Mayence and Cologne, see, for instance, 
Haug, Ungleiche Außenbeziehungen.
34 Guy Rowlands, The Financial Decline of a Great Power: War, Influence, 
and Money in Louis XIV’s France (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 
pp. 23, 158.
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this was a result of a long-term state-building process or of the 
concrete experiences of French politicians and diplomats in relation 
to those means during the Thirty Years’ War and the Congress of 
Westphalia.
An outlook on subsidies in French diplomacy at the Congress 
of Westphalia
Subsidies were a subject of political correspondence and internal 
diplomatic discussion and, as they were part of diplomacy, the 
diplomats also took part in the subsidy policy. During the Thirty 
Years’ War, one of the Swedish negotiators in Osnabrück, Johan 
Adler Salvius, was simultaneously responsible for the administration 
of the French subsidies, a responsibility that constituted a heavy 
burden for him in addition to the peace negotiations.35 This task 
must have influenced his relations with his French colleagues, who 
served as his contacts for any questions or problems concerning the 
subsidies. Complaints regarding the frequent delay of payment were 
made by the Swedish resident in Münster where the French delegation 
resided.36 Vice versa, the French found themselves in an awkward 
position when they would have welcomed subsidies, and recognised 
their political benefit, but had to wait for decisions and money from 
Paris: in 1644, when the Swedes urged in favour of subsidies for 
Transylvania, the French diplomats made it clear that they had no 
power to make a decision on this point and that they furthermore 
did not have the money for this kind of extraordinary payments. 
This was something they had to point out, since it was quite common 
for them to pay for political and diplomatic expenses in advance.37 
Nevertheless, they agreed that the matter was of high importance 
in order to encourage the prince of Transylvania to fight against 
the emperor.
It is evident that subsidies were a means of diplomacy, but using 
this means was tricky. At least in its last phase, the Swedish war in 
Germany was completely dependent on French subsidies, and the 
35 Cf. Lorenz, ‘Schweden und die französischen Hilfsgelder’.
36 Acta Pacis Westphalicae, II B, vol. 1, p. 430.
37 ‘Nous n’avons pas apporté icy la bource si bien garnie que nous puissions 
pourvoir de nous mesmes à des despenses impréveues de cette nature.’ Acta 
Pacis Westphalicae, II B, vol. 1, p. 173.
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French diplomats knew it.38 They used the frequent delays of payment 
as a kind of policy of pinpricks, and the Swedes understood this 
correctly.39 When the French became more and more dissatisfied 
with the Swedish demands, the French ambassador Claude d’Avaux 
openly announced a delay to his Swedish counterpart Johan Oxen-
stierna in 1647.40 However, there was no serious consideration of 
stopping the subsidies, as the French and the Swedes were finally 
tied together in the war. Besides those threats, Cardinal Mazarin 
also tried to make it clear to the Swedish government that the 
subsidies were a heavy burden for the French people and that France 
nevertheless tried its best to fulfil its obligations.41
The subsidies for the Dutch Republic were used in the opposite 
way: when it became more and more evident that the ally was 
prepared to conclude a peace treaty without France, and when the 
French were particularly upset with the behaviour of the Dutch 
delegation, they were anxious that the subsidies should be paid 
without any delay.42 However, it was the Dutch Republic itself that 
sent a clear signal of its political independence: before it made an 
official arrangement with Spain, it refused to accept further subsidies 
and even forbade its still-ally to recruit its troops.43
On the basis of this, it is not surprising that the French were 
somehow frustrated regarding the subsidy policy. Ambassador Abel 
38 ‘en effect e[l’alliance] fust autant désirée des Suédois que de nous et qu’elle 
leur fust beaucoup plus nécessaire à cause du subside qu’on leur donne.’ Acta 
Pacis Westphalicae, II B, vol. 3, prep. by Elke Jarnut and Rita Bohlen with 
an introduction and an appendix by Franz Bosbach (Münster: Aschendorff 
Verlag, 1999), p. 711. The overview of Lorenz shows that this perception 
reflected reality.
39 Acta Pacis Westphalicae, II B, vol. 1, pp. 430, 435; series II C (Swedish 
Correspondence), vol. 3, prep. by Gottfried Lorenz (Münster: Aschendorff 
Verlag, 1975), p. XLVII. 
40 Acta Pacis Westphalicae, II B, vol. 5, 1, p. CXLIV.
41 Acta Pacis Westphalicae, II B, vol. 4, p. 516.
42 ‘Cependant, il est bon que vous soyés informés, pour le faire valloir de 
delà, que depuis trois jours on a faict payer quatre cens mil francz du 
dernier quartier du subside pour Messieurs les Estatz sans qu’on y ayt voulu 
apporter un seul moment de retardement pour la conduicte de quelques-uns 
de leurs députez, dans l’asseurance que les dictz Sieurs Estatz remédieront 
aux inconvéniens ausquelz ilz ont voulu nous exposer par leur mauvaise 
volonté.’ Acta Pacis Westphalicae, II B, vol. 5, 1, p. 427.
43 Acta Pacis Westphalicae, II B, vol. 5, 1, p. XCII.
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Servien wrote clear words to his nephew Hugues de Lionne, the future 
secretary for foreign affairs, and angrily stated that, with regard to 
subsidies, everyone would behave ‘as if we were the treasurers of 
other nations and as if we were obliged to buy the friendship of those 
who should be more than happy to have ours’.44 Servien’s outburst 
also shows that the French did not really regard those accepting 
subsidies as equals. There was even some disdain for them, since 
they took money for their ‘friendship’ and alliance, and they were 
openly interested in money. With this type of disdain towards such 
an economic attitude, Servien was definitely not alone in the French 
government.45 In particular when it comes to the Dutch Republic, 
this view fitted into the general disdain of a noble society towards 
a state of republicans and ‘merchants’.46 When later, in the 1670s, 
the political constellation had changed, and Louis XIV went to 
war against the Dutch Republic, French politicians and diplomats 
were more than eager to show that a war was not a merchant’s 
business – notwithstanding the fact that France had needed the 
Dutch fleet and military force against Spain some decades before.47
44 ‘comme si nous estions les trésoriers des autres nations et comme si nous 
estions obligez d’achepter l’amitié de ceux qui se doivent tenir trop heureux 
d’avoir la nostre.’ Acta Pacis Westphalicae, II B, vol. 4, p. 764.
45 See, for instance, the description provided in a royal memorandum regarding 
the ambassador of the Dutch Republic in Paris: ‘Messieurs les Plénipotentiaires 
ne doivent pas craindre que l’ambassadeur d’Hollande qui est en cette cour 
puisse avoir rien cogneu de nos sentimens sur le contenu dans cet article. 
C’est un homme qui ne se met guières en peyne de les descouvrir et que 
l’on ne veoid jamais que quand il vient demander l’argent des subsides ou 
parler en faveur de quelques marchands sur des “prises” de vaisseaux.’ Acta 
Pacis Westphalicae, II B, vol. 4, p. 810.
46 See, in general, Helmut Gabel and Volker Jarren, Kaufleute und Fürsten: 
Außenpolitik und politisch­kulturelle Perzeption im Spiegel niederländisch­
deutscher Beziehungen 1648–1748, with an introduction by Heinz Duch-
hardt and Horst Lademacher, Niederlande-Studien, 18 (Munich and Berlin: 
Waxmann, 1998). For the French perception of their enemies and allies, 
including the Dutch Republic, during the time of the Congress of Westphalia, 
see Anuschka Tischer, ‘Fremdwahrnehmung und Stereotypenbildung in der 
französischen Gesandtschaft auf dem Westfälischen Friedenskongress’, in 
Wahrnehmungen des Fremden: Differenzerfahrungen von Diplomaten im 16. 
und 17. Jahrhundert, ed. by Michael Rohrschneider and Arno Strohmeyer, 
Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der Neueren Geschichte 
e.V., 31 (Münster: Aschendorff Verlag, 2007), pp. 265–288.
47 See, for instance, the judgement of French diplomat Honoré Courtin as 
early as 1665: ‘Ce n’est pas le mestier des marchans de faire la guerre, il 
faut de bons chefs, de bons officiers, de braves soldats et de hardis matelots. 
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Conclusion
Subsidies were an important means in the French struggle against 
the House of Habsburg, a means that was made possible by the 
fact that the realm was quite advanced in its state-building process 
and that the king, consequently, had a solid income from taxes. On 
the other hand, the French subsidy treaties still reveal a deficit, 
because the French foreign policy was based on the military forces 
of its allies. Of course, this was not necessarily a structural deficit: 
the alliances just enabled France to pursue an ambitious policy that 
would have been impossible otherwise. Nevertheless, subsidies were 
an incalculable means with its own dynamics. During the Thirty 
Years’ War, the costs grew continuously whereas the effect was 
sometimes disappointing, or even the opposite of what was intended. 
It is thus not surprising that French politicians during the time of 
the Congress of Westphalia expressed serious doubts regarding the 
use of subsidies – just as they did regarding the use of protection.48 
There were several good reasons to look for other means.
However, if we do not merely focus on the development of France 
itself, we still have to pose the question what the French subsidies 
meant for European history and the states system. Financial needs, 
and in particular the necessity to finance war, are seen as key for 
understanding the modern state-building process.49 Usually, this 
factor is analysed from two perspectives: first, how a ruler was able 
Les Hollandois manquent de tout cela’, in Bescheiden uit vreemde archieven 
omtrent de groote nederlandsche zeeoorlogen 1652–1676, ed. by H.T. 
Colenbrander, vol. 1 (1652–1667) (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1919), 
pp. 218–219. Cf. also James Rees Jones, The Anglo­Dutch Wars of the 
Seventeenth Century (London and New York: Longman, 1996), p. 66. The 
war declared by Louis XIV on the Dutch Republic in 1672 is notorious 
for the fact that the French king saw his ‘glory’ being questioned by the 
fact that the republic’s diplomacy had forced him into a peace with Spain 
four years before. 
48 Cf. Anuschka Tischer, ‘Protektion als Schlüsselbegriff politischer Sprache 
und Praxis in Frankreich im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert’, in Protegierte und 
Protektoren: Asymmetrische politische Beziehungen zwischen Partnerschaft 
und Dominanz (16. bis frühes 20. Jahrhundert), ed. by Tilman Haug, Nadir 
Weber, and Christian Windler, Externa: Geschichte der Außenbeziehungen 
in neuen Perspektiven, 9 (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2016), pp. 49–64.
49 See Michael Stolleis, Pecunia nervus rerum: Zur Staatsfinanzierung in der 
frühen Neuzeit (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1983); Johannes Burkhardt, 
‘Die Friedlosigkeit der Frühen Neuzeit: Grundlegung einer Theorie der Bel-
lizität Europas’, Zeitschrift für historische Forschung 24 (1997), 509–574.
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to obtain money from inside their territory, in particular by the 
establishment of taxes, or, second, how the international rivalry 
over external resources became the motor of the wars of the early 
modern period. Subsidies render this view more complex: one may 
ask if the French subsidies, which were the subject of the present 
discussion, caused a kind of revenue equalization in some parts of 
Europe. They did not replace the struggle for financial resources; 
they were part of this struggle and balanced or counterbalanced 
other developments. By means of its subsidies, France influenced 
the state-building process in other territories and also contributed 
to the fact that a balance between Protestants and Catholics was 
reached in Germany and Europe. The French subsidies thus have 
to be regarded in a much wider context than just French foreign 
policy in itself.
2
‘Unter den Schutz Frankreichs’: German 




Historians have embraced the term ‘Thirty Years’ War’ for the 
multifaceted conflict that devastated Central Europe between 1618 
and 1648. At its heart, this was a civil war fought within the confines 
of the Holy Roman Empire, driven in large part by religious conflict 
and by fundamental disagreements over the very nature of the empire 
and the balance between princely liberties and imperial power. This 
internal German war was also of enormous interest to its neighbours, 
who intervened on one side or another, thus complicating the war 
further and intertwining it with larger European conflicts – especially 
the ones between the French Bourbons and the Spanish and Austrian 
Habsburgs, between the Swedes and the Danes, and between the 
Spanish and their rebellious Dutch subjects. In general, there were 
two clear sides in this war, sides which, despite some major shifts 
over the years, remained evenly balanced in strength until the final 
Peace of Westphalia in 1648. On one side stood the Catholic Austrian 
Habsburg emperor, supported by his Spanish Habsburg cousins and 
by most of the Catholic German princes and estates. On the other 
side stood the Protestant German princes and estates, assisted briefly 
by the Lutheran Danes and more extensively by the Calvinist Dutch, 
Lutheran Swedes, and Catholic French.
Despite the war’s broad reach, many German princes and rulers 
tried to avoid direct engagement unless absolutely forced to muster 
troops for self-defence. Moreover, even those who actively joined 
the conflict had difficulty fielding an army for more than a brief 
period. Not only were personal princely incomes usually insufficient 
to allow extensive warfare, but the representative bodies (estates) 
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of territories wielded traditional rights to approve taxation, and 
they frequently placed limits on the ability of princes to shift the 
financial burden to their subjects. And indeed, the cost of main-
taining an army was enormous. The ten-to-fifteen-thousand-man 
imperial army of the Lower Rhinish-Westphalian Circle, for example, 
required approximately 1–1.5 million reichstaler annually, while the 
78,000-man army of the Heilbronn League – an alliance made in 
1633 among a number of German Protestant princes, France, and 
Sweden – cost 9.8 million reichstaler annually. Thus on average, 
an army incurred a cost of approximately 100–125 reichstaler per 
soldier per year, roughly equivalent to the cost of one and a half 
pounds of bread a day for each man.1
To meet such expenses, armies subsisted largely off the land, 
drawing their maintenance from loot or from more regularized war 
taxation, known as contributions, imposed on occupied territories. 
Yet while contributions provided a principal method of war financing 
in this era, they could be insufficient to allow effective offensive 
military action, or could fail entirely through over-extraction or 
popular resistance. This was true even for the emperor or imperial 
leagues that could pool the resources of multiple territories and 
princes – for individual princes the problem was far greater. Those 
intent on taking part in the conflict, therefore, were forced to depend 
on the financial resources of their officers or to seek external sources 
of funding from other European powers. For the emperor and his 
allied German states, such external military subsidies came primarily 
from the Spanish Habsburgs and to a lesser extent from the papacy. 
For the German opponents of the emperor, some subsidies came 
1 Hubert Salm, Armeefinanzierung im Dreißigjährigen Krieg: Der Niederrhein-
isch-Westfälische Reichskreis 1635–1650 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1990), pp. 
165–176; Johannes Kretschmar, Heilbronner Bund, 1632–1635, I (Lübeck: 
H.G. Rahtgens, 1922), pp. 230–231; Kersten Krüger, ‘Schwedische und 
dänische Kriegsfinanzierung im Dreißigjährigen Krieg bis 1635’, in Krieg und 
Politik 1618–1648, ed. by Konrad Repgen (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 
1988), pp. 275–298. For the cost of bread, see Tryntje Helfferich, The Thirty 
Years War: A Documentary History (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2009), pp. 296, 
300. Theoretical wages for ordinary infantry soldiers ranged between 6 and 
10 florins (4–5 reichstaler) a month, but food, lodging, and other expenses 
were deducted, and any remaining wages were often in arrears. David 
Parrott, The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution 
in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 
pp. 161–163.
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from the Dutch and English; but by far the greatest subsidy amounts 
were distributed by the French.2
In this chapter I discuss the German understanding of these 
French moneys and what this can teach us about the war. I argue 
that subsidies were primarily seen and described as functional, as 
a means by which the German princes could levy troops, manage 
their supply and maintenance, and employ them in the fight to 
preserve princely liberties from what they saw as Habsburg tyranny. 
Yet French subsidies were also freighted with additional, and often 
contradictory, meanings. First, the payments were seen by the 
Germans as proxies for the value the French monarch placed on 
his allies, and thus were in themselves honours and indications of the 
recipient’s worth and status. But the payments were also described 
as worrisome attempts by the French to buy influence and wield 
control over the princes – thereby denigrating the latter’s sovereign 
status and demoting them to the role of mercenary captains. French 
moneys were also portrayed as a means for this crown to meddle in 
imperial affairs, and perhaps even as a step towards the complete 
subjugation of the German empire and the subsequent loss of all 
its traditional liberties. Finally, we see that these subsidy treaties 
strengthened an existing fear of French cultural dominance among 
some members of the German elite, inspiring calls for the creation 
of a unified and an explicitly anti-French German national identity.
Subsidies as necessary tools of war
The functional and mutual nature of French moneys is most clearly 
demonstrated in the actual subsidy agreements signed between France 
and its Protestant German allies. In the October 1636 Treaty of 
Wesel made between Landgrave Wilhelm V of Hesse-Cassel and 
the French king Louis XIII, for example, the landgrave was granted 
2 For more on military financing and the importance of military enterpris-
ers see Parrott, Business of War. See also Cordula Kapser, Die bayerische 
Kriegsorganisation in der zweiten Hälfte des Dreißigjährigen Krieges 
1635–1648/49 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1997); Dieter Albrecht, ‘Zur 
Finanzierung des Dreißigjährigen Krieges: Die Subsidien der Kurie für den 
Kaiser und Liga 1618–1635’, Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgeschichte 
19, Vierteljahresschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Beihefte 47/48, 
2 vols (1956), 534–567; Fritz Redlich, The German Military Enterpriser 
and His Work Force: A Study in European Economic and Social History 
(Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1964).
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subsidies of 200,000 reichstaler a year (500,000 livres) in return 
for fielding an army of seven thousand infantry and three thousand 
cavalry for their common cause against the Habsburg emperor. This 
subsidy treaty was later renewed under Wilhelm’s widow, Landgravine 
Amalia Elisabeth, and fixed to continue until the end of all hostilities, 
with both parties vowing not to make peace without the other.3
Surveying the correspondence of the Hessian court during this 
period, we see that, when these French subsidies were discussed, it 
was almost always in terms of their functional and necessary role 
as a tool of the Hessian anti-Habsburg war effort. The landgrave 
and, after him, the landgravine, along with their military officers and 
councillors, all stressed how the money allowed them to pay and 
supply existing troops, levy new recruits, buy munitions, maintain 
an occupying presence in strategically significant areas in the empire, 
and undertake offensive pushes either independently or in conjunc-
tion with their foreign and German princely allies. For example, 
in an internal document in which Hessian councillors debated the 
continuation of the French alliance, one pointed out that it ‘would 
not be possible to acquire the means by which one could subsist and 
support the troops without the agreement, subsidies, and assistance 
of the allies’.4 This was no exaggeration, for, although the Hessians 
drew enormous contributions from occupied territories in East Frisia 
and Westphalia, they still depended on French subsidy payments 
for as much as a third of their military funding.5
Subsidy treaties with the French were thus practical tools that 
allowed German princes to engage in military adventurism despite 
monetary shortfalls. At times, however, the issue was not merely 
3 Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Correspondance Politique, 
Paris [AAECP] Hesse 1, fols 113–119, Treaty of Wesel, 21 October 1636. 
The earlier version of the treaty, with a smaller subsidy, is in AAECP Hesse 
1, fols 76–77, Treaty of Minden, 12 June 1636. See also AAECP Hesse 1, 
fols 233–245, Treaty of Dorsten, 22 [29] August 1639.
4 Hessisches Staatsarchiv Marburg [HStAM] 4d Nr. 46, fols 1–10, Dorsten, 
26 July/5 August 1639. See also HStAM 4h Nr. 1406, fols 19–21. This and 
all subsequent translations into English are by the author.
5 The landgravine extracted 180,000 reichstaler annually from East Frisia plus 
c. 100,000 from Westphalia, while French subsidies yielded 200,000-plus 
reichstaler annually. See HStAM 4d Nr. 51, fols 1–3, Instructions for Vultejus, 
Groningen, 12/22 January 1638; RK FrA Fasz. 50a Konv. A, fols 160–161, 
Trauttmansdorff to Ferdinand III, Münster, 7 August 1646, published in 
Acta Pacis Westphalicae [APW], II A, vol. 4 (Münster: Aschendorff, 2001), 
pp. 493–495.
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freedom of action but survival; for, as the war dragged on, France’s 
Protestant German allies were forced to contemplate the complete 
loss of their lands and liberties. Given these enormous stakes, subsidy 
alliances with France became all the more important. In February 
1638, for example, some of the landgravine’s councillors suggested 
that only through a French alliance could she ‘be assured of land 
and people, along with religion’.6 The following year, her councillor 
Johannes Vultejus went even farther, arguing that given the grim 
military situation, and the inability of the Protestant German estates 
to unify their military actions, a mere subsidy alliance was insufficient. 
Instead, they must throw themselves ‘under the protection of the 
Crown of France’. Reasonable terms for such a submission needed 
to be worked out, he admitted, to ensure that their Reformed ‘religion 
and liberty would remain unharmed’ and ‘foreign troops’ would 
not occupy their fortresses; but all this, and even ‘in extrema’ helping 
the French king gain the imperial title, were necessary because ‘the 
[Habsburg] house of Austria fully intends to subjugate Germany 
completely and to extirpate liberty and the Evangelical religion’.7
Despite their great fear of imperial tyranny, however, the German 
princes were not unaware of the irony of depending on Catholic 
France for the salvation of German Protestantism. Such cross-
confessional alliances were equally awkward for the French, who 
reassured themselves that pragmatism and religious flexibility were 
necessitated by the Habsburg menace.8 To assuage consciences and 
court preachers on both sides, therefore, subsidy treaties included 
various religious assurances for the treatment of conquered areas, 
such as a promise to allow the free exercise of the other’s religion 
without any change or innovation, and to leave the local clergy 
unmolested and in full possession of their properties. Even this was 
insufficient, however, for the landgravine of Hesse, who in 1639 
told the French that ‘she had wanted nothing more than the liberty 
6 HStAM 4d Nr. 90, Vice Chancellor and Secret Council to Amalia Elisabeth, 
Cassel, 18/28 February 1638.
7 This plan was not pursued. HStAM 4d Nr. 56, Gutachten des Geheimen Rats 
Vultejus betr. Unterstellung unter den Schutz Frankreichs, 24 November/4 
December 1639. For more on French protection of small states, see Pro-
tegierte und Protektoren: Asymmetrische politische Beziehungen zwischen 
Partnerschaft und Dominanz (16. bis frühes 20. Jahrhundert), ed. by Tilman 
Haug, Nadir Weber, and Christian Windler, Externa 9 (Cologne: Böhlau, 
2016), pp. 89–162.
8 Paul Sonnino, Mazarin’s Quest: The Congress of Westphalia and the Coming 
of the Fronde (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), p. 90.
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of her religion in her states’, and so, unless she had a written guarantee 
of actual French support for this at a general peace, there was no 
point in sending her any money. Indeed, such subsidies ‘would be 
useless’, because she would instead ‘make another agreement in 
order to have the free exercise of religion … [as] this is the primary 
reason that has obliged her to negotiate with the king [of France].’ 9 
After some hesitation, the French agreed.10
While the religious articles of subsidy treaties were generally, 
though not consistently, followed by both sides, other treaty terms 
were regularly violated. Subsidy recipients frequently provided smaller 
armies than promised, for example, or failed to take the field at all. 
Such behaviour could easily be justified, however, by the fact that 
throughout the war the French crown maintained a consistently 
abysmal record of paying on time or as promised.11 This infuriated 
its allies, who repeatedly attempted to explain that the entire war 
effort depended on the French infusions of money, which contem-
poraries termed ‘the sinews of war’. For example, in a letter of the 
Hessian agent Joachim de Wicquefort to the French superintendent 
of finances in 1644, he stressed that the landgravine’s financial 
distress was causing a dangerous situation both for her and for her 
allies. ‘Only France remains that can contribute to her support’, 
Wicquefort wrote, for the military situation was such that the 
landgravine was fully ‘exposed to [the enemies’] discretion, and to 
her total ruin’. Unless the French offered ‘something quickly and 
powerfully for her conservation’, he went on, ‘one will shortly see 
the ruin of her armies and the loss of her state’.12 This warning to 
the French was then reinforced by the Hessian councillor Adolf 
Wilhelm von Krosigk, who cautioned the French court that without 
overdue and additional funds, the landgravine ‘will be obliged to 
act simply in the defensive, to make a reduction of her troops, and 
to lower the number of the officers (through whom, however, the 
9 AAECP Hollande 21, fols 307–308, d’Amontot (extract), 10 December 
1639.
10 A declaration was added to the Treaty of Wesel. See AAECP Hesse 1, fols 
223–224, 254–256, 257, 307–310, 311–312, 313–314. 
11 The French paid Hesse-Cassel 6,442,566 livres by the end of the war (82 per 
cent of the sum promised). Jörg Ulbert, ‘Französische Subsidienzahlungen 
an Hessen-Kassel während des Dreißigjährigen Krieges’, in Frankreich und 
Hessen-Kassel zur Zeit des Dreißigjährigen Krieges und des Westfälischen 
Friedens, ed. by Klaus Malettke (Marburg: N.G. Elwert, 1999), pp. 166–168. 
12 AAECP Hollande 30, fols 106–107, Wicquefort to Bailleul, The Hague, 25 
January 1644.
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levies and recruits are necessarily raised) – even though by this 
means the small number [of men] that her highness will keep will 
not be secure’.13
Such letters also suggest the willingness of France’s German allies 
to use threats to obtain payment. ‘Pay us or we will collapse’ was 
a general refrain from the Hessians that appears in the documents 
year after year; ‘pay us or we will be forced to make peace and you 
will face the emperor alone’. The very frequency of such threats, 
as well as the insistent focus on allied funding we see in the Hessian 
correspondence, indicates how significant they understood the French 
subsidies to be for the continued functioning of the Hessian war 
effort in the empire, and how great a part they played in the 
French–Hessian relationship. Such dependence, however, left France’s 
German allies vulnerable to manipulation, and the French openly 
used their subsidy payments to encourage behaviour that favoured 
them or discourage behaviour that did not. For example, when in 
1640 the landgravine of Hesse-Cassel sent delegates to the Regensburg 
Reichstag, one of her counsellors reported that the French had been 
displeased by this delegation, which they feared indicated an effort 
to abandon her French allies and make a separate peace with the 
emperor. ‘Because of this,’ her counsellor reported, ‘the promised 
extraordinary subsidy moneys of 50,000 reichstaler are being with-
held’.14 Similarly, the French regularly withheld pledged subsidies 
to their ally Duke Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, both in an attempt to 
limit his independence and in response to his failures to field the 
promised number of troops.
The use and reception of pensions and honours
In addition to subsidies, the French also used other monetary and 
symbolic inducements such as pensions, honorary titles, and gifts 
in order to guide behaviour, mould and strengthen their ties with 
their German allies, and build trust. Yet whilst subsidies, like their 
related mercenary contracts, were usually given with strict terms 
spelled out in writing (such as the dates on which certain funds 
would be made available, the number of infantry and cavalry the 
13 AAECP Hollande 30, fols 108–109, Krosigk to Mazarin, The Hague, 25 
January 1644. Note also Krosigk’s careful refutation of rumours that the 
landgravine was skimming funds.
14 HStAM 4e Nr. 1411, fragment from letter to Amalia Elisabeth, c. December 
1640 / January 1641. 
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recipient was expected to field, and so forth), pensions and other 
financial handouts enabled the French to exert a softer form of 
influence. Moreover, unlike subsidies, where the crown demanded 
(though of course did not always receive) overt and specified return 
on investment, pensions and similar inducements usually came with 
no stated expectations of direct reciprocal action. This gave the 
recipients some freedom to manoeuvre. In 1633, for example, the 
French agent Feuquières visited Landgrave Wilhelm V with an 
honorary military title and gift of an annual pension of 12,000 écus 
(36,000 livres). The clear intention of the visit and the gifts was to 
persuade Wilhelm to join the Heilbronn League. However, while 
he gratefully and ‘very humbly’ accepted the money and honours, 
he did not in fact join the League.15
Once bestowed, honours were generally lasting, even when the 
recipient ignored French desires; but pensions, like subsidies, could 
be and were withheld. Wilhelm V’s promised ordinary pension of 
1633, for example, was not in the end paid either in that year or 
the next, nor was an extraordinary payment of 100,000 reichstaler, 
which was promised to the landgrave in December 1634 to aid him 
in maintaining his troops.16 Nevertheless, the fiction remained that 
at least the pension moneys were entirely honorary. At times, 
moreover, the French court made a special effort to deny even the 
suggestion that these were anything but freely given gifts and expres-
sions of regard. In the negotiations over the military alliance between 
Wilhelm V and the French in 1636, for example, in addition to 
thorough discussions of subsidy payments and other military details, 
the French instructions to their agent, St Chamond, ordered him 
to stress to the landgrave that the pension they offered him was ‘a 
demonstration of the good will of His Majesty, which will not carry 
any obligation’. Again, St Chamond was told that ‘this is not in 
the form of an obligation or as a condition of the treaty, but as a 
true demonstration of the good will that His Majesty has toward 
the said landgrave’.17
Thus pensions and gifts were portrayed by the French as signs 
of respect and honour. They also seem to have been accepted as 
such by the Germans. During treaty negotiations in 1636, the 
landgrave began by thanking the French king for the ‘evident zeal 
15 Ulbert, ‘Französische Subsidienzahlungen’, pp. 161, 169.
16 Ibid., p. 161.
17 AAECP Hesse 1, fols 73–75, Annotations on the treaty, [May?] 1636, fols 
73–75.
‘Unter den Schutz Frankreichs’ 51
that His Majesty had for the interests of the German Estates for 
re-establishing a secure and general peace and for preserving by all 
means the ancient liberties of the princes of the empire’, proclaiming 
that he was ‘infinitely obliged to His Majesty for all of the very 
special affection that he was pleased to harbour for his highness 
[the landgrave] and all of his house, and grateful for all of the lovely 
and honourable offices’.18 For such German princes, moreover, the 
value of a pension or the exalted nature of a title directly reflected 
upon the recipient’s worth, dignity, and personal prestige. Accordingly, 
German princes competed among themselves for the status that 
these conferred. In his 1636 negotiations, for example, the Hessian 
landgrave had complained that the duke of Wittenberg was being 
preferred to him for the title of General of the Army.19 Similarly, 
in 1637, the prince of Anhalt complained that the French had offered 
him only ‘a pension of 4,000 écus along with the position of field 
marshal’, unlike the 12,000 that had been given to Wilhelm of 
Hesse-Cassel and to Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar. Anhalt was only a 
colonel commanding a regiment of infantry within the landgrave’s 
army, so the lower title and pension made sense from the French 
perspective; but he clearly still took offence.20
Status inducements became such an important and expected part 
of Franco-German relations that, in the negotiations with Hesse-Cassel 
mentioned above, the French court expressed the concern that, if 
the gifts were to be deemed insufficient, the landgrave might scuttle 
the entire treaty over them as a matter of personal honour. Similarly, 
in negotiations with Wilhelm’s widow, Amalia Elisabeth, the French 
not only agreed to make subsidy payments in return for military 
action, they also offered the landgravine a large pension and an 
expensive cross of diamonds, as well as a pension for her young 
son and the same honorary French military title (Général des Troupes 
Allemandes) that his father had enjoyed at the time of his death.21 
18 AAECP Hesse 1, fols 57–58, William V mémoire, Cassel, 17/27 March 
1636.
19 AAECP Hesse 1, fols 53–54, Mémoire, 16 February 1636.
20 AAECP Hollande 21, fols 400–409, d’Estampes mémoire pour Monsieur 
de Bouthellier, April 1639. 
21 AAECP Hesse 1, fols 179–182bis, Louis XIII (minute) to de la Boderie, 19/29 
October 1637; AAECP Allemagne 14, fols 396–411, Memoire to D’Avaux, 
19/29 October 1637, letter sent in Bibliothèque Nationale [BN] Ms. Baluze 
167, fols 127ff. See also Ulbert, ‘Französische Subsidienzahlungen’, pp. 161, 
169 n. 15.
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In addition, it is noteworthy that titles and pensions bestowed by 
the French in order to curry German princely favour often came 
together, as a package of honours.22
Pensions, gifts, and honours were also directed to the councillors 
and military officers of princes, whose influence at German courts 
could be considerable. For example, as part of subsidy-treaty negotia-
tions with the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel in 1636, the French agent 
de la Boderie was asked to approach and satisfy those councillors 
at the landgrave’s court who were ‘affectionate towards France and 
to whom one has promised a pension’.23 At the death of the landgrave 
in 1637, the French court sent de la Boderie to the court of his 
widow with instructions to ensure the continuation of the Franco-
Hessian relationship. To this end, he was instructed to ‘gratify’ the 
landgravine’s counsellors, Hans Heinrich von Günderode and 
Reinhardt Scheffer, through the gift of 3,000 livres ‘divided between 
them’.24 Later, de la Boderie approvingly noted that Günderode ‘has 
not lost any occasion to serve with a lot of fervour, he is perfectly 
instructed on affairs and well disposed to serve the king’.25
In the following year, when the alliance with the Hessians seemed 
in danger, not only did the French court instruct de la Boderie to 
offer the landgravine larger subsidies and pensions if only she would 
ratify the treaty, it also instructed him to focus his attention on her 
lieutenant general, Peter Melander, and ‘to win him and to make 
him affectionate towards France’. For ‘considering that Mr Melander 
has a lot of power to bring her to the continuation of the alliance 
with His Majesty’, the instructions stated, ‘Mr de la Boderie has 
orders to sound him out and discover what he would like from His 
Majesty … [and] to promise him, if it is necessary, not only the 
said 18,000 livres already at hand, but double or triple the said 
22 French–princely relationships in a later period are analysed in Tilman Haug, 
Ungleiche Außenbeziehungen und grenzüberschreitende Patronage: Die 
französische Krone und die geistlichen Kurfürsten (1648–1679) (Cologne: 
Böhlau, 2015). For a similar situation, see Christopher Storrs, War, Diplomacy 
and the Rise of Savoy, 1690–1720 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), pp. 74–121.
23 AAECP Hambourg 1, fols 97–104, Instruction pour Mr Rorté, 15 April 
1636.
24 AAECP Hesse 1, fols 179–182bis, Louis XIII (minute) to de la Boderie, 29 
October 1637.
25 AAECP Hesse 1, fols 193–194, Summary of de la Boderie letter, 27 March 
1638.
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sum’.26 Such determined wooing led Melander to boast that ‘he was 
only to serve great kings who had the means to recompense their 
faithful servants’.27 French presumption and use of money to gain 
influence among their officers and officials did not always go down 
well with the German princes, however. In a letter to her closest 
adviser, for example, the Hessian landgravine complained of a visit 
by a French ambassador, who had brought such ‘excessively great’ 
sums of money to pay pensions to her military officers that it had 
caused a giant uproar among the men.28
Subsidies as a threat to princely independence
Whilst the German princes needed, expected, and gloried in their 
French subsidies and pensions, and used them to bolster their power 
at home vis-à-vis each other and their own estates, the relationship 
between a German prince and the French king was inevitably unequal 
and prone to misunderstanding and misuse. In 1638, for example, 
the Hessian privy council advised the landgravine of its general 
scepticism of foreign alliances and of French motives in particular, 
arguing that one could never depend on the French to fulfil their 
promises to reject peace with the emperor until the landgravine was 
assured of her lands, people, and religion. How, they continued, 
could allies of such unequal power ever work in conjunction? Such 
a relationship was inherently ‘an uncertain thing on which one 
cannot depend nor put any reliance, particularly because of the 
disparity of the confederates who would pull on a single yoke’.29
Fully aware of the dangers of their unequal status, the Germans 
(as we shall see below) quickly pushed back when the French 
attempted to use subsidies to impose explicit or implicit obligations 
and control beyond what the princes and their councillors thought 
appropriate. If pensions and honours were free gifts, and if subsidy 
26 AAECP Hollande 20, fols 387–390, Mémoir to Mr. d’Estampes, 18 August 
1638. Melander would be named by the French a field marshal and a ‘sub-
lieutenant of the German troops’, along with his 18,000 livres in pension.
27 AAECP Allemagne 14, fols 368–371.
28 Her annoyance at d’Estampes is in HStAM 4d Nr. 50, fols 30–31, Amalia 
Elisabeth to Vultejus, Dorsten, 21/31 December 1638.
29 HStAM 4d Nr. 90, Vice Chancellor and Secret Council to Amalia Elisabeth, 
Cassel, 18/28 February 1638. The same document then went on to cast 
doubt on the French willingness to stand with the Hessians on matters of 
religion if it came to a general peace.
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treaties were military alliances between sovereigns (even unequal 
ones), then the relationship was clear and princely honour maintained. 
But if pensions were bribes and subsidy treaties were mercenary 
contracts between a king and his employee, then the German princes’ 
treasured dignity and sovereignty were thrown into question. This 
was doubly a concern since, during the war, France’s German allies 
based their opposition to the emperor explicitly on the necessity to 
preserve the so-called German liberties – that is to say, the sovereign 
independence of the German princes and imperial estates. By allying 
with the French, the Germans wondered, were they merely trading 
one kind of subservience for another?
The Germans’ determination to preserve all indications of princely 
sovereignty may be observed within the framework of negotiations 
over one of the Hessian subsidy treaties. While a preliminary version 
of that treaty specified that Landgrave Wilhelm, ‘as Lieutenant 
General of the King’s Armies in Germany’, would command their 
joint forces under the name of the king, the landgrave utterly refused 
to accept this and so place himself in the role of military contractor 
or employee. Instead, the landgrave insisted that both his own troops 
and any new levies paid for by French subsidies should fight under 
his own command and name, not that of the king. The French 
eventually relented, and this point was removed in the final agree-
ment.30 At the same time, moreover, the landgrave complained that 
the king seemed to prefer another German subsidy recipient, Duke 
Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, to him. The king’s agent, St Chamond, 
was thus instructed to assure Wilhelm that the honorary title and 
moneys given to him were hereditary to his house and so ‘entirely 
different from the employment of the said Duke Bernhard’. Moreover, 
St Chamond was to take pains to mollify Wilhelm by stressing that 
the king knew well that the landgrave was a sovereign prince, while 
Bernhard merely served as the Heilbronn League’s general.31
This disagreement indicates the degree to which the German 
princes believed that their status was affected by their acceptance of 
French subsidies, as well as the degree to which the French were at 
30 AAECP Hambourg 1, fols 97–104, Instruction for Mr Rorté, 15 April 
1636. See also AAECP Hesse 1, fols 76–77, Treaty of Minden, 12 June 
1636; AAECP Hesse 1, fols 113–119, Treaty of Wesel, 21 October 1636. 
See also BN Ms. Fr. 10212, fols 55–71, Instruction to Cologne, between 
11 November and 22 December 1636; HStAM 4h Nr. 2116, fols 65–74, 
Das herrn Vice Cantzlars bedencken, n.d.
31 AAECP Hambourg 1, fols 97–104, Instruction for Mr Rorté, 15 April 1636.
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pains to address the princes’ scruples and umbrage over perceived 
slights to their honour and independence. Yet French frustration at 
this is evident. Not only was St Chamond told that ‘His Majesty 
considers it necessary to begin the negotiations by mentioning that 
His Majesty continues His concern for the conservation of the 
princes and estates of the empire – His friends and allies’; but St 
Chamond was also instructed to encourage the landgrave to be 
ready to give assistance to Duke Bernhard along the Rhine, with 
Bernhard acting ‘in the capacity of General of the League’ and 
Wilhelm acting ‘under his own name or under whatever other title 
it will please him to hold’.32
The German princes’ concern over the precise nature of their 
titles and honours was not merely a matter of personal ego and 
pride but an indication of a European society in which reputation 
and recognized social status were of the utmost importance. Thus 
even the most minor discourtesy shown towards a prince by the 
French crown could influence his individual status and honour within 
the empire’s intricate and closely observed web of hierarchical 
relationships. Navigating such subtle points was made all the more 
difficult for the princes, however, by the fact that the distinction 
between sovereign princely ally and noble military contractor might 
be fluid or unclear, and that subsidies from the French flowed into 
the pockets of both.33 At one end of the spectrum were princes such 
as Wilhelm of Hesse-Cassel, who studiously maintained and insisted 
on his princely status throughout all of his treaties with the French. 
At the other end were princes such as Count Ernst von Mansfeld, 
who often wielded an army as large as that of Hesse-Cassel but 
who was not a major territorial lord and was not treated as such 
in any of his subsidy agreements, which clearly understood him as 
a mercenary contractor.34
The nature of the Franco-German relationship was far more 
uncertain for Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, who was without doubt 
one of the most significant of France’s German subsidy recipients. 
32 Ibid., fol. 101r.
33 For more on this topic, see Andrea Thiele, ‘The Prince as Military Entre-
preneur? Why Smaller Saxon Territories Sent “Holländische Regimenter” 
(Dutch Regiments) to the Dutch Republic’, in War, Entrepreneurs, and the 
State in Europe and the Mediterranean, 1300–1800, ed. by Jeff Fynn-Paul 
(Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2014), pp. 170–192.
34 Walter Krüssmann, Ernst von Mansfeld (1580–1626): Grafensohn, Söld-
nerführer, Kriegsunternehmer gegen Habsburg im Dreißigjährigen Krieg 
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2010). 
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Bernhard was only a lesser German prince and not initially the ruler 
of a territorial state. After a long military career, mostly in the 
service of the Swedes, he had gained an impressive reputation and, 
as reward for his service, the duchy of Franconia. In 1633 he was 
also made general-in-chief for the army of the Heilbronn League. 
Then, in October 1635, after the League had withered (when most 
of its members joined the Peace of Prague, which brought them 
back under the emperor), Bernhard made an individual treaty with 
the French at Saint-Germain-en-Laye. According to the terms of 
this agreement, in return for an annual subsidy of 4 million livres 
(1.6 million reichstaler) and part of the territory of Alsace, Bernhard 
would field an army of eighteen thousand men to their mutual 
benefit. Interestingly, however, while most scholars consider Bernhard 
a military enterpriser or contractor, Bernhard, as with Wilhelm of 
Hesse-Cassel above, maintained in this treaty a claim to sovereign 
status and independence by refusing to swear an individual oath of 
loyalty to the French king.35
Yet despite this, the French, as we saw above in their negotiations 
with Wilhelm of Hesse-Cassel, still referred to Bernhard in conde-
scending terms as non-sovereign and fundamentally different to the 
landgrave. The immediate result of the confusion between Bernhard-
the-contractor and Bernhard-the-sovereign-ally was tension and 
discontent on both sides. While the French attempted to direct the 
duke and control his military actions, he chafed openly at any 
oversight and tried to use his influence to advance both his own 
princely power and the interests of the Protestant German princes. 
Matters between the French and the duke only deteriorated with 
time, as Bernhard began openly defying the requests of the French, 
pursing military goals they opposed, and generally indicating scorn 
for his supposed partners. Such intransigence, despite the ‘large 
amounts distributed’ to the duke, ‘greatly displeased’ the French 
king, who called on the duke to consider the common cause. 
Nevertheless, after taking the fortress of Breisach in 1638, Bernhard 
concluded the surrender in his own name, not that of the French, 
35 Bernhard Röse, Herzog Bernhard der Große von Sachsen-Weimar, vol. II 
(Weimar: Verlag des Großh. Sächs. priv. Landes-Industrie-Comptoirs, 1829), 
pp. 457–461, 554–556. See also Heinrich Bücheler, ‘Bernhard von Sachsen-
Weimar: der Cottodiere des Protestantismus’, Damals 22 (1990), 63–79; 
Amblard-Marie-Raymond-Amédée Noailles, vicomte de, Bernard de Saxe-
Weimar (1604 à 1639) et la réunion de l’Alsace à la France (Paris: Perrin, 
1908); Parrott, Business of War, pp. 107–110. 
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and installed a governor loyal and answerable to himself. The French 
were relieved when he died in 1639.36 Although such a spectacularly 
poor relationship was not the norm, the unequal status between 
subsidy giver and subsidy recipient often led to at least some 
uncertainty and disagreement over the extent of independence these 
agreements allowed.
Subsidies as a means to French domination of the empire
The subsidy-related anxieties of France’s German allies also fit into 
a far larger storm then brewing over French influence in the empire. 
To date, most scholarship on anti-French sentiment has focused on 
the rise of the aggressive France of Louis XIV later in the seventeenth 
century, and it was certainly at that time that concerns about the 
French exploded, with numerous calls for Germans to beware such 
things as ‘the secret intrigues of the French King’s ministers at the 
courts of several princes for the enslaving of Europe’.37 Similarly, 
Samuel von Pufendorf, in his Present State of Germany (1696), 
warned of the dangers of French subsidies and pensions, arguing 
that ‘the man must be very stupid, who doth not see, that the End 
of all this Courtship is the opening a Way to the Ruin of 
the German Liberty, especially if the Male Line of the House 
of Austria should happen to fail. And the French King should there 
upon obtain the Empire.’ 38 Thus, he added later in the work:
Germans must be careful not to contribute to their own servitude 
by assisting France, as happens when they do not conjoin their counsels 
and strength to repulse the enemy that threatens them all, but either 
incline together to ruin their fatherland because they have been bought 
by French gold, or sit by quietly, corrupted by noxious bribes, without 
36 AAECP Allemagne 15, fols 285–288, Louis XIII to d’Avaux, 16 July 1639.
37 Jean Baptiste Colbert, Monsieur Colbert’s ghost … (London: Printed for 
Edward Golden, 1684). The classic work on the so-called soldier trade of the 
eighteenth century is Friedrich Kapp, Der Soldatenhandel deutscher Fürsten 
nach Amerika (Berlin: Julius Springer, 1874). For more modern treatments 
see Charles W. Ingrao, The Hessian Mercenary State: Ideas, Institutions, and 
Reform under Frederick II, 1760–1785 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987); James Allen Vann, The Making of a State: Württemberg, 
1593–1793 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); Peter H. Wilson, War, 
State and Society in Württemberg, 1677–1793 (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1995).
38 Samuel von Pufendorf, The Present State of Germany, trans. by Edmund 
Bohun, ed. by Michael J. Seidler (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2007), p. 380.
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a care for the public good – even though others are struggling and 
they, too, will be devoured by Polyphemus after the rest have been 
consumed.39
Decades later, in an empire reeling from numerous French-initiated 
conflicts, such sentiments would be common, finding their way, for 
example, into the writings of Friedrich Wilhelm I who, in a letter 
of instruction for his son, Friedrich II (‘the Great’), famously stressed 
the importance of freeing the Prussian military from dependency 
on French and other foreign subsidies.40
Yet such anti-French propaganda and fears of French attempts 
to use money to achieve universal dominion, or at least domination 
of the empire, clearly had deeper roots; and especially during the 
middle years of the Thirty Years’ War, when French cash poured 
into German coffers and French armies crossed over into the empire, 
this sentiment gained ground. The most prominent of such critiques 
came from pro-Habsburg Catholics, who used the popular press to 
discredit France and its German Protestant supporters and to divide 
the allies. The 1626 polemical pamphlet ‘Altera secretissima instruc-
tio’, for example, was ostensibly an anonymous supporter’s letter 
of advice to Calvinist Elector Palatine Friedrich V, but was in fact 
an attempt by a member of the imperial privy council in Vienna to 
cause internal allied distrust. The author warned the elector that 
past French financial support for the Dutch Calvinists provided 
clear evidence that ‘it is never safe to trust to French papists’, for 
they had only used the conflict for their own purposes. During the 
Dutch Revolt against the Spanish, he argued,
the [French] king’s letters [of credit] were thrust upon every man, 
nay money was brought, but all to that end that the French might 
have time to make their own Peace, that they might settle their own 
affairs in a safe point, and derive the extremity of danger upon the 
Hollanders, and boast that the French were craftier then the craftiest. 
With the same fraud they will deal with you, suddenly leave you 
or ruin you … Count Maurice [prince of Orange] advised often, 
that French aid was to be used, but their faith not to be trusted 
to. The Great League rested upon the lilies, but they have pulled 
39 Ibid., n. 814. See also Peter Claus Hartmann, Geld als Instrument europäischer 
Machtpolitik im Zeitalter des Merkantilismus (Munich: Kommission für 
Bayerische Landesgeschichte, 1978).
40 Philip G. Dwyer, The Rise of Prussia 1700–1830 (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2014), pp. 56–57. 
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away their heads; and when one hath most need of them they turn  
enemies.41
Such critics thus warned Germans that the mendacious French 
wielded their subsidies in the empire only to benefit themselves, 
and would surely abandon their deluded allies when it suited them. 
The result would be a stronger France but an empire left damaged, 
its people dead and displaced, its ancient liberties and Catholic 
Church crippled. Similar critiques also appear in private correspond-
ence. In July 1647, for example, the Catholic Bishop von Wartenberg 
noted in his diary after a meeting with two of the French delegates 
to the Peace of Westphalia, the duc de Longueville and Claude 
d’Avaux, that although one might hope for better from fellow 
Catholics, ‘through French interposition [in the empire], nothing 
has been improved. On the contrary, through its subsidies and 
confederates, it has inflicted irreparable damage on Catholicism in 
Germany – if not by intention, then at least in effect.’ 42
Catholics were the most outspoken critics of the French and their 
subsidies; but after the 1635 Peace of Prague, when most German 
Protestants abandoned their foreign allies and joined the imperial 
side, anti-French critiques became more multi-confessional. French 
intervention then became more explicit, for, in response to the loss 
of its allies, France sent its own troops across the Rhine into the 
empire, rather feebly defending this action by claiming that it was 
still attempting to protect the German liberties – even if the princes 
themselves had abandoned the effort. The leader of the Protestant 
princes’ volte-face at this time was Elector Johann Georg of Saxony, 
who transformed himself from an imperial rebel into an imperial 
general and a prominent voice of anti-foreign sentiment. In a 1638 
letter to the Hessian estates, for example, he castigated them for 
their refusal to come to peace or reject their French allies. Rather 
than look to German solutions, as almost all other princes had 
done, the elector argued, the Hessians trusted that their goals would 
be more likely ‘to be pushed through under the domination of foreign-
ers. And thus at the same time the beloved fatherland and the whole 
41 Noel Malcolm, Reason of State, Propaganda, and the Thirty Years’ War: 
An Unknown Translation by Thomas Hobbes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2007), pp. 140–142, 144 (English modernized for ease of reading).
42 APW III C 3, 2, Diarium Wartenberg, vol. 2, 2, ed. by Joachim Foerster 
(Münster: Aschendorff, 1987), pp. 936–937.
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German nation would go to rack and ruin. And you would want 
to rend asunder all volumes of the holy imperial constitution under 
the name of German freedom.’ 43
Yet even among those Germans who rejected the Peace of Prague 
and maintained French alliances, we see an awkward disconnect 
between, on the one hand, an acceptance and even eagerness to 
accept subsidies and honours, and, on the other, a striking distrust 
of French pretentions and unease at the spectre of French dominance 
over the German lands and people. For example, one pamphlet, 
published ostensibly by a leading officer of Bernhard’s army shortly 
after his death in 1639, offered a strong defence of imperial territorial 
integrity and fear that Bernhard’s conquests along the Rhine would 
now fall to France. What would all ‘righteous German hearts’ think 
of them, he asked, if, through their actions, they
burdened the fatherland with such a powerful neighbour and so 
brought the ancient acquired liberty into the most extreme danger … 
[with] the result that foreign potentates, peoples, and nations, after 
they suck the marrow from the bones of us Germans, shall also rule 
over and dominate us, divide the Roman Empire among themselves, 
eliminate German liberty, and impose on us … the unprecedented 
mockery of the yoke of slavery, while we, with our own sweat and 
blood and acting in a blind, mindless way, help them like poor slaves.44
Despite such public demands for German liberty, however, the 
directors of Bernhard’s army eventually signed a treaty with the 
French. By requiring oaths of loyalty from the generals, that treaty 
placed them more firmly under French control and authority while 
still leaving them full operational independence. This was a move 
that the historian C.V. Wedgwood called, with typical flair, ‘the 
final abdication of the German patriots, such as they were, from 
any even partial control of their allies’ war’.45
43 HStAM 4d Nr. 90, Johann Georg of Saxony (copy) to the Estates of Hesse-
Cassel, Dresden, 12/22 January 1638.
44 AbtruckSchreibens Von einem fürnehmen Officier vnter der von Hertzog 
Bernhardt Sachsen Weinmar hinterlassenen Armee … (1639), fols Bi r, 
Bii r. Of course, it is quite possible that this too was a bit of Habsburg 
propaganda, not the work of a Protestant French ally.
45 C.V. Wedgwood, The Thirty Years War (New York: New York Review 
of Books, 1938), pp. 412–413. Note that the oath was a matter of great 
controversy, and not actually sworn until August 1640. On this matter, see 
David Parrott, Richelieu’s Army: War, Government and Society in France, 
1624–1642 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 295–296. 
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As a sign of their lingering internal concern about French arro-
gance, untrustworthiness, and empty promises, the Hessians also 
briefly (beginning in 1639) entertained a scheme, in conjunction 
with the Catholic duke of Pfalz-Neuburg, to form a new third party 
in the empire. This league of princes would create a purely German, 
and bi-confessional, power bloc within the empire, a bloc that would 
counter the Franco-Swedish party on the one hand and the Imperial-
Spanish party on the other. Draft manifestos (for the league never 
came to fruition) argued that ‘foreign kings and potentates’ had 
used the war as an excuse to seize ‘one place after another in the 
empire’. Yet ‘in spite of all this, so many noble German cavaliers 
find themselves in the service of such foreign potentates whereby, 
under the false delusion of the conservation of their freedom, they 
themselves co-operate in the oppression and subjection of their 
fatherland’. If German princes did not soon extract themselves from 
service to foreign crowns, the manifesto warned, ‘they and other 
German princes will be plunged and precipitated into a far greater 
servitude and slavery than had ever before occurred’. To save 
themselves and their fatherland from ‘further oppression and dis-
memberment’ by these foreign powers, all imperial electors, princes, 
and estates ‘without distinction of religion’ must co-operate and 
unite into a ‘faithful coalition’.46
Subsidies as one part of a greater threat to the fatherland
In common usage, the term fatherland (Vaterland in German or 
patria in Latin) indicated the town or land of one’s birth; but, by 
the sixteenth century, the term was also being used to indicate a 
larger, more abstract political body, territory, or kingdom to which 
its adherents owed loyalty and service, and which they were obliged 
to defend. The term also became highly politicized, and was especially 
wielded by those attempting to justify military and political opposition 
to a central authority. In this sense a person who demonstrated love 
for the fatherland (amor patriae), that is, who was a ‘patriot’, would 
not simply show civic piety by defending his fatherland’s religion 
and laws – the classic definition of patriot found in the works of 
Cicero; he would safeguard the constitutional privileges of the 
46 Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, Abteilung Westfalen [LANRW] Julich 
Berg II 3370, fols 10r–13v, 14 July 1639; LANRW Julich Berg II 3370, fols 
47–54v, 13 February 1640.
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fatherland against the unjust acts of a despotic ruler or power.47 
During the Thirty Years’ War, it was this broader idea of amor 
patriae that was seized upon by internal opponents of imperial 
power, but the league manifesto demonstrates how this idea was 
also directed against subsidy alliances with the French and other 
foreigners. Germans who joined these foreigners or accepted their 
money, titles, and honours, the manifesto warned, might mean well, 
but had in truth been tricked into co-operating in their own, and 
the empire’s, subjugation and enslavement.
We thus see a recurring theme in critiques of French subsidies – that 
the French intended to gain and dominate the empire not so much 
through force of arms but through the softer, more insidious strategy 
of trickery, delusion, and money. Even worse, the Germans themselves 
seemed willing to assist in this plan, gladly fighting for the French 
and stupidly trusting their inducements and false assurances that 
the king desired nothing more than the preservation of the German 
liberties. If Germans did not awaken to the danger, the critics argued, 
the French would not merely enslave them but dismember them, 
devour them, and suck the marrow from their bones. The French, 
in other words, would take from them both their freedom and their 
very essence. Interestingly, this new anti-subsidy rhetoric clearly drew 
on, and then merged into, an existing anti-French polemic that was 
concerned not primarily with the dangers of French military-financial 
might but with the threat of France’s dominant cultural power. For 
by the end of the sixteenth century, French art, music, clothing, and 
language had become all the rage at European princely courts and 
within wealthy urban social circles. This Francophilism among the 
European elite meant that young German nobles had French tutors, 
learned, spoke, and wrote in the French language from their early 
years, wore the latest in French fashion, often went to France as 
47 For more on ideas of patria, see Robert von Friedenburg (ed.), ‘Patria’ 
und ‘Patrioten’ vor dem Patriotismus: Pflichten, Rechte, Glauben und die 
Rekonfigurierung europäischer Gemeinwesen im 17. Jahrhundert (Wiesbaden: 
Harrassowitz Verlag, 2005); Alexander Schmidt, Vaterlandsliebe und Reli-
gionskonflikt: Politische Diskurse im Alten Reich (1555–1648) (Leiden: Brill, 
2014); Gundula Caspary, Späthumanismus und Reichspatriotismus: Melchior 
Goldast und seine Editionen zur Reichsverfassungsgeschichte (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006); Orest Ranum (ed.), National Conscious-
ness, History and Political Culture in Early Modern Europe (Baltimore 
and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975); Alastair Duke and 
Andrew Spicer, Dissident Identities in the Early Modern Low Countries, 
ed. by Judith Pollmann and Andrew Spicer (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 
pp. 1–76.
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part of their Grand Tour, and then brought home and aped French 
etiquette, courtly styles, and political patterns.
By the beginning of the seventeenth century, such wholescale 
elite adoption of foreign trends brought about a conservative reaction 
and led to calls among some intellectuals for Germans to show a 
greater love of their fatherland by reviving and celebrating native 
German culture, language, traditions, and values. One clear example 
of this trend is the 1617 establishment in Weimar of the Frucht-
bringende Gesellschaft (‘Fruitbearing Society’). This elite literary 
society, founded on an Italian model, had as its goals the establishment 
of linguistic norms, the purification of the German language and 
purging of foreign words and phrases, and the advancement of 
German in literary and scholarly works – where it sadly lagged 
behind other European vernaculars. From the beginning, however, 
the Society had at its heart both a literary or linguistic goal and 
what we might call a political, patriotic purpose. This was both 
negative, in terms of driving out foreign influences, and positive, 
in attempting to forge a unified German literary tradition, to advance 
the honour and reputation of the German language (and thus also 
of German speakers), and to spark an empire-wide regeneration 
through the improvement of morals and the restoration of unique 
German cultural norms.48
German language theorists within the Society and elsewhere 
criticized France, in particular, as exerting an enervating influence 
on German behaviour, character, and unity. Moreover, Society 
writings warned, true Germans needed to be careful, for foreign 
linguistic domination was only the first step in the complete political 
enslavement of the German nation and loss of its shared identity.49 
Especially as the war dragged on, the Society presented itself as a 
48 Calls for German purity stretch back to the medieval era, but the seventeenth 
century saw the rise of numerous specifically literary societies, including the 
Aufrichtige Tannengesellschaft (est. 1633), the Deutchgesinnete Genossenschaft 
(est. 1643), and the Pegnesische Blumenorden (est. 1644). For more on what 
he terms the ‘linguistic patriotism’ of these baroque language societies, see 
Thorsten Roelcke, ‘Der Patriotismus der barocken Sprachgesellschaften’, 
in Nation und Sprache: Die Diskussion ihres Verhältnisses in Geschichte 
und Gegenwart, ed. by Andreas Gardt (Berlin and New York, 2000), 
pp. 139–168.
49 The Pietist mystic Jakob Böhme, for example, argued for the special sanctity 
of German as the pure ‘sensual’ mother language that gave Germans their 
national identity. See Leon Stein, ‘Religion and Patriotism in German Peace 
Dramas during the Thirty Years War’, Central European History IV.2 (June 
1971), 131–148 (p. 133).
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defender of common German interests and of the freedoms threatened 
by foreign influence, and offered the German language as the best 
way for Germans – divided in so many other ways – to unite.50 As 
the Society member Karl Gustav von Hille argued, ‘[a]lthough our 
German empire sheds blood and tears, and is almost to the point 
of death because war afflicts it without end, yet the Palm Tree [the 
symbol of the Society] blossoms in the weapons of the virtuous, gives 
a welcome shaded space, and is greened by the dew from heaven’.51
Many of the arguments used by the Society and others who were 
concerned about foreign cultural domination thus employ the same 
imagery as that used against foreign subsidies, and advance much 
the same goal as those attempting to form a purely German imperial 
third party. Like the anti-subsidy authors, moreover, these linguistic 
patriots’ warnings against German slavery and folly suggest a 
widespread sense of insecurity and defensiveness, as well as an effort 
to heal imperial divisions and weakness by forging a new unified 
German national identity. A poem by Sigmund von Birken (known 
to the society as ‘Der Erwachsene’ or ‘the Adult’) provides an excellent 
example of this. ‘Learn from the Latins and let the Gauls teach you 
how one should honour the fatherland and its language’, he wrote:
Where is the Walloon who uses German? And where is the Frenchman 
who loves our tongue? Why then do you hold only to foreign mouths 
and ears? Is your language then born ignobly? … Pift! German! 
Shame on you! And if you will not be shamed, then God will take 
from you your honour and your freedom. If you make your language 
a maid, you will become a servant of the foreigners, because your 
fatherland is not good enough for you. No, patriot, oh no, treat 
yourself better! If you will be a nation, then you will be greater in 
honour and in reputation. Help old German loyalty, my German, 
help make new the adornment of the German language!52
According to Birken, therefore, Germans did not currently form a 
true ‘nation’ – a unified ethnic community or people. They could 
become one, however, by rejecting foreign language and service and 
by coming together under their shared, worthy German cultural 
and linguistic traditions. Thus in many ways, this movement, which 
50 This was the argument of the great German poet Opitz. See Joachim Whaley, 
Germany and the Holy Roman Empire, vol. I (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), p. 466.
51 Karl Gustav von Hille, Der Teutsche Palmbaum (Munich: Kösel Verlag, 
1970), pp. 28–29.
52 Georg Neumark, Der Neu-Sprossende Teutsche Palmbaum (Weinmar [Nürn-
berg]: Joachim Heinrich Schmid, 1668), VIII.
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tied identity and political freedom to cultural preservation, demon-
strates an interesting prefiguring of nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
cultural nationalism.53
Nevertheless, such arguments did little to stem the use of the 
French styles and French language, both at the princely courts and 
in literary and diplomatic circles. French also remained the language 
of the European and German officer class, partly because of the 
ongoing influence of French military schools and manuals. The 
dominance of French military terminology caused some critics, such 
as the Stettin military engineer Wendelin Schildknecht, to complain 
that ‘although we were born of our mother in Germany’, we behave 
as if ‘we were suckled in France by an ape and raised by a baboon’.54 
The Hessian general Peter Melander, similarly, had the reputation 
of shunning the use of foreign languages, and he did not tolerate 
the use by his soldiers of such common French terms as corps de 
garde, parade, and parole, requiring instead the solid German terms 
Hauptwache, Stellung, and Wort.55 Melander, despite having accepted 
hundreds of thousands of French livres during his early career, 
would also turn against their subsidies in the end, leaving Hessian 
service in an angry protest against the continued French alliance, 
which he claimed would lead to German subjugation.56
53 This complicates Robert von Friedeburg’s argument that cultural meanings of 
patria were extremely unusual in the early modern era. Robert von Friedeburg, 
‘In Defense of Patria: Resisting Magistrates and the Duties of Patriots in the 
Empire from the 1530s to the 1640s’, Sixteenth Century Journal 32 (2001), 
357–382. Note that the attempt to form a common identity around language 
purposely excluded the large number of peoples living within the empire 
who were not native German speakers. For more on how early modern 
peoples attempted to shape themselves into nations, see Duke and Spicer, 
Dissident Identities; Robert Stein and Judith Pollmann (eds), Networks, 
Regions and Nations: Shaping Identities in the Low Countries, 1300–1650 
(Leiden: Brill, 2010); Adrian Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood. 
Ethnicity, Religion, and Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997); Georg Schmidt, ‘Die frühneuzeitliche Idee “deutsche Nation”: 
Mehrkonfessionalität und säkulare Werte’, in Nation und Religion in der 
Deutschen Geschichte, ed. by Heinz-Gerhard Haupt und Dieter Langewiesche 
(Frankfurt and New York: Campus, 2001), pp. 33–67.
54 William Jervis Jones, Images of Language: Six Essays on German Attitudes 
to European languages from 1500 to 1800 (Amsterdam: John Benjamins 
Publishing, 1999), pp. 96, 103–104.
55 Ibid., pp. 104–105.
56 HSAM 4f Frankreich, Nr. 1311, de la Boderie to Amalia Elisabeth, 9/19 
December 1640.
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Disquiet about foreign cultural and political domination, and 
the countervailing push for the creation of a shared German national 
identity, also spilled over into the German popular press from the 
late 1620s onwards, a development which coincided with the begin-
ning of French financial involvement in the war. Thus we find 
numerous pamphlets and broadsheets ridiculing Germans who wore 
French fashions, sported French beards, or used the French language 
in preference to the good old German tongue. A German who put 
on such foreign fashions and modes – a ‘Monsieur Alamodo’ – was 
shown to be both a fop and a fool.57 ‘As for the French, I know 
well that God will punish Germany through them’, one pamphlet 
writer opined, ‘for we have, like gesticulating apes in nightgowns, 
every day thoughtlessly and artlessly copied that nation in customs, 
ceremonies, gestures, banquets, language, clothes, and music. How 
could we fall into their hands better than this? But the Frenchman 
shall not become emperor in this way. The lilies belong to him; the 
eagle belongs to the Germans.’ 58
Conclusions
This study of the German understanding of French subsidies sheds 
new light on the Thirty Years’ War by highlighting the internal 
tension among princes over how best to preserve both their liberties 
and their national identity. On the one hand, the German subsidy 
recipients described French moneys as beneficial, functional, and 
indeed necessary tools for the pursuit of their political and religious 
goals, which helped them to defend both their territorial rights and 
the proper balance of power within the larger empire. The princes 
also celebrated and fought over such subsidies, and the titles and 
gifts that often accompanied them, as indicators and promoters of 
their personal honour and social status. On the other hand, those 
opposed to French involvement in the war complained that such 
subsidy agreements were not helpful but foolish, and damaging to 
the German liberties, in that they not only allowed a hostile foreign 
crown to meddle in imperial affairs but probably concealed sinister 
efforts by the French to weaken, conquer, or even dismember the 
empire. France’s German allies shared some of these suspicions and 
57 John Roger Paas, The German Political Broadsheet 1600–1700, vol. 4 
(Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1994), pp. 34, 291–322, 352–375; vol. 7 (2002), 
pp. 27–28, 232–236, 240–244.
58 Der Deutsche Brutus, Das ist: Ein Abgeworffenes Schreiben … (1636).
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expressed unease that subsidy treaties, by leaving them dependent 
on French aid and placing them under French protection, made 
them seem mercenaries or supplicants, constantly having to beg or 
threaten to be paid while simultaneously needing to resist French 
efforts to use money as a means of control and domination. Such 
fears about a possible loss of German princely or imperial sovereignty 
and territorial integrity then drew on and merged with pre-existing 
anxieties and insecurities about the weakness or disunity of the 
German people and culture as a whole. As a result, both types of 
fear were reinforced – a process that helped contribute, well before 
the French Revolution, to calls for the creation of a unified German 
nation centred on a shared linguistic-cultural inheritance.
3




Subsidies are widely acknowledged as an important manifestation 
of European interstate relations between the fifteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, and they are beginning to attract serious 
attention from scholars. To date, research has largely focused on 
individual agreements or sets of agreements as part of wider dip-
lomatic relations between two states. It is recognized that such 
relations were invariably asymmetrical, with the stronger party 
paying the weaker one in return for some kind of support or co-
operation, usually in military or political terms. Subsidies are seen 
as an extension of a states system, like a financial lubricant smoothing 
and strengthening alliances between sovereign governments. Most 
research draws heavily on official records and concentrates on 
quantifying how much was paid and what kind of support was 
purchased.1 Ancillary to this are studies examining the public discus-
sion of such arrangements, especially in the eighteenth century when 
they drew criticism as akin to ‘mercenary’ service and unworthy of 
civilized governments.2 Finally, there are works on the soldiers who 
served under ‘subsidy treaties’. Like the other two approaches, this 
1 For example, P.C. Hartmann, Geld als Instrument europäischer Machtpolitik 
im Zeitalter des Merkantilismus 1715–1740 (Munich: Kommission für 
Bayerische Landesgeschichte, 1978).
2 C.W. Eldon, England’s Subsidy Policy towards the Continent during the 
Seven Years War (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1938); H.D. 
Schmidt, ‘The Hessian Mercenaries: The Career of a Political Cliché’, History 
43 (1958), 207–212.
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third category usually focuses narrowly on individual cases and 
views these from a variety of hostile perspectives, such as subaltern 
studies, often echoing early modern critiques of the ‘soldier trade’.3
This chapter argues that we need to set subsidies in their wider 
context as just one of many ways of transferring war-making resources 
across political jurisdictions. Subsidies belong to the contractual 
forms which emerged during early modernity and which this chapter 
will term Fiscal-Military Instruments. These were contractual forms 
and specific recognized practices which evolved to facilitate the 
procurement and exchange of a wide variety of war-making resources 
supplied not only by states but also by a host of non-state actors. 
This exchange of resources was sufficiently complex and extensive 
to warrant the term European Fiscal-Military System which is 
deliberately used here to extend, rather than replace, the existing 
term Fiscal-Military State by supplementing the study of war’s impact 
on domestic development with an examination of how it affected 
interaction with other states and non-state actors. Taking this broader 
perspective removes subsidies from the narrow, and partly anach-
ronistic, confines of diplomatic and conventional political history 
anchored on the study of sovereign states, which tends to reduce 
research to a cost-benefit analysis of objectives and outcomes in 
military, economic, and political terms.
The primary goal of this chapter is to disentangle subsidies from 
other Fiscal-Military Instruments, notably the various forms of 
contract to supply troops with which subsidy treaties were often 
combined. The first part will sketch the wider context by briefly 
outlining the emergence, scope, and eventual demise of the European 
Fiscal-Military System, before defining Fiscal-Military Instruments 
and identifying the most common forms. The third, more substantial, 
section will examine the different kinds of troop contracts and 
indicate the extent to which they were combined with subsidies.
3 This is particularly true of works on the so-called ‘Hessians’ fighting for 
Britain during the American Revolutionary War, much of which is stuck 
in ‘for and against’ arguments already articulated in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries: Peter Keir Taylor, Indentured to Liberty: Peasant Life 
and the Hessian Military State, 1688–1815 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1994); Charles W. Ingrao, The Hessian Mercenary State: Ideas, Institu-
tions, and Reform under Frederick II 1760–1785 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987); Die ‘Hessen’ im Amerikanischen Unabhängigkeitskrieg 
(1776–1783), ed. by Holger Th. Gräf, Andreas Hedwig, and Annegret 
Wenz-Haubfleisch (Marburg: Historische Kommission für Hessen, 2014).
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The European Fiscal-Military System
European political geography is the product of violent competition 
which has left the continent divided into distinct states. This process 
is often described as a Darwinian struggle for survival, with only 
the ‘fittest’ states achieving full sovereignty. Leopold von Ranke, 
one of the founders of modern historical method, argued that ‘primacy 
of foreign policy’ dictated how each state developed internally. Each 
state strove for autarky, modifying its own institutions, economy, 
and society so as to compete more aggressively and efficiently with 
its neighbours.4
More recently, John Brewer coined the term ‘Fiscal-Military State’ 
to describe the institutionalization of permanent taxation and armed 
forces during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. His study is 
part of a wider debate on whether authoritarian or constitutional 
states are more efficient at mobilizing resources for warfare.5 This 
4 Leopold von Ranke, Das Politische Gespräch und andere Schriftchen zur 
Wissenschaftslehre (Halle: M. Niemeyer, 1925; first published in 1836), pp. 
10–35, available in English as ‘A Dialogue on Politics’, in Theodore H. von 
Laue (ed.), Leopold von Ranke: The Formative Years (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1950), pp. 152–180, esp. pp. 167–168. The concept was 
developed further by Ranke’s colleague Wilhelm Dilthey, ‘Friedrich der 
Große und die deutsche Aufklärung’, in Dilthey, Studien zur Geschichte 
des deutschen Geistes (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1959; first 
published in 1927), pp. 176–205, and propagated further by Otto Hintze, 
‘Military Organisation and the Organisation of the State’, in The Historical 
Essays of Otto Hintze, ed. by Felix Gilbert (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1975), pp. 180–215, esp. p. 180.
5 John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State 
1688–1783 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989). The subsequent debate has 
spawned an extensive literature, of which the following offer good introduc-
tions: The British Fiscal Military States 1660–c.1783, ed. by Aaron Graham 
and Patrick Walsh (Farnham: Ashgate, 2016); War, State and Development: 
Fiscal-Military States in the Eighteenth Century, ed. by Rafael Torres Sánchez 
(Pamplona: Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, 2007); The Fiscal-Military State 
in Eighteenth-century Europe, ed. by Christopher Storrs (Farnham: Ashgate, 
2009). There are important, though often unacknowledged, connections with 
the earlier discussions of Joseph Schumpeter’s historical sociology of the 
emergence of the ‘tax state’, especially in his classic ‘The Crisis of the Tax 
State’, International Economic Papers 4 (1954), 5–38, which was written 
in 1918. See also Richard Abel Musgrave, ‘Schumpeter’s Crisis of the Tax 
State’, Journal of Evolutionary Economics 2 (1992), 89–113; E. Ladewig 
Petersen, ‘From Domain State to Tax State: Synthesis and Interpretation’, 
Scandinavian Economic History Review 23 (1975), 116–134.
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research has greatly extended our understanding of the relationships 
among political institutions, economies, and societies; but it has 
largely overlooked the fact that virtually no European state has 
waged war without external assistance.
This is the paradox of European history. Competition was possible 
only through co-operation with allies, neutrals, and even enemies, 
since states have rarely obtained all they needed for warfare from 
their own populations, while governments have generally been unable 
to prevent their own subjects from aiding other powers. The ‘success’ 
of each state has depended not only on its ability to assert itself 
militarily but also on its being recognized as a ‘state’ by its neighbours. 
The emergence of diplomatic conventions and international law is 
only one aspect of this process. Europe contained a host of semi-
sovereign entities, like the German and Italian principalities and 
city-states, which not only struggled to preserve or enhance their 
autonomy but also provided war-making resources to other, larger 
states.
These exchanges have primarily been studied from the perspective 
of diplomacy, which only identifies formal alliances and arrangements 
between states. In fact, the connections were far more complex and 
profound, as they encompassed numerous non-state actors like 
merchants, entrepreneurs, bankers, experts, and agents of all kinds.6 
The resources that were transferred ranged from armaments to fully 
equipped and manned warships, from individual recruits to entire 
armies, from barrels of cash to sophisticated financial transfers and 
credit. Additionally, numerous services were provided, such as 
transportation for men and materials, the right to cross neutral 
territory or use specialist facilities like ports, as well as the exchange 
of intelligence and specialist know-how.
These transfers were handled by intermediaries often based in 
cities which were not necessarily political capitals, but which 
functioned as ‘hubs’ or nodal points in the complex Fiscal-Military 
System that emerged during the 1560s and matured around 1700, 
when all the essential features were in place.7 These included 
6 Useful examples of the different kinds of agent in War, Entrepreneurs, 
and the State in Europe and the Mediterranean, 1300–1800, ed. by Jeff 
Fynn-Paul (Leiden: Brill, 2014).
7 These ideas are elaborated at greater length in Peter H. Wilson, ‘The 
European Fiscal-Military System and the Habsburg Monarchy’, in The 
Habsburg Monarchy as a Fiscal-Military State c.1648–1815: Contours and 
Perspectives, ed. by William Godsey, Petr Mat’a, and Thomas Winkelbauer 
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recognized ways of interacting, such as specific forms of military 
conventions, recruitment contracts, and financial exchanges, all of 
which were as much part of Europe’s political development as 
diplomatic protocol or court rituals. This system allowed governments 
to access vital additional resources and greatly contributed to the 
growing scale and intensity of warfare across this period.
The French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars saw both the 
peak of the system and the onset of its demise. The revolutionary 
ideology of the citizen-in-arms, as well as the Revolution’s assault 
on social and geographical privileges, greatly expanded the state’s 
war-making potential by removing many of the legal barriers to 
the mobilization of human and material resources. Simultaneously, 
the state’s greater reach was legitimated by heightened nationalist 
ideology (sovereignty of the nation), which expanded the state’s 
power to command ‘national’ resources whilst discouraging reli-
ance on ‘foreigners’.8 The nationalization of war-making resources 
encouraged efforts to prevent their ‘export’ to potential enemies 
by curbing extra-territorial violence through bans on privateering 
or enlisting in foreign armies.9 Co-operation continued amidst the 
competition as states agreed collectively to remove or nationalize the 
non-state actors, for instance through a more coherent articulation 
of neutrality after 1815.10
Meanwhile, the wars between 1792 and 1866 eliminated most 
of Europe’s smaller states, as well as the remaining areas of fuzzy 
(Oxford: Proceedings of the British Academy, forthcoming); ‘Competition 
through Cooperation: The European Fiscal Military System 1560–1850’, 
inaugural lecture, University of Oxford, 30 January 2017, podcast at 
www.history.ox.ac.uk/article/peter-h-wilson-inaugural-lecture. The concept 
of ‘hubs’ is discussed further by Marianne Klerk, Chapter 9 below. 
8 The introduction of more truly universal conscription is one example of this: 
Conscription in the Napoleonic Era: A Revolution in Military Affairs?, ed. 
by Donald J. Stoker, Frederick C. Schneid, and Harold D. Blanton (London: 
Routledge, 2014).
9 For this process, see Janice E. Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereigns: 
State-building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Jan Martin Lemnitzer, Power, Law and 
the End of Privateering (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2014); Nir Arielli, Gabriela 
A. Frei, and Inge van Hulle, ‘The Foreign Enlistment Act, International Law, 
and British Politics 1819–2014’, International History Review 38 (2016), 
636–656.
10 Maartje Abbenhuis, An Age of Neutrals: Great Power Politics 1815–1914 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
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sovereignty such as the German Confederation. These areas had 
been the major suppliers of foreign troops together with Switzerland, 
which progressively curbed its inhabitants from enlisting in foreign 
armies between 1848 and 1870 as such enlistment was considered 
increasingly at odds with the country’s official neutrality adopted 
in 1815. The surviving larger states emerged better equipped to 
wage war independently of outsiders. Industrialization assisted this, 
partly by boosting domestic arms manufacture (though few states 
achieved self-sufficiency) but mainly by easing recruiting problems 
by replacing manual labour by machine production. European 
imperialism simultaneously opened access to additional military 
human resources. The recruitment of indigenous soldiers reduced 
(relatively speaking) the numbers of Europeans required to expand 
and defend empires, whilst also increasing overall numbers that 
could be deployed globally.11
The risks of conflict were increased, however, because the presence 
of nationalism combined with the removal of minor states made it 
harder to make peace through the traditional means of minor ter-
ritorial adjustments. Meanwhile, the nationalization of warfare 
meant that, when conflicts broke out, their impact on each belligerent 
was even greater than before, leading to what has become known 
as the age of ‘total war’ 1914–1945.12
Fiscal-Military Instruments
Fiscal-Military Instruments evolved as ways to facilitate the procure-
ment and exchange of war-making resources between state and 
non-state actors across political jurisdictions. The emergence of 
these standardized practices contributed greatly to the coherence 
11 Examples in Guardians of Empire: The Armed Forces of the Colonial Powers, 
c. 1700–1964, ed. by David Killingray and David Omissi (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1999); Myron Echenberg, Colonial Conscripts: 
The Tirailleurs Sénégalais in French West Africa, 1857–1960 (London: 
Heinemann, 1990).
12 On the Road to Total War: The American Civil War and the German Wars 
of Unification, 1861–1871, ed. by Stig Förster and Jörg Nagler (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997); Anticipating Total War: The German 
and American Experiences, 1871–1914, ed. by Manfred F. Boemeke, Roger 
Chickering, and Stig Förster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); 
Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 
1914–1918, ed. by Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000).
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of Europe as a Fiscal-Military System and frequently enabled hostile, 
or at least mutually suspicious, parties to co-operate in what were 
high-risk arrangements.
Fiscal-Military Instruments such as troop levies were contracts 
between two or more parties which could be governments with 
their own jurisdictions, but were not necessarily so and could include 
semi-sovereign powers like the German principalities, or non-state 
actors like agents and contractors. They took a variety of forms, 
but all gave rise to a fiscal-military asset (i.e. some form of war-
making resource) of one entity, and a financial and/or political liability 
of another entity. One party agreed to provide some kind of assistance 
in return for material and/or political recompense from another 
who might be based in a different political jurisdiction. Agreements 
were framed as contracts, setting out the terms and obligations of 
each party. These were signed and sealed, and thus formally binding, 
despite the obvious absence of any supranational framework capable 
of enforcing them. Their key role was to foster trust between the 
parties through their appearance in commonly accepted, mutually 
understood forms.
The most obvious forms of Fiscal-Military Instruments were the 
various ways in which governments extracted human, financial, 
and material resources from their own subject populations. These 
frequently lacked explicit contracts, though all political authority 
rested on some kind of contractual theory of government in which 
the state provided protection against internal and external threats 
in return for subordination and support from the inhabitants. In 
practice, all states in the parts of Europe that were touched by 
Roman Catholicism developed some form of representative institution 
to mediate their demands for taxes, human resources, and materials. 
These forms of extraction can be labelled ‘fiscal’ and encompassed 
a wide variety of direct and indirect taxes paid in cash and kind, 
as well as forms of compulsory service extending from varieties of 
feudal levy through types of militia to different forms of conscription. 
Debt and forced loans were additional forms and played a substantial 
part in all war finance. These aspects have been widely studied as 
a dimension of the emergence of sovereign states, but this literature 
has generally interpreted states as autarkic actors and only examined 
their efforts to raise resources within their own territories.13 Fiscal 
13 The Rise of Fiscal States: A Global History, 1500–1914, ed. by Bartolomé 
Yun-Casalilla, Patrick K. O’Brien, and Francisco Comin (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012); The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, 
c. 1200–1815, ed. by Richard Bonney (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
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instruments were employed in neutral or hostile territory, notably 
through the levying of ‘contributions’ under the threat of violence. 
These extorted payments in cash and kind and emerged during the 
later sixteenth century, before being refined during the mid-1620s 
in the Thirty Years’ War. Contrary to their depiction in most second-
ary literature, contributions were not a form of licensed plundering 
but generally relied on formal agreements with the authorities of 
neutral or occupied communities and territories. These authorities 
employed their own fiscal structures to raise what was demanded, 
sometimes by introducing new taxes specifically for that purpose.14
Material Fiscal-Military Instruments were contracts which covered 
the provision of war-making materials ranging from warships, 
weaponry, munitions and other equipment to food and fodder, as 
well as the supply of horses and transport animals. These resources 
were often purchased, but they could also be hired – notably in the 
case of warships such as the fleet, complete with weaponry and 
crews, that was provided by the Dutch arms merchant Louis de 
Geer (1587–1652) for the Danes in their war against Sweden in 
1643–1645.15 Similar subcategories can be identified for contracts 
over the use of port facilities, transit for troops or war materials 
across another party’s territory, or for the supply of intelligence or 
expertise. The recent literature on the ‘contractor state’ has noted 
the significance of entrepreneurs, who were often more important 
in supplying the material needs of armies and navies than procurement 
from state-owned factories or yards.16 To date, this literature has 
1999). For a detailed example of the role of non-state actors as brokers for 
international loans, see Aaron Graham, ‘The War of the Spanish Succession, 
the Financial Revolution, and the Imperial Loans of 1706 and 1710’, in The 
War of the Spanish Succession: New Perspectives, ed. by Matthias Pohlig 
and Michael Schaich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 299–321.
14 Peter H. Wilson, ‘War Finance, Policy and Strategy in the Thirty Years 
War’, in Dynamik durch Gewalt? Der Dreißigjährige Krieg (1618–1648) 
als Faktor der Wandlungsprozesse des 17. Jahrhunderts, ed. by Michael 
Rohrschneider and Anuschka Tischer (Münster: Aschendorff, 2018), pp. 
229–250.
15 R.C. Anderson, Naval Wars in the Baltic during the Sailing-ship Epoch 
1522–1850 (London: C. Gilbert-Wood, 1910), pp. 47–69.
16 The Contractor State and Its Implications 1659–1815, ed. by Richard Harding 
and Sergio Solbes Ferri (Las Palmas de Gran Canaria: Universidad de Las 
Palmas de Gran Canaria, 2012); Roger Knight and Martin Wilcox, Sustaining 
the Fleet, 1793–1815: War, the British Navy and the Contractor State 
(Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 2010); Rafael Torres Sánchez, Military 
Entrepreneurs and the Spanish Contractor State in the Eighteenth Century 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
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largely focused on indigenous contractors supplying their own 
government; but it is clear that many were engaged in supplying 
other powers, often through networks of intermediaries.17
Like fiscal instruments, financial ones could be employed within 
a state’s own jurisdiction or across it to obtain money from other 
countries. Examples include bills of exchange, bonds, and all manner 
of loans and debts. Subsidies were another important, specific form, 
involving the promise of one party to provide financial support to 
another in return for military and/or political support or co-operation. 
A major problem in the literature has been confusion between the 
purpose of such agreements and the form they took. Subsidies could 
be paid for a wide variety of reasons, including securing the active 
support of an ally, enabling such support from a weaker partner 
which might otherwise be unable to assist, and paying another 
power to refrain from assisting a hostile third party. Likewise, the 
party receiving subsidies might have multiple motives of which 
simple financial gain was rarely the most prominent, despite the 
frequent characterization by earlier historians of such arrangements 
as ‘mercenary’.18 The purposes of subsidies varied greatly, but the 
form was essentially the same. They were agreed in a treaty which 
specified the amount, timing, duration, and form of payment, as 
well as the obligations of the recipient. There were often additional, 
secret articles detailing political co-operation, including political 
favours that the paying party promised the recipient in addition to 
the financial transaction.19
17 One example was de Geer. For others, see Julia Zunckel, Rüstungsgeschäfte im 
Dreißigjährigen Krieg: Unternehmerkräfte, Militärgüter und Marktstrategien 
im Handel zwischen Genua, Amsterdam und Hamburg (Berlin: Duncker 
und Humblot, 1997); Pepijn Brandon, War, Capital and the Dutch State 
(1588–1795) (Leiden: Brill, 2015).
18 For example, Max Braubach, Die Bedeutung der Subsidien für die Politik 
im spanischen Erbfolgekrieg (Bonn: Schroeder, 1923). Further discussion of 
the recipients’ motivation is found in Peter H. Wilson, ‘The German “Soldier 
Trade” of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: A Reassessment’, The 
International History Review 18 (1996), 757–792. For the debate on the 
term ‘mercenary’, see Sarah V. Percy, Mercenaries: The History of a Norm 
in International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
19 Much of the following is based on an analysis of the treaties signed by 
the English/British monarchy and numerous continental partners from the 
1680s to 1790s (in The National Archive, London, State Papers 103 and 
108 series), those signed by the Dutch Republic (in the National Archief, 
The Hague, 1.01.02 Staten Generaal, VII.A. De ratificaties van tractaten, 
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Subsidy treaties were arrangements between recognized, established 
political authorities, even if one or both parties lacked fully modern 
sovereignty, as in the case of the German princes who were bound 
within the wider framework of the Holy Roman Empire and who 
made up the majority of the recipients of such funds. It is important 
to note that subsidies often required other financial instruments to 
be delivered, such as bills of exchange or loans. Thus, like Fiscal-
Military Instruments generally, though they were agreements between 
political authorities, they frequently relied on non-state actors for 
their actual operation.
Historians have sometimes used the term ‘subsidy treaty’ for 
what should, for the sake of analytical clarity, be classed as one of 
the other three types of troop convention discussed below.20 Another 
common confusion arises from the fact that subsidy agreements 
shared a common origin in the ‘pensions’ paid by powerful states 
like France to individuals, such as members of the various Swiss 
cantonal governments. ‘Public’ and ‘private’ were not distinguished 
in the modern sense; indeed such distinctions emerged as part of 
the wider delineation of political power in sovereign states which 
included an internal as well as international dimension and was not 
completed until the early nineteenth century, and in some respects 
even later.21 Some princes, such as Wilhelm V of Hesse-Cassel, 
1700–1797), and those of numerous German principalities including Hesse-
Darmstadt (Staatsarchiv Darmstadt, A6 series, as well as negotiations in the E8 
B259–B266 series, and papers on foreign enlistment E8 B10/10–16), Münster 
(Landesarchiv Münster, A58 Nr. 218, 253); Paderborn (Landesarchiv Münster, 
A267 I Kriegsrechnungen 1694–1798); Württemberg (Hauptstaatsarchiv 
Stuttgart [HStAS], treaties and papers relating to recruitment for other 
powers, chiefly A5 Bü.62, 63, 65, 66; A6 Bü.33, 56–60; A7 Bü.10; A8 Bü.5, 
8, 59; A74 Bü.189, 190, 197; A19a Bd.1382; A202 Bü.737, 1157, 1159, 
1206, 1358, 1361, 1362,2109–2114, 2118, 2219, 2236, 2241, 2254–2256, 
2263, 2265, 2282, 2290, 2294, 2462–2471; Landesbibliothek Stuttgart, 
Cod.Hist.647). I am very grateful to Tom Nora for supplying digital copies 
of the material from the Dutch National Archives.
20 A common example is the agreement made between France and Bernhard 
von Sachsen-Weimar in 1635 in which France subsidised what had been 
till then, and what was still in Sweden’s eyes, the army of the Heilbronn 
League.
21 Giorgio Chittolini, ‘The “Private”, the “Public”, the State’, Journal of 
Modern History 67, supplement (1995), 34–61. For pensions and military 
recruitment, see Christian Windler, ‘ “Ohne Geld keine Schweizer”: Pensionen 
und Söldnerrekrutierung auf den eidgenössischen Patronagemärkten’, in 
Nähe in der Ferne: Personale Verflechtungen in den Außenbeziehungen 
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received both pensions and subsidies from the same power.22 
Moreover, pensions and subsidies could both take the form of a 
retainer, paid by a government to secure the services of an individual 
or a prince, should they be required, similar to the ‘retainers’ 
(Wartgelder) paid to experienced officers and soldiers by many 
German princes from the end of the fourteenth to the mid-seventeenth 
century.23 The development of permanent ‘standing’ armies around 
the middle of the seventeenth century transformed retainers into 
‘half-pay’, whereby surplus officers were placed on waiting lists 
with reduced pay at the termination of each conflict, ready to be 
recalled should the need arise. France paid several German princes 
to hold troops in readiness during the early 1750s in anticipation 
of renewed war in Europe following the unsatisfactory outcome of 
the War of the Austrian Succession.24 However, for the sake of 
analytical clarity it is helpful to distinguish ‘subsidies’ as transactions 
between sovereign or at least semi-sovereign authorities and in some 
way binding on their jurisdictions, and to use ‘pensions’ to denote 
payments made to individuals, even if these also had a direct political 
or military purpose.
Arrangements to pay subsidies were often included in formal 
alliances, but that did not mean that every subsidy treaty entailed 
an alliance, or that every alliance involved the transfer of financial 
or other assistance between the signatories. Neither the provider 
nor the recipient necessarily agreed to become involved in wars in 
which the other was engaged. For example, France paid subsidies 
to the Dutch Republic, Denmark, and Spain during the 1620s 
without being regarded as a belligerent in the Eighty Years’ War 
(1568–1648) or the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648) by either these 
three recipients or by their Spanish and Austrian Habsburg opponents. 
der Frühen Neuzeit, ed. by Hillard von Thiessen and Christian Windler (Berlin: 
Duncker und Humblot, 2005), pp. 105–133; Friedrich Edelmayer, Söldner 
und Pensionäre: Das Netzwerk Philipps II. im Heiligen Römischen Reich, 
Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur der iberischen und iberoamerikanischen 
Länder, 7 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2002).
22 For an example, see Jörg Ulbert, ‘Französische Subsidienzahlungen an 
Hessen-Kassel während des Dreißigjährigen Krieges’, in Frankreich und 
Hessen-Kassel zur Zeit des Dreißigjährigen Krieges und des Westfälischen 
Friedens, ed. by Klaus Malettke (Marburg: N.G. Elwert, 1999), pp. 159–174.
23 Reinhard Baumann, Landsknechte (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1994), pp. 19, 87, 
214.
24 Peter H. Wilson, War, State and Society in Württemberg, 1677–1793 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 203–209.
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Likewise, the German principalities supplied troops to numerous 
European monarchies and republics between the 1560s and the early 
nineteenth century, without necessarily formally becoming official 
belligerents. Indeed, most princes ensured that their agreements 
allowed them to remain neutral and to honour their commitments 
to the Holy Roman Empire, even if the latter was actually at war 
with their subsidy partner. Treaties could include safeguards for 
troop providers who were attacked as a consequence of fulfilling 
their agreements.25 The latter certainly approached the character of 
an alliance, as did the terms which were often also included to cover 
political co-operation for specific purposes. However, the alliance 
elements were not indispensable to the arrangements to transfer 
war-making resources.
Troop conventions and ‘mercenary’ contracts as 
Fiscal-Military Instruments
These preliminary remarks lead us directly to the questions of troop 
conventions as Fiscal-Military Instruments, and their relationship 
to subsidies. A major reason for the confusion in much of the lit-
erature is that it focuses on subsidy treaties, generally regarding 
them as asymmetrical alliances between major and minor powers, 
and failing to treat troop conventions as distinct instruments since 
they were often made entirely independently of any agreements over 
subsidies. Further problems stem from an often uncritical use of 
the term ‘mercenary’ to cover all forms of military recruitment and 
service before the age of the citizen-in-arms which is widely believed 
to have begun around 1789.26 The only serious attempt to date to 
classify troop conventions is limited to those made by France, with 
the result that it creates categories which are not fully applicable 
elsewhere.27
It is difficult to design watertight categories for the different 
forms of foreign troop contracts, as actual practice was so varied 
25 For instance, all these provisions are included in Württemberg’s treaty with 
France of 4 February 1752, HStAS, A202 Bü. 2219.
26 Alan Forrest, The Legacy of the French Revolutionary Wars: The Nation-
in-Arms in French Republican Memory (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009); The People in Arms: Military Myth and National Mobilization 
since the French Revolution, edited by Daniel Moran and Arthur Waldron 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
27 Guy Rowlands, ‘Foreign Service in the Age of Absolute Monarchy: Louis 
XIV and His Forces Étrangères’, War in History 17 (2010), 141–165.
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and could slip from one form to another, or even combine several 
different aspects in one arrangement. Contemporaries were also not 
consistent in their use of terms like ‘auxiliary’, ‘foreign’, ‘hired’, or 
‘subsidy’. Variations in motivation and purpose further cloud the 
distinctions, notably as providers of troops did not necessarily have 
to be full belligerents or allies of those they were assisting militarily. 
Broadly, contemporaries used the term ‘treaty’ (e.g. Tractat) for 
all kinds of agreement, but generally restricted ‘capitulation’ to 
contracts covering ‘foreign’ regiments and ‘convention’ to the hire 
of auxiliaries.
Some clarity is obtained when we tease out the different aspects 
of these arrangements which included how soldiers were recruited 
and by whom, how they were paid and maintained, and how they 
related to military command and political authority. It is possible 
to delineate four main forms, within each of which a number of 
important variations existed. The four forms co-evolved with the 
wider Fiscal-Military System, emerging by the mid- to late sixteenth 
century, and persisting in most cases into the mid-nineteenth century. 
None of these forms was static, but space precludes exploration of 
how each changed, and the priority here is to identify their distin-
guishing characteristics to assist further research in the field.
Direct recruitment
The first form to consider is that of the direct recruitment of individual 
soldiers who were subjects of one political jurisdiction into the 
service of another. Many men enlisted individually, often travelling 
considerable distances to do so, or because they were overtaken by 
some personal misfortune or economic necessity while away from 
their own homeland. However, it is almost certain that many more 
men were recruited by an agent of the hirer sent for that purpose, 
or by an autonomous intermediary (an enterpreneur or contractor) 
acting on their own account for financial gain, for career advance-
ment, or to curry favour with the government for which they were 
recruiting.28 A key distinguishing feature of this form was that such 
28 Fritz Redlich’s classic study of these intermediaries still provides useful detail: 
The German Military Enterpriser and His Workforce, Vierteljahresschrift 
für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Beihefte 47/48, 2 vols (Wiesbaden: 
Steiner, 1964–1965). The best and most recent reappraisal of these activities 
is David Parrott, The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military 
Revolution in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012).
‘Mercenary’ contracts 81
agents and intermediaries lacked jurisdiction over the area where 
they were recruited and thus did not have any legal authority to 
compel men to enlist. They also had no direct call on the support 
of the authorities in the area where they were recruiting, frequently 
because those authorities did not want their neutrality compromised. 
Often, agents and intermediaries secured formal permission to recruit. 
If granted, permission was usually restricted according to the time 
and place where recruiters could operate and whether they were 
allowed to act publicly, accompanied by military musicians in order 
to attract potential recruits. However, such permission was also 
frequently refused, or not even sought in the almost certain knowledge 
that a request would be declined. In such circumstances, recruiters 
operated clandestinely and could be subject to fines or imprisonment 
if caught.29
The chances of formal permission varied depending on the political 
circumstances and often also religion of the area where recruitment 
was to take place, as well as its relationship to the power in whose 
name the request was being made. For example, the Swiss cantonal 
authorities declined 133 of the 494 requests from the Prussian army 
to recruit and postponed at least 30 more between 1717 and 1740, 
but Catholic authorities were significantly less likely to co-operate 
than Protestant ones.30 Many German principalities were reluctant 
to allow Prussia to recruit, because they rightly feared that Prussian 
officers and agents would try to induce their own soldiers to desert 
rather than pick untrained men. Yet, they often agreed for fear of 
antagonizing such a powerful monarchy.
Sometimes, authorities granted permission even to hostile powers, 
if the men being recruited were considered politically or economically 
undesirable. For example, the English monarchy allowed Spain to 
send officers to recruit Irishmen during years of peace in the sev-
enteenth century, as well as allowing Irishmen to seek appointment 
as captains in the Spanish service in return for recruiting a company 
of soldiers.31 In other cases, the authorities permitted recruitment 
29 There is a further discussion with examples in Peter H. Wilson, ‘The Politics 
of Military Recruitment in Eighteenth-century Germany’, English Historical 
Review 117 (2002), 536–568. 
30 Rudolf Gugger, Preußische Werbungen in der Eidgenossenschaft im 18. 
Jahrhundert (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1997), pp. 254–262.
31 Eduardo de Mesa, The Irish in the Spanish Armies in the Seventeenth 
Century (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2014), esp. pp. 39–66; R.A. Stradling, The 
Spanish Monarchy and Irish Mercenaries: The Wild Geese in Spain, 1618–68 
(Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1994).
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as a form of indirect support for the power that was recruiting, 
notably in the case of the English monarchy’s permission to the 
Palatinate, Denmark, and Sweden to recruit Scottish, Welsh, and 
English soldiers between 1618 and 1638. In some cases, recruits 
were even conscripted to supply armies organized by autonomous 
contractors, notably Count Ernst von Mansfeld (1580–1626).32 In 
the latter case, the authorities’ formal co-operation pushed this form 
of recruitment close to the second category, as we shall see.
The primary contractual elements in this form encompassed a 
written agreement between the power commissioning the recruitment 
and the officer or agent conducting it, as well as between that agent 
and the men enlisting. Agents’ contracts specified the number of men 
they should recruit by a specific date, as well as how they would 
be recompensed for this service. Frequently, there were stipulations 
as to what kind of recruit was considered acceptable, with the 
commissioning power reserving the right to reject men considered 
unfit for its service. Such stipulations were broadly similar to those 
employed by that power in its own territory to recruit directly into 
its army. Recruits were generally signed up on ‘capitulations’, or 
time-limited service contracts that were often shorter and on better 
terms than those offered to native recruits. Additionally, agents and 
sometimes the commissioning power might sign agreements with 
the authorities within whose jurisdiction recruitment was to take 
place. These agreements bound the agents to observe local laws, 
not to take men by force, and to pay for all goods and services they 
received. Sometimes they had to provide a ‘caution’ or deposit as 
a safeguard for their good behaviour.
Men recruited under this form of troop convention were collected 
in small groups and then travelled to join specific regiments. Austria 
and Prussia recruited Germans from across the Holy Roman Empire 
into their infantry and cavalry regiments to supplement native 
32 Walter Krüssmann, Ernst von Mansfeld (1580–1626): Grafensohn, Söldner-
führer, Kriegsunternehmer gegen Habsburg im Dreißigjährigen Krieg (Berlin: 
Duncker und Humblot, 2010), pp. 544–555; Adam Marks, ‘England, the 
English and the Thirty Years War (1618–1648)’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, 
University of St Andrews, 2012); Steve Murdoch, Britain, Denmark-Norway 
and the House of Stuart, 1603–1660 (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 2000), 
pp. 187–252; Scotland and the Thirty Years War, 1618–1648, ed. by Steve 
Murdoch (Leiden: Brill, 2001); J.V. Polisensky, ‘Gallants to Bohemia’, The 
Slavonic and East European Review 25 (1947), 391–404; Steven J. Stearns, 
‘Conscription and English Society in the 1620s’, Journal of British Studies 
11 (1971), 1–24.
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conscripts and volunteers. Other states generally segregated foreign 
recruits by nationality into separate regiments. France maintained 
regiments of Germans, Swiss, Irish, Scots, Poles, and Italians, while 
Germans, Swiss, Irish, and Italians also served Spain. The Dutch 
had German, Swiss, English, and Scottish units. Sweden recruited 
widely during the 1620s and 1640s, and then maintained permanent 
German regiments stationed in its possessions in the Holy Roman 
Empire. Savoy-Piedmont recruited German and Swiss units after 
1690 and the kingdom of Naples did the same after its independence 
from Austria in 1735.
‘Foreign’ regiments
Other examples can be found, but, in most of these cases, the direct 
recruitment of individual soldiers by agents was to sustain units 
which were already in existence, thus further distinguishing the first 
form of troop convention from the second which involved an external 
authority contracting to provide fully formed units for another 
army. This form of convention involved direct relations between 
the power commissioning the recruitment and the authority within 
whose territory it was conducted, in contrast to the first form where 
relations were either indirect through an agent, or absent altogether 
in clandestine recruitment. The power requesting recruitment could 
send an agent to negotiate permission, or it might be approached 
by another authority who wished to recruit for it, as in the case of 
several minor German princes who raised regiments for the Dutch 
and Venetian republics in the 1680s. Unlike direct recruitment, this 
second form of convention involved the raising of entire regiments 
or groups of regiments which were recruited with the express permis-
sion and often direct assistance of the local authorities.
Intermediaries could still play an important part, as in the case of 
the Dutch Republic’s agreement with the Grisons (Grey Leagues) to 
recruit an infantry regiment in March 1693 which was secured thanks 
to the good offices of Colonel Hercules Capol (1642–1706). Capol, 
who came from an established Grisons family, was promptly named 
commander of the new unit and it is clear that he relied on his wider 
kinship and professional networks to recruit it: the company-grade 
officers included Capol’s nephew, cousin, and son-in-law.33
33 Martin Bundi, Bünder Kriegsdienste in Holland um 1700: Eine Studie zu 
den Beziehungen zwischen Holland und Graubünden von 1693 bis 1730 
(Chur: Calven Verlag, 1972), pp. 30–40.
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Regardless of how the agreement was reached, it generally fol-
lowed a standard form which emerged as early as around 1500 
and specified how the regiment was to be raised, the kind of 
men who were acceptable as recruits, their terms and length of 
service, and how this was to be paid for, including what financial 
or political benefits the recruiting authority would receive from 
the commissioning power. Agreements often granted the recruiting 
authority residual rights over the unit once it had been mustered 
into the commissioning power’s forces. Such rights could include 
the powers to name or at least suggest candidates to fill the initial 
officer appointments, as well as to replace any subsequent vacan-
cies. Such rights were an important source of patronage, and they 
linked the regiment and the two contracting authorities through 
complex personal relationships. However, it was often difficult to 
exercise actual control once a unit had left the territory where 
it had been raised, because it passed under the authority of the 
commissioning power and became an integral part of its army. 
This point is important, as it constitutes a significant feature which 
distinguishes this form of convention from auxiliary and subsidy 
troops who were intended to be returned once they were no longer 
needed.
The case of the Grisons regiment in Dutch service exemplifies these 
difficulties. The Dutch unilaterally disbanded five of the regiment’s 
ten companies as an economy measure in 1717, ignoring protests 
from the Grisons authorities. The importance of such units as a 
source of income and patronage often obliged providers to comply 
with hirers’ requests for additional human resources to maintain the 
unit once it had entered their service. The Grisons readily agreed 
to find more recruits when the Dutch decided to augment each 
company from 50 to 150 men in 1726, and the unit remained an 
integral part of the Dutch army until 1797.34
Often, the men needed to keep such units up to strength were 
recruited directly, thus blurring the distinction between the first and 
second forms of convention. However, once the unit had passed into 
the commissioning power’s army, it remained distinctly ‘foreign’, 
additional recruits being sought in the area which had originally 
provided it. This status was more pronounced in some armies 
than others, and the overall characteristics changed between the 
mid-sixteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries. The Spanish, French, 
Dutch, and later also Savoyard and Neapolitan armies recruited 
34 Ibid., pp. 123–124.
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units characterised as German, Swiss, Italian, and in some cases 
Scottish, Irish, or English, that were explicitly considered separate 
from ‘national’ regiments recruited directly from these states’ own 
subjects. Their distinctiveness was marked by particular uniforms, 
flags, and generally also legal privileges, pay, and conditions. Other 
armies recruited such regiments from men who were less obviously 
linguistically or culturally distinct from their own subjects. For 
example, both Austria and Prussia incorporated regiments provided 
by German princes within the Holy Roman Empire which retained 
connections with their original provider, but were not classed as 
distinctly ‘foreign’ units.
The actual composition of these units could vary considerably, 
particularly over time, as other foreigners, deserters, prisoners, and 
‘native’ recruits were often used to keep them up to strength. For 
example, only a fifth of the ‘Swiss’ soldiers in Savoyard service in 
1721 actually came from Switzerland, with Germans forming the 
majority along with a few French and some Savoyards.35 Official 
records are often misleading, because definitions of ‘foreign’ could 
vary. The Prussian system of conscription introduced around 1733 
classed any recruit from outside a regiment’s recruiting ‘canton’ as 
‘foreign’.36
Even allowing for these issues, the numbers of men raised by 
both the first and second types of convention were considerable. 
Between the early sixteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries an estimated 
one million Swiss served in other armies, mainly in distinct regiments. 
Around half of these were in French service, including around 120,000 
who served during the reign of Louis XIV.37 To put this further into 
perspective: the French army expanded dramatically from about 
55,000 men in the early 1660s to about 150,000 at the start of the 
Nine Years’ War in 1688. At least 655,000 men were recruited 
during the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714), while overall 
around two million served between 1700 and 1763, of whom about 
35 Sabina Loriga, ‘Soldaten in Piemont im 18. Jahrhundert’, L’Homme: Zeitschrift 
für feministische Geschichtswissenschaft 3 (1992), 64–87 (p. 65).
36 Martin Winter, Untertanengeist durch Militärpflicht? Das Preußische 
Kantonsystem in brandenburgischen Städten im 18. Jahrhundert (Bielefeld: 
Verlag für Regionalgeschichte, 2005), pp. 262–265.
37 John McCormack, One Million Mercenaries: Swiss Soldiers in the Armies 
of the World (London: Leo Cooper, 1993); Albert Hochheimer, Verraten 
und verkauft: Die Geschichte der europäischen Söldner (Stuttgart: Goverts, 
1967), p. 183.
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300,000 were recruited from outside France.38 Though distributed 
throughout the army, foreigners also formed a significant part of 
the Prussian army, with their proportion rising from about 20 per 
cent in the 1720s to around 40 per cent by 1740, and thereafter 
around half the total until the end of the eighteenth century.39 Given 
that the army not only grew from about 40,000 in 1713 to 195,000 
by 1786, but also fought four costly wars between 1740 and 1778, 
this represented a significant increase in foreign recruitment.
The French and Spanish armies continued to maintain foreign 
regiments throughout the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, while 
the Neapolitan and Papal armies also raised Swiss and German 
units when they reconstituted their armies in 1814.40 Britain also 
recruited such units, notably from Germans, Swiss, and Dutch, 
during the wars against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France. After 
1815 it became a troop provider, when six thousand Britons, mainly 
discharged soldiers, joined the armies fighting for independence 
from Spain in South America.41 Spanish protests prompted Britain 
to pass the Foreign Enlistment Act (1819) prohibiting its subjects 
from joining the forces of foreign powers, but suspended this 
temporarily in 1835 to permit the recruitment of a ten-thousand-man 
British Auxiliary Legion to assist the liberal Cristino monarchy 
against its Carlist rivals in the Spanish civil war of 1833–1840.42 
The progressive nationalisation of war-making, with its ideal of 
citizens-in-arms, discouraged most states from recruiting foreigners 
by the 1850s.
That decade was a watershed between premodern Fiscal-Military 
Instruments and modern forms of military assistance which were 
more clearly determined by political ideology and by the ideals of 
the sovereign nation state. Conservative regimes provided foreign 
units in support of allies facing revolution. Austria and Bavaria 
38 André Corvisier, Les Français et l’armée sous Louis XIV (Vincennes: Ministère 
de la défense, Etat Major de l’Armée de terre, Service historique, 1975), 
p. 133, and the same author’s L’armée française de la fin du 17e siècle au 
ministère de Choiseul, 2 vols (Paris: PUF, 1964), vol. II, p. 962.
39 Willerd R. Fann, ‘Foreigners in the Prussian army 1713–1756’, Central 
European History 23 (1990), 76–85.
40 David Alvarez, The Pope’s Soldiers: A Military History of the Modern 
Vatican (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2011), esp. pp. 32–40.
41 Ben Hughes, Conquer or Die! Wellington’s Veterans and the Liberation of 
the New World (Oxford: Osprey, 2010).
42 Edward M. Brett, The British Auxiliary Legion in the First Carlist War 
1835–1838 (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2005).
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recruited four ‘foreign’ carabineer regiments for the Bourbon regime 
in Naples, which had disbanded its Swiss units after a mutiny in 
1858 and now faced Garibaldi’s insurgency. Austria and Belgium 
likewise sent foreign legions to back Archduke Maximilian’s ill-fated 
rule as emperor of Mexico 1864–1867, primarily because both 
monarchies were linked dynastically to him. 43 Meanwhile, a variety 
of volunteers flocked to fight for various liberal causes across Europe, 
especially during the 1848 Revolutions and subsequently in Italy, 
Poland, France, and Greece during the later nineteenth century.44
Exile regiments formed a special subcategory of the premodern 
foreign troops, since they followed their prince into the service of 
an allied monarch. These examples primarily belong to the era of 
the Nine Years’ War (1688–1697) and the War of the Spanish 
Succession (1701–1714). Around 25,000 Irish and British troops 
followed James II into exile after 1691 and became a permanent 
part of the French army.45 Smaller numbers of Bavarian and Cologne 
troops joined the French army when the emperor punished their 
rulers for backing Louis XIV during the War of the Spanish Suc-
cession; but, unlike James II, their princes were restored in 1714 
and they were able to return home. The Hanoverian army broadly 
fits this subcategory during the Napoleonic Wars, when around 
thirty thousand former personnel and other Germans escaped their 
occupied homeland to serve in the King’s German Legion which 
formed part of the British army 1803–1815.46
Stateless troops recruited as embodied regiments by colonel-
entrepreneurs or groups of officers represented a second subcategory 
of foreign soldiers. One early example was the former army of the 
Heilbronn League. It was originally formed to assist Sweden during 
the Thirty Years’ War, but after the League’s collapse it acted on 
its own account under its primary commander, Duke Bernhard of 
Weimar (1604–1639), in arrangement with Sweden’s main ally, 
France, which subsidised its operations. After Bernhard’s death, the 
43 Ernst Pitner, Maximilian’s Lieutenant: A Personal History of the Mexican 
Campaign, 1864–67, translated and ed. by Gordon Etherington-Smith 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 1993).
44 For example, see Andrea Viotti, Garibaldi: The Revolutionary and His Men 
(Poole: Blandford, 1979).
45 John A. Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle: The French Army 1610–1715 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 367.
46 Mark Wishon, German Forces and the British Army: Interactions and 
Perceptions, 1742–1815 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013), pp. 165–192.
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force was absorbed incrementally into the French army.47 Other 
examples include the various units raised after 1685 from and often 
by Huguenot refugees who served in the armies of Britain, Savoy, 
the Dutch Republic, Brandenburg-Prussia, Celle and other Protestant 
German principalities until the early eighteenth century.48
Both these subcategories were distinguished by the political 
circumstances of their formation, but otherwise shared the same 
features as other foreign troops. Their establishment, organisation, 
conditions of service, and other matters were all regulated in conven-
tions signed by their leaders with the power whose service they 
entered. They remained distinct units within their paymaster’s army, 
but were not fully independent and could be discarded when 
considered no longer needed, as was the case with the four Huguenot 
regiments in the British army which were disbanded in 1697. Likewise, 
they sustained themselves through direct recruitment with a similar 
impact on their actual composition. While almost all of the initial 
eight thousand men enrolled in the King’s German Legion by 1805 
were Hanoverians, the force had become cosmopolitan and polyglot 
by the time it was disbanded in 1815.
Hired auxiliaries
The third major form of troop convention consisted in the hiring 
of auxiliaries. Like foreign regiments, these were organised by a 
provider exercising formal jurisdiction over its own territory, notably 
the German and Italian princes, but also other monarchs such as 
the rulers of Denmark and Sweden. Units were also provided fully 
formed, armed, and equipped, and served under their own officers 
appointed by the provider, who likewise retained some jurisdiction 
over the units’ internal management, such as discipline and promo-
tions. The provider did not have to be an active ally of the power 
it was assisting, as was the case with the various German principalities 
supplying troops to Venice in its war against the Ottomans in the 
1680s, as well as the better-known example of the Hessians and 
other Germans serving Britain in America roughly a century later.49 
47 David Parrott, Richelieu’s Army: War, Government and Society in France, 
1624–1642 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 293–298.
48 War, Religion and Service: Huguenot Soldiering, 1685–1713, ed. by Matthew 
Glozier and David Onnekink (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007).
49 For Venetian service, see for example Alexander Schwencke, Geschichte 
der Hannoverschen Truppen in Griechenland 1685–1689 (Hanover: Hahn, 
1854).
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Finally, as in the case of foreign regiments, the conventions stipulated 
the initial period of service and sometimes imposed restrictions on 
where the troops could be deployed, such as prohibiting their dispatch 
overseas. What distinguished hired auxiliaries from foreign troops 
was that this was always intended to be a two-way exchange, the 
units being returned once their contract expired or (as was sometimes 
allowed in the conventions) their provider recalled them.
The timing of the exchange was carefully choreographed to proceed 
through clearly defined stages. The overall length of the agreement 
was specified in a signed treaty or convention. Once this had been 
ratified, the provider had a fixed period within which the troops 
had to be assembled at the specified strength and at a designated 
point. Some agreements allowed for the transfer of mobilisation 
money to cover at least part of the costs of making the units combat-
ready, including bringing them up to the required strength and 
providing them with field equipment such as wagons and tents. In 
some cases units had to be raised from scratch, notably where 
providers concealed their actual lack of preparedness from the hirer. 
Generally, the provider remained responsible for paying, feeding, 
and housing the troops throughout this first stage, and was also 
responsible for their command and for all disciplinary matters. The 
second stage began once the hirer formally mustered the troops 
who now entered the hirer’s service. This ceremony was much like 
those held to mark the embodiment of newly raised units in any 
army, except that auxiliaries remained bound by an oath to their 
provider and did not become a fully integrated part of the hirer’s 
army. In most cases, auxiliaries were already soldiers and had sworn 
to abide by the articles of war. They had thus already crossed from 
civilian to martial law. Instead, what changed was that they now 
went in under the operational command of the hirer who simultane-
ously assumed at least partial responsibility for their pay and 
maintenance. The second stage lasted until the auxiliaries were 
discharged in another muster from the hirer’s service back into the 
command and maintenance of their provider. This stage was also 
marked by a formal ceremony, as well as an audit of personnel, 
equipment, and accounts, so that any outstanding moneys could 
be calculated. In practice, providers then frequently complained 
that they were still owed substantial sums, leading in some cases 
to a fourth stage where these claims were settled, usually in some 
kind of compromise agreement. Some conventions included demo-
bilisation payments to cover the cost of returning the troops and 
reducing them to their peacetime strength. Where provided, such 
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payments were usually calculated at between one and three months’ 
pay; but again disagreements could arise when the provider claimed 
them at the unit’s full strength, whereas the hirer paid only according 
to actual strength.
There were two important subcategories of hired auxiliaries, 
distinguished by the form and extent of the monetary and material 
compensation provided. Fully hired auxiliaries became financially 
independent of the provider and were instead paid, fed, and housed 
at the hirer’s expense. Usually, troop conventions specified that hired 
auxiliaries were to receive the same rates as the hirer’s own forces, 
to ensure that they were not discriminated against. Subsidised 
auxiliaries remained partially dependent on their provider for their 
maintenance. Generally, they received food and fodder in kind, but 
remained paid by their provider. Additional subsidies might be paid 
in both cases, but these were not the principal means of maintaining 
the forces. The lines could blur between hired auxiliaries and foreign 
regiments if the contracts were extended across many years, including 
peacetime. Examples include the Anglo-Scottish brigade in Dutch 
service 1572–1782 and the 3,500 ex-Cromwellian soldiers sent by 
Charles II to serve Portugal 1662–1668.50
Auxiliaries constituted a substantial part of most European armies 
in wartime between the 1660s and 1790s. The seven thousand 
Danes hired by William III in 1689 formed 15 per cent of his 
army at the decisive Battle of the Boyne the following year, and 
they continued to serve him in campaigns in Flanders until 1697.51 
Between 33,000 and 115,000 German auxiliaries supported the 
Allied war effort in any given year during the War of the Spanish 
Succession, dwarfing the British contingent sent to the continent as 
well as providing a considerable augmentation to the Dutch army, 
which already contained a large number of German and Swiss foreign 
regiments.52
50 Papers Illustrating the History of the Scots Brigade in the Service of the 
United Netherlands, ed. by James Ferguson, 2 vols (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1899–1901); Jonathon Riley, The Last Ironsides: The 
English Expedition to Portugal 1662–1668 (Solihull: Helion, 2014).
51 Kjeld Hald Galster, Danish Troops in the Williamite Army in Ireland, 1689–91 
(Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2012).
52 Peter H. Wilson, ‘Financing the War of the Spanish Succession in the Holy 
Roman Empire’, in The War of the Spanish Succession: New Perspectives, 
ed. by Matthias Pohlig and Michael Schaich (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2018), pp. 267–297, and German Armies: War and German Politics 
1648–1806 (London: UCL Press, 1998), pp. 104–112.
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Subsidy troops
Subsidy troops can be distinguished from auxiliaries by the much 
looser relationship between the soldiers provided and the monetary 
compensation received. Such troops were significant, especially during 
the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, but their numbers were 
generally fewer than those in the other three forms of troop conven-
tion. The inflated importance attached to subsidy troops is largely 
due to their being confused with auxiliaries and because subsidy 
payments are generally easier to track than the diverse, but often 
more substantial, sums paid directly to auxiliaries and foreign 
troops.53 Unlike auxiliaries, subsidy troops were not paid in full 
and did not serve so closely under the payer’s command. The treaty 
generally specified a certain number of men to be provided, but did 
not entitle the payer to stipulate exactly which units or where they 
served. The subsidy simply ‘subsidised’ the provider’s costs, but the 
proportion covered could vary.
Subsidies were more clearly ‘political’ than the other three forms 
of convention. A more powerful ally subsidised the cost of a weaker 
partner in a common war effort, and the arrangements often bore 
more resemblance to an alliance than was usual in the other forms. 
Subsidy and auxiliary agreements were often combined, one treaty 
arranging political co-operation and the payment of a subsidy and 
another specifying the supply of auxiliaries to the stronger partner, 
who thus had to meet their direct costs as well as provide the subsidy. 
However, like the provision of foreign regiments and auxiliaries, 
such arrangements did not automatically make both partners full 
belligerents in the same way, thus helping to distinguish these Fiscal-
Military Instruments from alliances.
Conclusions
Subsidies were closely associated with the transfer of soldiers from 
the service of one power to another, but the exact relationship 
between financial payments and troop conventions has been clouded 
by lack of precision in identifying and defining the different ways 
in which war-making resources were exchanged. This chapter has 
suggested that subsidies should be interpreted as one of several 
53 An example of this is John M. Sherwig, Guineas and Gunpowder: British 
Foreign Aid in the Wars with France, 1793–1815 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1969).
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Fiscal-Military Instruments which evolved across early modernity 
as ways of transferring men, money, materials, services, information, 
and expertise between partners. Such instruments facilitated what 
were high-risk arrangements between partners who were often 
justified in mistrusting each other. Whilst scholarly attention has 
concentrated on subsidies as aspects of interstate diplomacy, this 
chapter has argued that we also need to consider the ways in which 
soldiers were recruited, hired, or lent which were themselves often 
separate from subsidy treaties and which involved non-state as well 
as state actors.
4




In his book Tankar om krig i gemen och Sweriges krig i synnerhet 
(‘Thoughts about war in general and Sweden’s war in particular’), 
written in 1758 and published in 1767, a civil servant and politician 
by the name of Anders Nordencrantz (1697–1772) heavily criticized 
the Swedish acceptance of foreign subsidies. Subsidies become opiates, 
poisons that delight, corrupt, and drug recipients. Subsidies are like 
golden hooks pulling the receivers like fish out of their natural 
environment, Nordencrantz says, and lead them to go wherever the 
foreigner wishes – especially if there are individuals within the 
receiving nation who gain from these operations.2
By 1758, Sweden had received subsidies from France for twenty 
successive years, whereas the Franco-Swedish subsidy relationship 
went back much longer. From 1631 to 1758, Sweden had received 
subsidies for more than sixty years, most often from France and 
usually in the form of subsidy troops, as described by Peter H. 
Wilson in Chapter 3 above. According to Nordencrantz, it had been 
a grave mistake for Sweden to accept subsidies in the 1630s in order 
to enter the war in Germany. By its greedy conquest of land, Sweden 
1 Some of the findings contained in this chapter derive from research more 
fully presented in Svante Norrhem, Mercenary Swedes: French Subsidies to 
Sweden 1631–1796 (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2019).
2 Anders Nordencrantz, Tankar om krig i gemen och Sweriges krig i synnerhet, 
samt hwaruti Sweriges rätta och sanskyldiga interesse består: skrifwit år 
1758, och hörer til et större wärk, som på hög wederbörlig befallning blifwit 
författadt, men icke förr kunnat komma i dagsljuset (Stockholm: Lorens 
Ludvig Greving, 1767), pp. 65, 67.
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had ended up in a situation where subsidies were constantly needed 
for protecting the new territories. Sweden would have been quite 
a different country, Nordencrantz argues, had that money been 
invested in agriculture rather than war. The wars and the cost of 
protecting overseas territories, such as Pomerania in northern 
Germany, had never been covered by foreign subsidies.3 People in 
general rejected war, Nordencrantz wrote, claiming that the wars 
Sweden fought between 1740 and 1756 were decided by just ten 
individuals within the political elite.4
Criticism against accepting subsidies had been voiced before and 
repeatedly during the lengthy period when Sweden had received 
them; however, the critique was rarely public before the eighteenth 
century. Some of the most prominent critical voices belonged to the 
head of the treasury, Gustaf Bonde (1620–1667), and his grandson, 
the politician Gustaf Bonde (1682–1764). Bonde the Elder introduced 
in 1661 a political programme in which he advocated thrift as a 
method for ceasing to be on the receiving end of foreign money.5 
Expenses could be reduced by putting an end to the ennoblement 
of officers, civil servants, or merchants.6 His grandson, seventy years 
later, echoed many of these suggestions but directed his criticism 
much more pointedly against French subsidies as such. France, 
according to Gustaf Bonde the Younger, had proved that it sometimes 
made use of its superior position towards Sweden. An independent 
nation like Sweden should not accept giving up its freedom for the 
sake of money.7
3 Ibid., p. 47.
4 Ibid., p. 62.
5 Gustaf Bonde, ‘Riksskattmästaren Gustaf Bondes politiska program 1661’, 
Historisk Tidskrift 33 (1913), 42–54 (p. 46).
6 Ibid., 49–50.
7 Carl Trolle-Bonde, Anteckningar om Bondesläkten af Carl Trolle-Bonde (Lund: 
Berlingska Boktryckeri- och Stilgjuteri Aktiebolaget, 1898), pp. 138–139. 
Similar voices against subsidies were also raised in other European countries 
from time to time. By the end of the eighteenth century, the recruitment of 
soldiers in German territories for foreign military service drew increasing 
criticism. The arguments against subsidies included the high mortality 
rates among young fighting men and a troubling overdependence on the 
subsidizer. Enlightenment ideas encouraged this resistance, especially when 
the British started using German armies in North America. See Tryntje 
Helfferich, Chapter 2 above, as well as Philip G. Dwyer, The Rise of Prussia 
1700–1830 (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 56–57; Frederic 
Groß, ‘Einzigartig? – Der Subsidienvertrag von 1786 über die Aufstellung
The uses of French subsidies in Sweden 95
Despite this criticism of how taking subsidies affected the recipient’s 
political independence and social and economic well-being, research 
on the early modern period shows that subsidies also brought benefits 
both to states and to specific people living there. Looking at subsidies 
at a state level, one may argue that subsidies granted the giver access 
to much-needed armies and allies at the same time as they enabled 
relatively small countries, such as Denmark and Sweden, to play a 
role in European politics.8 Much of the continental warfare in which 
the two countries were involved during the early modern period 
was enabled by foreign subsidies. The same may be said of other 
countries in Europe at the same time.9 Rulers and elites benefited 
from being able to participate in European great-power politics, as 
they could accrue greater prestige and greater territorial and other 
material benefits. The so-called ‘Soldatenhandel’, meaning resource-
rich states hiring armies from smaller German states in exchange 
for subsidies, became a way for lesser German princes to play a 
role in European politics. Providing soldiers for money could 
strengthen the political position of princes and give them higher 
des “Kapregiments” zwischen Herzog Karl Eugen von Württemberg und 
der Niederländischen Ostindienkompanie’, in Militärische Migration vom 
Altertum bis zur Gegenwart, ed. by Christoph Rass (Paderborn: Studien 
zur Historischen Migrationsforschung, vol. 30, 2016), pp. 143–164; Lothar 
Höbelt, ‘Vom militärischen saisonnier zum miles perpetuus: Staatsbildung und 
Kriegsführung im ancien régime’, in Krieg und Gesellschaft, vol. 2, ed. by 
Thomas Kolnberger and Ilja Steffelbauer (Vienna: Mandelbaum, 2010), pp. 
59–79; Charles W. Ingrao, The Hessian Mercenary State: Ideas, Institutions, 
and Reform under Frederick II, 1760–1785 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987), pp. 138–140; Hans-Martin Maurer, ‘Das württembergische 
Kapregiment. Söldner im Dienste früher Kolonialpolitik (1787–1808)’, 
Zeitschrift für Württembergische Landesgeschichte 47 (1988), 291–307.
8 Dwyryd Wyn Jones, War and Economy in the Age of William III and 
Marlborough (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), pp. 7–11; Christopher Storrs: 
‘ “Große Erwartungen”: Britische Subsidienzahlungen an Savoyen im 18. 
Jahrhundert’ in Das ‘Blut des Staatskörpers’: Forschungen zur Finanzge-
schichte der Frühen Neuzeit, ed. by Peter Rauscher, Andrea Serles, and 
Thomas Winkelbauer (Munich: Historische Zeitschrift, Beiheft, vol. 56, 2012), 
87–126 (p. 124); Peter H. Wilson, War, State and Society in Württemberg, 
1677–1793 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 85–86.
9 Peter Lindström and Svante Norrhem, Flattering Alliances: Scandinavia, 
Diplomacy and the Austrian-French Balance of Power, 1648–1740 (Lund: 
Nordic Academic Press, 2013), pp. 68–74; Peter H. Wilson, German Armies: 
War and German Politics 1648–1806 (London: UCL Press, 1998), pp. 
47–49, 176. 
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prestige within the international community, as shown by the 
examples of Hesse, Württemberg, and Saxony-Gotha.10 For Hesse, 
this resulted in its armies becoming major employers offering 
opportunities for advancement (especially to the lower nobility). In 
addition, it meant that taxes could be kept at a low level, while 
also enabling a focus on commercial activity.11 However, such obvious 
benefits were not necessarily found elsewhere among smaller German 
states.12
Prestige – also used as one of several justifications for Sweden 
to ally with France in the 1630s – was only one possible benefit 
from gaining subsidies.13 Armies needed weapons, gunpowder, cannon 
balls, clothes, shoes, and food, and they needed somebody who 
could provide them. Subsidies were sometimes used to build or 
repair fortresses and ships, which implies that there was a demand 
for building contractors, suppliers of building material, craftsmen, 
and workers. Of this we know relatively little, since most research 
on subsidies has focused on the state level and the hiring of soldiers 
and officers. An exception concerns the merchant entrepreneurs 
who handled the frequently difficult issue of moving money from 
one country to another, discussed by Marianne Klerk and Erik 
Thomson in Chapters 9 and 10 below.14
10 Ingrao, The Hessian Mercenary State, pp. 22–44; Wilson, War, State and 
Society, pp. 22, 41, 74; Andrea Thiele, ‘The Prince as Military Entrepreneur? 
Why Smaller Saxon Territories Sent “Holländische Regimenter” (Dutch 
Regiments) to the Dutch Republic’, in War, Entrepreneurs, and the State in 
Europe and the Mediterranean, 1300–1800, ed. by Jeff Fynn-Paul (Leiden 
and Boston: Brill, 2014), pp. 170–192 (pp. 191–192). See also Peter H. 
Wilson, ‘The German “Soldier Trade” of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centuries: A Reassessment’, The International History Review 4 (1996), 
757–792 (pp. 775, 777–778).
11 Ingrao, The Hessian Mercenary State, pp. 22–44, 127.
12 Wilson, War, State and Society, p. 84.
13 Svenska riksrådets protokoll, vol. VI, 1636 (Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt & 
Söner, 1891), pp. 716–723.
14 Another exception is Sofia Gustafsson’s excellent study of the effects of 
the building of the fortress Sveaborg off the southern coast of Finland in 
1748–1756; Sofia Gustafsson, Leverantörer och profitörer: Olika geografiska 
områdens och sociala gruppers handel med fästningsbygget Sveaborg under 
den första byggnadsperioden 1748–1756 (Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum 
Fennica, 2015).
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The aim of the present chapter
Anders Nordencrantz’s claim to the effect that a state which accepts 
subsidies is likely to become drugged and dependent, with only a 
few individuals profiting from them, is worthy of a serious examina-
tion. Turned into research questions, these would be: Who on the 
receiving side – Sweden – benefited from the subsidies? How did 
subsidies affect Swedish society? And, finally, what can be said 
about Swedish dependency on subsidies – did Sweden go wherever 
France led?
Through a detailed study of three periods – 1632, 1675–1677, 
and 1727–1729 – the wider effects of subsidies on Swedish society 
as well as the nature of dependency between Sweden and France is 
discussed. The study is primarily based on accounts of how the 
Swedish government spent subsidies during the aforementioned 
periods, as well as on records of discussions within the Council of 
the Realm. While the sources used for this study can only provide 
information about who may have gained from receiving part of the 
subsidies in the most tangible form – money – the aim is to take 
the analysis further and discuss who benefited from the subsidy 
system in a broader sense. In the background, there is another 
question, a much larger one, which has to do with state building. 
‘Our rise has come through war’, Queen Christina (1626–1689) 
said in 1652, thus in a sense preceding Charles Tilly’s well-known 
assertion that war, or the preparation for war, built states.15 If 
resources – such as subsidies – were prerequisites for war, what was 
the significance of subsidies in relation to state building? There are 
arguments for the assumption that subsidies played a great role in 
terms of state building; one would be that major players such as 
France, Spain, or Britain needed the armies and allies they received 
through subsidies. Without subsidies, there would have been no 
armies, no wars, and no war preparations to make these major 
powers as strong as warfare made them. Another argument supporting 
the assumption that subsidies built states is that minor players such 
as Sweden, Denmark, or Brandenburg needed the money to safeguard 
their territories or partake in warfare. Subsidies not only paid for 
15 Michael Roberts, The Swedish Imperial Experience, 1560–1718 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 22; Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, 
and European States, AD 990–1990 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), pp. 14–15, 
19–28.
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soldiers but also contributed to the need for building an administra-
tion to handle war supplies, training of military personnel, transport, 
and foreign affairs.
Subsidies, state revenue, and war costs
For much of the time from the early seventeenth century to the end 
of the eighteenth century, Sweden was partially dependent on foreign 
money in order to play a role in European politics, and even maintain 
its own security.16 A way to estimate dependency is by calculating 
how much of the war finances or state revenue came from French 
subsidies. Calculations for 1632 show that French subsidies covered 
about 15 per cent of the war cost. A calculation for the years 
1630–1634 indicates that 15 per cent of the cost of war, amounting 
to 9 per cent of the state revenue, was covered by subsidies – regard-
less of giver – during the same time.17 Calculations for the eighteenth 
century show that French subsidies amounted to at least between 
5 and 15 per cent of the state revenue between 1747 and 1776, 
reaching 20 per cent and above in exceptional years. For the years 
1727–1729, the Franco-British subsidies to Sweden amounted to 
18 and 19 per cent of the state revenue. As research has shown, 
these figures are likely to be low; but exactly how low is very difficult 
to estimate.18
The 5 to 20 per cent that the subsidies were worth means that, 
without these, the resources would have had to be raised in other 
16 See, for example, Sveriges riksråds protokoll, vol. V (Stockholm: P.A. Norstedts 
& Söners förlag, 1888), pp. 383–385 (17 December 1635); Stockholm, 
Riksarkivet (RA, the Swedish National Archive), Det odelade kansliet: 
Rådsprotokoll, vol. 37b (5 November 1662), 59a (21 February 1672), 63 (22 
March 1674 and undated); Utrikesexpeditionen: Rådsprotokoll över utrikes 
ärenden för 1734 från 18 maj (6 August 1734); RA, Utrikesexpeditionen: 
Rådsprotokoll över utrikes ärenden 1740–1743 (5 August 1740). 
17 Kersten Krüger, ‘Dänische und schwedische Kriegsfinanzierung im Dreißigjäh-
rigen Krieg bis 1635’, in Krieg und Politik 1618–1648: Europäische Probleme 
und Perspektiven, ed. by Konrad Repgen (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 
1988), pp. 275–299 (p. 288); Sven Lundkvist, ‘Svensk krigsfinansiering 
1630–1635’, Historisk Tidskrift 2 (1966), 377–417 (p. 387). Lars Ekholm 
estimates that, in 1631, subsidies from France and the Netherlands together 
with favourable contracts for buying grain from Russia represented 45 per 
cent of the cost of war; see Lars Ekholm, Svensk krigsfinansiering 1630–31 
(Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, 1974), p. 11.
18 Karl Åmark, Sveriges statsfinanser 1719–1809, parts I–III (Stockholm: 
Norstedt, 1961), pp. 151, 585–589.
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ways, through taxation, contributions, loans, or higher tariffs on 
trade – or there would have been corresponding cuts or reductions 
in public spending. The latter is the most likely alternative, given 
the poor condition of Swedish finances during all the three periods 
studied here.19 The importance of foreign financial support becomes 
evident from the point where Karl XI, in the early 1680s, decided 
to go his way without it. In order to finance a desperately needed 
reorganization of the army and expansion of the fleet with domestic 
funds only, the choice fell on forcing a reduction of land from the 
nobility – a decision with enormous financial and political implica-
tions.20 Whether receiving 5 to 20 per cent of its state revenue from 
abroad made Sweden slightly or very dependent on France may 
also be measured by how the need for subsidies was discussed 
among Swedish politicians.
An argument frequently used by Swedish politicians in order to 
motivate why Sweden needed subsidies was that Sweden ‘måste 
gripas under armarna’ by France. The Swedish expression liter-
ally means that Sweden needed ‘to be seized under the arms’ in 
order to avoid falling to the ground.21 This and similar expressions 
were used both within the Council of the Realm in closed debates 
and, seemingly openly, in discussions with French diplomats.22 It 
reflects a feeling that Sweden was in dire need of support while 
referring to Sweden’s financial inability to defend the country 
or to partake in war. In contacts with French officials, at times 
when Sweden either sought subsidies or was waiting for delayed 
subsidies to be paid, one can see the same kind of outspoken 
19 For the 1630s, see Lundkvist, ‘Svensk krigsfinansiering 1630–1635’, pp. 
383–384, 415–417; for the 1670s, see Göran Rystad, Karl XI: En biografi 
(Lund: Historiska media, 2001), pp. 27–28, 59, 62–63, 168–169; for the 
1720s, see Åmark, Sveriges statsfinanser, pp. 129–144.
20 For a more developed description of the background of this decision, see Sven 
A. Nilsson, På väg mot reduktionen: Studier i svenskt 1600-tal (Stockholm: 
Natur och kultur, 1964), pp. 114–123.
21 See note 16. 
22 Axel Oxenstierna to Cardinal Richelieu 24 September 1634, 11 May 1635. 
Also in instruction for Hugo Grotius 10 September 1635. See Rikskanslern 
Axel Oxenstiernas skrifter och brevväxling, 1:12. Brev 1634, juni–dec 
(Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1977), pp. 488–490; and 
Rikskanslern Axel Oxenstiernas skrifter och brevväxling, 1:13. Brev 1635, 
jan–aug (Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt & Söners förlag, 1949), pp. 250–251; 
and Rikskanslern Axel Oxenstiernas skrifter och brevväxling, 1:14. Brev 
sept–dec (Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt & Söner, 1950), pp. 24–26. 
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desperation.23 It appears to be a paradox that, at the same time as 
Swedish diplomats and politicians quite unreservedly asked France 
for help, they were sensitive to how France would respond. Signs 
of French haughtiness were not well received, and members of the 
Council of the Realm discussed how to avoid Sweden’s being seen 
as a mercenary.24 One issue was that diplomats from less friendly 
courts visiting Stockholm sent dispatches to Vienna or Copenhagen 
reporting on Swedish eagerness to obtain subsidies, preferably from 
France.25 French observers also viewed Sweden as impecunious and 
in need of help from allies, especially in the aftermath of the Great 
Northern War (1700–1721).26
From a broader perspective, I suggest that one may analyse how 
individuals or groups employed the rhetoric of ‘dependency’ on the 
basis of how different individuals or groups hoped for, or were 
accused of gaining from, subsidies. For example, young officers 
expressed disappointment when the French ambassador in 1650 
failed to deliver money that was needed for a Swedish regiment; there 
was a similar case in 1669, when Spanish money was not paid.27 
23 For example, Stockholm, RA, Det odelade kansliet: Rådsprotokoll, vol. 45 
(3 December 1666), vol. 47 (24 September 1667). 
24 For example, when discussing a possible treaty with the emperor, the Council 
of the Realm did not want to give the impression that Sweden would enter 
into such a treaty because of the money. Stockholm, RA, Det odelade kansliet: 
Rådsprotokoll, vol. 59b (4 December 1672). The French ambassador Terlon 
had implied that Sweden would do anything for France if the latter offered 
money. ‘They are mistaken’, says Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie, ‘if they 
think so. They cannot treat us like the Swiss.’ Stockholm, RA, Det odelade 
kansliet: Rådsprotokoll, vol. 63 (27 February 1674). 
25 Wratislaus von Sternberg, ‘Memorial on the Situation in Sweden, May 
1674’ in Handlingar rörande Sverges historia ur utrikes arkiver samlade 
och utgifna af And. Fryxell, tredje delen, ed. by Anders Fryxell (Stockholm: 
L.J. Hjerta, 1839), pp. 94–148 (pp. 123, 144); ‘Utdrag och afskrifter ur 
Danska ministern Jens Juels bref till kungen af Danmark 1664 och följande 
år’, in Handlingar rörande Sverges historia ur utrikes arkiver samlade och 
utgifna af And. Fryxell, första delen, ed. by Anders Fryxell (Stockholm: L.J. 
Hjerta, 1836), pp. 106–210 (p. 156).
26 La Courneuve, Archives diplomatiques (AD), Memoires et documents Suède 
4 (discours by ambassador Pomponne 1668), and Memoires et documents 
Suède 9 (instruction for ambassador Lanmary October 1741).
27 Johan Ekeblads bref. 1: Från Kristinas och Cromwells hof, ed. by Nils 
Sjöberg (Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt & Söners förlag, 1911), p. 48; Jens 
Juel, ‘Utdrag och afskrifter ur Danska ministern Jens Juels bref till kungen 
af Danmark 1664 och följande år’, in Handlingar rörande Sverges historia 
ur utrikes arkiver samlade och utgifna af And. Fryxell, första delen, ed. by 
Anders Fryxell, pp. 106–210 (pp. 198, 248). 
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For these young officers, war was a source of income that supported 
their social climbing. Thus, the English ambassador in Stockholm 
in 1653–1654 reported that Swedish officers hoped that the war 
between the Netherlands and Britain would continue, so that they 
would have the opportunity to join on Britain’s side. However, the 
ambassador had been told that since the most powerful politicians 
in the country, chancellor Axel Oxenstierna and his sons, were so 
rich, Sweden would stay at peace. According to this reasoning, 
Oxenstierna and his immediate family had little personal interest in 
going to war – they did well without the extra money and did not 
need to raise their status – to the disappointment of the officers.28
The Thirty Years’ War and the Swedish intervention
When Sweden entered the war in Germany in the summer of 1630 
to fight for the Lutheran cause against the Holy Roman Emperor, 
the promise of French subsidies, which materialized with the 
treaty of Bärwalde in January 1631, was vital. The treaty is quite 
straightforward in what was expected from Sweden in return for 
the subsidies: thirty thousand infantry soldiers and six thousand 
cavalry were to fight in Germany. In return, Sweden would receive 
400,000 riksdaler annually for five years.29 Sweden would also receive 
a smaller sum as back payment for parts of 1630. On the death of 
King Gustav II Adolf in November 1632, the treaty expired since 
it was an agreement between kings, not between states; but it was 
in all essential aspects renewed in 1633. Apart from the obvious 
point that Sweden promised to provide an exact specified number 
of soldiers, neither of the treaties (1631 or 1633) goes into detail 
as to how the money was expected to be used, nor for whom it 
was supposed to be used.30 France obviously expected to benefit 
from this deal by getting the Swedish king and his armies to fight 
the emperor on its behalf. The question here, however, is where the 
French money went and who else besides the French king managed 
to benefit from it. As French statesmen accepted Swedish control 
over the subsidies once they had been paid, it is necessary to examine 
28 Bulstrode Whitelocke, A Journal of the Swedish Embassy in the years 1653 
and 1654 (London: Longman, 1855), vol. ii, pp. 34–35.
29 Sverges traktater med främmande magter: jemte andra dit hörande handlingar: 
5:1 1572–1632, ed. by O.S. Rydberg and C. Hallendorff (Stockholm: P.A. 
Norstedt & Söners förlag, 1903), pp. 438–442.
30 See note 28 and Sverges traktater med främmande magter: jemte andra dit 
hörande handlingar: 5:2 1632–1645, ed. by C. Hallendorff (Stockholm: 
P.A. Norstedt & Söners förlag, 1909), pp. 12–18.
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what Swedish statesmen used the subsidies for in order to determine 
their understanding of their fiscal situation.
Expenses 1632
One of the earliest accounts in the Royal Treasury of subsidy 
expenditure from the war is dated 1632 and shows the allocation 
of funds, 136,796 riksdaler, for the November term of that year.31 
By November 1632, Sweden had been at war in Germany for more 
than two years. The people listed in the account are all men and, 
not surprisingly, many of those were military commanders. The 
account lists most of the recipients by name, with only a few remain-
ing anonymously hidden behind titles. By far the biggest share of 
the money was allocated to individuals, not to collectives or institu-
tions. At the top of the list was Duke Wilhelm of Saxe-Weimar 
(1598–1662) who received 20,000 riksdaler, some 15 per cent of 
the total amount. Duke Wilhelm, brother of the more famous general 
Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, sided with Gustav II Adolf in the German 
war but was sidestepped by Axel Oxenstierna after the death of 
the Swedish king in November 1632. The source does not specify 
for what purpose Duke Wilhelm received the money, so one can 
only speculate that it was intended for maintaining troops and/or 
recruiting soldiers. The Swedish army at the time was full of hired 
foreign officers fighting on the same side as the Swedish king and 
raising armies for him.32 Others mentioned in the account included 
Donald Mackay, first Lord Reay (1591–1649), a Scotsman, and the 
German baron Dodo zu Innhausen und Knyphausen (1583–1636), 
who was third in command at the battle of Lützen where the Swedish 
king died and who became a Swedish field marshal in 1633. Both 
Mackay and Knyphausen received relatively small sums, but it was 
not stated for what purposes. Two officers, Lammermont and 
Hamilton, were paid substantial sums for army supplies, a total 
cost of 18,298 riksdaler. ‘Hamilton’ could refer to just about any 
of the sixty-five Scottish Hamiltons serving in the Swedish armies 
under King Gustav II Adolf.33
31 Stockholm, RA, Kammarkollegiet: Kansliet och kontorsarkiv, F3/1.
32 In 1631, around 80 per cent of the troops fighting for Sweden were hired, 
which gives us an idea of the importance of foreign officers. Lundkvist, 
‘Svensk krigsfinansiering 1630–1635’, p. 384.
33 Hamilton, släkt, urn:sbl:12476, Svenskt biografiskt lexikon, accessed 10 
July 2017.
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Although many who were paid from the subsidies were not 
Swedish, there were also Swedish noblemen and burghers on the 
receiving end. Some of them got what seem to be reimbursements, 
in total 67,141 riksdaler (49 per cent of the grand total). One of the 
recipients of such reimbursements was Baron Sten Bielke (1598–1638), 
who at the time was stationed in Stralsund and Pomerania in order 
to find resources and buy supplies for the Swedish army.34 Bielke 
belonged to the group of noblemen and merchants who were asked 
to advance money towards French subsidies.35 Others included the 
nobleman Klas Horn, most probably the Klas Horn (1583–1632) 
who at the time of his death was in charge of Stralsund, and Peter 
Grönberg (1579–1632).36 Grönberg was a Swedish businessman 
and war financier who had earned the trust of Axel Oxenstierna. In 
1631, he was raised to the nobility and at the same time stationed in 
Hamburg to buy weapons and gunpowder, to pay for the recruitment 
of soldiers and also to pay off creditors.37
Other Swedish recipients of money included Melchior Falkenberg 
(1597–1651), who was in the Netherlands to manage the copper 
trade, and Johan Leuhusen (1597–1641), who was used as an envoy 
by Axel Oxenstierna and who went on a diplomatic mission to 
Paris in 1631, together with Axel’s cousin Bengt Oxenstierna. An 
entry for money that had been spent in France for travel and gifts 
– not specifying any details – can be referred to this diplomatic 
mission to Paris in 1631.
Even though details are missing from many of the entries, it is 
fair to say that by far the largest proportion of the funds from the 
third term of French subsidies in 1632 was used for supporting the 
military actions in Germany, as specified in the treaty. Most of the 
money was seemingly used for recruiting and maintaining troops 
or for buying supplies for troops, while only a minor share, some 4 
per cent, was spent on diplomacy and an even smaller share covered 
the costs of managing the subsidies (approximately 1.5 per cent).
34 Sten Svantesson Bielke, urn:sbl:34575, Svenskt biografiskt lexikon (article 
by B. Boëthius), accessed 10 July 2017.
35 Axel Oxenstierna to Sten Bielke 9 May 1633 in Rikskanslern Axel Oxen-
stiernas skrifter och brevväxling, 1:8. Brev 1633, Jan–maj (Stockholm: P.A. 
Norstedt & Söners förlag, 1942), pp. 605–606.
36 Horn, släkt, urn:sbl:13802, Svenskt biografiskt lexikon, accessed 10 July 
2017.
37 Peter Grönenberg (Gröneberg), urn:sbl:13267, Svenskt biografiskt lexikon 
(article by Birgitta Lager), accessed 10 July 2017.
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As far as it is possible to trace what the money was spent on, 
most resources seem to have been spent outside Sweden. During 
this period, the subsidies never reached Sweden. They were spent 
in Europe and were to a large extent also used for paying non-Swedes 
for services rendered to the Swedish crown. Rather than being an 
independent agent, one could say that, as far as subsidies were 
concerned, the Swedish state merely acted as a distributor of French 
resources between France and the army commanders and suppliers 
to the armies engaged in the war in Germany. To what degree any 
of the people on the list actually profited personally from getting 
a share of the subsidies, or if they spent it all on paying salaries or 
buying supplies, is difficult to say. A possible profit may have arisen 
from being hired and given an opportunity to make a career and 
advance socially. Indirectly, however, people in Europe who supplied 
the Swedish armies would probably benefit from the subsidies.
The treaty of 1672 stipulated that Sweden would receive 400,000 
riksdaler annually for three years in peacetime and 600,000 annually 
if war broke out.38 In return, Sweden would keep sixteen thousand 
soldiers in Germany, with an exception for 1672 when the number 
had to be only six thousand. The treaty was renewed on 15 April 
1675.39 The treaties of 1672 and 1675 did not explicitly prohibit 
Sweden from using the money for purposes other than keeping 
armed forces in Germany.
Expenses 1675–1677
The situation in Sweden in the 1670s was different from that of 
forty years earlier. By 1630, Gustav II Adolf had ruled his country 
for many years and proved himself to be a capable commander of 
arms. He had also sought and managed to work together with the 
Swedish aristocracy with the aim of building an efficient civil service. 
Even though Sweden was a relatively poor country with a small 
population, the administration’s increasing efficiency in retrieving 
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resources, and the increasing export of copper and iron, enabled 
the state to build a strong military. When Sweden agreed to a new 
treaty with France in 1672, it had been ruled by a government led 
by aristocrats since 1660 during the minority reign of Karl XI 
(1655–1697). There was strong criticism voiced against the govern-
ment for mismanaging the state finances. The young king eventually 
decided to seek the advice of men outside the aristocratic circle that 
had ruled the country during his minority reign. He gradually 
excluded people such as the once-mighty chancellor Magnus Gabriel 
De la Gardie from his inner circle.40
The accounts from the 1670s are more detailed than the ones 
from 1632 and hence provide more in-depth knowledge of what 
the subsidies were used for.41 The focal point here has been the 
years 1675–1677, during which Sweden was at war with Brandenburg 
and Denmark.
Unlike in 1632, the money actually arrived in Sweden and was 
apparently to a large extent also spent in Sweden. Again unlike the 
situation in 1632, most recipients were active in Sweden, including 
both women – albeit a small number – and men. As in the accounts 
from 1632, much of the money was distributed among individuals, 
but with the difference that what they had delivered in return, or 
were supposed to deliver, is also described in much greater detail.42
Of the total of 4,400,000 daler silvermynt (ds), which was the same 
as 2,400,000 reichsthaler, around 5.4 per cent was used for diplomacy 
and 8.9 per cent for the court. Most of the money allocated for the 
court was used for purchasing goods in Paris for the king’s coronation, 
which took place on 28 September 1675. Other court expenses 
included liveries for courtiers and an unspecified sum used for the 
queen dowager.43 Adding minor costs for the civil administration 
40 Rystad, Karl XI, pp. 120–122, 128–135.
41 With regard to 1675, it is also possible to double-check the subsidy accounts 
with Rikshuvudboken (the general account of the state) for accuracy: 
Stockholm, RA, Kammarkollegiet, Generalbokhållaren: Rikshuvudböcker, 
vol. 129 (1675).
42 It is of course difficult to separate military and non-military purposes in 
a country so heavily militarized as Sweden was at the time. In this case, I 
have classified expenses for diplomacy and the royal court as non-military.
43 Spending subsidy money on the court was not unique for the period of 
1675–1677; it had also been done in the previous period, 1672–1674. See 
Stockholm, RA, Det odelade kansliet: Rådsprotokoll, vol. 59b (4 December 
1672).
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and the percentage given to Johan Adlercrona for managing the 
subsidies – about 0.5 per cent altogether – approximately 15 per 
cent of the subsidies over the three years 1675–1677 was used for 
purposes other than purely military ones.44
Of the military costs, the single highest entry went to the army 
in Pomerania (1,295,000 ds). This was followed by costs for debts 
(367,000), the navy (364 000), the regiments in Skåne (253,000), 
and troops in Bremen (189,000). Other entries with high figures, 
although lower than those mentioned, include garrisons, ammunition, 
powder, and recruitment. Other expenses were far lower than any 
of these.45
The treaty with France stated that Sweden was paid subsidies to 
keep troops in Germany. According to the list of expenditures, 
keeping an army in Pomerania amounted to about 29.5 per cent 
of all subsidies, whereas the cost of troops in Bremen amounted to 
4.2 per cent – altogether 33.7 per cent. As the headings for Pomerania 
and Bremen do not specify whether these figures covered all costs, 
such as supplies and transport, it is possible that one has to add a 
number of costs that may be found under other headings, such as 
buying supplies and recruiting soldiers. By excluding costs not 
intended for troops in Germany (costs for the navy, regiments in 
Skåne, and some of the debts that were obviously not connected 
to Germany), and treating all other expenses as costs pertaining to 
German troops, nearly 70 per cent of the subsidies were used for 
the purpose stated in the treaty. This is likely to be a generous calcula-
tion. The lowest figure, on the other hand, would be 33.7 per cent. 
In either case, a substantial part of the subsidies, at least 30 per 
cent, was used for purposes other than those stated in the treaty.
So far, we have looked only at what the money was used for; 
however, another issue is the question with whom the resources 
ended up. The group that received the largest sums for supplying 
the Swedish navy or army with goods included merchants, manu-
facturers, or members of the new nobility, who often also served 
as civil servants. Many of these were newcomers in Sweden or in 
Swedish service, much like the officers who were paid from the 
French subsidies in the early 1630s. Some were sons of immigrants 
44 Stockholm, RA, Kammarkollegiet, Kansliet och kontorsarkiv, Generalstats-
kontoret 1653–1680.
45 For example, payment for tin copper (186 ds) or 22 barrels of rye (176 
ds), both for the navy. See Stockholm, RA, Kammarkollegiet, Kansliet och 
kontorsarkiv, Generalstatskontoret 1653–1680.
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who had arrived in Sweden during the Thirty Years’ War. What the 
two generations had in common seems to be that their relocation 
to Sweden was an effect of Swedish involvement in European politics. 
Unlike the officers in the earlier period, though, people like Jakob 
Sneckensköld and Henrik Cronstierna (both of Livonian descent), 
Johan Adlercrona (of French descent), Abraham Boneauschöld (from 
France), Gerdt Störning (from Germany), Daniel Leijonankar (from 
Scotland), and the brothers Abraham and Jakob Reenstierna (from 
the Netherlands) lived in Sweden and had most of their business 
in Sweden. Altogether, this group of merchants, manufacturers, and 
lower civil servants were paid nearly 600,000 ds for clothes, fish, 
cheese, grain (rye), flour, cannons, tin, copper, ships, gunpowder, 
and other supplies. Others, like the newly ennobled Joel (Ekman) 
Gripenstierna, were reimbursed for having advanced money to the 
crown.
Moving away from the people who made a lot of money, there 
were also entries with smaller amounts, implying that there were 
others who may have benefited: a widow who had manufactured 
ensigns, the baker’s office for providing bread, various (anonymous) 
skippers for transporting soldiers, the painter Baltsar Friedrich, a 
group of poor petitioners, the book-keeper Johan Mattsson, and 
others. The 4,000 ds used for constructing a stable must have resulted 
in a need for supplies and somebody to build it; the 1,000 ds called 
‘tobacco money for the queen dowager’ means that somebody 
importing and selling tobacco might have profited.
Even though much of the subsidies was spent in Sweden, a 
substantial portion went back to France. The largest sum spent in 
France was spent on goods for the king’s coronation: 207,000 ds. 
But that was not all: the gift for the French diplomat de la Picquetière, 
worth 3,500 ds, was taken from the subsidy money. The Swedish 
ambassador to Paris and the Swedish diplomat Nils Eosander Lil-
lieroot, also in Paris, were both paid using the subsidy money, and 
it is fair to guess that a certain amount of that was spent in Paris.46
1727–1729: in the aftermath of the Great Northern War
Subsidies paid by France and Great Britain in 1727–1729 were a 
result of Sweden’s joining the Hanoverian alliance that France, Great 
Britain, and Prussia had entered in 1725. The treaty of Hanover 
46 This means that at least 6 per cent of the subsidies for 1675–1677 was 
spent in France. 
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was a response to the treaty of Vienna, which brought Spain, Austria, 
and Russia together. When Sweden became affiliated to the Hanover-
ian alliance in 1727, the secret articles stated that France and Britain 
would pay £50,000 sterling per annum in return for seven thousannd 
infantry soldiers and three thousand cavalry to be used if needed.47 
As with earlier treaties, there is no mention in detail how the Swedish 
government could allocate the money once it had reached Sweden. 
During the period 1727–1729, the subsidies from France and Britain 
made up 18–19 per cent of the annual state revenue.48
Expenses 1727–1729
The Great Northern War (1700–1721) had been extremely costly 
measured in both loss of lives and loss of land, and it put a financial 
strain on Sweden for a long time.49 After the death of Karl XII 
(1682–1718) in November 1718 and the short reign, 1719–1720, 
of his sister Queen Ulrika Eleonora (1688–1741), the Swedish throne 
passed to her husband Landgrave Friedrich of Hesse-Cassel 
(1676–1751), who consequently became King Fredrik I of Sweden. 
As a reaction against the absolute rule of Karl XII, the monarchy 
was stripped of much of its power, the Parliament instead ending 
up being the strongest political institution throughout what has 
been labelled Sweden’s ‘Age of Freedom’, beginning in the 1720s 
and ending only with the coup d’état in 1772, which once again 
gave the monarchy a stronger political position.
When joining the Hanoverian alliance in 1727, Sweden renewed 
its tradition of accepting financial support, this time from both 
France and Great Britain. With a few exceptions, Sweden had not 
received any French subsidies since the beginning of the 1680s.50 
Of the total of 3,690,000 ds Sweden received over the three years 
1727–1729, slightly more than 20 per cent was used for non-military 
purposes. A large part of this was used to cover already incurred 
costs for the coronation in 1720 (150,000). Some expenses covered 
47 Stockholm, RA, Originaltraktater med främmande makter. 14 mars 1727. 
Separata artiklar och sekret artikel till Litt. A.
48 Åmark, Sveriges statsfinanser, pp. 151, 585.
49 Sweden lost Bremen-Verden to Great Britain, parts of Pomerania to Prussia, 
and the Baltic provinces and part of Finland to Russia. The loss of the Baltic 
provinces in particular represented a tough blow for the Swedish economy.
50 In fact, the three-year subsidy treaty agreed between France and Sweden in 
1715 is the only exception. 
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historical agreements: Stanisław I Leszczyński of Poland, the deposed 
and exiled Swedish puppet king who ruled Poland in 1704–1709, 
was paid a yearly allowance taken out of the French subsidies. 
Another, though minor, part was used to pay off debts to Ottoman 
merchants to whom Sweden owed money for services rendered in 
the 1710s.51
Subsidies were also used to fill up the queen’s private purse 
(15,000 ds), but the largest single amount (400,000) was used for 
covering the king’s journeys back and forth to Hesse-Cassel. Besides 
these costs for the court, resources were also allocated for diplomacy 
such as the Swedish presence at the peace congress in Soissons, 
which amounted to 111,010, and gifts to foreign envoys in the 
amount of 43,000.
As in previous periods, by far the largest proportion of the subsidies 
was used for military purposes. Interestingly, though, of the 3,061,000 
ds spent on the military, 38 per cent was spent on building or 
repairing fortresses, building new houses for the navy, or building 
warehouses. Nearly a third of the total amount of subsidies was 
used for the navy.
With the treaty stating that Sweden would, in return for subsidies, 
keep seven thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry, the spending 
of the subsidies – even what was spent on the military – seems to 
point in another direction from what was intended. The use of 
subsidies in the 1720s to a great extent mirrors the situation at the 
time. There was a lack of resources, which meant that some had 
to be allocated to pay for historical expenses such as the coronation 
and debts to Ottoman merchants. There was peace, and Sweden 
had allied itself with the enemies of its powerful neighbour Russia, 
which explains the investment in building for the future.
Unlike in 1632 and 1675, only a few names are named on the 
expense list for 1727–1729. These include a member of the Grill 
family, the wealthiest merchant family in Stockholm at the time, 
and the merchant Hans Lenman (1683–1739). Lenman, who had 
made a fortune from trading in salt and grain, was in charge of 
delivering English money to the Swedish crown in the early 1720s.52 
By the 1720s, Hans Lenman was active in all kinds of manufacturing 
and trading. He supplied the navy with hemp and canvas for sails, 
51 Stockholm, RA, Statskontorets arkiv: Kammarkontoret G2, Q:5, Angående 
1727, 1728 och 1729 Åhrs Franska och Engelska Subsidier.
52 Stockholm, RA, Betänkanden och memorial, utrikes ärenden, 27. Undated. 
(9 October 1719, 10 October 1719, 9 March 1721).
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while also being contracted to build warships for the state. The 
latter circumstance is the reason why he was paid 50,000 ds in 
1727.53
Swedish dependency
There is a difference between what the subsidy treaties stated and 
what the Swedish government actually used the subsidies for. This 
is more obvious in the 1670s and 1720s than in 1632, as not only 
were 15–20 per cent of the subsidies used for non-military purposes 
in these two later periods but a substantial share of the remainder 
was used for military purposes not mentioned in the treaties. Could 
this simply be a matter of book-keeping? That is unlikely. It is 
quite clear that the Swedish state, especially in the periods where 
the discrepancy is at its largest, treated subsidies as separate from 
other state income and expenditure. Still, it is quite puzzling that 
in spite of the claims of Swedish politicians that the country was 
dependent on subsidies, and despite Sweden’s image – both in France 
and elsewhere – as a country that frequently and eagerly accepted 
subsidies, it seems that, once Sweden had received the money, it 
could manage these funds more or less any way it deemed fit. In 
that sense, Sweden’s independence was seemingly respected or at 
least accepted by the payer.
There were attempts from the French side to monitor the Swedish 
use of subsidies, but by all accounts these attempts were fended off 
by the Swedes. In 1726, when Swedish councillors debated whether 
Sweden should accept subsidies from France, some raised the point 
that, in the 1670s, France had requested that how the subsidies 
were used would be controlled by France.54 Nothing came of that 
request; but, in a council debate in 1680, information was given 
that Jean-Baptiste Colbert, in charge of French finances, had allegedly 
said that new subsidies would be paid to Sweden only if France 
could keep an envoy in Sweden who would monitor the use of the 
money.55 Earlier, in 1662, when the French had refused to ratify 
the Fontainebleau treaty, the French ambassador Hugues Terlon 
53 Hans Lenman, urn:sbl:11223, Svenskt biografiskt lexikon (article by Rune 
Kiellander), accessed 19 July 2017.
54 Stockholm, RA, Utrikesexpeditionen, riksrådsprotokoll i utrikesärenden 
1724–27 (15 February 1726).
55 Stockholm, RA, Det odelade kansliet: Rådsprotokoll, vol. 72 (26 February 
1680).
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was instructed that – if necessary – he should tell the Swedish govern-
ment that they were to blame for the breakdown of the treaty owing 
to the misuse of subsidies. From the context, it appears that the 
French only wanted to use this as an excuse rather than as a serious 
accusation. The real reason for the refusal to ratify the treaty was 
changing conditions in Poland, which meant that France had less 
of a need for Sweden.56
Even though France unsurprisingly had an interest in keeping an 
eye on the use of subsidies given to Sweden, it seems that there 
were reasons why they could not force Sweden to accept being 
monitored. The Swedish attitude towards who had the last say in 
the use of subsidies is perhaps revealed by the councillor Sten Bielke 
in February 1672, when he simply stated in the council that Sweden 
might not have to keep the promised number of troops in Bremen, 
since it would be impossible for France to check.57 Another example 
is when the Swedish council in early 1680 was debating whether 
it could demand subsidies that had not been paid by France even 
though Sweden had failed to live up to the conditions in the subsidy 
treaty from 1672, as Sweden had not kept the promised number 
of troops in Bremen. One reason, some of the councillors argued, 
for Sweden to demand subsidies in spite of the breach of the agree-
ment was that Bremen had suffered badly because of French warfare.58 
It was decided that France should be approached with caution to 
see if it might be possible to obtain the subsidies. The use of subsidies 
for non-military purposes, or purposes that were not mentioned in 
the treaties, was rarely openly debated within the Swedish council. 
It is remarkable that when Sweden had broken the agreement from 
1672 by not providing the number of troops agreed upon – and 
obviously spent the money on things other than that which was 
intended in the treaties – that was not in itself an issue in the council 
discussion.
There may have been a change in French policy from the 1730s 
onwards. In 1734, the Swedish ambassador to Paris, Niclas Peter 
von Gedda, reported that Cardinal Fleury wanted the subsidy treaty 
that was being negotiated to be very precise in specifying the uses 
for which the Swedes would be allowed to use subsidies. This was 
56 Birger Fahlborg, Sveriges yttre politik 1660–1664 (Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt 
& Söner, 1932), pp. 278–279.
57 Stockholm, RA, Det odelade kansliet: Rådsprotokoll, vol. 59a (21 February 
1672).
58 Stockholm, RA, Det odelade kansliet: Rådsprotokoll, vol. 33c.
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strongly rejected by his Swedish counterpart, president of the 
chancellery Arvid Horn. Horn’s stern remark was that it was none 
of France’s business.59 Horn had spoken to the French ambassador 
in Stockholm and promised him that the subsidies would be used 
only for what had been agreed upon, and he felt that his word 
ought to be enough. Similar expressions of the French government 
becoming more interested in the Swedish use of subsidies can be 
found in a report from the French ambassador to Stockholm in 
1746, where he suggests a more restrictive policy under which France 
would pay more attention to what it paid for. A stricter monitoring 
of the use of subsidies is also mentioned as part of the instructions 
for the new ambassador to Stockholm in 1774.60
For the periods 1675–1677 and 1727–1729, the Swedish govern-
ment was able to reallocate subsidy funds and use them for invest-
ments beyond what had been agreed upon. Whether this was due 
to an overpayment of subsidies – intended or unintended – is not 
possible to say without carrying out a much more in-depth study. 
The French government’s indulgence towards Swedish spending may 
partly be explained by its interest in building the Swedish state, an 
interest articulated in internal diplomatic correspondence. France 
sought a northern ally that could play a role in Germany and, in 
the eighteenth century, also act as a buffer against Russia. As long 
as Sweden built its military strength by modernizing its navy and 
fortresses, especially in Finland, that would be in the interest of 
France.61 This is also how the Swedish Council of the Realm saw 
it.62 Another aspect that helps explain France’s attitude was the 
Swedish sensitivity – well-known in France – about appearing as 
lacking in dignity. Swedish governments were keen to protect the 
59 Stockholm, RA, Utrikesexpeditionen, riksrådsprotokoll i utrikes ärenden 
1733–1735 (21 April 1735).
60 La Courneuve, AD, Memoires et documents Sùede 22 (Sur l’etat ou se 
trouve la Suède a l’ouverture de Diette, report from ambassador Lanmary, 
November 1746); and MD Suède 25 (Instructions for ambassador d’Usson, 
3 September 1774).
61 The wish to build Sweden is, for instance, reflected in a memorial by ambas-
sador Pomponne (1668) and the instructions for ambassadors Lanmary 
(1741) and d’Usson (1774). The latter two refer back to how building the 
weak Swedish nation had been crucial for France. See La Courneuve, AD, 
MD Suède 4, 9, 25.
62 Stockholm, RA, Det odelade kansliet. Rådsprotokoll, vol. 59a (5 March 
1672); Utrikesexpeditionen. Riksrådsprotokoll i utrikesärenden 1733–35 
(14 January 1734).
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crown’s independence, which forced France to tread carefully if it 
wanted to keep this ally.63
Resources in motion
In basic terms, the subsidy system transferred resources from Catholic 
French tax-payers to soldiers in the Swedish armies, in order for 
the latter to kill and die for the Protestant cause on battlefields in 
northern Europe. The price for the system was mostly paid by 
peasants at both ends. Along the way from the French tax-paying 
farmer to the soldier in Swedish service on the battlefield, however, 
there were people who profited from the system.
As a result of the subsidy system, resources moved from wealthier 
states to Sweden. Like smaller German states that accepted subsidies 
as a way of acquiring allies and becoming part of European politics, 
Sweden too was brought into European big politics through – first 
and foremost – French subsidies. This, in turn, contributed to a 
movement not only of material resources but also of knowledge 
and expertise through the geographical and social movement of 
people. In the first line of people who stood to benefit from the 
system were the officers and merchants who not only received a 
share of the subsidies directly but also benefited socially and finan-
cially from the wars that the subsidy system paved the way for. The 
increasing demand for officers in the seventeenth century could not, 
as before, be met by the Swedish nobility, thus opening up for 
recruitment among non-nobles who had the opportunity to rise 
socially. A considerable number of the officers were recruited from 
abroad; and, while Sweden took subsidies during the Thirty Years’ 
War, the Swedish armies became a training institution for officers 
and soldiers from around Europe, not least since the armies under 
the command of Gustav II Adolf provided a modern way of strategic 
warfare, which had been developed from Dutch models and later 
became a model for other armies.64 Of the many officers from 
Scotland or Germany who fought in the Swedish armies during the 
wars in the seventeenth century, some stayed in Sweden and enjoyed 
remarkable careers. They became part of Swedish society, were 
63 For example, La Courneuve, AD, MD Suède 4 (Histoire des Traités entre 
la France et la Suède depuis 1569 jusqu’en 1680, 10 October 1716); MD 
Suède 22 (Instructions for ambassador Lanmary, 3 October 1741).
64 Sverker Olofsson, Gustav II Adolf (Stockholm: Atlantis, 2007), pp. 174–175, 
240, 317–318. For instance, Olofsson mentions Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar.
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ennobled and gained distinction not only as officers but also in 
politics.65 Among the many newly ennobled people were also 
merchants who were first- or second-generation immigrants and 
who can be found on account lists: Jean de Flon (ennobled Adler-
crona), Daniel Young (ennobled Leijonanker), Esaias Pufendorfer 
(ennobled von Pufendorf), Abraham and Jacob Momma (both 
ennobled Reenstierna), Jakob Snäck (ennobled Sneckensköld), 
Abraham Boneau (ennobled Boneauschöld). There were also a large 
number of Swedish merchants who gained socially and financially 
from resources coming in.66
The number of new nobles rose sharply, and more so than in 
other European countries, as a result of the wars in the seventeenth 
century. The expansion of the civil administration, which was a 
result of the Swedish state activities, also contributed to the social 
climbing and ennoblement of educated men who were sons of 
burghers or clergymen. In the year 1700, the number of adult men 
within nobility had increased fivefold since 1600, and in 1750 the 
number had risen to about three thousand.67 Being part of the wars 
made it necessary for Sweden to build an efficient state administration. 
Even though a very small share of the subsidies was used directly 
for administrative purposes, the development of new administrative 
units dealing with conquered provinces, handling resource revenues, 
or the increasing need for keeping in contact with foreign powers, 
was an effect of Swedish war policy fuelled by subsidies. As an 
indirect effect of the subsidy system, the many administrators who 
filled the Swedish bureaucracy were beneficiaries of a system offering 
career opportunities on a scale not seen before for men originating 
from a social layer below the nobility.
65 For example, Germans like Ascheberg, Königsmarck, or Wittenberg, or 
Scots like Lichton, Sinclair, Hamilton, or Douglas. Between 1633 and 1654, 
twenty-six Scottish-born individuals were ennobled, mostly officers. See 
Alexia Grosjean, An Unofficial Alliance: Scotland and Sweden 1569–1654 
(Leiden: Brill, 2003), pp. 148–149.
66 For example, Vilhelm Böös (ennobled Drakenhielm), Peter Grönberg 
(ennobled Grönberg), Johan Barckman (baron Leijonberg), Nils Eosander 
(baron Lillieroot) and Joel Ekman (ennobled Gripenstierna).
67 Ingvar Elmroth, För kung och fosterland: Studier i den svenska adelns 
demografi och offentliga funktioner 1600–1900 (Lund: Bibliotheca Historica 
Lundensis, 1981), pp. 40–43; Björn Asker, Hur riket styrdes: Förvaltning, 
politik och arkiv 1520–1920 (Stockholm: Skrifter utgivna av Riksarkivet, 
2007), pp. 89–92; David Gaunt, Utbildning till statens tjänst: En kollek-
tivbiografi av stormaktstidens hovrättsauskultanter (Uppsala: Almqvist och 
Wiksell, 1975), pp. 39–40, 107.
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These are all examples of social and sometimes geographical 
circulation and some of it also included the movement of knowledge 
and expertise. In peacetime, too, warfare and the alliances led to 
an increasing interaction with other states and, not least, to an 
increase in the need for experts not only in how to fight, supply 
armies, or administer a war but also in how to handle the transfer 
of large amounts of money. Thus, people like Jean Hoeufft in the 
first half of the seventeenth century, Jean de Flon (Adlercrona) in 
the second half and Hans Lenman in the first half of the eighteenth 
century, all with commercial networks in Europe and beyond, became 
invaluable for the Swedish state as experts on moving money. 
Throughout the seventeenth century, experts on trade and manufactur-
ing were drawn to the promising opportunities offered by the growing 
Swedish economy.
Some of the long-term effects that came as a result of warfare 
were unlikely to have been planned, such as social levelling, while 
other actions were intended to be long-term investments. From the 
1670s onward and especially in the 1720s, subsidies were used for 
long-term investments in building and repairing fortresses. In the 
1670s, resources were used for building projects in Livonia, Wismar, 
Bremen, and Sweden, and in the 1720s for Finland, Pomerania, 
and Sweden.68 In a council discussion in March 1672, before signing 
the 1672 treaty with France, Chancellor Magnus Gabriel De la 
Gardie rhetorically asked where Sweden would find the money for 
restoring fortresses, especially in Wismar, if there were no subsidies.69 
In both the 1670s and the 1720s, it would have been in the interest 
not only of the Swedish state but also of France that fortifications 
were up-to-date, so that Sweden would be strong enough to act as 
a buffer against the enemies of France.
The building projects provided work for master builders, craftsmen, 
and manual labourers, some of whom benefited from subsidies, 
although not all of them did. How such investments could have much 
further effects than what was possible to foresee is shown by the 
example of Sveaborg, one of the world’s largest sea fortresses, which 
was built off the south-western coast of Finland in the mid-eighteenth 
century with the help of French subsidies. Sofia Gustafsson has 
shown how fortress-building spread knowledge of new technology 
and led to investments in infrastructure. The many soldiers involved 
in building had to be educated in the relevant crafts by experts 
68 Stockholm, RA, Kammarkollegiet, Kansliet och kontorsarkiv F3/1.
69 Stockholm, RA, Det odelade kansliet: rådsprotokoll, vol. 59a (5 March 
1672).
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brought in from other parts of Sweden. Shipbuilders from the north 
of Finland moved south and gave rise to a shipbuilding industry 
near Helsinki, and, when there was no longer a need for soldiers 
who had learned how to lay bricks, they moved on and became 
part of a boom in house-building in Finland.70 One may assume 
that similar effects were achieved when other fortresses were built 
with the support of subsidies: there was a need for supplies such as 
timber, nails, rope, glass, tar, stone, brick, cannons, and whatever 
else might be needed when new buildings for military purposes 
were erected.
Conclusion
For long periods during both the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
Sweden was dependent on foreign subsidies: in 1631–1680, it needed 
financial support to uphold its armies in occupied territories in 
northern Europe; and from the 1720s onwards, it needed subsidies 
to secure its own territory as well. In the 1630s, subsidies were 
used to enable Sweden to enter the war in Germany as France’s 
ally, thus being a part of European politics. In the 1670s, subsidies 
were used to preserve Sweden’s and France’s position in Germany, 
while in the 1720s, in the aftermath of the catastrophic Great 
Northern War, most subsidies were employed in order to secure 
Sweden’s own territory and the small remaining parts of Germany 
it still held, at the same time as Swedes maintained some hope that 
Sweden would once again be able to reconquer lost provinces.
Receiving subsidies over a long period of time put Sweden in 
a position that might be interpreted as subordinate to France. It 
seems as if one way for both parties to handle this sensitive situation 
without losing prestige was to ensure that, once the subsidies had 
been paid, it was up to the Swedish state to use them properly. 
Most often, but not always, Sweden complied with the agreements 
it had made, after which it allocated the surplus as it pleased. It 
was only in the second half of the eighteenth century that France 
finally decided that paying Sweden cost too much and that the 
gain from doing so was too small. Until then, France sometimes 
70 Sofia Gustafsson, Leverantörer och profitörer, pp. 56–57, 118, 146–150, 
221–225; Sofia Gustafsson, ‘Rörlig kunskap och flyttbara färdigheter: skolad 
arbetskraft vid fästningsbygget Sveaborg på 1750-talet’, Sjuttonhundratal: 
Nordic Yearbook for Eighteenth-century Studies 2016, 31–53 (pp. 35–38, 
42–45).
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complained about the Swedish use of subsidies, and there was the 
occasional delay in paying with the justification that Sweden had 
to keep its part of the deal. The French wish to keep Sweden as an 
agent in Germany and as a buffer against Russia was enough to 
keep paying and not risk losing a long-time ally because of notions 
of prestige.
Besides moving financial resources, subsidies contributed to moving 
people geographically as well as socially. On an individual and 
collective level, there were a number of people who were directly on 
the receiving end of subsidies: army and naval officers, politicians, 
entrepreneurs managing the subsidies, diplomats, merchants, and 
manufacturers. They all had a potential interest in Sweden becoming 
or continuing to be a recipient of subsidies. For them subsidies 
offered opportunities for career and social climbing, as well as 
financial profit. Indirectly, there were many others who, without 
even knowing it, profited from the resources that flowed in with 
the subsidies.
Subsidies alone did not build the Swedish state, but it is safe to 
say that they exerted a considerable influence on the Swedish state 
and society. They were part of a wider resource mobilization which 
included various kinds of financing. Loans, taxation, customs, 
voluntary and forced contributions, looting, export, and trade could 
all, just like subsidies, lubricate the machinery of war in different 
ways. With subsidies periodically amounting to from 5 to over 20 
per cent of state revenue, in a country with very limited resources 
otherwise, they enabled investments in fortresses and ships as well 
as in supplies for the army and the navy, the hiring of soldiers, and 
the administering of the planning and realization of warfare on a 
scale that would otherwise have been impossible. Subsidies were 
important for the Swedish economy during long periods. What sets 
subsidies apart from many of the other ways of gathering resources 
is that they brought together two or more states as allies which, at 
least officially, worked together towards a common goal as well as 
forcing the creation of a counterpart. France as the main supplier 
of subsidies thus promoted Swedish state formation during the 
seventeenth century and helped maintain the Swedish state during 
parts of the first half of the eighteenth century. It is also clear that 
despite the asymmetric relationship between giver and recipient, 
both parties were in fact dependent on the system to work.
5
The problems with receiving subsidies: 
Sweden and the lesser powers in the long 
eighteenth century
Erik Bodensten
Introduction: Why the lesser powers sought subsidies
During the long eighteenth century, subsidies constituted a necessary, 
albeit insufficient, method for lesser powers to achieve political and 
dynastic objectives. In the context of imperial and European politics, 
these subsidies were crucial for the ability of minor German states 
to defend themselves and act more proactively and offensively, in 
spite of their otherwise significantly limited financial, political, and 
military resources. According to Peter Wilson, ‘only by capitalising 
on the military potential of their territory could the lesser princes 
hope to escape from their subordinate role in the grand drama of 
European politics’.1 At this point, research on lesser powers within 
the Holy Roman Empire receiving subsidies is quite extensive.2 
The research for this chapter has received support from the Crafoord Foundation. 
I would also like to extend a warm thank you to Svante Norrhem for all his 
generous help during both the application and the research process.
1 Peter H. Wilson, War, State and Society in Württemberg, 1677–1793 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 77.
2 See, for instance, Peter Claus Hartmann, Geld als Instrument europäischer 
Machtpolitik im Zeitalter des Merkantilismus (Munich: Kommission für 
Bayerische Landesgeschichte, 1978); Alois Schmid, Max III: Joseph und 
die europäischen Mächte: Die Außenpolitik des Kurfürstentums Bayern 
von 1745–1765 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1987); Charles W. Ingrao, The 
Hessian Mercenary State: Ideas, Institutions, and Reform under Frederick 
II, 1760–1785 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), ch. 5; Jeremy 
Black, ‘The Problem of the Small State: Bavaria and Britain in the Second 
Quarter of the Eighteenth Century’, European History Quarterly 19 (1989), 
5–36; Wilson, War; Peter H. Wilson, German Armies: War and 
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However, subsidies were also strategically crucial for other lesser 
powers throughout Europe.
For the lesser signatory powers, the interstate subsidy treaties 
represented a political and dynastic means and should be seen as 
an aspect of international politics, rather than as a commercial 
enterprise.3 The revenues stipulated and generated by the agreements 
were important; however, it was only rarely – such as in the case 
of Hesse-Cassel – that the subsidies covered the costs and resulted 
in a financial net profit.4 Typically, the subsidy payments only covered 
a small portion of the costs; they were severely delayed, and they 
were given only after the receiver had carried out a costly mobiliza-
tion. Often, the subsidies were reduced retroactively or cancelled 
altogether.5
Nevertheless, the subsidies constituted a means for the recipient to 
manage the rapidly increasing costs related to waging and preparing 
for war. The cost increase had to do with several different and 
interconnected factors. Suffice it to say that the long eighteenth 
century brought land and naval warfare on a new scale, which led 
to the fiscal-military state facing enormous challenges. This was 
particularly true for the smaller states, which were not in the same 
position as the great powers in terms of being able to extract ever 
more resources, either through borrowing or through territorial, 
German Politics 1648–1806 (London: UCL Press, 1998); Peter H. Wilson, 
‘Prussia as a Fiscal-Military State, 1640–1806’, in The Fiscal-military State 
in Eighteenth-century Europe: Essays in honour of P.G.M. Dickson, ed. by 
Christopher Storrs (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), pp. 95–124; Andrea Thiele, 
‘The Prince as Military Entrepreneur? Why Smaller Saxon Territories Sent 
“Holländische Regimenter” (Dutch Regiments) to the Dutch Republic’, 
in War, Entrepreneurs, and the State in Europe and the Mediterranean, 
1300–1800, ed. by Jeff Fynn-Paul (Brill: Leiden, 2014), pp. 170–192; as well 
as Andreas Flurschütz da Cruz, Chapter 7 below. For a very useful overview, 
see Peter H. Wilson, ‘The German “Soldier Trade” of the Seventeenth and 
Eighteenth Centuries: A Reassessment’, The International History Review 
XVIII.4 (November 1996), 757–792.
3 This relationship is clarified in Wilson, ‘The German’.
4 Ingrao, The Hessian Mercenary State, pp. 127–128; Wilson, War, pp. 77–84, 
89.
5 Christopher Storrs, War, Diplomacy and the Rise of Savoy, 1690–1720 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 103–118; Wilson, ‘The 
German’, 771–773; Christopher Storrs, ‘The Savoyard Fiscal-Military State 
in the Long Eighteenth Century’, in The Fiscal-military State in Eighteenth-
century Europe: Essays in honour of P.G.M. Dickson, ed. by Christopher 
Storrs (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), pp. 215–216.
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commercial, or colonial expansion.6 Thus, the subsidies offered 
the lesser states and princes an opportunity – for many the only 
opportunity – to compensate for scarce fiscal resources and, albeit 
temporarily and on a shaky foundation, maintain large, standing, well-
equipped, and well-disciplined troops ready for both defensive and 
aggressive action. As expressed by Christopher Storrs, the subsidies 
helped the princes bridge ‘the gap between what their own states 
could support (economically and politically) and what successful 
war required’.7 Without these external resources, the lesser powers 
would have been forced to assume the entire cost of the military, 
which would have necessitated cutbacks and in many cases drastic 
arms reductions. Some lesser powers, including Savoy-Piedmont and 
Brandenburg-Prussia, successfully exploited favourable developments 
in international politics and enticed the great powers to provide 
them with significant subsidies. This, in turn, enabled an increased 
military capability and territorial expansion at the expense of their 
neighbours.8
However, one cannot simply reduce the reception of subsidies 
by the lesser powers to a mere question of financial-military assistance. 
The political-diplomatic assistance in exchange for military service 
was just as important. This explains why the lesser powers did not 
exclusively court the highest bidder offering the most money, but 
also why some subsidizers – France in particular – were frequently 
forced to offer higher subsidies than others. Within the framework 
of the Holy Roman Empire, for example, many prospective subsidy 
recipients gravitated toward the emperor, who was typically in a 
better position than other actors when it came to assisting them in 
their political and dynastic ambitions. In the broader context, where 
money served as a means and not as an end in itself, the fact that 
the emperor regularly offered lower subsidies, was often late in his 
payments, and was more inclined to break agreements was less 
important.9
6 With regard to the increase in military costs and the fiscal-military state during 
this period, see, for example, War, State and Development: Fiscal-military 
States in the Eighteenth Century, ed. by Rafael Torres Sánchez (Pamplona: 
Eunsa, 2007); The Fiscal-military State in Eighteenth-century Europe, ed. 
by Christopher Storrs; The British Fiscal-military States, 1660–c. 1783, ed. 
by Aaron Graham and Patrick Walsh (London: Routledge, 2016).
7 Storrs, War, p. 119.
8 See, for instance, Wilson, ‘Prussia’; Storrs, ‘The Savoyard’.
9 Wilson, War, pp. 87–88; Wilson, ‘The German’, 774–787, 791–792; Wilson, 
German Armies, pp. 97–100.
The problems with receiving subsidies 121
During the latter part of the seventeenth century, for example, 
Brandenburg provided troops for the emperor in the wars against 
France and the Ottoman Empire in exchange for subsidies, but also 
in exchange for various forms of political, diplomatic, and legal 
assistance. To crown it all, so to speak, in November 1700, just 
before the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714), 
the electoral prince Friedrich I (1657–1713) concluded a subsidy 
agreement with the Habsburg emperor Leopold I (1640–1705), 
which in exchange for eight thousand troops provided him with a 
large yearly sum and, more importantly, the royal title of King in 
Prussia.10 A similar dynamic may be observed outside the empire, 
as in the example of Savoy-Piedmont. Through shifting subsidy 
alliances with France, Great Britain, Spain, and the United Provinces 
during the period of 1690–1713, Vittorio Amedeo II (1666–1732) 
managed to break out of his diplomatic isolation and establish close 
contacts with a large number of royal courts around Europe. This 
corresponded with the duke’s aim to raise his status and secure his 
dynastic ambitions, which he successfully achieved in the context 
of the peace negotiations in Utrecht 1712–1713 when he was elevated 
to king of Sicily.11
Political and diplomatic assistance, which quite frequently took 
the route of a subsidy alliance, almost always constituted a prereq-
uisite for territorial expansion, in particular for the lesser powers. 
In the Holy Roman Empire, the emperor was in a position to settle 
territorial disputes and divisions of estates.12 Even outside of this 
legal structure, however, actors frequently needed to ensure that 
they had the recognition and support of someone else, which was 
rarely afforded without any form of compensation. For a lesser 
power, a subsidy alliance with a politically and diplomatically 
influential great power frequently represented the crucial difference 
between being able to annex a painstakingly conquered piece of 
territory and reluctantly being forced to return it. In his peace with 
France in 1679, for example, the increasingly diplomatically isolated 
elector of Brandenburg, Friedrich Wilhelm (1620–1688), was forced 
to return almost all the German lands taken from Sweden, an ally 
10 Wilson, ‘Prussia’, pp. 114–115.
11 Geoffrey Symcox, ‘Britain and Victor Amadeus II: Or, The Use and Abuse 
of Allies’, in England’s Rise to Greatness, 1660–1763, ed. by Stephen B. 
Baxter (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 151–184; Storrs, 
War, pp. 122–170.
12 Wilson, ‘The German’, 774–787, 791–792.
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of France. For Sweden, on the other hand, the political and diplomatic 
support from France in the extended peace process that ended the 
northern sideshow of the Dutch War (1672–1678) was probably 
more important than the significant French subsidies during these 
years.13 An unusual, yet illustrative, example of how generously a 
powerful subsidizer might reward a loyal and useful junior partner 
is the aforementioned acquisition of Sicily by Vittorio Amedeo. This 
Spanish island was to all intents and purposes beyond the power 
and reach of Savoy-Piedmont and could have been conquered and 
secured only by means of British naval power.14 Hence, there were 
good strategic reasons for the lesser powers to conclude subsidy 
agreements with more powerful states.
However, receiving subsidies was not risk-free. On the contrary, 
it included a variety of strategic problems, dilemmas, and challenges, 
which the lesser receiving powers – Hesse-Cassel, Denmark, Würt-
temberg, Bavaria, Portugal, Brandenburg-Prussia, and Savoy-Piedmont 
among others – struggled to address. At the same time, these difficul-
ties seem to have increased throughout the eighteenth century.15
This chapter explores the strategic challenges facing the lesser 
powers during the long eighteenth century. It also examines to 
what extent the emergence of a new European states system, the 
novel scale and intensity of warfare, and the growing strength of 
the fiscal-military state over time rendered the role of the lesser 
states as subsidy recipients more problematic, not only in the Holy 
Roman Empire but also in a more general European sense. This 
allows us to acquire a deeper understanding of the conditions under 
which the lesser powers acted, as well as of the reasons why the 
international system increasingly came to be dominated by the great 
powers.
Our point of departure is Sweden, one of the lesser powers 
receiving subsidies that have been studied to a relatively small extent 
in this regard, and we particularly focus on the fifty-year period 
following the major Swedish defeat in the Great Northern War 
13 Georg Landberg, Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia, I:3 1648–1697 
(Stockholm: Norstedts, 1952), pp. 200–203; Derek McKay, ‘Small-power 
Diplomacy in the Age of Louis XIV: The Foreign Policy of the Great Elector 
during the 1660’s and 1670’s’, in Royal and Republican Sovereignty in Early 
Modern Europe: Essays in Memory of Ragnhild Hatton, ed. by Robert 
Oresko, G.C. Gibbs, and H.M. Scott (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), pp. 209–213.
14 Symcox, ‘Britain and Victor Amadeus II’, pp. 166–171; Storrs, War, p. 4.
15 Wilson, ‘The German’; Wilson, German Armies, ch. 7.
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(1700–21).16 The Swedish case is interesting in that it differs from 
many of the smaller, not least German, states whose receipt of 
subsidies has been in focus in previous research. First, Sweden was 
a territorially vast kingdom at the periphery of Europe and found 
itself in a very different geostrategic position compared to the lesser 
continental powers. Second, Sweden belonged to a part of Europe 
which was perhaps the most affected by the fundamental alterations 
in the states system during this period, primarily as a result of 
Russia and Prussia appearing as new great powers alongside France, 
Austria, and Great Britain.17 Third, in spite of its lost Baltic provinces 
and serious military-fiscal problems, Sweden had a significant military 
capability, which included a standing army of about 45,000 men, 
several major fortresses, some twenty ships of the line – a force 
often underestimated by historians – and a large oared navy. In 
Sweden, too, unlike the situation in the majority of the other 
recipients, a considerable portion of the subsidies was also allocated 
towards these capital-intensive naval forces.18 Fourth, and perhaps 
most importantly, during the period we focus on, Sweden was a 
16 However, see Michael Roberts, The Age of Liberty: Sweden 1719–1772 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), ch. 1; Patrik Winton, 
‘Denmark and Sweden in the European Great Power System, 1720–1765’, 
Revue d’histoire Nordique – Nordic Historical Review 14.1 (2012), 39–62; 
Patrik Winton, ‘Sweden and the Seven Years War, 1757–1762: War, Debt 
and Politics’, War in History 19.1 (2012), 5–31; Peter Lindström and 
Svante Norrhem, Flattering Alliances: Scandinavia, Diplomacy, and the 
Austrian–French Balance of Power, 1646–1740 (Lund: Nordic Academic 
Press, 2013); Erik Bodensten, ‘Political Knowledge in Public Circulation: 
The Case of Subsidies in Eighteenth-century Sweden’, in Circulation of 
Knowledge: Explorations into the History of Knowledge, ed. by Johan 
Östling, Erling Sandmo, David Larsson Heidenblad, Anna Nilsson Hammar, 
and Kari Nordberg (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2018), pp. 82–104, as 
well as Svante Norrhem, Chapter 4 above.
17 Hamish M. Scott, The Emergence of the Eastern Powers, 1756–1775 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
18 Jean Häggman, Studier i frihetstidens försvarspolitik: Ett bidrag till Sveriges 
inre historia 1721–1727 (Stockholm: Uppsala universitet, 1922); Oscar Nikula, 
Svenska skärgårdsflottan 1756–1791 (Helsingfors: K.F. Puromies boktryckeri, 
1933); Leif Dannert, Svensk försvarspolitik 1743–1757: I dess utrikespolitiska 
och inrikespolitiska sammanhang (Uppsala: Appelberg, 1943); Gunnar Artéus, 
Krigsmakt och samhälle i frihetstidens Sverige (Stockholm: Militärhistoriska 
förlaget, 1982); Jan Glete, ‘Den svenska linjeflottan 1721–1860: En översikt 
av dess struktur och storlek samt några synpunkter på behovet av ytterligare 
forskning’, Forum navale 45 (1990), 9–68; Jan Glete, Navies and Nations: 
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constitutional monarchy, where the political decision-making process 
was entirely in the hands of the Council of the Realm and the Diet. 
This represents a clear difference compared to the other states 
receiving subsidies, states ruled by absolute monarchs. Among other 
things, this meant that increasing state revenues by means of extract-
ing more resources became more or less politically impossible. Instead, 
Sweden was to an unusually high degree obliged to rely on foreign 
subsidies.19
The very fact that Sweden set itself apart in these respects provides 
us with a good opportunity for complementing our view of this 
phenomenon, but perhaps also to distinguish and understand the 
relevant set of problems generically: what strategic problems, dilem-
mas, and challenges united the lesser powers seeking and receiving 
subsidies from the major powers during this period?
The asymmetric Franco-Swedish subsidy alliance
Coming out of the Great Northern War, Sweden desperately needed 
the support of foreign subsidies. The strategy of avoiding subsidy 
alliances and treaty obligations, as they risked dragging Sweden 
into war – a strategy which had been in effect since around 1680 
– was now considered a failure. In 1715, Sweden successfully 
concluded a three-year subsidy agreement with France. However, 
this treaty collapsed almost immediately as a result of a French 
policy reversal and an Anglo-French alliance.20 New and growing 
tensions between the great powers following the War of the Spanish 
Succession offered Sweden the opportunity of joining the western 
power bloc. Having done so, Sweden received significant British 
and French subsidies in 1727–1729, as well as much-needed security 
Warships, Navies and State Building in Europe and America, 1500–1860, 
vols I–II (Stockholm: Stockholms Universitet, 1993), vol. I, pp. 297–305; 
Jan Glete, ‘Navies and Power Struggle in Northern and Eastern Europe, 
1721–1814’, in Navies in Northern Waters, 1721–2000, ed. by Rolf Hobson 
and Tom Kristiansen (London: Frank Cass, 2004), pp. 66–93.
19 Roberts, The Age, pp. 20–21.
20 Jerker Rosén, Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia, II:1 1697–1721 
(Stockholm: Norstedts, 1952), pp. 132, 137–138. In the final years of the 
war, Sweden also briefly came to receive some British subsidies, as well as 
a couple of smaller French payments; see Karl Åmark, Sveriges statsfinanser 
1719–1809, parts I–III (Stockholm: Norstedts, 1961), pp. 571–572.
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guarantees and British navy demonstrations in the Baltic Sea aimed 
at Russia.21
Nevertheless, the Anglo-French detente of 1716 and the Alliance 
of Hanover in 1725 did not constitute a long-term basis for Swedish 
foreign policy. By the early 1730s, it was clear that the previous 
sharing of interests between France and Great Britain no longer 
existed. After a long period of recovery and diplomatic restraint, 
France was now able to start regaining its position as the leading 
power in Europe. From a Swedish perspective, this new strategic 
situation included several historically familiar elements. It was once 
again possible to discern the outlines of a states system whereby 
France alone was confronted by a broad alliance under Austrian 
leadership. In this context, Sweden could assume its former role as 
a junior subsidy partner to France and one of the cornerstones of 
France’s eastern system, no longer tasked with directly confronting 
the emperor but rather weakening and preventing Russia from 
assisting Austria and meddling in continental matters.22
Leaving important domestic and dynastic motives aside, Sweden 
had two major strategic ambitions related to Russia: on the one 
hand, territorial expansion and a revision of power; on the other, 
preserving the peace and maintaining Sweden’s fragile security. 
These two ambitions were clearly difficult to reconcile. However, 
this duality was in no way unique to Sweden; it may be seen 
elsewhere as well, for example in Savoy-Piedmont and Bavaria. 
Both of these powers were squeezed tightly between neighbouring 
great powers and thus accustomed to living in fear and minimizing 
risk. Nevertheless, they were also always ready to play for high 
stakes and exploit opportunities for expansion. The decision to 
accept subsidies from a great power, directed against another, was 
21 Bertil Boëthius, Sveriges traktater med främmande magter: Jemte andra 
dit hörande handlingar, Åttonde delen 1723–1771 (Stockholm: Kungl. 
Boktryckeriet, P.A. Norstedt & Söner, 1922), pp. 69–83; Olof Jägerskiöld, 
Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia, II:2 1721–1792 (Stockholm: Norstedts, 
1957), pp. 66–82; Åmark, Sveriges statsfinanser, pp. 572, 587; Roberts, 
The Age, pp. 33–34.
22 Arthur M. Wilson, French Foreign Policy during the Administration of 
Cardinal Fleury 1726–1743 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1936), passim; Jägerskiöld, Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia, pp. 92–99; 
Roberts, The Age, pp. 20, 34; Jeremy Black, European International Relations, 
1648–1815 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 145–157.
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never easy, and it was typically preceded by considerable doubts 
and difficult discussions. The example of Bavaria illustrates the 
consequences of making an error of judgement: before the War 
of the Spanish Succession, France sought to restore its network 
of subsidy alliances within the Holy Roman Empire. Here, the 
Bavarian Wittelsbachs played a key role. In 1701, Elector Maxi-
milian Emanuel II (1662–1726) accepted a secret Franco-Bavarian 
subsidy alliance, after repeatedly having failed to gain the support 
of the emperor for his ambitious political and dynastic objectives. 
Before the final and reluctant break with the emperor the following 
year, Maximilian Emanuel received a clear promise that significant 
French forces were to join him on the Upper Danube, which also 
materialized. After some great successes – followed by generous 
offers to defect to the Grand Alliance – his fate was none the less 
sealed when the Franco-Bavarian forces suffered a crushing military 
defeat in 1704. It would take more than ten years, and only after 
the war was over, before Maximilian Emanuel was able to return 
to a financially ruined and politically and militarily marginalized 
Bavaria. New Bavarian attempts were made in the 1730s and 
1740s, with the same catastrophic result, after which France finally 
withdrew its support.23 Savoy-Piedmont, in turn, abandoned its old 
strategy of joining forces with Bourbon France at about the same 
time. To a large extent as a result of Vittorio Amedeo’s successful 
use of mainly British subsidies, the duke succeeded in the feat of 
simultaneously freeing his state from its powerful neighbour – 
without becoming dependent on Austria – as well as expanding its 
territory.24
As far as Sweden was concerned, a Franco-Swedish subsidy alliance 
was seen as the only viable option capable of assisting Sweden in 
both its offensive and its defensive ambitions. Pro-French debaters 
in Sweden liked to emphasize that France was the only power with 
an interest in strengthening Sweden that simultaneously possessed 
the means necessary for doing so and was prepared to prioritize 
and pay for this task. Subsequently, from a Swedish perspective, 
23 Wilson, French; Peter C. Hartmann, ‘Die Subsidien- und Finanzpolitik Kurfürst 
Max Emanuels von Bayern im Spanischen Erbfolgekrieg’, Zeitschrift für 
Bayerische Landesgeschichte 32.1 (1969), 238–289; Reginald de Schryver, 
Max II: Emanuel von Bayern und das spanische Erbe: Die europäischen 
Ambitionen des Hauses Wittelsbach 1665–1715 (Mainz: Verlag Philipp von 
Zabern, 1996); Wilson, German Armies, pp. 107, 113–119, 250–258.
24 Symcox, ‘Britain and Victor Amadeus II’; Storrs, War.
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France’s recovered strength and re-established policy in northern 
Europe naturally constituted a most welcome development. Swedish 
decision-makers in the Council of the Realm and the Diet disagreed 
on how best to use France and the instrument of subsidies for 
achieving the Swedish objectives, as well as when this should occur, 
whereas it is hard to detect any type of fundamental disagreement. 
The fact that Sweden needed large subsidies for its underfunded 
army and navy was evident to every informed analyst. Refraining 
from accepting French subsidies was in other words tantamount to 
giving up on at least Sweden’s offensive ambition. Before the Swedish 
defeat in the war against Russia in 1741–1743, few Swedish politi-
cians were prepared to do so.25
The fact that it was not until 1738 that a Franco-Swedish subsidy 
alliance was finally concluded was mainly a result of France, at 
the time, not having a need for a Swedish intervention in northern 
Europe. France instead prioritized theatres of war in Germany and 
Italy where – in spite of its name – the War of the Polish Succes-
sion (1733–1735/39) was mainly fought. In June 1735, however, 
a Franco-Swedish subsidy agreement was concluded. Nevertheless, 
as the war came to an end shortly thereafter, France’s interest in 
Sweden vanished and Versailles subsequently refused to ratify the 
treaty and pay out the money. This incident ended up becoming 
exceedingly important in Swedish domestic politics, representing 
a sobering reminder for those who might have forgotten that the 
interests of Sweden and France only partly coincided and that 
the relationship was highly asymmetrical.26 The French ‘betrayal’ 
in 1735 – as well as in earlier similar incidents in 1633–1634, 
1661–1662, and 1716–1717 – would assume a prominent place in 
the Swedish debate concerning the Franco-Swedish subsidy alliance 
and its value during the following decades. The same must be said 
about the arrogant behaviour of Louis XIV (1638–1715) in the 
1679 peace negotiations, which was neither forgotten nor forgiven. 
As mentioned above, France had secured the recovery of Sweden’s 
lost provinces; but the insult – one of many – of paying one of the 
25 Roberts, The Age, pp. 16–26, 114; Oskar Sjöström, ‘Sekreta bihangen 
1741 och deras idépolitiska bakgrund’, Sjuttonhundratal (2008), pp. 5–24; 
Bodensten, ‘Political Knowledge’.
26 Boëthius, Sveriges traktater, pp. 203–212; Jägerskiöld, Den svenska utrikes-
politikens historia, pp. 99–123; Erik Bodensten, Politikens drivfjäder: 
Frihetstidens partiberättelser och den moralpolitiska logiken (Lund: Lunds 
universitet, 2016), pp. 162–164.
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Swedish commanders directly, thereby circumventing the Swedish 
king, deeply offended the Swedes.27
Less than a year after the 1738 subsidy treaty – where France 
agreed to assist Sweden with an amount corresponding to 900,000 
ds annually for three years – the time had come for yet another such 
betrayal.28 Emboldened by the Franco-Swedish subsidy alliance, the 
Swedish government transferred a fairly large troop contingent to 
Finland in order to negotiate, armata manu, with Russia concerning 
a revision of the last peace treaty and prepare for a Swedish attack. 
The Swedes hoped that the partial mobilization would also serve to 
strengthen the Swedish subsidy negotiations simultaneously taking 
place at several European courts. This endeavour proved to be 
an utter failure. The Swedish threat unintentionally contributed to 
the Ottoman Empire concluding a peace treaty with both Russia 
and Austria, thus ending a war which had been going on since 
1736–1737 and which had been a fundamental element of the 
Swedish policy. Furthermore, it turned out that France had been 
the driving force in the negotiations – thus inflicting a harsh peace 
27 See, for instance, En Swensk Mans Tankar Om Dess Fädernes-lands Tilstånd, 
År 1675. Öfwersättning ifrån Latin. Med korta Anmärkningar, lämpade 
til närwarande tid (Stockholm: Tryckt hos Carl Stolpe, 1769); Kungliga 
biblioteket (KB), Historia, D 351:8, Samtal emellan Bonus och Cordatus; 
KB, Historia, D 351:9, Hyperborei Swar uppå Sin vän Austrasii bref; D 
351:9, Reflexioner öfver Krigsdeclarationen år 1741; KB, Historia, D 901, 
Herr Gallipilei Bref till sin wän Severus; Partiers Ursprung och Wärkan 
I Swerige (Stockholm: Tryckt i Kongl. Finska Boktryckeriet, hos Johan 
Arvid Carlbohm, 1769); ‘Partistriden wid 1738–1739 års riksdag och dess 
orsaker’, Riksrådet grefve Gustaf Bonde: Anteckningar om Bonde-släkten, 
vol. 3, Carl Trolle-Bonde (Lund: Gleerup, 1897–1899); Swar, Uti Bref til 
Aristarchus, På Dess 12:te Nummer den 13 April 1769 (Stockholm: Tryckt i 
Kongl. Finska Boktryckeriet, 1769); Sweriges Rikes Naturliga och Sanskyldiga 
Interesse uti Förbund med Kronan Frankrike, Granskat Uti Bref Ifrån En 
Wän i Stockholm til des Correspondent I anledning Af hans Swar På Des 
förra betydeliga Bref (Stockholm: Tryckt i Kongl. Finska Boktryckeriet; 
Hos Johan Arvid Carlbohm, 1769); Uppsala universitetsbibliotek (UUB), 
Sveriges historia, F 275, Bref til förswar af den med Ryssland förnyade 
Alliancen 1735. For the 1679 incident in particular, see Ingemar Carlsson, 
Olof Dalin och den politiska propagandan inför ‘lilla ofreden’: Sagan Om 
Hästen och Wår-Wisa i samtidspolitisk belysning (Lund: CWK Gleerup, 1966), 
pp. 41–42; A.F. Upton, Charles XI and Swedish Absolutism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 27–28; Göran Rystad, Karl XI: En 
biografi (Lund: Historiska Media, 2001), pp. 116–118.
28 Boëthius, Sveriges traktater, pp. 270–276; Åmark, Sveriges statsfinanser, 
p. 573.
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on the Habsburgs – apparently deceiving its northern ally for its own 
purposes. Now that Russia enjoyed peace and France had made it 
clear that it currently had no wish to see a Swedish attack, it was 
unthinkable for the Swedish government to proceed. Nor was it 
possible to withdraw its troops. Notwithstanding the political costs, 
this was out of the question from a military perspective, as Russia 
moved increasing numbers of troops to the border area. Needless 
to say, the detractors of the Franco-Swedish subsidy alliance had 
a field day.29
This event illustrates a general fact sooner or later experienced 
by every lesser recipient of subsidies: Whereas a subsidy alliance 
often served to create the conditions for more active and expansionist 
policies, it was far from certain that such policies could also be 
realized. The subsidy recipient had to take the interests and intentions 
of the giver into account, and, when a conflict of interest arose, the 
receiver generally had to stand down, at least if the subsidy alliance 
was to last, which these policies depended on. The support from 
the subsidizer came with conditions and the subsidies could always 
be withdrawn, reduced, or deliberately delayed. In 1684, for instance, 
Louis XIV made the limits for his support clear to his subsidy 
partner the Danish King Kristian V (1646–1699). French subsidies 
and diplomatic support had enabled the Danes to take possession 
over the duchy of Holstein-Gottorp, which was closely linked to 
Sweden. While the Danes were now preparing themselves for a 
direct attack on Sweden, the French king used his influence as 
subsidizer, forcing Denmark to back down and preventing a war 
he had no interest in.30 Then again in 1743, Denmark was forced 
to abort its imminent invasion of Sweden, partly as a result of 
France holding back its subsidies, deemed essential to the Danish 
war-making capability.31
Defying the subsidizing great power in such situations represented 
significant risks for the lesser subsidized power. For instance, having 
29 Wilson, French, pp. 318–326; Jägerskiöld, Den svenska utrikespolitikens 
historia, pp. 129–136. For the domestic political consequences, see Bodensten, 
Politikens drivfjäder, pp. 222–226.
30 Lars Christensen, ‘I Solkongens Skygge: Dansk-franske relationer 1661–1693’ 
(unpublished doctoral thesis, Syddansk Universitet, 2003), pp. 199–208; 
Lindström and Norrhem, Flattering Alliances, pp. 72–73.
31 Knud J.V. Jespersen and Ole Feldbæk, Revanche og neutralitet, 1648–1814: 
Dansk udenrigspolitiks historie, 2 (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2002), pp. 
288–289.
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failed to win the support of France and Austria for peace negotiations 
between Sweden and Prussia, the Swedish government none the less 
decided to proceed and unilaterally initiate negotiations. This resulted 
in a separate peace in May 1762, status quo ante bellum, which 
concluded Sweden’s participation in the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763). 
France answered by recalling its ambassador and largely suspending 
its subsidy payments. This aggravated the already serious fiscal and 
monetary crisis in Sweden but also served to discredit the Swedish 
government domestically in the eyes of the electorate. During the 
difficult negotiations in the following years, France clearly com-
municated its dissatisfaction with its subsidy client but also empha-
sized the extent to which the Swedish government was politically 
dependent on a good relationship with France. In April 1764, the 
increasingly strained Swedish government once again tried to obtain 
the withheld subsidy payments, without success. It was not until 
November that same year that both parties were able to agree on 
a compromise – the estates were to meet in January 1765 and France 
had no interest in seeing the government fall, just to be replaced 
by one more orientated towards Great Britain.32
In spite of the renewed subsidy alliance, however, this was exactly 
what happened. In February 1766, the new government signed a 
friendship treaty with Great Britain but failed in its efforts to secure 
subsidies and defence guarantees. France now referred to the provi-
sions in the Franco-Swedish treaty which stipulated that the parties 
were required to obtain the consent of the other party in all negotia-
tions with third parties, and, as this had not been the case, France 
declared that the treaty was now null and void. In the autumn of 
that same year, France also formally broke off its relationship with 
Sweden and cancelled all subsidy payments.33 The situation to a 
large extent resembled the failed attempts of the Swedish government 
in 1735 to conclude a Franco-Swedish subsidy alliance, while at 
the same time seeking to avoid becoming too dependent on France 
and being reduced to a French satellite. Simultaneously with these 
32 Boëthius, Sveriges traktater, pp. 886–893; Jägerskiöld, Den svenska utrikes-
politikens historia, pp. 212–216, 221–224; Åmark, Sveriges statsfinanser, 
pp. 574, 588, 592; Michael F. Metcalf, Russia, England and Swedish Party 
Politics 1762–1766: The Interplay between Great Power Diplomacy and 
Domestic Politics during Sweden’s Age of Liberty (Stockholm: Stockholm 
University, 1977); Michael Roberts, British Diplomacy and Swedish Politics, 
1758–1773 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980).
33 Jägerskiöld, Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia, pp. 224–227; Åmark, 
Sveriges statsfinanser, p. 588, 592; Metcalf, Russia; Roberts, British.
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negotiations, in 1735, the Swedish government decided to renew a 
previous twelve-year defence alliance with Russia, which was about 
to expire, without first consulting France as stipulated in the treaty. 
As Versailles had not yet had time to ratify the subsidy alliance, it 
was able to use this loophole as a pretext for terminating the treaty, 
as mentioned earlier.34 In both 1735 and 1766, France had good 
reasons for breaking off relations with Sweden. One was obviously 
not having to pay out extensive subsidies to an ally that did not 
appear to be particularly useful at the time. Another reason, however, 
was the opportunity to clarify the true nature of the relationship: 
France could hardly be seen as accepting its junior subsidy partner 
freeing itself and disloyally approaching France’s antagonists without 
suffering some consequences.
The subsidy agreements were generally formulated as agreements 
between equal partners, as in this case between the French king 
and the Swedish king. It was, for instance, understood that the 
above-mentioned obligation to consult one’s partner before entering 
into new agreements with third parties only concerned the subsidy 
recipient.35 The complex and rapidly changing European cabinet 
politics resulted in major difficulties for the lesser subsidy-receiving 
powers when the great powers suddenly and unilaterally changed 
their priorities. A particularly dramatic example in this regard was 
the 1756 Franco-Austrian and Anglo-Prussian rapprochement that 
turned the entire European system of alliances on its head and 
placed states such as Hesse-Cassel in a very difficult position. By 
1755, Landgrave Wilhelm VIII (1682–1760) had yet again concluded 
an Anglo-Hessian subsidy treaty. In the light of Great Britain’s 
long-standing and close relationship with the Habsburgs – also a 
traditional British subsidy ally – and with a similarly good relationship 
with Prussia, this agreement seemed relatively risk-free. In the event 
of a new major war in Europe, Hesse-Cassel could just as previously 
be expected to confront France along the Rhine as a junior ally and 
subsidy partner of Great Britain and Austria. The diplomatic revolu-
tion – as it became known – completely changed the strategic position 
of Hesse-Cassel, which now instead found itself in a very exposed 
34 Jägerskiöld, Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia, pp. 99–123. The Swedish 
and French motives have been the subject of some debate; see Göran Nilzén, 
Studier i 1730-talets partiväsende (Stockholm: Stockholms universitet, 1971), 
pp. 133–134, 160–164, and the literature cited there. See also Lindström 
and Norrhem, Flattering Alliances, pp. 152–161.
35 Roberts, The Age, pp. 26–27.
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position and open to primarily French attacks, which it could not 
possibly face on its own regardless of how many subsidies it received.36
Unlike in 1735, the French reversal in 1739 did not result in 
Sweden losing its subsidies; however, as discussed above, it put the 
Swedish government in a precarious situation. In order to break 
the unsustainable deadlock, the Swedish government decided to 
convene the estates in August 1740. Before the Diet could assemble, 
however, the Habsburg Emperor Karl VI (1685–1740) passed away, 
shortly followed by the Russian ruler, Empress Anna Ioannovna 
(1693–1740). Faced with the prospect of a new major war of suc-
cession, France was once again willing to support a Swedish attack 
on Russia. In February 1741, the former Franco-Swedish subsidy 
treaty was renewed for another three years. As soon as the following 
month, the subsidies were increased somewhat in the event of Sweden 
attacking Russia, which it did in August.37 Once again, it had become 
clear to what extent France, in its capacity as a great power and a 
subsidizer, laid out the framework for Swedish actions on the 
international scene.
Viable options and geostrategic realities
One indication of how well lesser powers managed to use the 
instrument of subsidies for achieving their political and dynastic 
objectives was the extent to which they possessed the strategic 
elements needed for being able to play off different givers against 
one another. Savoy-Piedmont, Denmark, and Brandenburg-Prussia 
belonged to the group of lesser powers that managed to establish 
themselves as attractive subsidy partners to many of the great powers 
in Europe. These powers regularly changed allies based on the promise 
of better conditions. Some princes, most notably Vittorio Amedeo 
and Friedrich Wilhelm, became known for their opportunism.38 
36 Ingrao, The Hessian Mercenary State, p. 128; Wilson, German Armies, p. 
266; Franz A.J. Szabo, The Seven Years War in Europe, 1756–1763 (Harlow: 
Pearson, 2008), pp. 179–180, passim.
37 Wilson, French, pp. 330–338; Jägerskiöld, Den svenska utrikespolitikens 
historia, pp. 137–143; Åmark, Sveriges statsfinanser, p. 573; Bodensten, 
Politikens drivfjäder, pp. 222–227.
38 Symcox, ‘Britain and Victor Amadeus II’; Storrs, War, pp. 122–170; McKay, 
‘Small-power Diplomacy’; Wilson, German Armies; Jespersen and Feldbæk, 
Revanche og neutralitet, pp. 102, 106, 114, 125, 159, 168, 267, 273–277, 
282–296; Wilson, ‘Prussia’, pp. 114–115; Winton, ‘Denmark’, pp. 43–46, 
50–52, 55–56, 59–61; Lindström and Norrhem, Flattering Alliances, pp. 
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However, success did not require such drastic reversals. For instance, 
Hesse-Cassel, which had great success as a recipient of subsidies, 
was very consistent in its subsidy alliance with Great Britain.39 
Instead, what was essential was that the lesser power – in addition 
to possessing military resources in demand – could make a prospective 
subsidy giver believe that it could also turn to another interested 
power, preferably one antagonistic to the former. This not only 
enabled the lesser power to obtain better conditions than would 
have been possible otherwise; it also strengthened the recipient’s 
negotiating position once a subsidy treaty had been concluded, a 
position which might otherwise have been dangerously weak. The 
existence of alternative subsidy givers forced the dominant party 
to fulfil its commitments and also look after the interests of the 
junior party if the latter were to remain in the alliance and have it 
renewed once it expired.40
However, most of the lesser powers were unable to deal with 
the great powers in such a manner. In such a case, one alternative 
could be to turn to other lesser powers. For instance, the Republic 
of Venice was a significant giver of subsidies up until 1719; and, 
throughout the entire period, the United Provinces paid out large 
subsidies in peacetime as well as, in particular to the German states, 
providing them with troops. The lesser subsidizers represented lesser 
political risks. At the same time, however, the crucial political leverage 
that made subsidy treaties with the great powers attractive in the 
first place did not materialize. In these cases, subsidy agreements 
really turned into pure transactions, where the giver purchased 
military services in exchange for money. At any rate, this option 
ended up becoming less and less available throughout the period.41
It also became increasingly hard for the lesser powers to play 
off the great powers against one another. This was largely due to 
changes in the European states system during the period. Protracted 
conflicts between states such as France and Spain, and France and 
the United Provinces, ceased; these were conflicts which quite a few 
lesser powers had been able to exploit. The two new great powers 
of Prussia and Russia were both poor but had large military capabili-
ties of their own. They themselves received subsidies, rather than 
offering them to others. From around 1760, Great Britain – arguably 
39 Rodney Atwood, The Hessians: Mercenaries from Hessen-Kassel in the 
American Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Ingrao, 
The Hessian Mercenary State, ch. 5.
40 See, for instance, Storrs, War, pp. 122–170.
41 Wilson, ‘The German’, 782–787.
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the largest subsidizer in the long eighteenth century – started to 
retreat from continental affairs and its previously very active involve-
ment in imperial politics. The continental struggle with France and 
Spain came to the forefront, whereas the Hanoverian interest was 
played down. In the second half of the 1770s, several minor German 
states received British subsidies in exchange for assisting Great Britain 
in fighting the American rebellion; but it was only in the 1790s that 
Great Britain returned as a major subsidizer and participant in the 
continental power struggle.42 Most importantly, however, the struggle 
between France and Austria – as well as the more general struggle 
between the Bourbons and the Habsburgs, which had dominated 
international relations in Europe for a long time – was put aside 
in the middle of the eighteenth century. For instance, following the 
mid-century Franco-Austrian rapprochement, and after Bourbon 
Spain had consolidated its position in Italy at about the same time, 
the strategic basis for Savoy-Piedmont’s activist subsidy policy more 
or less evaporated.43
This became particularly evident with respect to the lesser German 
powers.44 The difficulties of Hesse-Cassel during the Seven Years’ 
War have already been mentioned. Another useful example is Würt-
temberg, which at the same time failed to obtain good subsidy terms 
from the Franco-Austrian alliance in the absence of a credible 
alternative. The Württemberg duke Carl Eugen (1728–1793) vainly 
tried to strengthen his position, primarily in relation to the Habsburgs, 
42 John M. Sherwig, Guineas and Gunpowder: British Foreign Aid in the 
Wars with France, 1793–1815 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1969); Michael Roberts, Splendid Isolation, 1763–1780: The Stenton 
Lecture 1969 (Reading: University of Reading, 1970); Ingrao, The Hessian 
Mercenary State, pp. 135–162; Jeremy Black, A System of Ambition? British 
Foreign Policy 1660–1793 (Harlow: Longman, 1991), pp. 204ff; Wilson, 
‘The German’, 786–787; Wilson, German Armies, pp. 311–312, 326; Scott, 
The Birth, pp. 146–147. Sweden received very substantial British subsidies 
in 1805–1816; Åmark, Sveriges statsfinanser, pp. 594, 852–856; Sherwig, 
Guineas and Gunpowder, pp. 366–368, passim; Jan Glete, ‘The Swedish 
Fiscal-Military State in Transition and Decline, 1650–1815’, in War, State 
and Development: Fiscal-Military States in the Eighteenth Century, ed. by 
Rafael Torres Sánchez (Pamplona: Eunsa, 2007), p. 108.
43 Storrs, ‘The Savoyard’, p. 203; Scott, The Birth, pp. 73–74, 81–92; Christopher 
Storrs, ‘ “Große Erwartungen”: Britische Subsidienzahlungen an Savoyen 
im 18. Jahrhundert’, in Das ‘Blut des Staatskörpers’: Forschungen zur 
Finanzgeschichte der Frühen Neuzeit, ed. by Peter Rauscher, Andrea Serles, 
and Thomas Winkelbauer (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2012), pp. 87–126.
44 Wilson, ‘The German’, 778, 780–781, 786–787, 791–792.
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by creating and providing very large forces, far larger than what 
was actually required in the subsidy agreements and far larger than 
his state finances allowed. In previous wars, Württemberg had been 
able to play off France and Austria against each other and even 
receive subsidies for remaining neutral. Now, however, Württemberg’s 
interests were not looked after, despite its large troop contingent 
and despite the fact that Austria was engaged in a desperate military 
struggle and suffered from a chronic shortage of troops. The duke’s 
politics contained an element of sunk cost fallacy, which was not 
unusual for subsidy recipients at this time: the more wholeheartedly 
he committed himself to the subsidy relationship and the larger his 
debts, the more difficult it was to cut his losses and give up the 
leverage he had worked so hard to attain, a leverage which might 
help him realize his territorial claims in a future peace negotiation. 
Well aware of this situation, the allies were in a position to make 
even more extensive demands.45
Württemberg’s difficult position might have been avoided had it 
decided to limit its participation and withdrawn from the war at 
the first opportunity, or had it claimed to be neutral already from 
the outset. First, however, such a policy would not have resulted 
in any benefits for Württemberg. In relative terms, it would instead 
have weakened Württemberg’s position in relation to its antagonistic 
neighbours, which chose to assist the allies. Second, a more cautious 
policy could very well have resulted in punishments, which happened 
to other German princes who tried to remain neutral at the same 
time. The Austro-Prussian dualism – which had increasingly come 
to characterize imperial politics – made it increasingly difficult for 
the German lesser powers to avoid having to take a clear side. The 
decision in 1761–1762 to finally start demobilizing and take Würt-
temberg – now deeply in debt – out of the war was not unexpectedly 
followed by numerous unfavourable verdicts in the imperial courts.46
The Bavarian Wittelsbachs were faced with the same problem. 
Bavaria did not receive any subsidies between 1759 and 1800; this 
was not due to a lack of ambition, however, but rather to a lack 
of options. Just as in the case of Württemberg, the geostrategic 
location of Bavaria was the significant factor. Bavaria enjoyed few 
natural protective barriers and only had a few strong fortresses. In 
relation to the struggle between the Habsburgs and the Bourbons, 
this territory played a key strategic role; for both France and Austria, 
45 Wilson, War, pp. 209–239.
46 Wilson, War, pp. 209–239; Schmid, Max III.
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it constituted a defensive buffer zone as well as an offensive staging 
area. Bavaria thus represented an attractive subsidy partner for both 
of these great powers; but, as already mentioned, such alliances 
were also associated with great risks. Accepting subsidies from 
another power, directed at both Austria and France, was out of the 
question. At the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War, Great Britain 
offered Bavaria subsidies in exchange for declaring itself neutral, 
which Bavaria reluctantly had to decline.47
The geostrategic position of the states in southern Germany may 
be contrasted with that of the states in the north, which generally 
faced a smaller risk of retaliation in their attempts to capitalize on 
the Franco-Austrian conflict. This also opened up for other possibili-
ties in terms of alternative subsidizers, in particular the United 
Provinces and Great Britain. The position of Münster, for example, 
was very well suited to supplying the former with subsidy troops. 
The powers in southern Germany, on the other hand, and in particular 
those along the Rhine, were in a better position to offer direct access 
to strategic territories. The subsidizer’s own troops could, for instance, 
be granted safe passage and the opportunity to receive supplies – 
winter quarters were particularly important in this regard. These 
military resources could be just as important as troops and explain 
why states such as Cologne, Trier, and Mainz, whose forces were 
small but which held several strategically important fortresses, were 
able to obtain subsidies.48
Sweden belonged to the group of lesser powers whose geostrategic 
position did not enable direct military co-operation with the forces 
of the subsidizer – at least not primarily – but could on the other 
hand be used for extending the latter’s power projection far beyond 
what was possible in a direct sense. As part of the French eastern 
system, Sweden alone was able to directly threaten the exposed 
capital of Russia. That option was activated by France in 1741 by 
supporting the aforementioned Swedish attack on St Petersburg, 
which effectively deprived the Habsburgs of a potential ally during 
the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748).49 Previously, the 
Swedish bridgehead in northern Germany had also indirectly extended 
47 Black, ‘The Problem’, pp. 7, 24; Wilson, ‘The German’, 778.
48 Wilson, War, pp. 85–87; Wilson, ‘The German’, 779, 782–783; Wilson, 
German Armies, pp. 211–212.
49 Reed Browning, The War of the Austrian Succession (New York: St Martin’s 
Griffin, 1993), pp. 65–66; M.S. Anderson, The War of the Austrian Succession, 
1740–1748 (London: Longman, 1995), pp. 79–80.
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French power to this part of the empire and enabled France to 
attack the emperor and his allies here as well. The Austro-Prussian 
conflict, in combination with the Franco-Austrian alliance, once 
again made the remaining Swedish provinces in Germany strategically 
interesting and possible to capitalize on. Sweden could now side 
with both France and Austria and in exchange for subsidies attack 
Prussia from its exposed northern flank, which the two allies were 
unable to do by themselves.50
With the promise that major French subsidies would be forthcom-
ing and that Sweden would regain its territories lost to Prussia 
1720 in the coming peace negotiations, Sweden joined the strong 
anti-Prussian coalition in September 1757.51 The Swedish intervention 
in the war has often been described as a military, political, and fiscal 
fiasco.52 This is true in many ways. However, it should be noted 
that the Swedish generals were not trying to achieve a decisive 
military victory over the Prussians. Also, the subsidies represented a 
means rather than an end, and the actors knew that they would not 
cover the costs – the French subsidies to Sweden were significant, 
but still only covered around 20 per cent of all extraordinary 
wartime revenues.53 Hence, they were close in size – in relative, 
not absolute, terms – to the extensive wartime subsidies received by 
Vittorio Amedeo, and fully comparable with the substantial British 
subsidies received by Friedrich II of Prussia (1712–1786) during 
the war.54 Sweden’s attack on Prussia in many ways represented a 
typical subsidiary war, where the lesser subsidized power hoped to 
make future political or diplomatic gains by providing assistance 
to the great power. Obviously, we do not know what these gains 
would have looked like; but there are good reasons for believing 
that the Swedish government, just as it had done in the subsidy 
50 This strategic bridgehead also secured British subsidies during the Napoleonic 
Wars; see Sherwig, Guineas and Gunpowder, pp. 161–164.
51 Boëthius, Sveriges traktater, pp. 694–735; Jägerskiöld, Den svenska utrikes-
politikens historia, pp. 199–208; Winton, ‘Sweden’, pp. 14–16.
52 Sten Carlsson and Jerker Rosén, Svensk historia: II: Tiden efter 1718 
(Stockholm: Svenska bokförlaget, 1961), pp. 156–167; Roberts, The Age, 
pp. 19–21, 43–45; Szabo, The Seven Years War, pp. 294–299, passim.
53 Winton, ‘Sweden’.
54 Åmark, Sveriges statsfinanser, pp. 573–574, 588; Storrs, War, pp. 103–118; 
Hamish Scott, ‘The Fiscal-military State and International Rivalry during 
the Long Eighteenth Century’, in The Fiscal-military State in Eighteenth-
century Europe, ed. by Christopher Storrs, p. 49; Storrs, ‘The Savoyard’, 
pp. 215–216; Winton, ‘Sweden’, pp. 22–24.
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negotiations prior to the war, was particularly set on demanding 
territorial expansion in Pomerania. In the end, what was to solve 
the Swedish war equation was this type of traditional territorial 
expansion, at the expense of the neighbouring state, and not the 
French subsidies.55 The risk taken by the Swedish government was 
primarily that, in the future peace settlement, France would not be 
able to or would not want to push for Swedish compensation. In 
1757, however, this did not appear all that likely, as Prussia was 
confronted by a very strong and determined enemy coalition. Also, 
Sweden had been a loyal subsidy partner of France for a long time. 
A stronger Sweden in Germany, which was in a better position to 
counteract Prussia, was also in the interests of Austria and Russia. It 
was only after several years of very costly warfare, and when it was 
abundantly clear that France neither could nor had any desire to keep 
its earlier promise, that Sweden, just like Württemberg, chose to cut its 
losses.
From a Swedish perspective, the diplomatic revolution resulted 
in an unexpected and short-lived opportunity for expansion in the 
empire. However, throughout the entire period, Sweden had another 
primary interest, namely expansion and security vis-à-vis Russia. 
In this respect, Sweden belonged to the group of lesser powers that 
had difficulties in appealing to more than one potential subsidizer. 
Great Britain – Sweden’s only real viable option apart from France 
– certainly wanted to see a restriction of Russian influence in the 
Baltic region, which is why it offered very active support to Sweden 
in the 1720s. Nevertheless, following a certain time lag, it became 
increasingly clear that British and Russian interests coincided in 
many respects, which resulted in a gradual improvement in Anglo-
Russian relations. Above all, both states belonged to the anti-French 
camp, and they ended up becoming increasingly economically 
dependent on each other – a development which called the value 
55 Cf. Winton, ‘Sweden’, p. 31. See also Sherwig, Guineas and Gunpowder, pp. 
275–276, 284–286, 312, regarding the similar Swedish attempt in 1813–1814 
to secure British subsidies and, more importantly, allied recognition of planned 
territorial acquisitions, this time in Norway.
56 Stewart P. Oakley, ‘Trade, Peace and the Balance of Power: Britain and the 
Baltic, 1603–1802’, in In Quest of Trade and Security: The Baltic in Power 
Politics 1500–1990: Volume 1, 1500–1890, ed. by Göran Rystad, Klaus-R. 
Böhme and Wilhelm M. Carlgren (Lund: Lund University Press, 1994), 
pp. 239ff.
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of a potential Anglo-Swedish subsidy alliance into question.56 In 
any case, compared to France, Great Britain had a significantly 
more restrictive approach with regard to subsidies. That approach 
more or less excluded peacetime subsidies, essentially a Swedish 
requirement.57
The fundamental problem facing Sweden was that France was 
really the only power that valued the military, geostrategic, and 
political resources Sweden could offer, a fact of which the French 
counterpart was certainly not unaware. 58 Conversely, Denmark – the 
other Scandinavian power – was frequently in a position to suc-
cessfully play Great Britain, Austria, and France off against one 
another and even obtain subsidies simply by promising to remain 
neutral. Not least, Denmark was able to exploit its proximity to 
Hanover and provide subsidy troops either to protect or to threaten 
the Electorate, united in a personal union with Great Britain since 
1714.59 In this regard, Sweden’s strategic position more resembled 
that of Portugal, which in its ambitions to counteract Bourbon 
Spain had no other option than to turn to its subsidy ally Great 
Britain, on which it grew increasingly dependent.60
Swedish attempts at playing France and Great Britain off against 
each other consistently failed.61 Britain’s interest in an Anglo-Swedish 
57 C.W. Eldon, England’s Subsidy Policy towards the Continent during the 
Seven Years’ War (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1938); Roberts, 
British, ch. 8; P.G.M. Dickson, Finance and Government under Maria Theresia 
1740–1780: Volume II, Finance and Credit (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 
pp. 158–160; Jeremy Black, ‘Parliament and Foreign Policy in the Age of 
Walpole: The Case of the Hessians’, in Knights Errant and True Englishmen: 
British Foreign Policy, 1660–1800, ed. by Jeremy Black (Edinburgh: John 
Donald Publishers, 1989), pp. 41–54; Scott, ‘The Fiscal-military’, p. 49.
58 Cf. Winton, ‘Denmark’, pp. 45–46, 61–62, who does not consider the 
Swedish navy or geostrategic position – but only its army – as being an 
important asset in the subsidy negotiations.
59 See, for instance, Roberts, British, pp. 20, 28–29; Jespersen and Feldbæk, 
Revanche og neutralitet, pp. 102, 106, 114, 125, 159, 168, 267, 273–277, 
282–296; Szabo, The Seven Years War, p. 132; Winton, ‘Denmark’, pp. 
43–46, 50–52, 55–56, 59–61; Lindström and Norrhem, Flattering Alliances, 
pp. 68–69, 150–152.
60 David Francis, The First Peninsular War, 1702–1713 (London and Tonbridge: 
Ernest Benn Limited, 1975); L.M.E. Shaw, The Anglo-Portuguese Alliance 
and the English Merchants in Portugal, 1654–1810 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
1998).
61 See, for instance, Metcalf, Russia, pp. 18–19, 222–223.
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subsidy alliance was always secondary at best, primarily focused 
on challenging its main opponent, France. This deprived France of 
an important ally, or at any rate created distrust between the two 
allies; strengthened Sweden’s negotiating position, thus forcing France 
to increase its subsidies; and prevented a Swedish (and perhaps also 
a Danish) squadron from uniting with the French navy at a critical 
stage.62
The lack of other options than France constitutes an important 
reason why Sweden remained a French subsidy ally for so long and 
ended up being highly dependent on France. This became particularly 
evident during the fifteen-year period starting in the late 1740s, 
when Anglo-Swedish relations were very poor. However, it should 
be noted that Swedish behaviour on the international scene was 
never determined by France. For instance, the Swedish government 
wanted to attack Russia in 1741 and had sought to create favourable 
conditions for such an attack for a long time. This attack, just like 
the attack on Prussia, was not the result of an ultimatum from the 
subsidizer.63
Nor was Sweden in such a bad negotiating position that France 
looked likely to stop paying out very large sums of money. The 
1738 subsidy treaty marked the beginning of an almost unbroken 
period of large French subsidy payments, which did not end until 
the mid-1790s.64 These mainly peacetime subsidies enabled the 
Swedish government to compensate for its scarce fiscal resources, 
as well as to maintain and even strengthen its military capabilities. 
The importance of this factor is difficult to overestimate. This became 
particularly clear in the late 1740s, when France with a major effort, 
both diplomatically and financially, helped Sweden free itself from 
Russian dependency following the defeat in 1741–1743, while at 
the same time preventing Russia from interfering in the final phase 
of the War of the Austrian Succession.65 The Franco-Swedish subsidy 
agreements concluded in 1747–1749 enabled a substantial expansion 
of both Swedish naval forces and fortresses. In the peak year of 
62 Roberts, British, pp. xiii–xxv.
63 Roberts, The Age, pp. 26–27; Glete, ‘The Swedish’, p. 107. Cf. Winton, 
‘Denmark’, pp. 50, 61–62.
64 Åmark, Sveriges statsfinanser, pp. 573–575, 585–586, 588, 591–594, 597.
65 Jägerskiöld, Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia, pp. 161–181; Jeremy 
Black, From Louis XIV to Napoleon: The Fate of a Great Power (London: 
UCL Press, 1999), pp. 96–100.
The problems with receiving subsidies 141
1750, the French subsidies amounted to approximately 17 per cent 
of the total Swedish state revenue.66
Concluding remarks: A new states system and falling demand 
for subsidy troops
By the end of the Seven Years’ War, the European states system had 
become increasingly multipolar as a result of France’s declining 
power, and Prussia’s and Russia’s assumption of the status of great 
powers. Instead of the previous balance of power between two 
nearly equally powerful blocs, the system disintegrated into a western 
and an eastern part, outside of which none of the five great powers 
retained much influence. Together, however, they came to dominate 
the system in a qualitatively new way. The role of the lesser powers 
was significantly reduced as a result. In particular, the last war – with 
warfare on a new scale and with a new intensity – had demonstrated 
the rather marginal relative fiscal-military importance of the lesser 
powers. These changes made it increasingly difficult for the lesser 
powers to form alliances with the great powers and to secure 
subsidies. As the demand for subsidy troops and lesser allies decreased 
– the Habsburg emperor, for instance, abandoned the instrument 
in the 1770s and 1780s – the lesser powers increasingly had to fall 
back on their own ever more limited financial, political, and military 
resources.67
For Sweden – located in the eastern part of the European states 
system and increasingly dependent on external financial and diplo-
matic support – this was a particularly disturbing development. The 
new strategic situation became evident in 1772 as the three eastern 
great powers were allowed to partition Poland without the two 
western great powers being able to prevent this from happening 
– a situation that may serve as an illustrative contrast to the powerful 
intervention of France and Great Britain in the Baltic region in the 
66 Boëthius, Sveriges traktater, pp. 476–480, 507–512; Dannert, Svensk 
försvarspolitik 1743–1757, ch. 5–6; Nikula, Svenska skärgårdsflottan, pp. 
21–25; Åmark, Sveriges statsfinanser, pp. 573, 588, 591; Patrik Winton, 
‘Parlimentary Control, Public Discussions and Royal Autonomy: Sweden, 
1750–1780’, Histoire & Mesure XXX.2 (2015), 59–60. See also Dickson, 
Finance and Government, pp. 394–396.
67 Wilson, ‘The German’, 784–787; Wilson, German Armies, ch. 7; Scott, 
The Birth, pp. 5–6, 35–38, 117–121, 143–150, passim; Hamish Scott, ‘The 
Seven Years War and Europe’s Ancien Régime’, War in History 18.4 (2011), 
435–437.
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1720s. At the same time, the Swedish ambition to achieve a revision 
of power in the Baltic region and counteract Russia was being 
discarded, a process that had been ongoing ever since at least the 
1740s. Instead, the ambition to secure peace led to more people 
putting their faith in Great Britain, a policy that in practice meant 
joining forces with Russia. In the view of an increasing number of 
Swedish decision-makers and opinion leaders, subsidies in general, 
and the Franco-Swedish subsidy alliance in particular, were seen as 
an overly risky and costly strategy. However, it should be pointed 
out that contemporaries found it hard to grasp just how much 
France’s military, diplomatic, and financial influence and prestige 
had actually declined since the Seven Years’ War and more or less 
evaporated in eastern Europe.68
Perhaps the most obvious expression of French weakness was 
its great difficulties in terms of living up to its subsidy commitments. 
For Sweden, this in many ways constituted a new experience, as 
France had always paid on time and frequently even in advance. 
The French payment problems not only affected Sweden; for instance, 
it was not until 1769 that Austria received its last wartime subsidies 
from France.69 Following the Seven Years’ War, all warring states 
were confronted with unprecedented financial difficulties, which in 
turn resulted in a period of international detente, as the great powers 
tried to avoid war and regain their strength. The same dynamics 
had previously appeared in the period following the War of the 
Spanish Succession and would once again become particularly clear 
following the Napoleonic Wars.70 In these situations, the lesser powers 
experienced a significant weakening of their negotiating position, 
both with regard to obtaining new subsidies and with regard to 
receiving the ones already promised.71 The very real inability to pay 
on the part of the subsidy givers here interacted with their much-
reduced need to pay for allies.
Out of all the major subsidizers, it seems as if the war affected 
the French state finances the most; at the end of the 1760s, the 
68 Roberts, The Age, pp. 48–58; Black, From Louis, pp. 114–127; Scott, The 
Birth, pp. 144–145; Bodensten, ‘Political Knowledge’, pp. 98–99.
69 Åmark, Sveriges statsfinanser, p. 574; Szabo, The Seven Years War, pp. 
132–133, 299, et passim; Scott, ‘The Fiscal-military’, p. 49; Winton, ‘Sweden’, 
22–24.
70 Scott, ‘The Fiscal-military’, pp. 38–40; Scott, ‘The Seven’, pp. 430–435.
71 See, for example, Ingrao, The Hessian Mercenary State, p. 128; Wilson, 
‘The German’, 786–787; Wilson, War, p. 150.
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money spent on interest represented almost two-thirds of govern-
mental annual revenues.72 This situation forced France to abandon, 
or at least suspend, its previous and generous subsidy policy. The 
French subsidies became smaller, were paid out to fewer receivers, 
and were more or less paid only in wartime. In this respect, France 
followed the British example.73 However, this shift also reflected 
the altered strategic priorities of France. The colonial and naval 
struggle with Great Britain moved to centre stage, whereas the 
previous continental ambitions were downplayed. Nevertheless, it 
was only gradually and reluctantly that France was forced to abandon 
its influence, recognizing that many of its long-standing subsidy 
allies were no longer essential.74
The slowness with which France reluctantly carried out its strategic 
realignment seems to have saved Sweden from a very vulnerable 
position which it could otherwise have expected to find itself in, a 
position in which Poland and the Ottoman Empire – the two other 
powers that together with Sweden had formed the French barrière 
de l’est – increasingly found themselves. In 1771–1773, the new 
Swedish king, Gustav III (1746–1792), succeeded in reforging 
Sweden’s ties with France and concluding a new Franco-Swedish 
subsidy alliance which enabled another extensive military expansion 
and modernization during the 1770s and 1780s, in particular with 
regard to the Swedish navy and oared flotilla.75 There were good 
military and strategic reasons for the expansion of the Swedish 
72 James C. Riley, The Seven Years War and the Old Regime in France: The 
Economic and Financial Toll (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); 
James C. Riley, ‘French Finances, 1727–1768’, Journal of Modern History 
LIX (1987), 209–243; T.J.A. Le Goff, ‘How to Finance an Eighteenth-century 
War’, in Crises, Revolutions and Self-sustained Growth: Essays in European 
Fiscal History, 1130–1830, ed. by W.M. Ormrod, Margaret Bonney, and 
Richard Bonney (Stamford: Shaun Tyas, 1999), pp. 377–413; Scott, ‘The 
Seven’, pp. 432–434, 447–448.
73 Dickson, Finance and Government, pp. 180–183; Daniel A. Baugh, ‘Withdraw-
ing from Europe: Anglo-French Maritime Geopolitics, 1750–1800’, The 
International History Review 20.1 (1998), 8–9; Wilson, German Armies, 
pp. 290–291; Scott, ‘The Fiscal-military’, p. 49.
74 Baugh, ‘Withdrawing from Europe’; Scott, The Birth, pp. 143–146, 214–222. 
For Sweden, see Helle Stiegung, Ludvig XV:s hemliga diplomati och Sverige 
1752–1774 (Lund: CWK Gleerup, 1961); Metcalf, Russia; Roberts, British; 
Roberts, The Age, pp. 46–47.
75 Nikula, Svenska skärgårdsflottan, pp. 88–103; Jägerskiöld, Den svenska 
utrikespolitikens historia, pp. 237–238, 260–267; Åmark, Sveriges statsfi-
nanser, pp. 574–575, 588, 593, 597; Glete, ‘Den svenska’, pp. 27–31, 36.
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navy, even though this focus was also rational from a perspective 
of subsidy policy. In the naval arms race which involved Great 
Britain on the one hand and France and Spain on the other, and 
which became increasingly important in the decades following the 
Seven Years’ War, relatively small auxiliary naval forces could turn 
the scales. Strengthening the navy, something both France and Great 
Britain valued the most at this time and something France encouraged 
its allies to do, thus strengthened Sweden’s negotiating position, 
not least in relation to the other subsidy-seeking powers which did 
not possess this military resource.76
This was important, as Sweden’s previously stellar military cred-
ibility had been increasingly challenged. Both in the war against 
Russia in 1741–1743 and in that against Prussia in 1757–1762, the 
Swedish army had tied down significant numbers of enemy troops 
but also exhibited a strikingly cautious behaviour. At least in the 
latter case, it was obvious that Sweden, for political reasons, had 
been very reluctant to risk its troops in battle and entirely prioritized 
the maintenance of these troops.77
The Swedish behaviour was understandable and not uncommon 
among subsidy recipients. Württemberg, for example, made the 
same call during the Seven Years’ War, knowing full well that its 
negotiating position in relation to the subsidizer would collapse in 
the event of the loss of its army.78 This behaviour, however, was 
fundamentally problematic in that the value of the subsidy receiver 
as an ally was based not only on its military capabilities but on its 
willingness to loyally deploy these. As shown by Patrik Winton in 
an illuminating analysis, the conflict between saving the troops of 
the subsidized power and providing military assistance to the 
subsidizer as agreed upon may explain the performance of the Swedish 
army during the war, characterized by recurring marches and 
countermarches into Prussian territory – seemingly offensive but 
without ever seriously facing the enemy on the battlefield. The 
Swedish behaviour was rational, as the Swedes never intended to 
recapture Pomerania – lost to Prussia in 1720 – on the battlefield 
76 Baugh, ‘Withdrawing from Europe’, pp. 10, 14, 19.
77 Roberts, The Age, pp. 21–24; Szabo, The Seven Years War, pp. 158–159, 
171–173, 224–225, 294–299, 332–333, 361–363; Winton, ‘Sweden’, 
pp. 14–16; Winton, ‘Denmark’, pp. 58. This militarily cautious and politically 
shrewd behaviour was successfully repeated by Sweden in 1813–1814; see 
Sherwig, Guineas and Gunpowder, pp. 292, 312.
78 Wilson, War, pp. 216, 225.
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but rather to regain it at the negotiating table. This is also reflected 
in the exceedingly vague instructions from the Swedish government 
to its generals in the field.79 In practice, Sweden addressed this 
conflict by trying to keep its army active on Prussian territory and 
in full numbers, as agreed upon, while at the same time as far as 
possible reducing costs and risks while waiting for the great-power 
struggle to come to a conclusion. Just as in the case of Württemberg, 
however, the subsidizer ended up becoming increasingly dissatisfied 
over time. Not only did this undermine Sweden’s prospects in a 
future peace negotiation, it also risked the value of Sweden as a 
subsidy ally in the longer term.
Following the Seven Years’ War, it seems as if Sweden found 
itself in the same kind of ‘vicious circle’ as Württemberg, outlined 
by Peter Wilson: ‘Without such an established [military] reputation, 
it was difficult to attract adequate subsidies, but without these it 
was difficult to provide first-rate troops.’ 80 After each military failure, 
it became increasingly hard to obtain subsidies and equip, train, 
and pay larger forces.81 During the 1760s, the Swedish government, 
deprived of previous subsidies, was forced to implement extensive 
military cutbacks.82 Unable to take military risks and behave aggres-
sively during long campaigns and against a strong opponent as a 
result of fiscal-military factors, it proved difficult for the lesser powers 
to avoid such a dynamic in the long run.
79 Winton, ‘Sweden’, 15–21.
80 Wilson, War, p. 84.
81 Ibid., pp. 226–238.
82 Carlsson and Rosén, Svensk historia, p. 179.
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Pensions in Switzerland: practices, 
conflicts, and impact in the  
sixteenth century
Philippe Rogger
The development of Swiss power politics around 1500 was remark-
able, albeit short-lived. During the Burgundian Wars (1474–1477), 
Swiss cantons under Bernese leadership skilfully exploited the 
anti-Burgundian constellation on the European stage to expand 
their sphere of influence westwards, while in the Milanese Wars 
(1494–1516) they extended their territory to the south, into Lom-
bardy.1 Victory over Burgundy in the Battles of Murten (1476), 
Grandson (1476), and Nancy (1477) and over the French in the 
Pavia Campaign (1512) and at Novara (1513) established the Old 
Swiss Confederacy as a military power. Its great power politics came 
to an abrupt end in 1515, however, as the Confederacy was defeated 
by the young French King François I in the Battle of Marignano.2 
In the period spanning roughly thirty years between the Burgundian 
and Milanese Wars, the loose alliance of petty states and microstates 
in the heart of Europe proved unable to cope with the political, 
military, and financial demands of great-power politics in a sustainable 
1 Bernhard Stettler, Die Eidgenossenschaft im 15. Jahrhundert (Menziken: 
Markus Widmer-Dean, 2004), pp. 233–256; Walter Schaufelberger, ‘Spätmit-
telalter’, Handbuch der Schweizer Geschichte, vol. 1 (Zurich: Berichthaus, 
1972), pp. 239–388 (pp. 336–358).
2 Walter Schaufelberger, Marignano: Strukturelle Grenzen eidgenössischer 
Militärmacht zwischen Mittelalter und Neuzeit, Schriftenreihe der Gesell-
schaft für militärhistorische Studienreisen, 11 (Frauenfeld: Huber, 1993); 
Regula Schmid, ‘Gemein Eitgnossen hattend nie vil gewunnen, über den 
Gothart zu reisen: Ziele und Zwänge des eidgenössischen Ausgriffs in die 
Lombardei vor 1516’, in Marignano 1515: la svolta, Atti del congresso 
internazionale, Milano, 13 settembre 2014, ed. by Marino Viganò (Milan: 
Fondazione Trivulzio, 2015), pp. 17–32.
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fashion. But although its infantry’s short phase of tactical superiority 
in the European theatres of war ended at Marignano, as a market 
for mercenaries and as a guardian of Alpine passes the Corpus 
Helveticum remained a power factor as Spain and France jostled 
for the predominant position in Europe.3 Hence, the victorious 
French king sought to form a military alliance with his Swiss enemies 
as swiftly as possible. And even when he did not initially succeed, 
he offered his adversaries an Eternal Peace (1516), which he made 
extremely attractive as a result of generous financial and trade 
incentives.4 His expensive investments and his persistence would 
pay off within a few years when the mercenary alliance of 1521 
was established. Regularly renewed, this alliance tied its unequal 
partners together throughout the entire sixteenth, seventeenth, and 
well into the eighteenth century.5
Unusual conventions in diplomatic dealings with foreign powers 
developed owing to the weakness of the Confederacy’s petty states, 
the lack of a power centre, the coexistence of different constitutions 
and (following the Reformation) confessions, and the relations of 
different cantons with other cantons and foreign powers.6 In the 
3 André Holenstein, Mitten in Europa: Verflechtung und Abgrenzung in der 
Schweizer Geschichte, 2nd ed. (Baden: Hier und Jetzt, 2015; first published 
in 2014), pp. 112–124.
4 See Après Marignan: La paix perpétuelle entre la France et la Suisse, 
1516–2016, ed. by Alexandre Dafflon, Lionel Dorthe, and Claire Gantet, 
Mémoires et Documents 4e série, vol. 14 (Fribourg: Société d’Histoire de 
la Suisse romande/Archives de l’État de Fribourg, 2018).
5 Andreas Würgler, ‘Symbiose ungleicher Partner: Die französisch-eidgenössische 
Allianz 1516–1798/1815’, Jahrbuch für Europäische Geschichte 12 (2011), 
53–75; Ernst Wüthrich, Die Vereinigung zwischen Franz I. und 12 eidgen: 
Orten und deren Zugewandten vom Jahre 1521 (Zurich, 1911).
6 There were five ‘democratic’ rural cantons (cantonal assemblies), four 
city cantons with patrician constitutions, and three city cantons with 
guild constitutions. One canton had both a rural and democratic and 
a city constitution. Two cantons were divided into two half-cantons. As 
for confession, after the Reformation, seven cantons remained Catholic, 
four were Reformed and two were mixed or bi-confessional. The Corpus 
Helveticum comprised the thirteen cantons with full rights involved in the 
administration of the subject territories (common bailiwicks), as well as allied 
principalities (the prince-bishopric of Basel, the princely abbey of St Gall, 
the principality of Neuchâtel), cities (Biel, Rottweil, Mulhouse, St Gall) and 
republics (Geneva, Valais, Grisons). See Andreas Würgler, ‘ “The League of 
the Discordant Members” or How the Old Swiss Confederation Operated 
and How It Managed to Survive for So Long’, in The Republican Alternative: 
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sixteenth century, for instance, Confederate embassies at foreign 
courts were a rarity, and there was no permanent representation 
by agents or residents.7 However, foreign royal diplomats abounded 
in the Corpus Helveticum from the last quarter of the fifteenth 
century onwards, advancing the interests of their respective courts 
as Spain, Milan, Savoy, or the pope all sought alliances. Obtaining 
access to the Confederate mercenary markets was the principal aim 
of these powers. The pensions (payments into official accounts and 
to individuals) created by princes and kings to this end demonstrate 
the asymmetry in political relations between the Confederate cantons 
and their allies from the late fifteenth century onwards.8
To support this theory, the present chapter takes a closer look 
at the pension practices and the friction caused by this flow of 
money on various levels by focusing on the example of France: 
conflicts abounded over distribution due to French pensions during 
the Milanese War, and the relations between the cantons and their 
western ally were at times severely tested during the French Wars 
of Religion (1562–1598) because of outstanding pensions. Both 
The Netherlands and Switzerland Compared, ed. by André Holenstein, 
Thomas Maissen, and Maarten Prak (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University 
Press, 2008), pp. 29–50 (pp. 29–35). Up to 1798, one can talk of two 
spheres of foreign policy: there was internal foreign policy pertaining to 
relations between the allied cantons and external foreign policy concerning 
the relations of individual cantons, or all of the cantons, with foreign 
powers. See Georg Kreis, ‘Außenpolitik’, Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz, 
www.hls.dhs.dss.ch/textes/d/D26455.php, accessed 18 September 2017.
7 See Nadir Weber and Philippe Rogger, ‘Unbekannte inmitten Europas? 
Zur außenpolitischen Kultur der frühneuzeitlichen Eidgenossenschaft’, in 
Beobachten, Vernetzen, Verhandeln: Diplomatische Akteure und politische 
Kulturen in der frühneuzeitlichen Eidgenossenschaft, ed. by Philippe Rogger 
and Nadir Weber, Itinera – Beihefte zur Schweizerischen Gesellschaft für 
Geschichte, 45 (Basel: Schwabe, 2018), pp. 9–44.
8 On the issue of asymmetrical foreign relations, see Protegierte und Protek-
toren: Asymmetrische politische Beziehungen zwischen Partnerschaft und 
Dominanz (16. bis frühes 20. Jahrhundert), ed. by Tilman Haug, Nadir 
Weber, and Christian Windler, Externa, 9: Geschichte der Außenbeziehungen 
in neuen Perspektiven (Cologne: Böhlau, 2016), pp. 9–27; Andreas Affolter, 
Verhandeln mit Republiken: Die französisch-eidgenössischen Beziehungen 
im frühen 18. Jahrhundert, Externa, 11: Geschichte der Außenbeziehungen 
in neuen Perspektiven (Cologne: Böhlau, 2017); Tilman Haug, Ungleiche 
Außenbeziehungen und grenzüberschreitende Patronage. Die französische 
Krone und die geistlichen Kurfürsten (1648–1679), Externa, 6 (Cologne: 
Böhlau, 2015); and Würgler, ‘Symbiose’.
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examples provide insights into the balance of power and dependencies 
that developed between the allies following the nascence of the 
pension system around 1500, dependencies which would be con-
solidated during the course of the sixteenth century. First, however, 
we must explain what the term ‘pension’ actually means in the 
context of the Old Swiss Confederacy.
Pensions, mercenary dealings, and foreign relations
From the late fifteenth century onwards, a great deal of money poured 
into the Confederacy from royal treasuries. Unlike German studies, 
for example, Swiss research literature only very rarely uses the term 
subsidies to denote these payments. The Historisches Lexikon der 
Schweiz (HLS) contains no entries for the word. In the Enzyklopädie 
der Neuzeit, on the other hand, a specific article defines subsidies 
as ‘moneys of aid or support’ paid to one power by another by 
contract, while also noting that the payment of subsidies was a 
‘common means of financing wars in the early modern period’.9 
Although the same reference work also contains an entry on pen-
sions and rightly points out the ambiguity of the term, there is no 
substantial consideration of the significance of pensions as a form 
of transnational royal money transfer.10 This lacuna is remarkable, 
since such pension payments are also documented for the Holy 
Roman Empire and other territories.11 This contradiction, the lack 
of uniform terminology for cross-border money transfers, and the 
dominance of the term ‘subsidies’ in the German research literature 
thus demand an explanation of the term ‘pensions’. On which basis 
were these payments made, what did they achieve, and what was 
9 Michael Busch, ‘Subsidien’, Enzyklopädie der Neuzeit Online, ed. by 
Friedrich Jaeger, http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2352-0248_edn_a4205000, 
accessed 6 September 2017.
10 Josef Ehmer, ‘Pension’, Enzyklopädie der Neuzeit Online, ed. by Friedrich 
Jaeger, http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2352-0248_edn_a3186000, accessed 6 
September 2017.
11 See Haug, Ungleiche Außenbeziehungen, passim; Friedrich Edelmayer, Söldner 
und Pensionäre: Das Netzwerk Philipps II. im Heiligen Römischen Reich, 
Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur der iberischen und iberoamerikanischen 
Länder, 7 (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 2002), pp. 27–29; 
and Fritz Redlich, The German Military Enterpriser and His Work Force: 
A Study in European Economic and Social History, Vierteljahresschrift 
für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Beihefte 47/48, 2 vols (Wiesbaden: 
Franz Steiner, 1964–65), vol. 1, pp. 327–330.
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their significance for the political economy of the cantons of the 
Confederacy?
Pensions first appear as royal payments in the Old Swiss 
Confederacy in connection to the anti-Burgundian alliances in the 
last third of the fifteenth century.12 As noted by historian Valentin 
Groebner in the HLS, they ‘aimed, both as public pensions paid 
into official accounts and as secret pensions paid to individuals, to 
influence political decisions and to secure foreign warlords access 
to the coveted Swiss mercenaries’.13 The generosity of the European 
warlords was due, on the one hand, to the Confederacy’s special 
geopolitical location in the heart of Europe and, on the other hand, 
to the potency of its markets of violence. The Confederacy bordered 
on the Free County of Burgundy to the west and the duchy of 
Milan to the south. Hence, it was positioned in both the Spanish 
and French spheres of interest, in terms of both geostrategy and 
trade policy.14 This special geopolitical position, caught between 
the might of the Spanish and the French, took on further virulence 
due to the cantons’ trade in mercenaries. From the late fifteenth 
century onwards, the Confederacy developed into a prosperous 
mercenary farm, becoming an important recruitment market. Large 
sections of the ruling elites made economic and political use of 
this situation. The leading political and military families enjoyed 
large profits and prestige as military entrepreneurs and recipients of 
pensions.15 While the political-military elite secured and expanded 
12 Fremde Gelder: Pensionen in der Alten Eidgenossenschaft, ed. by Maud 
Harivel, Florian Schmitz, and Simona Slanicka (Zurich: Chronos, forthcoming).
13 Valentin Groebner, ‘Pensionen’, Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz, www. 
hls.dhs.dss.ch/textes/d/D10241.php, accessed 6 September 2017. See also 
Valentin Groebner, Gefährliche Geschenke: Ritual, Politik und die Sprache 
der Korruption in der Eidgenossenschaft im späten Mittelalter und am 
Beginn der Neuzeit, Konflikte und Kultur – Historische Perspektiven, 4 
(Constance: UVK Universitätsverlag Konstanz, 2000), pp. 159–163, and 
the same author’s Liquid Assets, Dangerous Gifts: Presents and Politics 
at the End of the Middle Ages (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2002).
14 Holenstein, Mitten in Europa, p. 113.
15 See the ongoing project of the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNF) led by 
Prof. André Holenstein at the University of Bern: Militärunternehmertum und 
Verflechtung. Strukturen, Interessenlagen und Handlungsräume in den trans-
nationalen Beziehungen des Corpus Helveticum in der frühen Neuzeit. Projekt 
A: Philippe Rogger: Eidgenössisches Militärunternehmertum in der frühen 
Neuzeit – Strukturen, Handlungsräume und Familieninteressen (1550–1750), 
www.hist.unibe.ch/forschung/forschungsprojekte/militärunternehmertum_ 
amp_verflechtung/index_ger.html, accessed 6 September 2017.
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local power via mercenary service, the risks for the ordinary soldiers 
were much greater. Nevertheless, these subjects also saw mercenary 
life as an opportunity and entered the service of foreign masters as 
military migrant workers for uncertain pay.16 It is estimated that in 
the sixteenth century alone, around four hundred thousand Swiss 
mercenaries went to war for foreign powers.17 Close to the theatres 
of war in Italy or France, the Swiss mercenaries had the advantage 
of rapid availability. ‘The rival powers of Spain and France sought 
to bind this strategically sensitive space as closely as possible to 
themselves or to take it from their adversary. The aim was to secure 
the right to march their own troops through [the territory] and over 
the Alps, to keep the Swiss mercenary market open and to prevent 
their rival from gaining a dominant position in the Confederacy.’ 18 
As the HLS definition cited above also indicates, pensions entailed 
both public and private payments. It is important to make this 
distinction if we are to outline the conflicts caused by these pensions.
We first encounter pensions as public payments agreed by contract 
in the treaty of alliance with France of 1474. An annual payment 
of 20,000 francs was to be divided evenly between the then eight 
cantons of Zurich, Bern, Lucerne, Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, Zug, 
and Glarus and Freiburg and Solothurn.19 After military conflict in 
16 Philippe Rogger and Benjamin Hitz, ‘Söldnerlandschaften – räumliche 
Logiken und Gewaltmärkte in historisch-vergleichender Perspektive: 
Eine Einführung’, Söldnerlandschaften: Frühneuzeitliche Gewaltmärkte 
im Vergleich, ed. by Philippe Rogger and Benjamin Hitz, Zeitschrift für 
Historische Forschung, Beiheft 49 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2014), 
9–43; Philippe Rogger, Geld, Krieg und Macht: Pensionsherren, Söldner 
und eidgenössische Politik in den Mailänderkriegen 1494–1516 (Baden: 
Hier und Jetzt, 2015); Benjamin Hitz, Kämpfen um Sold: Eine Alltags- und 
Sozialgeschichte schweizerischer Söldner in der Frühen Neuzeit (Cologne: 
Böhlau, 2015).
17 Hans Conrad Peyer, ‘Die wirtschaftliche Bedeutung der fremden Dienste 
in der Schweiz vom 15. bis zum 18. Jahrhundert’, in Hans Conrad Peyer, 
Könige, Stadt und Kapital: Aufsätze zur Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte 
des Mittelalters, ed. by Ludwig Schmugge, Roger Sablonier, and Konrad 
Wanner (Zurich: Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 1982), pp. 219–231 
(p. 222); Fighting for a Living: A Comparative History of Military 
Labour 1500–2000, ed. by Erik-Jan Zürcher, Work Around the Globe, 
1 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013); Rogger and Hitz, 
‘Söldnerlandschaften’; André Holenstein, Patrick Kury, and Kristina Schulz, 
Schweizer Migrationsgeschichte: Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart 
(Baden: Hier und Jetzt, 2018), pp. 47–59.
18 Holenstein, Mitten in Europa, pp. 113–114.
19 Rudolf Thommen, ‘Friedensverträge und Bünde der Eidgenossenschaft 
mit Frankreich, 1444–1777’, Basler Zeitschrift für Geschichte und 
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northern Italy, France renewed its agreement to pay the cantons 
enjoying full entitlement 2,000 francs in pensions (or peace payments) 
in the Eternal Peace of 1516.20 François I increased the pensions to 
3,000 francs in the mercenary alliance of 1521.21 The king paid 
this amount, according to the wording of the treaty of 1521, ‘in 
clear and open recognition of the men, the Confederates concerned 
[and] the deep love, liberality, obligingness, and fondness of said 
most Christian king towards Us’.22 The king of Spain also promised 
the annual payment of 1,500 crowns to the Catholic cantons (exclud-
ing Solothurn) in the mercenary alliance in order to win favour. 
Felipe II paid the money ‘out of especially graceful good will’ for 
the purpose of ‘better maintenance of mercenary friendship and 
alliance’.23 Thus, the contractually agreed payments were not 
motivated by the warlords’ tangible interests in recruitment licences; 
rather, they were a symbol of royal affection and friendship towards 
their partners in the alliance. Indeed, the two alliances between the 
cantons and France and Spain combine elements of friendly and 
military treaties of alliance.24 Even if the rhetoric of friendship 
suggests an equal footing, the two parties are anything but equal, 
as we shall see below.25
Altertumskunde 15 (1916), 117–214 (p. 144). There were also provisions 
for pensions in the treaties of 1495 and 1499. Ibid., 153–160.
20 Die Eidgenössischen Abschiede aus dem Zeitraume von 1500 bis 1520, ed. 
by Anton Philipp Segesser, Amtliche Sammlung der ältern Eidgenössischen 
Abschiede, vol. 3.2 (Lucerne: Meyer’sche Buchdruckerei, 1869), p. 1409.
21 Die Eidgenössischen Abschiede aus dem Zeitraume von 1521 bis 1528, 
ed. by Johannes Strickler, Amtliche Sammlung der ältern Eidgenössischen 
Abschiede, vol. 4.1a (Brugg: Fisch, Wild und Comp., 1873), p. 1498.
22 Abschiede, vol. 4.1a, p. 1498.
23 Die Eidgenössischen Abschiede aus dem Zeitraume von 1587 bis 1617, 
ed. by Josef Karl Krütli and Jakob Kaiser, Amtliche Sammlung der ältern 
Eidgenössischen Abschiede, vol. 5.1 (Bern: Wyß’sche Buchdruckerei, 1872), 
p. 1838; Rudolf Bolzern, Spanien, Mailand und die katholische Eidgenos-
senschaft: Militärische, wirtschaftliche und politische Beziehungen zur 
Zeit des Gesandten Alfonso Casati (1594–1621), Luzerner Historische 
Veröffentlichungen, 16 (Lucerne: Rex 1982), p. 150.
24 Andreas Würgler, ‘Freunde, amis, amici: Freundschaft in Politik und Diplo-
matie der frühneuzeitlichen Eidgenossenschaft’, in Freundschaft oder ‘amitié’: 
Ein politisch-soziales Konzept der Vormoderne im zwischensprachlichen 
Vergleich (15.–17. Jahrhundert), ed. by Klaus Oschema, Zeitschrift für 
Historische Forschung, Beiheft 40 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2007), 
191–210 (p. 195).
25 Tilman Haug, Nadir Weber, and Christian Windler, ‘Einleitung’, pp. 9–27 
(p. 12).
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Although the articles on pensions contain no mention of the 
recruitment of mercenaries, the pension payments were motivated 
not by emotions but by power politics. The contracts provided for 
mutual military aid in the event of conflicts or the passage of troops 
and, above all, granted the French or Spanish king the right to 
recruit mercenaries to defend their territories.26 While the military 
alliances with France of 1474, 1495, or 1499 did not stipulate how 
many soldiers were to be recruited, the treaty of 1521 prescribed 
a minimum of six thousand and a maximum of sixteen thousand.27 
The 1587 agreement with Spain stipulated a minimum of four 
thousand and a maximum of thirteen thousand mercenaries.28 If 
the pensions were not paid on time, article 16 of the Spanish alliance 
allowed the cantons to annul the contract.29 The annulment clause, 
testifying to the cantons’ bad experiences with their allies, demon-
strates the essentially commercial nature of these alliances: the deal 
was mercenaries for pensions.30 For the cantons – and the Catholic 
cantons had a special interest in such services – the contractually 
agreed trade in mercenaries represented an extremely profitable 
business. From 1510 to 1610, in the Catholic city cantons of Fribourg, 
Lucerne, and Solothurn, the pensions amounted to 66.5 per cent, 
41.2 per cent, and 36.9 per cent of the respective regular income. 
The figures were somewhat lower in the Reformed city cantons of 
Zurich (15.2 per cent), Basel (15.7 per cent), and Schaffhausen 
(32.1 per cent).31 In the rural cantons, pensions may well have been 
much more important to state budgets than in the Catholic cantons 
owing to the weak structure of their economies: in Appenzell, pensions 
accounted for around 80 per cent in 1582–1583.32 The alliances, 
26 On the Spanish alliance, see Abschiede, vol. 5.1, pp. 1832–1833; Bolzern, 
Spanien, pp. 73–108.
27 Thommen, ‘Friedensverträge und Bünde’, pp. 144, 154, 158; Abschiede, 
vol. 4.1a, p. 1494.
28 Ibid., vol. 5.1, p. 1839.
29 Ibid., vol. 5.1, p. 1834.
30 Nathalie Büsser, ‘Militärunternehmertum, Außenbeziehungen und fremdes 
Geld’, in Geschichte des Kantons Schwyz, vol. 3, ed. by Historischer Verein 
des Kantons Schwyz (Zurich: Chronos, 2012), pp. 69–127 (p. 102).
31 Martin H. Körner, Solidarités financières suisses au seizième siècle, Biblio-
thèque historique vaudoise, 66 (Lausanne: Édition Payot, 1980), p. 112.
32 Christian Windler, ‘ “Ohne Geld keine Schweizer”: Pensionen und Söldner-
rekrutierung auf den eidgenössischen Patronagemärkten’, in Nähe in der 
Ferne: Personale Verflechtung in den Außenbeziehungen der Frühen Neuzeit, 
ed. by Hillard von Thiessen and Christian Windler, Zeitschrift für Historische 
154 Subsidies, diplomacy, and state formation
especially the close involvement with France in 1516–1521, brought 
the Confederates not only financial but also trade-related advantages 
(customs privileges, unrestricted access to trade fairs in Lyon, salt 
imports, etc.).33 In terms of security policy, the cantons also profited 
from the opportunity to recall troops in the event of war, as first 
established in the provisions of the French alliance of 1521, and 
later in the Savoy alliance of 1577 and the Spanish military alliance 
of 1587.34 A consequence of the recall clause was that the cantons 
could manage without an expensive standing army and were thus 
able to keep direct taxation low. As argued by Christian Windler, 
the ‘successful Confederate model of Early Modernity, “state-building 
without direct taxation and a standing army”, was only possible 
thanks to the intensity of external involvement and the extent of 
the resources that created’.35 In contrast to the Spanish alliance or 
the Catholic cantons’ treaties with Savoy in 1560 (renewed in 1577 
and 1581) and the pope in 1565, the French alliance included all 
faiths and united both Catholic and Reformed cantons. The alliance 
formed with King Henri II in 1549 included the cantons Lucerne, 
Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, Zug, Glarus, Basel, Freiburg, Solothurn, 
Schaffhausen, and Appenzell and the allied cantons of the Abbey 
and City of St Gall, Grisons, Valais, and Mulhouse.36 Despite the 
absence of Zurich in 1521 and the temporary withdrawal from the 
alliance by Bern in 1529 on account of reformatory opposition to 
pensions, the alliance with France played an important role in holding 
together the loose confederacy, since it balanced the tensions between 
the confessional blocs. It was renewed in the sixteenth century in 
1549, 1564, and 1582, each time only with minimal changes, although 
France finally succeeded in expanding the alliance to include Bern 
in 1582–1583 and Zurich in 1614.37 The installation of a permanent 
embassy in the Confederacy in 1522 and the role of the ambassadors 
as mediators in internal conflicts underline France’s eminent interest 
Forschung, Beiheft 36 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2005), 105–133 (pp. 
105–106); Holenstein, Mitten in Europa, pp. 145–146.
33 Würgler, ‘Symbiose’, 69–72; Dafflon, Dorthe, and Gantet, Mémoires et 
Documents.
34 Abschiede, vol. 4.1a, pp. 1494–1495, vol. 5.1, p. 1835, and Die Eidgenös-
sischen Abschiede aus dem Zeitraume von 1556 bis 1586, ed. by Joseph 
Karl Krütli, Amtliche Sammlung der ältern Eidgenössischen Abschiede, 
vol. 4.2 (Bern: C. Rätzer’sche Buchdruckerei, 1861), p. 1545.
35 Windler, ‘ “Ohne Geld keine Schweizer” ’, p. 107.
36 Thommen, ‘Friedensverträge und Bünde’, p. 180.
37 Würgler, ‘Symbiose’, 124–133.
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in maintaining good relations with the cantons or a smooth supply 
of mercenaries from as many cantons as possible.38 From 1530 
onwards, they had a permanent residence in Solothurn, from where 
they organized the recruitment of mercenaries and advanced the 
formation of mercenary alliances and capitulations.39
Since there was no centre of power comparable to a royal court, 
the regular Federal Diet (Tagsatzung) played only a co-ordinating 
role in foreign policy, which meant that the Confederacy presented 
the French, Spanish, and Savoy diplomats with difficulties.40 Foreign 
policy was an affair for the sovereign cantons. They alone were 
responsible for forming alliances, with many decision-makers involved 
in the political process, be it the councillors in the city cantons or 
the countryfolk with voting and electoral rights in the rural cantons 
(Landsgemeinden). Occasionally, in city cantons such as Bern, even 
the subjects were consulted by the authorities on questions of alliances 
in the form of surveys (Ämteranfragen).41 Given the decentralized 
political structure and the complex political setting in the polyarchies 
of the Confederacy, the diplomatic representatives of the European 
powers relied on personal connections and various communication 
channels to push their political interests. That was both very time-
consuming and very expensive; they corresponded with many actors 
from different cantons, travelled to diets and conferences, met contacts 
in the cantons in person, or received them in their places of resi-
dence.42 Drawing on recent insights into the history of diplomacy 
38 Würgler, ‘The League’, p. 36.
39 Holenstein, Mitten in Europa, p. 134; Alexandre Dafflon, Die Ambassadoren 
des Königs und Solothurn: Ein ‘vierzehnter Kanton’ am Ufer der Aare, 16. 
bis 18. Jahrhundert (Solothurn: Zentralbibliothek Solothurn, 2014). For 
Spanish diplomacy, see Bolzern, Spanien, and Andreas Behr, Diplomatie 
als Familiengeschäft: Die Casati als spanisch-mailändische Gesandte in 
Luzern und Chur (1660–1700) (Zurich: Chronos, 2015). 
40 Holenstein, Mitten in Europa, pp. 133–141; Andreas Würgler, Die 
Tagsatzung der Eidgenossen: Politik, Kommunikation und Symbolik 
einer repräsentativen Institution im europäischen Kontext (1470–1798), 
Frühneuzeit-Forschungen, 19 (Epfendorf: Bibliotheca Academia, 2013), pp. 
477–484; Weber and Rogger, ‘Unbekannte’. On the functioning of the Federal 
Diet, see Würgler, Tagsatzung, and Michael Jucker, Gesandte, Schreiber, 
Akten. Politische Kommunikation auf eidgenössischen Tagsatzungen im 
Spätmittelalter (Zurich: Chronos, 2004).
41 Sarah Rindlisbacher, ‘Zwischen Evangelium und Realpolitik: Der Ent-
scheidungsprozess um die Annahme der französischen Soldallianz in Bern 
1564/65 und 1582’, Berner Zeitschrift für Geschichte 75 (2013), 3–39.
42 Würgler, Tagsatzung.
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inspired by social and cultural history, we know that the Confederacy’s 
transnational connections in the early modern period were achieved 
via personal networks composed of many different actors, each of 
whom pursued their own interests and whose loyalty to the polity 
was occasionally rather weak.43
These informal networks were usually formed by the establishment 
of patron–client relationships.44 This policy made use of bribes in 
the form of all kinds of patronage (pensions, captain’s ranks, 
aristocratic titles, etc.), secret payments to select politicians, military 
entrepreneurs, and trusted individuals playing a very important 
role. Indeed, towards the end of the sixteenth century, a much larger 
number of pensions were covertly paid to private individuals from 
state treasuries. Taking Lucerne as an example, while France in 
1475 paid around half (45 per cent) of its pensions to private 
individuals, about a hundred years later, around 1580, the figure 
stood at roughly three-quarters. Spain, too, spent 4,000 scudi in 
private pensions per canton and year in 1587, while public pensions, 
as outlined above, amounted to only 1,500 scudi.45 In the course 
of the sixteenth century, however, private pensions became more 
nuanced, with different categories distinguishing between purpose, 
mode of distribution, and the people dispensing them.46 Individual 
43 Akteure der Außenbeziehungen: Netzwerke und Interkulturalität im 
historischen Wandel, ed. by Hillard von Thiessen and Christian Windler, 
Externa, 1 (Cologne: Böhlau 2010); Nähe in der Ferne, ed. by Hillard von 
Thiessen and Christian Windler. 
44 Ulrich Pfister, ‘Politischer Klientelismus in der frühneuzeitlichen Schweiz’, 
Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte 42 (1992), 28–68; Windler, ‘ “Ohne 
Geld keine Schweizer” ’, pp. 105–133; Soldgeschäfte, Klientelismus, Kor-
ruption in der Frühen Neuzeit: Zum Soldunternehmertum der Familie 
Zurlauben im schweizerischen und europäischen Kontext, ed. by Kaspar von 
Greyerz, André Holenstein, and Andreas Würgler, Herrschaft und soziale 
Systeme in der Frühen Neuzeit, 25 (Göttingen: V & R unipress, 2018); 
for research on patronage in general, see Birgit Emich, Nicole Reinhardt, 
Hillard von Thiessen, and Christian Wieland, ‘Stand und Perspektiven 
der Patronageforschung’, Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung 32 (2005), 
233–265.
45 Bolzern, Spanien, p. 150; Leonhard Haas, ‘Die spanischen Jahrgelder von 
1588 und die politischen Faktionen in der Innerschweiz zur Zeit Ludwig 
Pfyffers’, Zeitschrift für Schweizerische Kirchengeschichte 45 (1952), 81–108, 
161–189 (pp. 83–94); Windler, ‘ “Ohne Geld keine Schweizer” ’, p. 110; 
Rogger, Geld, pp. 328–329.
46 Haas, ‘Die spanischen Jahrgelder’, p. 82; Büsser, ‘Militärunternehmertum’, 
pp. 90–93; Urs Kälin, ‘Salz, Sold und Pensionen: Zum Einfluss Frankreichs 
auf die politische Struktur der innerschweizerischen Landsgemeindedemokra-
tien im 18. Jahrhundert’, Der Geschichtsfreund 149 (1996), 105–124 
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pensions, as a resource of patronage, influenced the political culture 
in the cantons.47 Regular pensions were used by the French or 
Spanish king to reward clients for their service in furthering their 
patron’s political goals, procuring mercenaries or supplying important 
information.48 The dispensers of pensions, who acted as brokers by 
organizing the exchange of resources between the patron and his 
clients, were surrounded by pro-French, pro-Spanish, or pro-Savoy 
factions jostling for influence on behalf of their patrons.49 Although 
we do not claim that there was a simple automatic connection 
between money and political power, the boundaries of entwinement 
were determined by the availability – or indeed shortage – of patron-
age resources.50 Furthermore, the development and maintenance of 
these informal networks were determined not only by political culture 
but also by confessional circumstances. For instance, Spanish Milan 
had limited access to Reformed patronage markets.51 With regard 
to transfers of resources in connection with mercenary service and 
pensions, client networks were of inestimable importance for the 
formation of political elites in the cantons.52 Hence, it is not surprising 
(pp. 114–119); Gustav Allemann, ‘Söldnerwerbungen im Kanton Solothurn 
von 1600–1723, I. Teil’, Jahrbuch für Solothurnische Geschichte 18 (1945), 
1–122 (pp. 31–41).
47 See, for instance, U. Pfister, U. Kälin, C. Windler, and P. Rogger, ‘Mit Fürsten 
und Königen befreundet – Akteure, Praktiken und Konfliktpotential der 
zentralschweizerischen Pensionennetzwerke um 1500’, Der Geschichtsfreund 
165 (2012), 223–254.
48 Pfister, ‘Politischer Klientelismus’, pp. 29–40; Simon Teuscher, Bekannte 
– Klienten – Verwandte: Soziabilität und Politik in der Stadt Bern um 
1500, Norm und Struktur. Studien zum sozialen Wandel in Mittelalter und 
Früher Neuzeit, 9 (Cologne: Böhlau, 1998), pp. 135–138; Ulrich Vonrufs, 
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Andreas Würgler, ‘Factions and Parties in Early Modern Swiss Conflicts’, 
in Factional Struggles: Divided Elites in European Cities & Courts 
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that, given this opaque flow of resources and the complex mesh of 
contacts, there was no shortage of contemporary criticism of the 
pension system. In the sixteenth century, money and gifts were part 
of the political discourse, and the line between legitimate practice 
and bribery was hotly debated.53 As early as 1503, the entire 
Confederacy reached an agreement forbidding private pensions (the 
Pensions Letter). Nevertheless, this consensus lasted only until 1508, 
and it was the work of the Zurich reformer Zwingli – a harsh critic 
of mercenary service and pensions – that led to private pensions 
being forbidden in the Reformed city cantons.54 However, such bans 
could easily be circumvented, as is shown by the example of Bern 
where, for a time, salt concessions were instead used as a patronage 
resource.55 This criticism of private pensions is the subject of the 
first case study illustrating how the asymmetry in political relations 
between powers awarding and powers receiving pensions manifested 
itself.
Pensions as a patronage resource: cross-border practices of 
political influence during the Milanese Wars
The asymmetrical nature of the cantons’ foreign relations becomes 
especially clear when the continental great powers sought to obtain 
licences to recruit Swiss mercenaries. France, Milan, and the pope 
regarded the cantons of the Confederacy as patronage markets in 
which recruitment largely depended on the attractiveness of their 
offers (pensions, pay, etc.).56 This was also the case when the cantons 
began to pursue their own power politics in northern Italy in the 
early sixteenth century.
5 (Lucerne: Rex-Verlag, 1976), pp. 77–93; Philippe Rogger, ‘Familiale 
Machtpolitik und Militärunternehmertum im katholischen Vorort: Die Pfyffer 
von Luzern im Umfeld des Dreissigjährigen Krieges’, Berner Zeitschrift 
für Geschichte 77 (2015), 122–138; Rogger, Geld, pp. 323–343; Büsser, 
‘Militärunternehmertum’, pp. 69–127.
53 Groebner, Geschenke; von Greyerz, Holenstein, and Würgler, Herrschaft 
und soziale Systeme; Andreas Suter, ‘Korruption oder Patronage? Aus-
senbeziehungen zwischen Frankreich und der Alten Eidgenossenschaft als 
Beispiel (16.–18. Jahrhundert)’, in Korruption: Historische Annäherungen 
an eine Grundfigur politischer Kommunikation, ed. by Niels Grüne and 
Simona Slanicka (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010), pp. 167–203.
54 Groebner, Geschenke, pp. 178, 208, 239, 241–246.
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In the last decade of the fifteenth century, Italy became the focus 
of French and Spanish expansionism. Both countries had already 
achieved a high degree of monarchic concentration at this time, 
and dominion over Italy promised the wealth of its trade hubs as 
well as agricultural production in the north and centre. It would 
also mean securing a position as the dominant force in the Mediter-
ranean and represented the key to European hegemony. In 1494, 
the French monarchy had achieved sufficient internal consolidation 
for Charles VIII to embark on a campaign to Naples. The aim was 
to realise Angiovinian claims to the rule of the House of Anjou 
over Naples by military means. Following the conflict between the 
Valois and the Habsburgs over the Burgundian Succession 
(1477–1493), the antagonism between the two houses continued 
on the Apennine peninsula, causing the swift collapse of the fragile 
Italian state system. The years between the 1494 Naples campaign 
of Charles VIII and the victory of King François I in Marignano in 
1515 were characterized by several military campaigns and shifting 
coalitions and alliances between the power blocs involved. With 
the help of the Confederacy’s cantons, France conquered the duchy 
of Milan in 1499 and occupied it in the ensuing years.57 Indeed, 
the cantons supplied the French king with the mercenaries he urgently 
needed for his Italian campaigns until 1509. Between 1509 and 
1511, however, the Confederacy split with France when the Swiss 
did not renew the mercenary alliance of 1499 after it expired in 
1509. Instead, an alliance was formed with the pope in 1510 and 
rapprochement was sought with the Holy Roman Emperor (the 
Hereditary Agreement of 1511).
The Pavia campaign of 1512, pursuing the Confederacy’s own 
designs for power, led to the capitulation of Cremona, Pavia, and 
Milan. When France was driven out of Lombardy, the conflict over 
the duchy escalated markedly.58 On 29 December 1512, the Con-
federacy made Massimiliano Sforza, the son of Ludovico Sforza 
and the formal feudal overlord of Milan, duke of the city without 
considering the interests of the Holy Roman Emperor. Milan thus 
57 Alfred Kohler, Expansion und Hegemonie: Internationale Beziehungen 
1450–1559, Handbuch der Geschichte der Internationalen Beziehungen, 
1 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2008), pp. 6–7, 327–341; Heinrich 
Lutz, ‘Italien vom Frieden von Lodi bis zum Spanischen Erbfolgekrieg 
(1454–1700)’, in Handbuch der europäischen Geschichte, vol. 3, ed. by 
Theodor Schieder (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1971), pp. 851–901 (pp. 864–871).
58 Schaufelberger, ‘Spätmittelalter’, pp. 348–358.
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became a tributary protectorate of the Confederacy.59 But the French 
King Louis XII was by no means inclined to accept the loss of a 
duchy to which he had declared hereditary claims. It seems as if 
immediate attempts to reconquer the territory were out of the question 
following France’s bitter defeat. Instead, Louis used diplomatic 
channels to approach his former allies, turned enemies, in order to 
regain control over this rich and geopolitically vital duchy, requesting 
peace negotiations.
Hence, a phase of intensified diplomatic activity in the individual 
cantons and at the Federal Diet began. From July 1512 onwards, 
various dynasties offered to serve as mediators between the Con-
federacy and the French king. Pope Julius II, the greatest beneficiary 
of the summer of 1512, had no interest in such a development and 
sternly warned the Confederacy against taking up the offers of 
Savoy or Lorraine.60 Outside of official communications, France 
paved the way for peace talks via informal channels in the hope of 
gaining access to the Swiss mercenary markets as soon as possible. 
This explosive political constellation initially required that France 
proceed covertly. In order to provide safe passage for a French 
legation, Simon de Courbouson, Hofmeister to Philiberta of Lux-
embourg, was sent as the representative of French interests. To 
distribute the French pensions, Courbouson relied on a network of 
various intermediaries in the cantons who had local connections, 
were familiar with the political situation, and knew who was worth 
investing in and who was not. In Bern, for example, the innkeeper 
and member of the Grossrat Michel Glaser served as a broker, 
secretly distributing 1,500 crowns (out of a total of 2,100 crowns) 
to over 160 individuals without instructions from France. He was 
rewarded for his risky services with 600 crowns of the French 
pension payments; 665 crowns went into the pockets of seventeen 
members of the Kleinrat. Thus, over half of the twenty-seven members 
of the Kleinrat, the city-state’s most important political body, had 
secretly received French pensions from Glaser. The remaining money 
(835 crowns) was primarily distributed between members of the 
Grossrat, mercenary leaders, and guildsmen. The sum of 2,100 
crowns was a substantial one – it was the equivalent of roughly 
half of Bern’s state budget. Glaser performed these secret payments 
59 Ernst Gagliardi, Novara und Dijon: Höhepunkt und Verfall der schweiz-
erischen Grossmacht im 16. Jahrhundert (Zurich: Leemann, 1907), p. 19; 
Schaufelberger, ‘Spätmittelalter’, p. 353.
60 Abschiede, vol. 3.2, pp. 647, 651.
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partly in person at his inn and partly via third parties. He received 
assistance from another member of the Grossrat and intermediaries 
in the town’s guilds. In Zurich, on the other hand, a member of 
the Kleinrat, a knight, and a member of the Constaffel circle acted 
as brokers, secretly distributing French pensions (to the tune of 
1,000 crowns) with the assistance of twelve sub-brokers to approxi-
mately eighty people, many of whom belonged to the diets and 
guild rooms that held great political influence in the city.61 Hence, 
politics often took place outside of the diets intended for that purpose. 
Indeed, inns, for example, played an important role in the establish-
ment of informal ‘pension networks’. As observed by Simon Teuscher, 
in ‘terms of its suitability as a place where political groups could 
form, the inn can well be termed the counterpart of the town hall, 
with partially complementary functions’.62
Split by political orientations, the urban inns were frequented 
by pro- or anti-French factions. Around 1500, the pope’s supporters 
met in the Schlüssel tavern, whereas the clients of the French king 
met for their evening drinks in Gasthaus Sonne, run by the above-
mentioned Glaser.63 Despite the fact that the clients could not stipulate 
the size of their pensions themselves, the local connection of the 
pension business provided the elites with a lot of room for manoeuvre. 
The clamour for the favour of foreign potentates was not so much 
a matter of political loyalty; the authorities’ actions were often 
61 Rogger, Geld, pp. 209–232, 255–272. See also Gagliardi, Novara und 
Dijon, pp. 19–38; Teuscher, Bekannte – Klienten – Verwandte, pp. 147, 
184, 196–197, 199; and Hans Braun, ‘Heimliche Pensionen und verbotener 
Reislauf: Die Prozesse vom Sommer 1513 im Spiegel von Verhörprotokollen 
aus dem Berner Staatsarchiv’, in Personen der Geschichte – Geschichte 
der Personen. Studien zur Kreuzzugs-, Sozial- und Bildungsgeschichte: 
Festschrift für Rainer Christoph Schwinges zum 60. Geburtstag, ed. by 
Christian Hesse, Beat Immenhauser, Oliver Landolt, and Barbara Studer 
(Basel: Schwabe, 2003), pp. 25–41.
62 Teuscher, Bekannte – Klienten – Verwandte, p. 200; see also Pfister, 
‘Politischer Klientelismus’, pp. 32–39; Beat Kümin, Drinking Matters: 
Public Houses and Social Exchange in Early Modern Central Europe 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 83, 126, 130; and Philippe 
Rogger, ‘Solvente Kriegsherren, vernetzte Wirte, empfängliche Politiker: 
Interessenpolitik auf den eidgenössischen Gewaltmärkten um 1500’, Lob-
bying: Die Vorräume der Macht, ed. by Gisela Hürlimann, André Mach, 
Anja Rathmann-Lutz, and Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl, Schweizerisches 
Jahrbuch für Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte 31 (Zurich: Chronos, 2016), 
49–60 (pp. 54–57).
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dominated by self-serving motives. The lists of pensions documented 
in Swiss and foreign archives demonstrate that the diets maintained 
political contacts with several powers at the same time. Consequently, 
many Bernese clients were awarded pensions by more than one 
patron. Regardless of the provenance of these lists, be they from 
Milan, France, or the Holy Roman Empire, the same names are 
often encountered. These multiple loyalties on the part of the 
Confederacy’s elites were clearly something their wealthy benefactors 
were prepared to overlook in the case of influential clients. For the 
Holy Roman Emperor, merely neutralizing or silencing a supporter 
of France could be a worthwhile investment.64
Such practices, only the subject of rumour, and the fact that 
France had secretly recruited Swiss mercenaries proved a severe test 
of political unity in the Confederacy.65 The legitimacy of the great-
power interests in the Confederacy’s markets of violence was precari-
ous, as the secret pensions represented more than a whiff of cor-
ruptibility and venality.66 In the summer of 1513, there were violent 
protests against the pension system undertaken by subjects in the 
city cantons of Bern, Lucerne, Solothurn, and – two years after a 
similar incident related to the Battle of Marignano – in Zurich. In 
the course of these protests, some recipients of pensions were deposed, 
fined, or sentenced to hand over their French money to the city 
treasury. Pardons, however, were forthcoming as soon as the riots 
had ended. The receipt of private pensions was forbidden (with the 
exception of Solothurn), which had no effect on the clandestine 
continuation of this lucrative practice.67 However, the Bernese subjects 
also demanded an institutionalized say concerning alliance policy. 
With the exception of Zurich, the cantons upheld the time-honoured 
rights of their subjects.68 The real peak of the riots in Bern was the 
performance of the city’s clerk, who took it upon himself to stand 
before the angry subjects and read out loud the names of everyone 
who had received secret payments from the French broker Michel 
Glaser (who was sentenced to death). By theatrically reading out 
the names and the sums of money they had received, the clerk 
turned the suspicions concerning individual members of the Diet 
that had been circulating prior to the riots into certainties. For the 
audience of rebelling subjects, the links between the Bernese elite 
64 Rogger, Geld, pp. 142–151. 
65 Braun, ‘Heimliche Pensionen’, pp. 29, 36–41.
66 Groebner, Geschenke, pp. 155–226.
67 Rogger, Geld, pp. 55–116.
68 Ibid., pp. 106–112.
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and the French king took on the character of a tight network of 
transnational connections.69
The secret transactions were a cause of growing dissatisfaction 
among the subjects of the city state of Bern, partly because they 
had come to symbolize immoral politics and partly because they 
raised the question of who profited the most from the trade in 
mercenaries and pensions.70 In Bern, for instance, the subjects, 
consulted by the authorities on important issues such as the formation 
of alliances, complained that, as captains, the city elites permanently 
led ‘our flesh and blood’ from the land.71 The rural districts were 
thus confronted with an increased, uncontrolled exodus of men 
who were fit for work whenever war was brewing. Given the subjects’ 
great enthusiasm for mercenary service in the early sixteenth century, 
it can be assumed that especially housefathers (i.e. the rural notables) 
in their role as farm owners or master craftsmen had a lot to lose 
financially from the uncontrolled military economic migration. The 
temporary absence, potential disabling, or death of a mercenary in 
Italy represented an economic burden for the running of a farm or 
a trade, quite apart from the emotional drama for his social sphere.72 
The social explosiveness of this setting becomes clear if we consider 
that only one in three returned unharmed from the battles of 1500.73 
Unlike the simple mercenaries who risked life and limb for uncertain 
pay in Italy, the city aldermen had nothing to fear in this regard. 
Far removed from the physical dangers of the battlefield, they 
determined the political framework of mercenary service and were 
rewarded with high pensions. The fact that private pensions were 
forbidden during the pension riots, and that demands were made 
in Bern in 1514 to the effect that if an alliance was formed part of 
the pensions should go to the subjects, suggests that the secret 
payments collided with the popular ideas of appropriate financial 
dealings – of a moral economy.74
69 Ibid., pp. 69, 215–232.
70 Groebner, Geschenke, p. 190.
71 Catherine Schorer, ‘Berner Ämterbefragungen: Untertanenrepräsentation und 
-mentalität im ausgehenden Mittelalter’, Berner Zeitschrift für Geschichte 
und Heimatkunde 51 (1989), 217–253 (p. 237).
72 Rogger, Geld, pp. 323–343.
73 Peyer, Könige, Stadt und Kapital, p. 221.
74 Schorer, ‘Berner Ämterbefragungen’, p. 233; see also Kälin, ‘Salz, Sold und 
Pensionen’, p. 115, and Daniel Schläppi, ‘Das Staatswesen als kollektives 
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Pensions as promises: France’s debt policy during the French 
Wars of Religion
In 1597, Renward Cysat, the Lucerne city clerk and an outstanding 
observer of the political situation of his time, wrote a commentary 
on the transformation in the Lucerne treasury over the course of 
the previous fourteen years.75 His remarks in 1574 on the Confed-
eracy’s relations with France following the accession of King Henri 
III are particularly harsh. He accuses the latter of a general inability 
to keep order in his kingdom and in matters of war, while expressing 
unveiled criticism of the king’s financial policy: where money should 
have been saved, it was wasted, and where it should have been 
invested, it was saved.76 The Swiss also suffered from this policy 
(especially the Catholic cantons), Cysat asserts, since they always 
dependably supplied mercenary troops, who were now in a pitiful 
situation under Henri III. The king’s ill-advised policy was not only 
due to his incompetence, Cysat claims, but was also a political 
strategy. He deliberately ‘introduced all kinds of harmful innovation, 
discoveries and finances to the detriment of the Confederates’.77 
What is behind this accusation?
In the second half of the sixteenth century, the French crown 
was undoubtedly confronted by fundamental political challenges. 
At the same time, the financial situation was extremely tense. Military 
expenditure during the Wars of Religion caused huge deficits.78 A 
debt of 101 million livres in 1576 had reached 133 million by 
1588.79 At the end of the century, the state budget was in a desolate 
state: ‘The debts of nearly four decades of war meant that by 1598 
the crown was in debt to the tune of 300 million livres’.80 The 
75 Renward Cysat, ‘Über die Beziehungen der Schweiz zu Frankreich in der Zeit 
Heinrichs III.’, ed. by Theodor von Liebenau, Anzeiger für schweizerische 
Geschichte new series 8 (1898–1901), 457–460; also see Fritz Glauser, 
‘Cysat, Renward’, in Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz, www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/
textes/d/D11751.php, accessed 6 September 2017.
76 ‘[W]here they should save they have spent, and where they should delve 
into their pockets they have saved’; Cysat, ‘Über die Beziehungen’, p. 458.
77 Cysat, ‘Über die Beziehungen’, 458.
78 James B. Wood, The King’s Army: Warfare, Soldiers, and Society during the 
Wars of Religion in France, 1562–1576 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), pp. 275–300; Arlette Jouanna, La France du XVIe siècle, 
1483–1598 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1996), pp. 566–568.
79 Jouanna, La France du XVIe siècle, p. 593.
80 Mack P. Holt, The French Wars of Religion, 1562–1629, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005; first published in 1995), p. 217.
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Confederacy’s allies were also affected by France’s empty coffers; 
the annual costs of Swiss pensions amounted to 200,000 livres 
between around 1560 and 1574 – almost 4 per cent of the total 
royal army expenditure in peacetime.81 And, although the Swiss 
mercenary contingent was better paid than the French soldiers and 
generally received preferential treatment, their demands during the 
Wars of Religion went unmet for months and years.82 In 1570, for 
instance, the king owed the Pfyffer and Schiesser regiments alone 
800,000 livres.83 Indeed, the Swiss regiments were a comparatively 
large burden for the French budget. The monthly costs of a Swiss 
mercenary contingent with twenty companies, or six thousand men, 
stood at around 73,000 livres. A single ten-company regiment of 
French infantry cost only about 20,000 livres per month.84 It is no 
surprise that the crown could only partially fulfil its obligations 
given the deficits that grew each year. Cysat reported that outstanding 
payments to Swiss creditors had reached such a high level under 
Henri III ‘that they cannot be calculated or estimated’.85 At the 
Federal Diet in late November 1586, the French debts, consisting 
of peace payments, pensions, loans, and payment of mercenaries, 
were declared to amount to 2.5 million crowns, including outstanding 
interest.86 In the ensuing years, the figures grew from bad to worse. 
Around 1600, the outstanding peace payments, public and private 
pensions, mercenary arrears, loans, and interest are believed to have 
amounted to 36 million livres.87 It is thus hardly surprising that the 
outstanding credits in France were permanently on the agenda when 
the Swiss delegates met.88 This is well illustrated by the eleven years 
between 1575 and 1585. During this period, the congresses, which 
were sometimes divided by confession, tabled the subject of French 
81 Wood, The King’s Army, p. 282 (tab. 11.1).
82 Ibid., pp. 235, 279.
83 Theodor Müller-Wolfer, ‘Der Staatsmann Ludwig Pfyffer und die Huge-
nottenkriege’, Zeitschrift für Schweizerische Geschichte 8 (1928), 1–63, 
113–148, 241–320 (p. 15).
84 Wood, The King’s Army, p. 283.
85 Cysat, ‘Über die Beziehungen’, 459.
86 Abschiede, vol. 4.2, p. 965.
87 Walter Schmid, Der Beitritt Zürichs zum französischen Soldbündnis 1614 
(Zurich: Gebr. Leemann & Co., 1943), p. 66 (and note 7); Allemann, 
‘Söldnerwerbungen’, p. 111.
88 On the thematic activities of the Federal Diet in the spheres of foreign 
policy, the administration of the common bailiwicks and internal affairs, 
see Würgler, Tagsatzung, pp. 207–221.
166 Subsidies, diplomacy, and state formation
debt around ninety times, as documented by the minutes of the 
Federal Diet.89 These records concisely demonstrate the extent of 
the problem.90
Yet it would be a mistake to believe that the diplomatic discord 
between the cantons and France began with the accession of Henri 
III in late May 1574, as might be inferred from the report of the 
Lucerne clerk. As a matter of fact, outstanding pensions and mer-
cenary pay had been a bone of contention since the beginning of 
the Franco-Confederate alliances in the fifteenth century.91 The 
problem of debts was already entrenched before Henri III and was 
thus mentioned immediately after he ascended to the throne, when 
the French ambassador appeared before the Federal Diet on 20 
June 1574. After he had ended his address and handed over a letter 
from Catherine de Médicis (of 10 June) to the nine cantons allied 
with France, the response of these cantons expressed sorrow concern-
ing the death of Charles IX and wished his successor Henri III good 
fortune. But they also did not miss the opportunity to inform the 
new king that they expected France to honour its promises regarding 
the pensions.92 Just two months later, on 20 August 1574, the French 
ambassador called a conference of the Catholic cantons in which 
he related the king’s regret that the Catholic cantons had been forced 
to endure so much stalling regarding pension payments and that 
some cantons consequently had supplied mercenaries to the king 
of Spain.93 To avoid further excursions to other rulers, he would 
henceforth attempt to ‘show his good intentions in every way and 
even surpass his predecessors in so doing’.94 But, as Cysat correctly 
observed, French payment practices did not improve under the new 
king. As early as June 1575, the cantons allied with France complained 
89 Between 1575 and 1585, the Swiss delegates met on average 25 times per 
year. The subject of payments is mentioned after the register entries and 
the list of departures in Abschiede, vol. 4.2. On the problem of the regests 
in the minutes of the Federal Diet, see Würgler, Tagsatzung, pp. 63–80, 
and Jucker, Gesandte, Schreiber, Akten, pp. 33–60.
90 See also Allemann, ‘Söldnerwerbungen’, pp. 107–122; Büsser, ‘Militärun-
ternehmertum’, pp. 105–107; and Hitz, Kämpfen um Sold, pp. 199–211, 
247–304.
91 On this point, see the indexes to the following volumes of Abschiede.
92 Abschiede, vol. 4.2, pp. 541–542. On the presence of the European powers 
at the Federal Diet and the significance of this institution for diplomacy, 
see Würgler, Tagsatzung, pp. 113–122, 150–160, 347–363.
93 Abschiede, vol. 4.2, pp. 548–549, 542.
94 Ibid., vol. 4.2, p. 548.
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to the ambassador about two lapsed pensions, and in 1579 the 
court was in arrears with four pensions.95 Consequently, promises 
were made and deadlines were adhered to.96 The ambassador was 
repeatedly asked to take the Swiss issues to the king (which he 
promised to do), to remind him of the outstanding mercenary pay-
ments and pensions, and to see that the money was received as 
soon as possible.97 But it was of little use. The ambassador and 
other French representatives mostly endeavoured to apologize to 
the Swiss for outstanding payments, make uncertain agreements, 
gain their confidence and calm them down, or explain why the 
debts could not be paid this time.98 In February 1580, for instance, 
the French ambassador appeared before the Federal Diet once again. 
His apologetic explanations for the failure to honour the pensions 
and other promises were not greeted with much sympathy, and the 
Diet’s response was stern. No payments had been received for four 
years, neither pensions nor other debts. The interest was constantly 
growing. The Diet wished to know when the peace payments, 
pensions, etc. would be paid. The ambassador was left with few 
alternatives but to admit that the king was simply unable to raise 
such a large sum within a year. Nor was he able to specify a time 
when the payments would be made. Nevertheless, he promised that 
he would do everything he could about the matter.99 It would appear 
that France proved either unable or unwilling to pay its growing 
debts, although it repeatedly made substantial partial payments.100 
Occasionally, the king felt the need to act in person and write a 
letter of apology.101 The issue of debt sometimes became so urgent 
that special sessions of the Federal Diet took place.102 And in order 
to increase pressure in the negotiations, the cantons repeatedly sought 
conflict with the king by sending letters containing direct demands 
– bypassing the ambassador – or, if all else failed, sending costly 
envoys to the Paris court.103
95 Ibid., vol. 4.2, pp. 567, 688.
96 Ibid., vol. 4.2, pp. 603, 652, 710–711, 721, 724, 732, 735, 737, 743, 
745, 810.
97 Ibid., vol. 4.2, pp. 548, 569–570, 574, 575, 581, 584, 590, 688, 904.
98 Ibid., vol. 4.2, pp. 798, 849, 902, 904, 949–950, 959.
99 Ibid., vol. 4.2, p. 707.
100 Müller-Wolfer, ‘Der Staatsmann Ludwig Pfyffer’, 15–16; Allemann, 
‘Söldnerwerbungen’, p. 111.
101 Abschiede, vol. 4.2, p. 599.
102 Ibid., vol. 4.2, pp. 710, 743, 756, 859.
103 Ibid., vol. 4.2, pp. 613, 753–754, 952.
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Despite these conflicts with France and Henri III over outstanding 
debts, it is remarkable that the Swiss exercised a certain measure 
of restraint and made the supply of mercenaries conditional upon 
partial payments and wages, but did not withdraw from the alliance 
owing to the arrears despite their threat to do so.104 On the contrary, 
the alliance with Henri III was renewed with great ceremony in 
1582. This is even more astonishing given that not only the king’s 
debt but also his role in the conflict over Geneva, whose protection 
had been guaranteed between France, Bern, and Solothurn by the 
Treaty of Solothurn since 1579, had met with firm resistance in the 
Catholic cantons. This was due to the fact that when Duke Carlo 
Emanuele I of Savoy took over government affairs following the 
death of his father Emanuele Filiberto, there was a noticeable 
intensification of the conflict that had been smouldering between 
Savoy and Bern concerning the city on the Rhône. Carlo Emanuele 
left France and the Swiss in no doubt regarding his claim to the 
economically and politically important centre in the Lake Geneva 
basin. He was also prepared to use military means to get what he 
wanted. The Reformed city of Bern had a deep geopolitical interest 
in Geneva’s independence under its own protection, as it served as 
a western gate to the Confederacy. The Catholic cantons, however, 
were prepared to offer military support (alliance with Savoy in 
1577) if the duke attempted to conquer the site of Calvin’s work. 
A few days after the alliance was ceremonially renewed in Paris on 
2 December 1582, various representatives of the Catholic cantons 
tried to persuade the king himself to relinquish his erstwhile policy 
concerning Geneva. They demanded an immediate end to French 
protection for the city. Henri III rejected this demand, partly because 
Bern’s return to the alliance was all but sealed at that point.105 While 
the internal tensions between the Swiss confessional blocs intensified 
(with an alliance between Bern, Zurich, and Geneva in 1584, a 
special union of the Catholic cantons in the Golden Alliance in 
1586), meanwhile the conflict with their French ally escalated when 
104 Ibid., vol. 4.2, pp. 588, 600, 719.
105 Peter Stadler, ‘Das Zeitalter der Gegenreformation’, in Handbuch der 
Schweizer Geschichte, vol. 1 (Zurich: Berichthaus, 1972), pp. 571–672 
(pp. 593–595, 601–602); Peter Stadler, Genf, die grossen Mächte und 
die eidgenössischen Glaubensparteien 1571–1584, Zürcher Beiträge zur 
Geschichtswissenschaft, 15 (Affoltern am Albis: J. Weiss, 1952); Rindlis-
bacher, ‘Zwischen Evangelium und Realpolitik’, pp. 28–32; Müller-Wolfer, 
‘Der Staatsmann Ludwig Pfyffer’, 46–56.
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Catholic contingents fought for the Holy League against Henri III 
in 1585.106
One might ask why the Catholic cantons did not split with France 
completely, at least after forming the Spanish mercenary alliance of 
1587. It was not just for religious reasons that Spain was a reliable 
and potent military partner guaranteeing the Catholic special alliance 
of 1586; the alliance (excluding Solothurn) with King Felipe II 
also promised lucrative trade in mercenaries and pensions.107 Quite 
apart from that, the Catholic cantons (excluding Solothurn) had 
maintained profitable business relations with Savoy in the military 
sphere since 1577.108 Although there were prospects of at least 
partially compensating for leaving the alliance with France with 
Spanish and Savoy pensions, the outstanding credits prevented a 
break with France – on the contrary, they served to bind the cantons 
to Henri III. Hence, it is not too far-fetched to argue that the French 
policy of empty coffers was a useful tool for keeping the Swiss 
creditors close even during phases of political differences. Cysat, 
who as a committed Catholic reformer was critical of French policy 
anyway, appears to have seen through this logic. According to Cysat’s 
report, the French ambassador from 1566 to 1571, Pomponne de 
Bellièvre, advised Henri III upon entering office to remain heavily 
in debt to the Swiss. This way, Cysat continued, Henri attempted to 
‘keep them on a string and in his grip, so if he wanted anything from 
them, he could force them to do his bidding with their own money, 
which he still owed them, however little money he had’.109 Leaving 
the alliance would undoubtedly have meant losing the outstanding 
credits. And the Swiss creditors could not afford or indeed want 
106 Stadler, ‘Zeitalter’, pp. 602–604; Müller-Wolfer, ‘Der Staatsmann Ludwig 
Pfyffer’, 114–128; Hitz, Kämpfen um Sold, p. 45; Abschiede, vol. 4.2, pp. 
882–883, 885.
107 Bolzern, Spanien, pp. 109–188. The Spanish pensions were, in fact, never 
paid on time. No payments were made at all for some individual years 
after 1597. Ibid., pp. 169–188.
108 See the mercenary alliance treaty of 1577 in Abschiede, vol. 4.2, pp. 
1541–1551. The annual pensions of 300 gold guilders per canton, however, 
were considerably less than the French or Spanish pensions. Ibid., p. 1550.
109 Cysat, ‘Über die Beziehungen’, 459. The same conclusion was drawn by the 
papal nuncio Ladislao d’Aquino (1546–1621) in his official report to Rome 
in 1612. See [Ladislao d’Aquino,] ‘Die päpstliche Nuntiatur in der Schweiz 
1612: Information des Cardinals d’Aquino für seinen Amtsnachfolger. 
Uebersetzt von Prof. Jak. Burkhardt’, Taschenbuch für Geschichte und 
Alterthum in Süddeutschland 5 (1846), 223–256 (p. 242).
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that, despite the significant differences between the two parties. By 
remaining loyal to the alliance, they kept alive the chance of one day 
being paid. In this respect, one might conclude that pensions were 
an extremely effective instrument of power; withholding payment 
enabled Henri III to consolidate his position. France’s high mercenary 
and pension debts thus did not have the centrifugal effect one might 
assume because of the diplomatic tensions they caused; rather, the 
faltering payments played a large role in stabilizing Franco-Swiss 
relations in the long term.
Conclusion
This assessment takes us back to our initial thesis that pensions 
implied asymmetrical political relations between the Confederacy 
and its allies. Both conflicts outlined above, brought about by 
transnational patronage practices and a policy of empty coffers, 
would seem to support this theory. There was significant dependence 
on France as a patron power with respect to both private and public 
pensions. The above-mentioned conflicts concerning the distribution 
of funds around 1500 document the growing political importance 
of external involvement and the resources thereby negotiated. They 
make it clear that the elites with informal connections to France 
benefited personally from foreign-policy relations. Pensions, captain’s 
ranks, titles, and other patronage resources were fundamental to 
the accumulation of political power of the ruling elites. The reciprocity 
of the ruling class’s transnational connections and the formation of 
elites is quite evident.110 Foreign involvement was thus something 
of an obligation which no political actor could avoid. However, 
relations with the French king were of a clientelist nature, meaning 
that the exchange of resources took place between a socioeconomically 
superior patron and a client of lower status. The patron’s dominant 
position can be explained, among other things, by the exclusivity 
of the goods at his disposal and the opportunity to replace his client 
with another at any time. The patron had his Swiss clients more 
or less in his pocket.
Similarly, the significance of public pensions for the state treasuries 
meant that ending the alliance with France was not a realistic option 
for the cantons of the old Swiss Confederacy, as pensions were not 
legally recoverable – their payment or non-payment was solely at 
110 See Windler, ‘ “Ohne Geld keine Schweizer” ’, pp. 126–133.
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the discretion of the French king. The fact that they never received 
the full amount they were owed meant that the relationship with 
France could not be terminated.111 The picture of pensions painted 
by the treaties as a sign of royal affection, and the equality suggested 
by the friendly rhetoric of the military alliances, thus constituted 
an unconvincing attempt to conceal the asymmetry in Franco-Swiss 
political relations.
111 See the general reflections on the economy of social relationships in Die 
Ökonomie sozialer Beziehungen: Ressourcenbewirtschaftung als Geben, 
Nehmen, Investieren, Verschwenden, Haushalten, Horten, Vererben, 
Schulden, ed. by Gabriele Jancke and Daniel Schläppi (Stuttgart: Franz 
Steiner Verlag, 2015).
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Subsidy treaties in early modern times: the 
example of the German principality of 
Waldeck
Andreas Flurschütz da Cruz
Subsidy treaties: definitions and contents
During the early modern period, German princes collectively received 
more subsidies for their troops than any other single state received 
at the same time.1 But of course there were variations over time, 
as well as variations between the German princes, who were not 
the only players in this business: there were also other states in 
Europe on the receiving end, such as Denmark and Savoy. This 
chapter deals with one of the smallest among them, the German 
principality of Waldeck.
The present discussion focuses on troop-leasing contracts as a 
specific form of subsidy treaty. It seeks to identify the key players 
and their motives for either hiring or leasing large contingents of 
soldiers, often entire regiments, from/to other states (the second 
section of the chapter). Focusing on the case of the German principal-
ity of Waldeck (the third section), it sets out to exemplify the 
assumptions presented in the second section. The concluding section 
intends to clarify whether the frequently criticized ‘soldier trade’ 
(‘Soldatenhandel’) between German princes and foreign powers was 
just a way for lower-ranking rulers to make money or whether these 
projects had other aims as well.2
1 Peter Keir Taylor, The Household’s Most Expendable People: The Draft 
and Peasant Society in 18th Century Hessen-Kassel (Ann Arbor: Michigan 
University, 1987), p. 56.
2 Friedrich Kapp, Der Soldatenhandel deutscher Fürsten nach Amerika 
(1775–1783) (Berlin: Verlag von Franz Duncker, 1864. Reprint Munich 
1986).
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It is possible to adapt the example of Waldeck to older scholarship, 
showing that renting out soldiers was not just an instrument for 
making money but that it could be a quite expensive activity, even 
for the receiver of subsidies. Furthermore, it shows that not only 
large German territories like Prussia and Hanover took part in the 
business but also, sooner or later, nearly every German prince. The 
chapter suggests that other forms of ‘profit’, such as international 
relations and contacts, sometimes even linked to dynastic benefits, 
could be much more important for the smaller German princes than 
for the major ones, as the former had to take active measures to 
be recognized in Europe’s early modern community of states.
Royal subsidizers and princely German troop providers
Taking a closer look at the two parties involved in subsidy treaties 
allows us to identify interesting similarities, both on the side of the 
subsidizing states and on that of the subsidized territories which 
provided mercenary troops and their princes. On the side of the 
powers that paid subsidies, we find governments paying huge amounts 
of money in order to hire troops from their allies.3 A major player 
was England/Great Britain,4 which was dynastically and religiously 
linked to the Netherlands from the final third of the seventeenth 
century onwards. After setting aside their commercial rivalries, which 
had caused three Anglo-Dutch wars between 1652 and 1674, these 
two powers co-financed a considerable number of subsidy projects 
with minor German princes. A third important actor in this field 
of international military relations was the Serenissima, the Republic 
of Venice. From 1645 until 1719, it was a major subsidizer of a 
number of German princes, hiring their armies for defending its 
lands in the eastern Mediterranean against Ottoman forces – a giant 
military subsidy project, which, in the end, proved unsuccessful.5 
3 For example, Peter Taylor counted 22 million florins paid as subsidies by 
different countries to Hesse-Cassel between 1677 and 1815 for the raising 
and renting out of more or less 238,400 soldiers: The Household’s Most 
Expendable People, p. 56. 
4 Dwyryd Wyn Jones, War and Economy in the Age of William III and 
Marlborough (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988); John Brewer, The Sinews of 
Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688–1783 (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1989).
5 Venice, Archivio di Stato di Venezia (ASVe), Senato, Deliberazioni, Corti, 
Registri, 63, and other holdings; Benjamin Arbel, ‘Venice’s Maritime Empire in 
the Early Modern Period’, in A Companion to Venetian History, 1400–1797, 
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Those three powers are politically characterized by their corporate 
structure and mixed monarchical or republican constitution. Their 
oligarchic regimes favoured a ‘classical republican’ ideology, according 
to which standing armies were regarded as harmful to the preservation 
of political liberty. England had already experienced a lapse into 
military dictatorship when Oliver Cromwell took charge of the 
troops to usurp the rule of Britain in 1653.6 Regarding the political 
organization of those states, one may find clear resemblances in 
their military needs and political priorities. Great Britain became 
known as the guarantor of the balance of powers in Europe in the 
eighteenth century, whereas Venice and the Dutch Republic arguably 
pursued similar interests, at least on a regional scale. While Venice 
sought to halt the expansion of the Ottoman Empire, the Netherlands 
had to defend itself against the hegemonic ambitions of France.
On the other side, we find those rulers who lent their troops to 
these limited monarchies and republics. Most of them were princes 
of the Holy Roman Empire and were traditionally, or had recently 
become, ‘armed states’. This status had many advantages in the 
seventeenth-century Holy Roman Empire, as the emperor in his 
wars against the France of Louis XIV imposed a heavy burden on 
unarmed princes by quartering his and his allies’ troops on their 
land. For a German ruler, the maintenance of the troops of other 
princes was quite expensive but entailed neither glory nor honour. 
While the leaders of great battles were usually promoted and rewarded 
with titles and goods – most famous amongst them were Albrecht 
von Wallenstein and Prince Eugene of Savoy – nobody remembered 
those who became poor by quartering the troops of other powers. 
Hence, being an unarmed principality became decidedly unattractive 
at least by the time of the French wars between 1667 and 1697.
Nevertheless, there were enormous advantages involved in 
outsourcing the costs of large numbers of troops by providing them 
ed. by Eric R. Dursteler (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2014), pp. 125–253 (p. 
203); Guido Amoretti, La Serenissima Repubblica in Grecia: XII–XVIII 
secolo. Dalle tavole del Capitano Antonio Paravia e dagli archivi di Venezia 
(Turin: Omega Edizioni, 2006); Stephan Karl Sander-Faes, ‘Die Soldaten 
der Serenissima: Militär und Mobilität im frühneuzeitlichen Stato da mar’, 
in Militärische Migration vom Altertum bis zur Gegenwart (Paderborn: 
Studien zur Historischen Migrationsforschung, vol. 30, 2016), pp. 111–126. 
6 Wolfgang Reinhard, ‘Staat und Heer in England im Zeitalter der Revolutionen’, 
in Staatsverfassung und Heeresverfassung in der europäischen Geschichte 
der frühen Neuzeit, ed. by Johannes Kunisch and Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger 
(Berlin: Historische Forschungen, vol. 28, 1986), pp. 173–212.
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to foreign kings. The most obvious motive was money. German 
princes seeking to circumvent the budgetary approval of their estates, 
above all on military investments, urgently needed money. Foreign 
subsidy payments for rented troops enabled the prince to become 
more independent of his estates (Landstände), who at the same time 
tried to limit princely power and extend their influence over public 
decisions. However, recent research has shown that, for seventeenth- 
and eighteenth-century princely war entrepreneurs, the financial 
motivation for leasing their armies to other powers might have been 
overestimated. Providing large numbers of equipped soldiers was 
not only lucrative but also entailed financial obligations,7 and no 
one could be sure if the payments agreed upon by the contracting 
parties in the subsidy treaties would actually materialize. At least 
initially, the raising and provisioning of armies was a losing business. 
In 1702, Landgrave Carl of Hesse-Cassel (1654–1730) insisted on 
an advance payment of at least half of the contracted sum of a total 
of 400,000 florins to raise six thousand soldiers for the English 
king and the Dutch Republic, because of ‘the high expenditure the 
troops’ raising had already caused him’.8 Sometimes, expenses for 
levy and equipment eventually exceeded the income that the contract-
ing parties had agreed upon, and additional money had to be raised 
to fill the gap.9 A Waldeckian officer ensured the States-General in 
1767 that the Prince of Waldeck had incurred a loss from the last 
treaty and that he had to add 16,000 florins each year to the expenses 
for the troops instead of becoming rich by renting them out.10 Often, 
such losses even resulted in legal proceedings related to the amount 
and terms of the payments.
7 Peter H. Wilson, ‘The German “Soldier Trade” of the Seventeenth and 
Eighteenth Centuries: A Reassessment’, The International History Review 
XVIII.4 (1996), 757–792 (p. 758); Johannes Burkhardt, ‘Vollendung und 
Neuorientierung des frühmodernen Reiches 1648–1763’, in Gebhardt 
Handbuch der deutschen Geschichte, vol. 11 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2006), 
p. 135. 
8 Marburg, Staatsarchiv Marburg (HStAM), 4 h, no. 3975, instruction Kassel 
1702, 26 March. Copy of the subsidy treaty in HStAM, 118 a, no. 652: 
‘les grosses depenses que ce Corps Luy a deyá coûté à mettre sur pied’. All 
translations are by the author unless otherwise stated.
9 HStAM, 118 a, 967 I, fols 15r–16r. 
10 HStAM, 118 a, no. 665/17, H.C. von Kalm to the States General, The Hague, 
14 August 1767: ‘daß der Fürst aljährl. 16000 fl. zugeschoßen, welches ich 
allein in der Absicht anführe, daß er sich damit nicht bereichert, sondern 
vielmehr persöhnlichen Verlust gehabt’. 
176 Subsidies, diplomacy, and state formation
Prestige and other advantages that came along with these interstate 
contracts may have been far more important than money.11 In spite 
of the mostly unequal relations between the money-offering (sub-
sidizer) and the troop-providing (subsidy recipient) partner, the 
agreements resulted in interdependencies: the party offering money 
did so because it lacked sufficient troops and needed to acquire the 
military force necessary to participate in certain conflicts. The 
soldier-providing ‘client’, on the other hand, depended on the financial 
resources of his ‘patron’ to maintain his standing army and increase 
his independence of the estates of his territory. As a result of those 
circumstances, even ‘a relatively insignificant prince of the empire’ 
could become ‘the ally of the principal powers of the world’.12
German sovereigns held a princely but by no means a royal stand-
ing. When Elizabeth Stuart prepared to get married to Elector-Palatine 
Friedrich V in 1613, there were great doubts regarding the spouse’s 
status. After the Thirty Years’ War, the German dynasties sought to 
make their princely rank unambiguous.13 Therefore, their apparent 
main task regarding the military subsidy projects was simply to 
‘get in touch’ with foreign rulers, whatever the cost might be, and 
regardless of whether the contracts they entered into would bear 
fruit or even cause debts. In spite of its asymmetry, striking a deal 
with a foreign power laid the foundation for a partnership, and the 
ruler’s partner also got some of the former’s prestige out of it. In 
fact, during the early modern period, some of the most important 
German princes providing troops to foreign governments managed 
to achieve royal dignity and European thrones for themselves, such 
as the dukes of Brunswick/Hanover in Great Britain (1714–1901) 
and the electors of Saxony in Poland (1697–1763). The example 
11 Johannes Kunisch, ‘La guerre – c’est moi! Zum Problem der Staatenkonflikte 
im Zeitalter des Absolutismus’, in Fürst – Gesellschaft – Krieg: Studien zur 
bellizistischen Disposition des absoluten Fürstenstaates, ed. by Johannes 
Kunisch (Cologne: Böhlau, 1992), pp. 1–41. 
12 Carl Brinkmann, ‘Charles II and the Bishop of Münster in the Anglo-Dutch 
War of 1665–6’, The English Historical Review 21 (1906), 686–698 (p. 
686); cf. Tilman Haug, Nadir Weber, and Christian Windler, ‘Einleitung’, 
in Protegierte und Protektoren: Asymmetrische politische Beziehungen 
zwischen Partnerschaft und Dominanz (16. bis frühes 20. Jahrhundert), ed. by 
Tilman Haug, Nadir Weber, and Christian Windler (Cologne: Böhlau, 2016), 
pp. 9–27.
13 Cf. Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger, Des Kaisers alte Kleider: Verfassungsgeschichte 
und Symbolsprache des Alten Reiches (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2008), p. 150. 
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of the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel is also interesting: through being 
a subsidy receiver, he had risen to become sufficiently important to 
be a consort of a Swedish princess and, in a second step, to reach 
the Swedish throne (1720–1751). Thus, military subsidy treaties 
could be coupled with inter-dynastic marriage projects.14
Even though not every troop-providing German prince was 
rewarded with a European crown, dealing with foreign rulers seemed 
a promising strategy to stabilize one’s position within the German 
and European noble hierarchy and lay the foundations for the 
international career of this prince and his lineage. The German 
principality of Waldeck is a good example with regard to proving 
this thesis.
Waldeck: the princely tradition of military entrepreneurship
Early international military projects (seventeenth century)
Although German princes and nobles were engaged in subsidy treaties 
before 1648, the Peace of Westphalia, which specified the ius armorum 
and the ius foederis as landmarks of sovereignty, redefined the legal 
position of German princes: they were enabled to negotiate and form 
alliances with foreign powers – as long as these did not turn against 
the empire itself – and became subjects of international law.15 The 
princes of Waldeck had played an important role in the arena of 
14 Philip Haas, Fürstenehe und Interessen: Die dynastische Ehe der Frühen 
Neuzeit in zeitgenössischer Traktatliteratur und politischer Praxis am Beispiel 
Hessen-Kassels (Darmstadt and Marburg: Quellen und Forschungen zur 
Hessischen Geschichte, 177, 2017), pp. 53–56. 
15 Heinz Schilling, Höfe und Allianzen: Deutschland 1648–1763, Das Reich 
und die Deutschen, 5 (Berlin: Siedler, 1989), p. 32; Ronald G. Asch, ‘The ius 
foederis Re-examined: The Peace of Westphalia and the Constitution of the 
Holy Roman Empire’, in Peace Treaties and International Law in European 
History: From the Late Middle Ages to World War One, ed. by Randall 
Lesaffer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 319–337; Karl 
Otmar von Aretin, Das Alte Reich 1648–1806, vol. 1: Föderalistische oder 
hierarchische Ordnung (1648–1684) (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1993), p. 19; 
Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, ‘Der Westfälische Frieden und das Bündnisrecht 
der Reichsstände’, Der Staat 8.4 (1969), 449–478; Heinhard Steiger, ‘Die 
Träger des ius belli ac pacis 1648–1806’, in Staat und Krieg: Vom Mit-
telalter bis zur Moderne, ed. by Werner Rösener (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 2000), pp. 115–135; Kyle M. Ballard, ‘The Privatization of Military 
Affairs: A Historical Look into the Evolution of the Private Military Industry’, 
in Private Military and Security Companies: Chances, Problems, Pitfalls and 
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interstate military collaborations ever since subsidy treaties became 
a relevant instrument of co-operation between European countries.
Count Josias II of Waldeck (1636–1669) was a central figure in 
the final phase of the war of the Republic of Venice against the 
Ottomans between 1645 and 1669. As the archives of Waldeck 
have been only partially inventoried and the existing Venetian material 
mentions him only briefly, we do not know very much about the 
actual dimensions and background of his commitment to sending 
troops to Venice. Together with various members of the noble family 
von Degenfeld, he seems to have been one of the first German 
noblemen to raise troops and lease them to a foreign power.16 He 
was no ruling prince, however, and his conscriptions apparently 
did not have a specific political motivation, instead being a vehicle 
to get him personally into Venetian service, which subsequently 
became a family tradition: when his nephew, Count Heinrich Wolrad 
of Waldeck (1665–1688), died at Negroponte in 1688, the Serenissima 
immediately turned to the brothers and cousins of the deceased to 
nominate a successor from their ranks to continue the ‘condotta’; 
in other words, to continue recruiting troops for the Republic.17 
The candidate who was finally selected for the task was Heinrich 
Wolrad’s younger brother, Count Carl (1672–1694). For the extremely 
young nobleman, the Venetian employment clearly served to lay 
the groundwork for his military career and improve his position 
within the aristocratic hierarchy of the empire; that is, ‘to qualify 
himself so much the better’.18 The House of Waldeck supplied the 
Republic of Venice with troops until the Peace of Passarowitz in 
1718, which marked the end of the Ottoman conflict.19 It used these 
Prospects, ed. by Thomas Jäger and Gerhard Kümmel (Wiesbaden: VS 
Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007), pp. 37–53 (p. 38); Bernhard R. 
Kroener, ‘Kriegswesen, Herrschaft und Gesellschaft 1300–1800’, Enzyklopädie 
Deutscher Geschichte, 92 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2013), pp. 38–39.
16 ASVe, Senato, Deliberazioni, Mar, Registri, 135.
17 HStAM, 117, no. 1329, Venice 1688, 26 November. 
18 HStAM, 117, no. 1329, Venice 1689, 21 January: ‘damit Er sich desto 
beßer qualificiren könne’.
19 A copy of the peace treaty can be found in: Deputazione Veneta di Storia 
Patria (ed.), I Libri Commemorali della Repubblica di Venezia, Regesti vol. 
VIII (Monumenti Storici, Serie Prima, Documenti, vol. XVII), Venice, 1914, 
pp. 125–127; cf. also Egidio Ivetic, ‘The Peace of Passarowitz in Venice’s 
Balkan Policy’, in The Peace of Passarowitz, 1718, ed. by Charles Ingrao, 
Nikola Samardžić, and Jovan Pešalj (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University 
Press, 2008), pp. 63–72. 
Subsidy treaties in early modern times 179
military contracts mainly to establish its first-born sons as military 
commanders within the ranks of international aristocratic society.20 
Several other German territories, such as Brunswick, Limpurg, the 
Elector of Saxony from the Albertine branch of the house of Wettin, 
and even some of the smaller Ernestine Saxon territories, imitated 
Waldeck’s subsidy strategy with varying degrees of success.21
Brokering subsidy treaties: negotiations with the Netherlands  
and Great Britain
Count Georg Friedrich von Waldeck (1620–1692), a cousin of Josias, 
Heinrich Wolrad, and Carl, was promoted to Prince of the Empire 
by Emperor Leopold I in 1682 as a reward for his military success.22 
He was the one who had arranged the first among many subsidy 
agreements with the Republic of the Netherlands for his patron 
and feudal lord, Landgrave Carl of Hesse-Cassel,23 and he may also 
have initiated a treaty for his own principality: in 1688, Georg 
Friedrich and William of Orange hammered out a plan to place 
‘the Venetian regiments’ into the service of the latter once they 
returned from the Levant.24 This project probably concerned Waldeck-
ian troops. William needed large numbers of soldiers in the Dutch 
Republic’s conflict with France, and he had the necessary funds at 
his disposal to afford them. Georg Friedrich was an influential 
counsellor in Cassel, as well as at the courts of Vienna and The 
20 HStAM, 118 a, no. 1054. 
21 ASVe, Senato, Deliberazioni, Mar, Registri, 153 and 154; Collegio, Lettere 
Principi, 7; Oliver Heyn, Das Militär des Fürstentums Sachsen-Hildburghausen 
1680–1806 (Veröffentlichungen der Historischen Kommission für Thüringen, 
Kleine Reihe, vol. 47) (Cologne: Böhlau, 2015), p. 135; Bastian Hallbauer 
and Jan Schlürmann, ‘Das schleswig-holstein-gottorfische Militär 1623–1773’, 
in Handbuch zur Nordelbischen Militärgeschichte: Heere und Kriege in 
Schleswig, Holstein, Lauenburg, Eutin und Lübeck, 1623–1863/67, ed. 
by Eva Susanne Fiebig and Jan Schlürmann (Husum: Husum Druck- und 
Verlagsgesellschaft, 2010), pp. 61–92; Andrea Thiele, ‘The Prince as Military 
Entrepreneur? Why Smaller Saxon Territories Sent “Holländische Regimenter” 
(Dutch Regiments) to the Dutch Republic’, in War, Entrepreneurs, and the 
State in Europe and the Mediterranean, 1300–1800, ed. by Jeff Fynn-Paul 
(Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2014), pp. 170–192.
22 On him and his career, see Gerhard Menk, Georg Friedrich von Waldeck 
(1620–1692): Eine biographische Skizze, Waldeckische Historische Hefte, 
3 (Arolsen: Waldeckischer Geschichtsverein, 1992). 
23 HStAM. 117, no. 1358, Kassel, 17 September 1688. 
24 HStAM, 117, no. 1346, 1688. 
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Hague; and he laid the foundations for continuous military co-
operation between the Landgraves and Waldeck, on the one hand, 
and the Netherlands, on the other, which for many decades also 
included Great Britain.
Given his role as middleman for Hesse-Cassel, Georg Friedrich 
can thus be seen as a broker of military subsidy treaties. Moreover, 
he arranged such contracts not only for his own house and the 
Hessian Landgrave but also for other sovereigns of the empire. In 
1688, for example, he assisted the duke of Württemberg with his 
treaty with Willem III of Orange.25 Soon, Duke Friedrich Carl hired 
the first thousand cavalry soldiers. This marked the beginning of 
another German prince’s long-lasting military co-operation not only 
with the Netherlands, but with various foreign rulers.26 In the same 
year, which seems to have played a crucial role in the history of 
this subject, several thousand soldiers from Brandenburg regiments 
also entered Willem’s (William’s) service.27
When Waldeck signed its first own major troop agreement with 
the British King George II (r. 1727–1760) in 1742,28 the principality 
had already established a tradition of military interstate co-operation. 
Since 1614, Waldeck had been linked by feudal ties to the dukes 
of Brunswick-Lüneburg, who became Electors of Hanover in 1692 
and occupied the British throne after 1714.29 The regiments provided 
to the British had, as a matter of fact, not been created specifically 
for this purpose, at least not all of them. In fact, the Waldeckian 
25 HStAM, 117, no. 1440, Stuttgart, 28 March 1688. 
26 ASVe, Senato, Deliberazioni, Mar, Registri, 154; Peter H. Wilson, War, 
State and Society in Württemberg, 1677–1793 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), p. 91. At the same time, 1688, Württemberg started 
another military project together with Venice: Rudolf von Andler, ‘Die 
württembergischen Regimenter in Griechenland 1687–89’, Württembergische 
Vierteljahreshefte für Landesgeschichte new series 31 (1922–1924), 217–279; 
John Childs, Armies and Warfare in Europe, 1648–1789 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1982), pp. 47–48. 
27 HStAM, 117, no. 1459, 1688. 
28 HStAM, 118 a, no. 729; Benno von Canstein, Der Waldeckisch-Englische 
Subsidienvertrag von 1776 – Zustandekommen, Ausgestaltung und Erfüllung: 
Eine rechtsgeschichtliche Untersuchung zur Darstellung von Rechts- und 
Verwaltungspraxis in einem deutschen Territorialstaate des ausgehenden 18. 
Jahrhunderts unter besonderer Berücksichtigung wehrrechtlicher Aspekte 
(Cologne: Universität zu Köln, 1987). 
29 HStAM, 118 a, no. 1196; Johann Jacob Moser, Einleitung in das 
Chur=Fürst=und Herzoglich Braunschweig=Lüneburgische Staats=Recht 
(Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1755), p. 673. 
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regiments, which comprised approximately two thousand recruits, 
had already existed for decades, serving such different powers as 
Venice (1716–1718) and the Holy Roman Emperor (1740).30
On April 20, 1776, Prince Friedrich Carl August von Waldeck 
(1743–1812) signed a subsidy treaty with Great Britain in which 
he agreed to send 660 infantrymen to America.31 Waldeck was one 
of seven German territories to support the British in the American 
War of Independence by sending troops to their rebellious North 
American colonies: the others were Anhalt-Zerbst, Ansbach-
Bayreuth,32 and the Wolfenbüttel and Lüneburg branches of 
Brunswick, as well as Hesse-Cassel33 and Hesse-Hanau.
Finances, patronage, networking, and international prestige
Three-quarters of the money paid by Great Britain to Waldeck 
served to cover the costs for the troops; the actual ‘subsidy’ for the 
private use of the Prince of Waldeck came only to a quarter of the 
payments (approximately £6,000 a year).34 This sum was paid from 
1776 to 1784 and amounted to a total of £52,146 – a tiny sum in 
comparison with Waldeck’s debts, which reached several million 
florins in this period.35 The subsidies thus brought a slight relief to 
the disastrous financial situation of the principality but did not 
solve the problem at all.
These figures show that money was neither the only nor the main 
consideration for the princes of Waldeck when it came to supporting 
30 HStAM, 118 a, no. 1054 and 1102. 
31 HStAM, 118 a, no. 949. 
32 Erhard Städtler, Die Ansbach-Bayreuther Truppen im Amerikanischen 
Unabhängigkeitskrieg 1777–1783: Forschungen zur Kulturgeschichte und 
Familienkunde (Nuremberg: 1956). 
33 Die ‘Hessians’ im Amerikanischen Unabhängigkeitskrieg (1776–1783): Neue 
Quellen, neue Medien, neue Forschungen, Veröffentlichungen der Historischen 
Kommission für Hessen, 80, ed. by Holger Th. Gräf, Andreas Hedwig, and 
Annegret Wenz-Haubfleisch (Marburg: Historische Kommission für Hessen, 
2014); Holger Th. Gräf, ‘Die “Fremden Dienste” in der Landgrafschaft 
Hessen-Kassel (1677–1815): Ein Beispiel militärischer Unternehmertätigkeit 
eines Reichsfürsten’, in Schweizer Solddienst: Neue Arbeiten. Neue Aspekte. 
Service Étranger Suisse. Nouvelles Études. Nouveaux Aspects, ed. by Rudolf 
Jaun, Pierre Streit, and Hervé de Weck (Birmensdorf: Schweizerische Ver-
einigung für Militärgeschichte und Militärwissenschaft, 2010), pp. 83–103. 
34 HStAM, 118 a, no. 966 and no 949, subsidy treaty 20 April 1776, §13.
35 HStAM, 118 a, no. 967 I, fols 32v–33r.
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their foreign allies with troops for decades or even centuries, although 
the pecuniary element seems to have become more important in the 
second half of the eighteenth century.36 Of particular relevance, 
though, were the additional possibilities offered by the treaties in 
a society fundamentally based on a system of patron–client relation-
ships.37 The subsidy business was a ‘machine of patronage’ pointing 
in several directions: it served as a vehicle for the princes of the 
empire not only to join the retinue of foreign rulers but also to 
build up (or expand) their own clientele by promoting and benefiting 
favoured courtiers applying for positions in the military hierarchy 
of Waldeckian regiments. A large number of such requests have 
been preserved.38 The military projects did not just help the princes 
define and improve their standing within imperial and international 
aristocratic society; they also represented an opportunity to get in 
touch with their own peer group. When the Prince of Waldeck 
signed the American contract with the British king in 1776, he knew 
right from the beginning that it would not be possible to recruit 
enough men from his own principality. Immediately, Prince Friedrich 
Carl August sent confidential letters to the other princely houses in 
the region to ask them for permission to recruit soldiers in their 
countries. As a next step, he presented his request to the Free Imperial 
Cities of the empire to fulfil his obligations to the British.39 Several 
nobles rejected his request as they themselves had similar projects 
in mind and as their countries were already full of recruiting officers 
from different nations. Others accepted the request and hoped to 
profit from the agreements.40 Military projects thus generated a 
significant job market involving different social layers among the 
population.41
36 HStAM, 118 a, no. 665. 
37 Heiko Droste, ‘Patronage in der Frühen Neuzeit – Institution und Kulturform’, 
Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung 30 (2003), 555–590; Birgit Emich, 
‘Staatsbildung und Klientel – politische Integration und Patronage in der 
Frühen Neuzeit’, in Integration. Legitimation. Korruption: Politische Patron-
age in Früher Neuzeit und Moderne, ed. by Ronald G. Asch, Birgit Emich, 
and Jens Ivo Engels (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2011), pp. 33–49.
38 HStAM, 118 a, no. 721. 
39 HStAM, 118 a, no. 1009.
40 HStAM, 118 a, no. 1013. 
41 Matthias Asche, ‘Krieg, Militär und Migration in der Frühen Neuzeit: 
Einleitende Beobachtungen zum Verhältnis von horizontaler und vertikaler 
Mobilität in der kriegsgeprägten Gesellschaft Alteuropas im 17. Jahrhundert’, 
in Krieg, Militär und Migration in der Frühen Neuzeit, ed. by Matthias 
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Not only lords but also civil servants, who functioned as inter-
mediaries and providers of goods, money, contacts, and favours, 
could make their fortune within the machinery of subsidies.42 The 
Waldeckian Secret Secretary August (von) Frensdorff, for example, 
seems to have been one of the chief architects of the 1776 treaty, 
while the diplomat Ludwig von Thun took care of the prince’s 
affairs and interests in The Hague. Both were specialists, and their 
importance can hardly be overestimated. When Thun, who had 
been in charge of the Prince of Waldeck’s negotiations with the 
Netherlands since 1742, died in 1752, his wife took over this task 
for the next two decades before passing it on to her nephew – a 
very interesting case demonstrating the relevance of women in this 
business, a topic which merits further investigation in its turn.43 
The business thus remained within this ‘civil-servant dynasty’ for 
at least sixty-two years (1742–1804).
Another crucial position was that of the commissioners and 
‘solliciteurs-militairs’, who were in charge of the financial dealings 
linked to carrying out the terms of the treaties. They arranged 
transfers from the tax receivers to the soldiers. Especially Jewish 
court factors and military contractors, like the brothers Jacob and 
Philip Marc, who had significant financial scope and credit, played 
an important role in this field, as they were part of far-flung 
international financial and economic networks.44
Asche, Michael Herrmann, Ulrike Ludwig, and Anton Schindling, Herrschaft 
und soziale Systeme in der Frühen Neuzeit vol. 9 (Berlin: Lit, 2008), pp. 
11–36 (p. 14). 
42 Marika Keblusek, ‘Introduction: Profiling the Early Modern Agent’, in Your 
Humble Servant: Agents in Early Modern Europe, ed. by Hans Cools, 
Marika Keblusek, and Badeloch Noldus (Hilversum: Uitgeverij Verloren, 
2006), pp. 9–15.
43 HStAM, 118 a, no. 900; cf. Nathalie Büsser, ‘Die “Frau Hauptmann” als 
Schaltstelle für Rekrutenwerbungen, Geldtransfer und Informationsaustausch: 
Geschäftliche Tätigkeiten weiblicher Angehöriger der Zuger Zurlauben im 
familieneigenen Solddienstunternehmen um 1700’, in Schweizer Solddienst, 
ed. by Rudolf Jaun, Pierre Streit, and Hervé de Weck, pp. 105–114; John A. 
Lynn, Women, Armies, and Warfare in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
44 HStAM, 118 a, nos 948, 981 and 993–995; Mark Häberlein and Michaela 
Schmölz-Häberlein, ‘Revolutionäre Aussichten: Die transatlantischen Aktiv-
itäten der Gebrüder Mark im Zeitalter der Amerikanischen Revolution’, 
Jahrbuch für Europäische Überseegeschichte 15 (2015), 29–90. Cf. Pepijn 
Brandon, ‘Finding Solid Ground for Soldiers’ Payment: “Military solicit-
ing” as Brokerage Practice in the Dutch Republic (c. 1600–1795)’, in The 
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At the same time, the princes often took a personal interest in 
the negotiation of subsidy treaties and regarded them as an appropri-
ate medium for entering into discussions with their peers. The 
Stadholder of the United Provinces, Willem IV, himself wrote to the 
Prince of Waldeck in 1749 to negotiate the future employment of 
the latter’s troops.45 In 1756, Willem’s widow consulted with her 
so-called ‘cousin’ Friedrich Carl August regarding this question and 
even smoothed the way for his negotiations with the States-General.46 
In 1776, King George III personally thanked his Waldeckian ‘cousin’ 
for his troop offer;47 and as late as 1806, when the future of the 
Waldeckian regiments in Dutch service was anything but certain, 
Friedrich Carl August sent a handwritten letter to King Louis of 
Holland (1778–1846, r. 1806–1810), one of Napoléon’s brothers, 
to entrust the matter to him.48
Military subsidy projects: a key instrument of early modern 
state and dynastic politics?
Subsidy treaties faced public followed by legal opposition more or 
less simultaneously with the end of the Holy Roman Empire. The 
forced recruitment of soldiers in many German territories for foreign 
military service drew increasing criticism from proponents of the 
Enlightenment; and several disastrous subsidy projects discredited 
the practice, which was outlawed at the Congress of Vienna in 
1814.49 The military arrangements between German princes and 
Spending of States: Military Expenditure during the Long Eighteenth 
Century: Patterns, Organisation, and Consequences, 1650–1815, ed. by 
Stephen Conway and Rafael Torres (Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, 
2011), pp. 51–82.
45 HStAM, 118 a, no. 652/54: William IV of Orange to Prince Waldeck, 25 
April 1749.
46 HStAM, 118 a, no. 652/78: Anne to Prince Waldeck, The Hague, 13 December 
1756. 
47 HStAM, 118 a, no. 949, fol. 8: George III to Waldeck, St James, 2 January 
1776. 
48 HStAM. 118 a, no. 3712/69: Waldeck to King Louis Napoléon of Holland, 
Arolsen, 6 October 1806, and King Louis Napoléon of Holland to Waldeck, 
Wesel royal quarters, 23 October 1806. 
49 Preparing the British-American troop project in 1776, the Waldeckian 
administration, which had difficulties hiring enough soldiers, pretended 
that the men hired for Great Britain would most probably not be sent to 
the American colonies: ‘daß wenn sie auch wieder eine mehr als gewiße 
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foreign powers thus came to an end, as did the constitutional structure 
of the Holy Roman Empire.
One of the central questions raised in this chapter has concerned 
the motives of German princes for entering into agreements with 
foreign powers. Quite a few explanations (or rather: justifications) for 
this practice are given in the analysed sources. Political (e.g. patriotic) 
reasons are listed along with ideological and religious motives: 
Waldeck’s support in the Dutch war against France (1672–1678)50 
was important not just for the affairs of these countries but also 
for the German territories. Supporting the enemies of the French, 
the German princes also expected ‘good effects on the conservation 
of German liberty’, a liberty which had been threatened by Louis 
XIV.51 Especially in supporting this conflict, German Protestant 
Erwartung nach America geschickt werden sollten, sie in ein clima wie das 
hiesige Land, und wo es sehr wohlfeil leben ist, kommen und mithin einen 
untrieglichen Weg ihr Glück reichlich zu machen erhalten würden’. HStAM, 
118 a, no. 971/4, fol. 6r, §6. Discussions regarding the recruitment of foreign-
ers and the preference to locals (HStAM, 118 a, no. 665 and 1013), as well 
as regarding volunteers (who should get ‘special advantages’; HStAM, 118 
a, no. 971/2) and the prohibition of forced recruitment (HStAM, 118 a, no. 
971/4). HStAM, 118 a, no. 971, fols 1r-1v: ‘die Unglückliche Überschiffung 
der Hannoveraner, einen so starcken Eindruck auf die Gemüther gemachet’; 
Frederic Groß, ‘Einzigartig? – Der Subsidienvertrag von 1786 über die Aufstel-
lung des “Kapregiments” zwischen Herzog Karl Eugen von Württemberg 
und der Niederländischen Ostindienkompanie’‚ in Militärische Migration 
vom Altertum bis zur Gegenwart, ed. by Christoph Rass (Paderborn: Studien 
zur Historischen Migrationsforschung, vol. 30, 2016), pp. 143–164; Lothar 
Höbelt, ‘Vom militärischen saisonnier zum miles perpetuus: Staatsbildung 
und Kriegsführung im ancien régime’, in Krieg und Gesellschaft, vol. 2, 
ed. by Thomas Kolnberger and Ilja Steffelbauer (Vienna: Mandelbaum, 
2010), pp. 59–79; Hans-Martin Maurer, ‘Das württembergische Kapregiment: 
Söldner im Dienste früher Kolonialpolitik (1787–1808)’, Zeitschrift für 
Württembergische Landesgeschichte 47 (1988), 291–307. HStAM, 118 a, 
no. 660: Secret Secretary August Frensdorff, Promemoria, 28 February 1814, 
§1: ‘Ist die Frage: ob es einem Reichsfürsten überall erlaubt seyn werde, 
Truppen in fremden Sold zu geben?’
50 HStAM, 117, no. 1329/6, Giovanni Matteo Alberti to Georg Friedrich von 
Waldeck, Venice, 21 January 1689: ‘in dem Eß toto mundo politico nuzen 
solte, wann diesem Höffertigem Hanen Könnte der Kam[m] recht geschoren 
werden’.
51 HStAM, 117, no. 1436/1, Dutch resident in Berlin, Ham, to Georg Friedrich 
von Waldeck, 23 October 1688: ‘des bons effects pour la conservation 
de la liberté de l’Allemagne’, HStAM, Landgrave Carl of Hesse-Cassel to 
Georg Friedrich von Waldeck, Kassel, 17 September 1688: ‘daß die leüte 
fortkommen und des publici dienst darunter nicht ferner gehemmet werde’.
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princes – last but not least – also saw an important measure for 
preserving religious liberty in the Holy Roman Empire. At least, 
that is what they argued.52 We do not know, however, whether these 
were genuine motives or rather pretexts to conceal other intentions.
Regarding the relationship between the monetary aspects of 
interstate military subsidy treaties and less tangible immaterial factors, 
such as reputation and prestige, it appears as if money played an 
important role; however, the raising of troops might also require 
high investments, and payment by the subsidizing power might be 
uncertain. Opportunities for communicating and consulting with 
influential and prestigious foreign powers, and thus enhancing one’s 
own reputation within the arena of interstate relationships, seemed 
far more important than actual financial gains, which more or less 
balanced each other out and did not significantly affect the state’s 
budget. This is why we cannot even be certain if the German-Venetian 
agent Dr Giovanni Matteo Alberti, alias Johann Matthäus Albrecht, 
referred to material or immaterial ‘profit’ when informing Georg 
Friedrich von Waldeck about the latest military events and needs 
of the Republic in 1689, assuring him that Waldeck’s co-operation 
‘will conduce to its great profit’.53 In the long run, the treaties’ effect 
on the reputation of a princely house could be much more beneficial 
– even from a financial perspective – compared to substantial but 
unique or short-lived subsidy payments.
Waldeck’s experience with military subsidy contracts from the 
mid-seventeenth century to the late eighteenth century is just one 
example of many from early modern Germany. To assess the 
importance of those projects as a key instrument of state and dynastic 
politics, it is essential to adopt a comparative perspective including 
other territories: to discover the unifying principles in subsidy affairs 
as well as temporary shifts, but also to understand the diversity 
inherent in them. In such a synchronic as well as diachronic com-
parison, similarities and differences could be shown with regard to 
political, constitutional, and political factors: secular states as 
troop-offering countries (such as Hesse-Cassel or Waldeck) probably 
pursued motives other than those of ecclesiastical territories like 
Münster, Würzburg, or Bamberg, dynastic kingdoms as subsidizers 
52 HStAM, 117, no. 1440/2: Duke Friedrich Carl von Württemberg to Erffa, 
Stuttgart, 28 March 1688: ‘fur daß vatterlandt und die Religionsfreyheit’. 
53 HStAM, 117, no. 1329/6, Giovanni Matteo Alberti to Georg Friedrich von 
Waldeck, Venice, 21 January 1689: ‘weil ich gewiß bin d(ass) solcheß nicht 
werden abschlagen in dem eß zu ihrem Großen prouit dienet’.
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had another scope than republics; and it might even be important 
to integrate confessional positions and interests into a concept of 
German subsidy receivers.
In order to understand subsidy troop contracts, they should not 
merely be studied individually. On the one hand, interstate subsidy 
treaties were joint projects and referred to one another: the princely 
houses were in constant contact, and they exchanged information 
whenever preparations were made for new contracts.54 On the other 
hand, both the states providing troops and those offering subsidies 
were engaged in competition, depending on the current political 
situation as well as on the conditions of supply and demand.55 
Economic rivalry as well as political factions could create opposition: 
some princes of the empire would not let the troops of their princely 
peers pass through their territories in order to prevent their co-
operation with antagonistic foreign powers. In the Holy Roman 
Empire, this especially applied to the allies and clients of France.56
Whilst Waldeck’s rise to the status of a hereditary principality 
went hand in hand with its early military efforts, other dynastic 
ambitions did not play such an important role, as the princely house 
of Waldeck was among the smallest in the Holy Roman Empire 
and marriage projects with foreign royal partners (as in the case of 
Hesse-Cassel and Sweden) were out of reach. None the less, the 
military deals with Venice, the Netherlands, and Great Britain served 
to secure Waldeck’s precarious position within the structure of the 
Holy Roman Empire until its very end, as well as to strengthen its 
place within the noble hierarchy of Europe.
54 Copy of the Dutch–Hessian treaty of 1701 in the Waldeckian Archive: 
HStAM, 118 a, 652: ‘Auf folgende punkte ist zu refletiren, wann man ein 
Regiment oder Bataillon in Holländische Dienste übergeben will.’ Cf. also 
HStAM, 118 a, 665.
55 HStAM, 118 a, no. 652: Secret Councillor von Grass to Waldeck, The 
Hague, 30 March 1742: ‘da hingegen die offertes von anderen herrn wegen 
ihrer trouppen bis noch refusiert seind’. 
56 The Prince of Waldeck’s problems with the prince-bishops of Münster, 
Padernborn, and Cologne; HStAM, 117, no. 1358: ‘daß derselbe keine 
Regimenter so vor die Holländer /: wie die formalia gelautet:/ geworben, 
durchs Münsterische laßen würde, so embarrassiret mich solches nicht wenig’; 
discussion regarding an alternative route: ‘welcher so viel beschwerlicher sein 
wird, weil Er durchs Cöllnische fallen und daselbst noch mehr opposition 
haben dürffte’.
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Small powers and great designs: 
diplomacy, cross-border patronage, and 
the negotiation of subsidy alliances in the 
north-western part of the Holy Roman 
Empire (late seventeenth century)
Tilman Haug
In his study of mercenaries in north-western Germany in the early 
modern period, Peter Burschel stated that the end of the Thirty 
Years’ War with the Peace of Westphalia did not mark a significant 
decrease in demand in the regional mercenary markets, which 
remained at a fairly constant level throughout the entire seventeenth 
century.1 Even at a superficial glance at the political and military 
landscape in the north-western periphery of the Holy Roman Empire, 
this region may provide an example of the intense and prolonged 
susceptibility of the European order to military conflicts and their 
consequences, as it was particularly close to the main theatres of 
the Dutch conflicts with Spain, the Thirty Years’ War and the major 
wars waged by Louis XIV against his European rivals.2 Owing to 
the failure in negotiations between France and the Spanish monarchy 
in Münster, this military struggle continued up until the Peace of 
1 Peter Burschel, Söldner im Nordwestdeutschland des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts: 
Sozialgeschichtliche Studien (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1994), 
p. 113.
2 See, for instance, Andreas Rutz, ‘Der Westen des Reiches als Kriegsschauplatz 
und Erfahrungsraum im langen 17. Jahrhundert’, in Krieg und Kriegserfahrung 
im Westen des Reiches 1568–1714, ed. by Andreas Rutz and Marlene 
Tomczyk (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2016), pp. 11–30. For the 
Rhine region in particular, see Max Braubach, ‘Vom Westfälischen Frieden 
bis zum Wiener Kongress (1648–1815)’, in Rheinische Geschichte, 3 vols, 
ed. by Georg Droege (Düsseldorf: Schwann, 1980), vol. 2, pp. 219–365 (pp. 
240–265). For the structural proneness to warlike conflict in Europe, see 
Johannes Burkhardt, ‘Die Friedlosigkeit der Frühen Neuzeit: Grundlegung 
einer Theorie der Bellizität Europas’, Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung 
24 (1997), 509–574.
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the Pyrenees in 1659 and gravely affected the territories on the left 
bank of the Rhine.
Other minor, mostly low-intensity, military conflicts in Europe 
following 1648 included the war between Sweden and Denmark, 
which again was part of a major conflict in northern Europe, two 
military confrontations between Sweden and the Hanseatic city of 
Bremen, the punitive action of Bishop Christoph Bernhard von 
Galen against his own city of Münster and its council’s ambition 
to become a free city (alongside his many other military adventures), 
and territorial struggles such as the ‘Kuhkrieg’ (cow war), named 
after the capture of a significant amount of livestock during its 
course, between the duke of Neuburg and the elector of Brandenburg.3 
This was followed by the more aggressive and expansionist posture 
of Louis XIV’s foreign policy and the onset of a series of French 
wars of aggression, the attack on Spanish territories in 1667 marking 
the beginning of a period that has been dubbed the ‘second Thirty 
Years’ War’.4 Many of these conflicts, especially those on a larger 
scale from the 1660s onwards, involved subsidy treaties with German 
potentates in the region, where European diplomacy in relation to 
large and political conflicts in regional and local theatres often 
created interconnections and provided opportunities for some lesser 
estates of the Holy Roman Empire to engage in an elaborate form 
of military entrepreneurship undertaken by ruling princes.5
The eighth chapter in the Peace of Westphalia formally granted 
electors and princes of the empire the right to conclude cum exteris 
foedera with the soft and flexible provision stipulating that alliances 
should not be directed against the emperor and the empire.6 This 
enabled the armament of princes in asymmetrical relations with 
foreign princes and could eventually enable them to obtain certain 
possibilities of immersing themselves in the European concert of 
powers, enhance their status on the political stage, and make ter-
ritorial gains. Traditionally, the right to conclude foreign military 
3 For the conflict and the expansionist plans of the Brandenburg elector, see 
Ernst Opgenoorth, Friedrich Wilhelm: Der Große Kurfürst von Brandenburg, 
2 vols (Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1971), vol. 1, pp. 211–216. 
4 Burkhardt, ‘Friedlosigkeit’, p. 510.
5 See the classic account in Fritz Redlich, The German Military Enterpriser 
and His Work Force: A Study in European Economic and Social History, 
2 vols (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1964–1965), vol. 2, pp. 5–11.
6 Antje Oschmann, Die Friedensverträge mit Frankreich und Schweden, vol.1: 
Urkunden. Acta Pacis Westphalicae, Serie III Abt. B (Münster: Aschendorff, 
1998), p. 11.
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alliances was regarded as a clear step towards sovereign power 
politics outside the empire.7 More recent research, however, has 
rather placed it in the context of regional defence and peacekeeping 
or a right of resistance assumed by imperial estates. Despite the 
pursuit of their own interests, electors and princes engaging in treaties 
with foreign powers continued to regard the empire and its various 
internal security alliances – which could include foreign allies and 
their subsidies – as a central point of reference.8
The present chapter focuses on the practices of diplomacy and 
various cross-border negotiations concerning the formation of foreign 
subsidy alliances on various levels in the north-western periphery 
of the Holy Roman Empire in the first decades after the Peace of 
Westphalia. This field of inquiry is explored in three case studies: 
first, the attempt of the duke of Neuburg to use subsidies to recruit 
and equip more substantial military forces and the career of Georg 
Christian von Hessen-Homburg as negotiator and struggling military 
entrepreneur; second, the case study of Münster’s prince-bishop 
Christoph Bernhard von Galen and his English subsidy alliance in 
1665–1666 directed against the Republic of the Netherlands, and, 
third, the involvement of German princes in the Dutch War of 1672 
and Wilhelm von Fürstenberg’s diplomatic role in the formation of 
a subsidy alliance.
On the one hand, this chapter examines the practices of diplomats 
and cross-border patronage networks in negotiating subsidy treaties 
between asymmetrical partners and maintaining communication, 
ensuring flows of financial resources, and enabling the recruitment 
of mercenary armies. It particularly focuses on the activity of net-
works, clients, and brokers in the service of foreign powers.9 On 
7 See, for example, Ernst Wolfgang Böckenförde, ‘Der Westfälische Frieden 
und das Bündnisrecht der Reichsstände’, Der Staat 8 (1969), 449–478.
8 Karl Otmar von Aretin, ‘Die Kreisassoziationen in der Politik der Mainzer 
Kurfürsten Johann Philipp und Lothar Franz von Schönborn 1648–1711’, in 
Karl Otmar von Aretin, Das Alte Reich: Friedensgarantie und europäisches 
Gleichgewicht (Stuttgart: Klett, 1986), pp. 167–208; Ronald G. Asch, ‘The 
ius foederis Re-examined: The Peace of Westphalia and the Constitution 
of the Holy Roman Empire’, in Peace Treaties and International Law in 
European History: From the Late Middle Ages to World War One, ed. 
by Randall Lesaffer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 
319–337.
9 For a comparative European perspective on these problems, see the contribu-
tions in Nähe in der Ferne: Personale Verflechtung in den Außenbeziehungen 
der Frühen Neuzeit, ed. by Hillard von Thiessen and Christian Windler 
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2005).
Small powers and great designs 191
the other hand, the chapter addresses how princes negotiated and 
balanced their various roles as subsidy takers entitled to autonomous 
military action and ambitious de-facto warlords with their roles as 
members of the Holy Roman Empire. The latter mandated their 
loyalty to its head and obliged them to maintain peace following 
the norms of the Peace of Westphalia. How did these actors seek 
to reconcile their often problematic alliances with various, often 
conflicting, roles with regard to their political environment? What 
was the role of the Holy Roman Empire as a political framework 
in respect to foreign subsidy alliances?
Between European ambitions, regional security, and military 
entrepreneurship: projects concerning a French subsidy 
alliance involving Philipp Wilhelm von Neuburg
Duke Philipp Wilhelm of Palatinate-Neuburg was originally destined 
to be a dedicated Habsburg loyalist, yet found himself in collaboration 
with French politics in the Holy Roman Empire and was temporarily 
one of France’s most significant supporters.10 Following the untimely 
death of the Roman King Ferdinand IV in 1654, as a result of which 
the usually secure Habsburg succession on the imperial throne sud-
denly hung in the balance, the duke emerged as a serious contender 
for the throne. This made him one of the most important players 
in Mazarin’s policy of installing a non-Habsburg candidate on the 
throne, even though Neuburg’s successful candidacy seemed to become 
ever more unlikely the closer it came to the actual election after the 
death of Emperor Ferdinand III in April 1657.11 Philipp Wilhelm’s 
position was ambiguous. He never intended to break entirely with 
his house’s traditionally close ties to the Austrian Habsburgs, but 
10 For his earlier years and his 1650s political biography, see Hans Schmidt, 
Philipp Wilhelm von Pfalz-Neuburg 1615–1690, 2 vols (Düsseldorf: Schwann), 
vol. 1, 1973. 
11 On the 1657/1658 imperial election, see Martin Göhring, ‘Kaiserwahl und 
Rheinbund von 1658: Ein Höhepunkt des Kampfes zwischen Habsburg und 
Bourbon um die Beherrschung des Reiches’, in Geschichtliche Kräfte und 
Entscheidungen: Festschrift zum 65. Geburtstag von Otto Becker, ed. by 
Martin Göhring and Alexander Scharff (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1954), pp. 
65–83; S.N.F. Gie, ‘Die Kandidatur Ludwigs XIV. bei der Kaiserwahl vom 
Jahre 1658 mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Vorgeschichte’, Abhandlungen 
zur mittleren und neueren Geschichte 61 (1916), pp. 1–108; Alfred F. Pribram, 
‘Zur Wahl Leopolds I., 1654–1658’, Archiv für österreichische Geschichte 
73 (1888), 81–222. 
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he utilized French interest in co-operation as an asset in furthering 
his immediate political concerns as a Landesherr.
Neuburg’s involvement with the French and his subsequent 
attempts to obtain French subsidies for the formation of an army 
were not untypical of minor German princes in the region. Neuburg 
sought to obtain a certain degree of security for his territories scattered 
around the empire. His territories on the left bank of the Rhine 
were particularly affected by the ongoing Franco-Spanish conflict. 
In this situation, the French eventually guaranteed the integrity of 
his possessions in the north-west; France offered to mediate in relation 
to Neuburg’s conflicts with Brandenburg, and offered to represent 
his interests in any peace negotiation with Spain.12 Nevertheless, 
the duke’s interests in co-operation with France went beyond profiting 
from the efforts of French diplomacy on his behalf. In 1656, Philipp 
Wilhelm considerably raised the stakes for his compliance with 
French policies and demanded a subsidy treaty that would allow 
him to raise a sizeable armed force of around twenty thousand 
men.13 The projected military alliance would support all of Philipp 
Wilhelm’s political roles and ambitions.
First, the alliance would have solidified the duke’s position in a 
still volatile military conflict in the lower Rhine region and helped 
protect Neuburg’s territories. The alliance would also have been 
instrumental in keeping at bay Neuburg’s main rival, the prince 
elector of Brandenburg with whom he was involved in a series of 
territorial struggles and by whom he felt threatened.
Second, Neuburg underlined the mutual usefulness of this arma-
ment project and offered offensive as well as defensive alliances 
with the French, alliances that would allow him to contain the 
Spaniards on behalf of his French sponsors or, if required, directly 
engage them in offensive military action in the Spanish Netherlands. 
This was also in accordance with the duke’s immediate interests as 
a territorial ruler, as he particularly struggled to end the long-term 
Spanish occupation of the town of Jülich.14 Neuburg also pointed 
out that his army could be employed in the larger European arena 
12 Schmidt, Philipp Wilhelm, pp. 101–102. 
13 Ibid., pp. 155–156.
14 For Jülich under Spanish occupation and the political ramifications, see 
Günter Bers, Don Gabriel de la Torre: Ein spanischer Gubernator der Stadt 
und Festung Jülich (1641–1660). Zur Stadtgeschichte im Dreißigjährigen 
Krieg (Jülich: Verlag der Joseph-Kuhl-Gesellschaft, 2013). 
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of conflict with the Habsburgs, even though the duke’s plans for 
strategic movements and the necessary neglect of his more localized 
strategic interests seemed rather unrealistic.
Third, leading an army and being militarily and financially aligned 
with a major European power could also grant ‘political capital’ 
on both an instrumental and a symbolical level on the European 
stage for otherwise comparatively insignificant princes. Philipp 
Wilhelm was indeed preoccupied with an ambitious and lofty project 
on a large European scale: his desire to be elected king of Poland, 
thereby rising to a status in European social and political prestige 
above his rank as an otherwise relatively insignificant prince of the 
Holy Roman Empire.15 Cardinal Mazarin showed some interest in 
the alliance but remained sceptical towards Neuburg’s plans, while 
also suspecting that Neuburg’s desire for French subsidies and the 
recruitment of a sizeable army were partly meant to impress the 
potential voters among the Polish nobles.16
While neither Neuburg’s Polish ambitions nor his prospects as 
regards the imperial throne ever materialized (or were very promising 
to begin with), his ambitions were persistently supported by one 
particular actor in the French camp: Georg Christian of Hesse-
Homburg, a converted Catholic German prince originally employed 
in the Spanish army, who had ‘defected to the French side and who 
offered his services’.17 Mazarin and his close collaborator in all 
foreign affairs, the former ambassador at the Peace of Westphalia, 
Abel Servien, formed a patron–client relationship and employed 
Homburg to broker French subsidies, pensions, and political conces-
sions to German electors and princes in the run-up to the imperial 
election. They intended to capitalize on Homburg’s various entangle-
ments in the empire, which also included close relations with 
Neuburg.18
15 Schmidt, Philipp Wilhelm, pp. 156–159.
16 Archives diplomatiques du ministère des Affaires étrangères (AMAE), Cor-
respondance Politique, Allemagne, vol. 133, fol. 164r, Servien to Mazarin, 
14 July 1656.
17 His political biography is detailed in Margarethe Hintereicher, Georg 
Christian von Hessen-Homburg (1626–1677): Offizier, Diplomat und Regent 
in den Jahrzehnten nach dem Dreissigjährigen Krieg (Darmstadt: Hessische 
Historische Kommission, 1985). 
18 Hintereicher, Georg Christian, pp. 89–133; Tilman Haug, Ungleiche 
Außenbeziehungen und grenzüberschreitende Patronage: Frankreich und 
die geistlichen Kurfürsten 1648–1679 (Cologne: Böhlau, 2015), pp. 179–192. 
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A closer look at Homburg’s employment as a client not only cor-
rects the implicit image of informal local brokers and ‘enablers’ who 
merely paved the way for ‘proper’ French diplomats. Contemporary 
modes of formalization and officialization allowed Homburg to shift 
between informal and formal roles as a negotiator, doubling as a 
French diplomat with the ‘proper’ French envoy, Robert de Gravel, 
as his formal subordinate.19 The case of Homburg’s employment 
also reveals some risks and dysfunctionalities in conducting external 
affairs by local proxies. Not only were Homburg’s diplomatic missions 
prone to end in embarrassing blunders, since he was less familiar 
with the empire’s political culture than expected. His close ties to 
Neuburg also represented a liability with regard to the room for 
manoeuvre of French diplomacy in the empire. Homburg increasingly 
confounded his roles as French negotiator and as a de-facto client 
of Philipp Wilhelm. Apart from Philipp Wilhelm’s candidacy to the 
imperial throne, Homburg actively promoted the latter’s military 
ambitions.
Difficulties increased when Mazarin and Robert de Gravel began 
to knit closer ties to Johann Philipp von Schönborn, the elector of 
Mayence, who (albeit ambiguously and reluctantly at first) embraced 
the proposals for an alliance that resembled the later Alliance of 
the Rhine.20 Homburg saw Neuburg’s subsidies and armament as 
being in jeopardy and derailed Gravel’s negotiations in dismissing 
Johann Philipp’s projects concerning a security alliance as ill-conceived 
illusions. He insisted on the necessity of arming the duke of Neuburg, 
which initially succeeded in slowing down Gravel’s rapprochement 
with Johann Philipp.21
However, not only Homburg’s unconditional fidelity towards 
Philipp Wilhelm compromised his French services as a French client 
and negotiator. Insisting on French subsidies and an alliance treaty 
for Philipp Wilhelm coincided with his desire to establish himself 
as a military entrepreneur, for which he obtained a French commission 
and funds to recruit a regiment for the French army, which he hoped 
19 This is explicitly stated in Homburg’s Instruction, see AMAE, Correspondance 
Politique Allemagne, vol. 137, fol. 205v, Seconde Instruction de M. le Prince 
de Hombourg assisté du S. de Gravel, Paris, 27 April 1657.
20 For the rapprochement of France and Mayence, see Claude Badalo-Dulong, 
Trente ans de diplomatie française en Allemagne: Louis XIV et l’Électeur 
de Mayence (1648–1678) (Paris: Plon, 1956), pp. 23–26. 
21 AMAE, Correspondance politique Allemagne, vol. 137, fol. 375r, Homburg 
to Servien, Frankfurt, 24 June 1657.
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to lead into battle himself. Yet, Homburg not only proved to be 
rather inept in this task; he was now actively undermined by the 
French envoy Robert de Gravel, his colleague and bitter rival, who 
intervened to cut off and redirect Homburg’s funds.22 A French-funded 
army under Neuburg’s command could also have profited the ambi-
tious yet unfortunate Homburg as a would-be military entrepreneur. 
Despite being relegated to second rank concerning French political 
affairs of the empire, Neuburg still managed to obtain some degree 
of French subsidies to keep an armed force in his territories along 
the Rhine. With the final decision to join and contribute to the 
Alliance of the Rhine (after the failure of a non-Habsburg election) 
with a partially French-funded army corps in 1658, however, the 
French intended to cut back seriously on any individual armament 
for German princes. Instead of arming the duke of Neuburg, Mazarin 
initially proposed making him the supreme commander of the troops 
of the new defensive alliance.23 Philipp Wilhelm von Neuburg joined 
the alliance, but in relations with the reluctant French plenipotentiaires 
he and his negotiators still insisted on further French payments to 
keep Neuburg’s army in order to safeguard his territories.24 One 
year later, in 1659, the Peace of the Pyrenees was concluded and 
Mazarin ostensibly negotiated the release of Jülich on Neuburg’s 
behalf. Even though Neuburg remained a French sympathizer, 
Mazarin now felt free to reject further demands for French subsidies 
by the duke, let alone French financial support for any ambitious 
Polish projects.25
22 Hintereicher, Georg Christian, p. 154.
23 For the Alliance of the Rhine of 1658 and French participation, see Roman 
Schnur, Der Rheinbund von 1658 in der deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte 
(Bonn: Röhrscheid, 1955); Anuschka Tischer, ‘Die Vorgeschichte des ersten 
Rheinbundes von 1658’, in Der Erste Rheinbund (1658), ed. by Martin 
Peters, historicum.net, www.historicum.net/themen/erster-rheinbund-1658/
der-rheinbund-in-geschichte-und-gedaechtnis/die-vorgeschichte-des-ersten-
rheinbundes-von-1658, retrieved 4 November 2017. For Mazarin’s proposal, 
see: Mazarin to Robert de Gravel, Dijon, 19 November 1658, in Lettres du 
Cardinal Mazarin pendant son Ministère, ed. by Gustave d’Avenel/Adolphe 
Chéruel, 9 vols (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1894–1906), vol. 9 (1906), 
p. 101. 
24 AMAE, Correspondance politique, Allemagne, vol. 141, fol. 298v, Gramont 
and Lionne to Mazarin, Frankfurt, 18 August 1658. The idea of further 
French subsidies for Philipp Wilhelm von Neuburg does not seem to have 
vanished that easily, as suggested by Schmidt, Philipp Wilhelm, p. 279.
25 AMAE, Correspondance politique, Allemagne, vol. 146, fol. 112r–v, Mazarin 
to Robert de Gravel, St Jean de Luz, 12 September 1659. 
196 Subsidies, diplomacy, and state formation
England’s unlikely continental sword: the challenges of 
Christoph Bernhard von Galen’s subsidy alliance with the 
Stuart monarchy 1665–1666
Georg Christian von Homburg’s severe setbacks in both the diplomatic 
and the military entrepreneurial arena did not cost him his political 
or military career. In 1665, he found himself being the official field 
commander at the head of an army invading the Dutch Republic.
Obtaining this post, however, was directly related to the military 
ambitions of another German prince, whose diplomacy had succeeded 
in co-opting a major European conflict to secure funding for a 
military operation that also benefited his local interests and ambitions. 
Christoph Bernhard von Galen, the prince-bishop of Münster, was 
known for his uncompromising political stance and military aggres-
siveness, highly unusual at the time for an ecclesiastical prince and 
a cleric.26
The most frequent objective of the bishop’s military activity, and 
the driving force of his willing involvement as a provider of a military 
force subsidized by foreign powers, was attacking the Dutch Republic. 
A domineering political and economic actor in the regional power 
system, the Dutch had created a system of political dependencies 
and protections among the princes and prince electors of the empire, 
a system which included Dutch garrisons in Cleves curtailing the 
direct power of Friedrich Wilhelm of Brandenburg as the nominal 
overlord of the territory.27 Dutch protections directly affected 
Christoph Bernhard’s political ambition when his own city of Münster 
26 Particularly for Christoph Bernhard’s foreign and imperial policies, see 
Wilhelm Kohl, Christoph Bernhard von Galen: Politische Geschichte des 
Fürstbistums Münster 1650–1678 (Münster: Regensberg, 1964); Ernst 
Marquardt, Christoph Bernhard von Galen: Fürstbischof von Münster 
(Münster: Aschendorff, 1951); Peter Berghaus, Gerhard Langemeyer, and 
Peter Ilisch, Bommen Berend: Das Fürstbistum Münster unter Bischof 
Christoph Bernhard von Galen 1650–1678 (Greven: Cramer, 1972). For 
Christoph Bernhard’s role conflicts, see Bettina Braun, Princeps et episcopus: 
Studien zur Funktion und zum Selbstverständnis der nordwestdeutschen 
Fürstbischöfe nach dem Westfälischen Frieden (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck 
& Ruprecht, 2013), pp. 323–342. 
27 For the particular situation in the margraviat of Cleves, see Michael Kaiser, 
‘Temps de l’occupation – temps de la liberté: les territoires du duché de 
Clèves et du comté de la Marck sous l’occupation des Provinces-Unies’, 
in Les ressources des faibles: Neutralités, sauvegardes, accommodements 
en temps de guerre (XVIe–XVIIIe siècle), ed. by Jean-François Chanet 
and Christian Windler (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2009), 
pp. 241–260.
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sought to establish itself as a free city and initially succeeded in 
obtaining Dutch support and protection. The city was eventually 
coerced back into submission by the pugnacious bishop by means 
of military force.28
In 1663, Christoph Bernhard came in even more direct conflict 
with the Dutch when his troops occupied entrenchments near Diel 
in eastern Frisia to collect debts from their ruling house – debts to 
which the bishop claimed he was entitled. His soldiers were forced 
to stand down by Dutch forces, who acted as protectors of the 
Frisian estates.29 In response to this humiliating injury to his honour 
and a long-standing desire for territorial expansion, Christoph 
Bernhard offered himself as an ally and continental military arm 
of the English, who were about to enter the Anglo-Dutch War of 
1665–1666.30 Alongside alliances with Brandenburg and Philipp 
Wilhelm of Neuburg, it was a subsidy treaty with the Stuart monarchy 
that would provide Christoph Bernhard with considerable means 
for recruiting an army and conducting a punitive military action in 
the Netherlands which should be carried out in close co-operation 
with London. The campaign should also eventually secure the town 
and domain of Borkelo for Christoph Bernhard. In June 1665, his 
Lieutenant-Colonel Heinrich Alexander Wrede travelled to London 
to conclude the alliance, which granted £150,000 to the bishop of 
Münster to fund his armament.31 This was very welcome and indeed 
necessary financial aid, as the prince-bishop still partly depended 
on the budgetary rights of his estates and had by far overstretched 
his financial capacities even before the Dutch campaign was planned.32
28 Alwin Hanschmidt, ‘Zwischen bürgerlicher Stadtautonomie und fürstlicher 
Stadtherrschaft (1580–1661)’, in Geschichte der Stadt Münster, 2 vols, ed. 
by Franz-Josef Jakobi (Münster: Aschendorff, 1994), vol. 1, pp. 249–299 
(pp. 284–287). 
29 Kohl, Christoph Bernhard von Galen, pp. 178–180. 
30 For the genesis and the history of this particular alliance, see Carl Brinkmann, 
‘Charles II and the Bishop of Münster in the Anglo-Dutch War of 1665–6’, 
The English Historical Review 21 (1906), 686–698; Kohl, Christoph Bernhard, 
pp. 197–199. 
31 Offensiv- und Subsidienvertrag des Königs von Großbritannien mit dem 
Fürstbischof von Münster, London, 3 June 1665, in Akten und Urkunden 
zur Außenpolitik Christoph Bernhards von Galen (1650–1678), 3 vols, 
ed. by Wilhelm Kohl (Münster: Aschendorff, 1980–1986), vol. 1 (1980), 
pp. 455–456. 
32 For these sorts of difficulties, see Theodor Verspohl, Das Heerwesen des 
münsterischen Fürstbischofs Christoph Bernhard von Galen 1650–1678 
(Hildesheim: Lax, 1909), pp. 99–101. 
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This alliance between a major European power and what 
must from the Stuart perspective have been seen as a minor and 
distant principality not only was unlikely and asymmetric but also 
entailed a series of practical political challenges. To begin with, the 
diplomatic negotiations and political and military co-ordination 
of activities between the bishop and the Stuart king reveal the 
former’s ability to mobilize diplomatic negotiators and ‘trans-
territorial’ networks in order to overcome the lack of formalized 
relations.
In the case of the 1665 alliance, the English Catholic exile com-
munity and its entanglements with the Catholic peerage provided 
a communication node between the unlikely allies, where more 
formalized diplomatic contacts were sporadic at best.33 Following 
Christoph Bernhard’s informal talks with William Temple in Münster, 
the bishop managed to send an English ‘ex-patriate’, Father Joseph 
Sherwood, a Benedictine monk of noble descent, to London for the 
detailed negotiations on the terms of the subsidy alliance.34 Sherwood 
was ‘available’ for the services of a German prince-bishop in England, 
as his monastery in Lamspringe near Hildesheim had been re-
established by English Catholic exiles and maintained close contacts 
with its noble benefactors in England, who donated resources for 
the reconstruction of the convent church.35
Sherwood’s mission reflects the frequent use of hybrid social 
actors, in terms of ethnic and cultural affiliation, as negotiators – 
actors who were supposed to capitalize on their familiarity with 
the social and political culture on the ground as well as on their 
interpersonal relations in order to achieve success. Yet, while 
Sherwood seems to have been favourably perceived by his English 
interlocutors, and even after the negotiation demonstrated his abilities 
to gather political information on English affairs through various 
channels – he even managed to obtain a letter of recommendation 
from King Charles in 1673 – it is not easy to determine to what 
degree he mobilized any personal networks derived from ‘social 
capital’ through his closeness to the Catholic peerage or other 
33 More generally on the English Catholic communities, see Geert H. Janssen, 
‘The Exile Experience’, in The Ashgate Research Companion to the Counter-
Reformation (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 73–90. 
34 Kohl, Christoph Bernhard, p. 198.
35 For this monastery, see Lamspringe: An English Abbey in Germany 
1643–1803, ed. by Anselm Cramer (Ampleforth: Ampleforth Abbey Trustees, 
2004). 
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interpersonal relations for his negotiations on behalf of the bishop 
of Münster.36
When the flow of the much-needed subsidies began to stall, 
Sherwood was once again sent to London with an urgent mission 
to unblock the funds. Christoph Bernhard strongly suggested that 
he should exploit the very few contacts that von Galen himself had 
established with English diplomats in the empire, namely those with 
Temple and the brother of the Catholic Irish peer and ambassador 
to the imperial court in Vienna, the Earl of Carlingfort. For the 
same mission, Sherwood was also given substantial funds, ‘to give 
a gratification … if the entire sum of the remaining one [i.e. the 
subsidy rate] could thus be unblocked’.37 If necessary, in other words, 
Sherwood was instructed to bribe English officials to free up the 
remaining portions of the English subsidies – a practice requiring 
some local knowledge of the workings of a foreign court and 
administration, but not necessarily very close long-term personal 
relationships, on the part of the negotiator on the ground.
Later, the aforementioned Wrede, who seems to have shared 
some personal familiarity with Temple, was once again sent to 
England to urge that the remaining subsidies be paid out.38 But, 
without additional favourable advocates for Christoph Bernhard’s 
cause, Wrede was simply instructed to be persistent in his appeals 
to Arlington and other court officials.39 Wrede’s effort was unsuc-
cessful. The flow of money remained insecure and, particularly after 
the emperor and Brandenburg launched attempts to mediate a peace, 
Christoph Bernhard’s loyalty to the alliance increasingly appeared 
compromised.40 Members of the prince-bishop’s chapter, who opposed 
36 See, for instance, VWA, Ass. L, 489, Nr. 3, Sherwood to Christoph Bernhard, 
Hildesheim, 29 November 1669; for the letter of recommendation: VWA, 
Ass. L. 489, Nr. 32, Charles II to Christoph Bernhard, Whitehall, 29 March 
1673. 
37 ‘daß die verehrung davon in memorial gemeldet, gegeben werden solle, wan 
dadurch die gehele summe des restants loß zu machen’; Nebenmemorial 
Christoph Bernhards für Pater Joseph Sherwood OSB zur Gesandtschaft 
nach England, Münster, 2 November 1665, in Akten und Urkunden, vol. 
1, p. 532. 
38 Temple to Wrede, Brussels, 10 May 1665, in The Works of Sir William 
Temple, 4 vols (London: S. Hamilton, 1814), vol. 1, pp. 220–224.
39 Christoph Bernhard to Wrede, Münster, 8 January 1666, in Akten und 
Urkunden, vol. 1, p. 521. 
40 Wrede to Christoph Bernhard, Oxford, 7 January 1666, in Akten und 
Urkunden, vol. 1, p. 525.
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the treaty, had anticipated such difficulties and warned him of the 
unreliability of their English partner – ‘England virtually never kept 
its word to anyone’ – and further suspected that communication 
and co-ordination with such a distant ally with complicated political 
structures would be difficult.41
These difficulties eventually affected the military success of the 
alliance. While von Galen quickly earned his nickname ‘Bommen 
Berend’ (‘Bomber Bernd’) for his troops’ extensive use of mortar 
fire against fortified sites throughout the campaign, there was very 
little military co-ordination with the English, who suspended plans 
for an invasion even though Christoph Bernhard’s army attempted 
to establish landing zones.42 The frequent lack of English subsidies 
exposed the serious underfunding of the campaign and its complete 
dependence on contributions by the occupied, which were hard to 
come by as the invasion quickly began to stall. Desertions and the 
bribing of the scarcely paid officers and troops by the Dutch massively 
contributed to the dismantling of Christoph Bernhard’s army.43
Even before Christoph Bernhard’s army was on the march, a 
second difficulty had begun to emerge. Dutch networks and the 
political, social, and financial entanglements of neighbouring German 
princes and nobles within the United Provinces stymied Christoph 
Bernhard’s attempts to spend his promised English funds in the 
region’s mercenary markets, and particularly to enlist the units of 
the dukes of Brunswick, all of whom had recruited forces during 
an armed internal conflict between the various branches of the 
House of Brunswick. Von Galen enlisted the Brunswickian Colonel 
Johann Georg von Gorgas to undertake and co-ordinate recruitments 
in the north-western part of the empire; but, when he attempted to 
negotiate with the dukes of Brunswick over the transfer of a sub-
stantial part of these forces, Duke Georg Wilhelm had already 
committed his troops to the Dutch, apparently in exchange for a 
reduction of his debts in the Netherlands. His rival Duke Georg 
Friedrich right away rejected any co-operation with Münster’s 
recruitment efforts.44
41 ‘Engelandt hette baldt niemanten wort gehalten’; Protokoll des Domkapitels, 
s.l., 18 September 1665, in Akten und Urkunden, vol. 1, p. 474. 
42 For the fiscal-military rationale of this strategy for the collection of contribu-
tions, see Redlich, German Military Enterpriser, vol. 2, pp. 11–12. 
43 Floris der Kinderen, De Nederlandsche Republiek en Munster geburende de 
Jaren 1650–1666 (Leiden: Gebroeders van der Hoek, 1871), pp. 265–293. 
44 Akten und Urkunden, vol. 1, pp. 458–459. For Gorgas’s substantial contribu-
tion, see Georg Tessin, ‘Beiträge zur Formationsgeschichte des Münsterischen 
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Dutch ‘micro-politics’ became even more visible when Christoph 
Bernhard failed to employ as his supreme commander the experienced 
military entrepreneur Count Georg Friedrich von Waldeck, who 
had also recruited troops for the confusing Brunswick conflict. 
Christoph Bernhard’s efforts were to a large extent blocked as a 
result of Waldeck’s affairs and dependencies in the Netherlands. 
Not only did he cite his friendship and kinship relations to the 
Dutch political and military establishment, notably to Maurice of 
Nassau; his estates in the Netherlands and other financial affairs 
also committed him to the Dutch camp.45 Later, in 1672, Waldeck 
would assume supreme command of the Dutch army facing, among 
others, Christoph Bernhard’s troops.46
When, in 1665, the general states began to realize the danger 
posed by von Galen’s recruitments, they reinforced their troops and 
enlisted the Brunswickian units.47 The dismayed prince-bishop in 
turn wrote angrily to Waldeck and expressed his disappointment that 
Waldeck had refused ‘the general’s rank in our imperial army’.48 This 
rather odd reference to the Holy Roman Empire points to a third 
complicating and limiting factor in the asymmetrical alliance that 
Christoph Bernhard had entered. Even though a subsidy treaty with 
a major European power may have helped imperial princes assert a 
superior political and social status, the case of Christoph Bernhard 
demonstrates that a prince still had to reconcile the waging of a 
war supported by foreign subsidies with the overarching framework 
of the Holy Roman Empire and its internal alliances and mutual 
security guarantees, designed to stabilize the Peace of Westphalia 
and prevent foreign conflicts from spilling over to the empire.
The English offensive military alliance was clearly one of the 
main opposing factors, which is why the emperor and the imperial 
Militärs’, Westfälische Forschungen 32 (1982), 87–111 (p. 90). Christoph 
Bernhard to Franz Egon von Fürstenberg, Münster, 18 June 1665, in Akten 
und Urkunden, vol. 1, p. 457. Kohl, Christoph Bernhard, pp. 199–200. 
45 Kohl, Christoph Bernhard, p. 200.
46 For Waldeck’s career, see Gerhard Menk, Georg Friedrich von Waldeck 
(1620–1692): Eine biographische Skizze (Arolsen: Waldeckischer Geschichts-
verein, 1992). For the counts of Waldeck as European military entrepreneurs, 
see Andreas Flurschütz da Cruz, Chapter 7 above.
47 For the Dutch efforts to recruit the Brunswick troops, see der Kinderen, 
De Nederlandsche Republiek, pp. 289–293. 
48 ‘Das generalat über unsere Reichsarmee’; Christoph Bernhard to Georg 
Friedrich Graf von Waldeck, Borculo, 30 September 1665, in Akten und 
Urkunden, vol. I, p. 476. 
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estates assembled in Regensburg and why even Christoph Bernhard’s 
initial allies Brandenburg and Neuburg universally rejected his war. 
The fact that the Stuart monarchy, as the deputies at the imperial 
Diet complained, had made inroads in the empire via Münster and 
used English money for establishing an ‘armoury’ (rüßthaus), where 
even a second-rate warmongering prince could procure a sizeable 
army and shatter a precarious peace, was regarded as a considerable 
security hazard.49 Thus, Christoph Bernhard fashioned his own 
English-subsidized campaign so as to make it form part of a legitimate 
imperial war effort. Indeed, he claimed that he was reinstating 
territories of the empire occupied by the Dutch and thus acting not 
only on the basis of legitimate purposes as a Landesherr but ultimately 
in the shared interest and on behalf of all imperial estates as a 
defender of the empire.50 However, this bold claim seems more than 
anything to have baffled and angered the assembled deputies and 
shattered any desperate hopes for obtaining additional funds or 
troops for the war effort.51
Being a member of the aforementioned Rhine alliance himself, 
Christoph Bernhard also attempted not only to overcome the stiff 
French opposition to the offensive alliance but also to present the 
Dutch conflict as a case of collective self-defence for all the members 
of the alliance. Success in this attempt would have granted him 
additional military and financial assistance in the face of dwindling 
English resources.52 He also planned to persuade Sweden, as a fellow 
imperial estate and member of the alliance, to join the war against 
the Dutch.53
Regarding the empire and its estates, another factor entered the 
equation. Despite the bi-confessional alliance with England, the 
prince-bishop still had to shake off the impression of a religious 
49 Basserode to Christoph Bernhard, Regensburg, 19 November 1665, in Akten 
und Urkunden, vol. 1, p. 497.
50 Basserode to Christoph Bernhard, Regensburg, 9 November 1665, in Akten 
und Urkunden, vol. 1, p. 493; Christoph Bernhard to Basserode, n.p., 15 
October 1665, in Akten und Urkunden, vol. 1, p. 481. 
51 Christoph Bernhard to Basserode, Regensburg, 10 December 1665, in Akten 
und Urkunden, vol. 1, p. 505; Basserode to Christoph Bernhard, Regensburg, 
9 November 1665, in Akten und Urkunden, vol. 1, p. 493. 
52 Christoph Bernhard to Louis XIV, Münster, 7 January 1666, in Akten und 
Urkunden, vol. 1, p. 519.
53 Instruktion des Fürstbischofs von Münster für Friedrich Korff-Schmising 
zur Gesandtschaft an den französischen Hof, n.p., August 1665, in Akten 
und Urkunden, vol. 1, p. 467.
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war waged by a zealous ecclesiastical prince (which he blamed on 
defamation instigated by the Dutch and the faithless Waldeck).54 
Although von Galen was indeed a zealous and intolerant sponsor 
of Catholic reform in his own bishopric, there is a remarkable 
absence of professed religious motivation for the military actions 
in 1665–1666.55 The pope, for example, was officially notified only 
well after the campaign had ended and was then given Christoph 
Bernhard’s more secular justifications for the war.56 Confronted 
with allegations of leading a war of religion by the negotiators of 
Brandenburg, von Galen actively stressed his otherwise problematic 
English alliance and claimed: ‘one must not imagine that one could 
turn this war into a religious matter, since [von Galen] … had joined 
forces with England’.57 Obtaining subsidies from a foreign Protestant 
power could here conveniently be used as an argument to absolve 
von Galen from allegations of breaking the religious peace mandated 
by the treaties of 1648.
There was not very much denominational solidarity among fellow 
Catholic and ecclesiastical potentates with regard to Christoph 
Bernhard’s aggressive stance either. Instead, the position of Cologne’s 
elector and archbishop Max Heinrich and his principal collaborators, 
advisers and ministers, the two brothers Franz Egon and Wilhelm 
von Fürstenberg – who were both by far the most important clients 
and agents in the French diplomatic network in the empire – was 
highly ambiguous.58 As French clients, they should have stridently 
opposed Christoph Bernhard’s planned attack on the Dutch and 
54 Christoph Bernhard to Basserode, St Ludgersburg, 18 September 1665, in 
Akten und Urkunden, vol. 1, p. 473. 
55 For Christoph Bernhard’s strong confessional stance in his own territory, 
see Manfred Becker-Huberti, Die tridentinische Reform im Bistum Münster 
unter Fürstbischof Christoph Bernhard von Galen 1650–1678 (Münster: 
Aschendorff, 1978). 
56 Christoph Bernhard von Galen to Pope Alexander VII., Münster, 2 July 1665, 
in Die Korrespondenz des Münsterer Fürstbischofs Christoph Bernhard von 
Galen mit dem Heiligen Stuhl (1650–1678), ed. by Alois Schröer (Münster: 
Aschendorff, 1972), pp. 332–335. 
57 ‘Man dürfe sich aber nicht einbilden, als wen man aus dieser kriegsunruhe 
ein religionswerck machen wollte, den er sich ja mit Engelandt … verbunden 
hette’; Schöning to Frederick William of Brandenburg, Meppen, 5 November 
1665, in Akten und Urkunden, vol. 1, p. 488.
58 Particularly with regard to Wilhelm von Fürstenberg, see Max Braubach, 
Wilhelm Egon von Fürstenberg (1629–1704) (Cologne: Röhrscheid, 1972); 
John T. O’Connor, ‘William Egon von Fürstenberg, German Agent in the 
Service of Louis XIV’, French Historical Studies 5 (1967), 119–145. 
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stopped any attempt at recruiting troops in his territories in its 
tracks, given the fact that Louis XIV resolutely opposed the war 
against the Dutch and vowed to protect the Republic.
Nevertheless, Christoph Bernhard was granted recruitment 
privileges on Cologne territory.59 On the one hand, the Fürsten-
berg brothers tried to dissuade Christoph Bernhard from war on 
behalf of the English, whereas, on the other hand, it is likely that 
they banked on a military disaster and even occupation of the 
bishopric of Münster, in hopes that such a development would 
prompt Rome to unseat the belligerent prince-bishop.60 This unholy 
speculation was driven by micropolitical interest and the scramble 
for the amassment of benefices by Archbishop Max Heinrich and 
the Fürstenbergs, who hoped to install their master in Christoph 
Bernhard’s place and had also committed the French crown to 
assist them in their own quest for free episcopal sees in 1658.61 
By the start of Christoph Bernhard’s campaign, Wilhelm von 
Fürstenberg tried to move his French patrons in this direction, 
even though no French request on that matter was ever presented 
in Rome.62
However, Louis XIV eventually acted upon his warnings to the 
prince-bishop and sent troops to terminate Christoph Bernhard’s 
campaign, although these troops took no direct action but rather 
oversaw the increasing disintegration of Christoph Bernhard’s army. 
When Friedrich Wilhelm of Brandenburg in this situation renewed 
his offers for mediation in peace talks (alongside a thinly veiled 
threat to otherwise join the war on the Dutch side), Christoph 
Bernhard von Galen suspended the military campaign and entered 
into negotiations that ultimately resulted in the Peace of Cleves in 
1666 and Christoph Bernhard’s temporary abandonment of territorial 
expansion at the expense of the United Provinces.63 It was only then 
59 Christoph Bernhard to Franz Egon von Fürstenberg, Münster, 18 June 1665, 
in Akten und Urkunden, vol. 1, p. 457. 
60 Braubach, Fürstenberg, pp. 96–97.
61 Max Braubach, ‘Der Pakt der Brüder Fürstenberg mit Frankreich’, in Max 
Braubach, Kurköln: Gestalten und Ereignisse aus zwei Jahrhunderten 
rheinischer Geschichte (Münster: Aschendorff, 1949), pp. 19–42.
62 Wilhelm Egon von Fürstenberg an Lionne, Oberkirch, 16 September 1665, 
in Akten und Urkunden, vol. 1, p. 472.
63 Ernst Opgenoorth, Friedrich Wilhelm: Der Große Kurfürst von Branden-
burg: Eine politische Biographie, 2 vols (Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1978), 
pp. 89–93. 
Small powers and great designs 205
that the English government stepped in for a last-ditch effort to 
save their alliance, dispatching William Temple to Cleves and then 
to Münster to stop the treaty and its subsequent ratification and to 
provide some of the overdue subsidies with a view to keeping the 
bishop in line. Lamentably for his principals, Temple succeeded 
neither in persuading the prince-bishop to remain in their alliance 
nor in reversing the payment of English subsidies after Christoph 
Bernhard had signed the peace treaty.64
Gearing up for the ‘grand dessein’: German princes and  
the negotiation of French subsidy alliances for Louis XIV’s 
Dutch War
By 1668, the strategic situation on the larger European scale had 
changed a good deal: the Netherlands gradually emerged as the 
principal enemy of Louis XIV, and he began to arrange French 
diplomacy in Europe as a tool to enable large-scale warfare against 
the Dutch. This constellation would ultimately commit the Fürsten-
berg brothers and Christoph Bernhard to the same political camp. 
Soon after the end of the War of Devolution (1667–1668), Wilhelm 
von Fürstenberg shifted into high gear as Louis XIV’s principal 
negotiator in the empire to broker subsidy alliances with German 
princes – alliances that should, on the basis of his and foreign 
secretary Lionne’s thinking, enable them to recruit armies that would 
participate in a French attack on the Netherlands.65 As shown in 
Paul Sonnino’s comprehensive study of the run-up to the Dutch 
War, these negotiations proved to be complicated and the French 
attack had to be delayed repeatedly; it is also evident that the military 
outlines for the campaign and the subsequent roles of the German 
allies frequently changed.66
Fürstenberg’s negotiations in the Holy Roman Empire demonstrate 
particularly well how the French diplomatic effort to form subsidy 
alliances relied on French cross-border patronage relations as an 
64 For this last episode, see William Temple to John Temple, Brussels, 10 May 
1666, in Works of Temple, 4 vols, pp. 242–252. 
65 Braubach, ‘Der Pakt der Brüder Fürstenberg’; Hans Böhmer, ‘Forschungen 
zur französischen Rheinpolitik im 17. Jahrhundert: Wilhelm Egon von 
Fürstenberg und die französische Diplomatie in Deutschland’, Rheinische 
Vierteljahrsblätter 4 (1934), 225–259.
66 Paul Sonnino, Louis XIV and the Origins of the Dutch War (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
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important tool of French diplomacy. Fürstenberg and other actors 
acted within a local French network of informants, political brokers, 
and (unofficial as well as official) negotiators. They were obligated 
to the crown in ‘cross-border’ patron–client relationships that 
resembled the networks of clients serving as channels for royal 
patronage to provincial elites in exchange for their compliance in 
organizing provincial politics, which contributed to the political 
integration of the kingdom’s periphery.67 As French clients, the two 
Fürstenberg brothers were not only indispensable pillars of French 
politics in the empire. As clients, the Fürstenbergs amassed multiple, 
often rivalling, loyalties – a very common phenomenon found in 
many patronage relations in the early modern period. They carefully 
balanced and played out their many roles as powerful counsellors, 
ministers, and diplomats to a prince elector, clients of the French 
crown, clergymen, and members of a traditionally pro-Habsburg 
noble house to their own advantage to improve their noble status, 
ecclesiastical careers, or revenues.68
Moreover, the negotiations for subsidy alliances reveal how 
Wilhelm von Fürstenberg imposed his family’s respective ‘micropoliti-
cal’ interest on to the negotiations and the operational preparations 
for war. In his treaty with Cologne, Fürstenberg made sure that the 
alliance treaty with Archbishop Max Heinrich would not only secure 
the Dutch-occupied city of Rheinberg for his elector and principal 
but also guarantee the Fürstenbergs several rich Dutch-controlled 
manors.69 Moreover, Wilhelm von Fürstenberg himself joined the 
ranks of German military entrepreneurs when, in the run-up to 
the war that his negotiations would eventually facilitate, he began 
recruiting a regiment on his own with French funds in 1669 and thus 
joined the ranks of German military entrepreneurs. But interestingly, 
Wilhelm insisted on posting his regiment under French command, 
not under that of Max Heinrich’s army operating on the basis of 
French subsidies.70 Considering Fürstenberg a client of the French 
crown does not mean that he simply served the interests of a unified 
governmental mind on a strictly local level.
67 Sharon Kettering, Patrons, Brokers, and Clients in Seventeenth-century 
France (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
68 For the workings of this clientele and the practices of the Fürstenberg 
brothers and other actors from the 1650s to the 1670s, see Haug, Ungleiche 
Außenbeziehungen.
69 Braubach, Fürstenberg, p. 220.
70 Ibid., pp. 231–232.
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The French stance on the vast system of subsidy alliances with 
German princes was subject to the interplay of ministerial and court-
faction infights, which typically aligned themselves with conflicts over 
larger political issues. As the crown’s client in the empire, Fürstenberg 
had close ties to the French foreign secretary Hugues de Lionne, who 
acted as a kind of patronage manager towards French clients abroad 
but with whom Fürstenberg also had a personal friendship, Lionne 
having been a French ambassador at the Frankfurt imperial election 
of 1657–1658.71 As Lionne’s confidant, Fürstenberg subsequently 
saw his project of alliances heavily contested by Lionne’s bitter rival 
Louvois, the French minister of war, who sought a more exclusive 
role for the regular French troops throughout the campaign.72
As a client, Fürstenberg was not merely an instrument for French 
interests and brokerage in the empire; he had easy access to the 
court and the king and could play his own party in the faction 
rivalries. Still, Wilhelm’s room for manoeuvre in terms of subsidy 
alliances became substantially curtailed with Lionne’s death in 1671 
when Louvois temporarily took over as foreign minister. Fürstenberg’s 
negotiations for subsidy alliances were also riddled with other 
difficulties. Not only would it eventually prove too complicated to 
co-ordinate the complex interests and rivalries of the elector of 
Brandenburg, Philipp Wilhelm von Neuburg, or the dukes of 
Brunswick into an offensive alliance; Fürstenberg’s leverage for the 
negotiation of military alliances was also dependent on French 
payments to the courts of larger European powers – for example 
costs associated with Sweden’s abandonment of the Dutch, which 
at one point effectively defunded Fürstenberg’s planned subsidy 
alliances.73
Finally, in 1672, Fürstenberg could muster two rather ‘obvious’ 
offensive subsidy alliances with Max Heinrich of Cologne, still 
firmly in the grip of the influence of both Fürstenberg brothers, and 
with Christoph Bernhard von Galen who got a chance to rekindle 
his infamous feud with the Dutch, now aided by French subsidies. 
While Max Heinrich as a particularly weak monarch was practically 
carried into the alliance by the Fürstenberg brothers, Christoph 
Bernhard von Galen’s involvement was more proactive: he had 
already become a beneficiary of French subsidies in exchange for 
his neutrality during the War of Devolution in 1667 and immediately 
71 Ibid., p. 36. 
72 Sonnino, Dutch War, pp. 140–141. 
73 Ibid., pp. 151–153.
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invested the funds in a modest rearmament.74 With the Peace of 
Aachen in 1668, this source of revenue was cut off abruptly. No 
payment of French subsidies to Münster in peacetimes was to be 
expected, as was pointed out by Friedrich Korff-Schmising, one of 
his negotiators, who was sent to Paris to collect these debts.75
The preparations for a French war against the Dutch Republic 
were hence eagerly awaited by Christoph Bernhard, who needed 
little persuasion to insert himself into a coalition for a renewed 
attack on the Dutch for a highly paid subsidy alliance. Several delays 
and the preliminary offer of a less lucrative and merely defensive 
alliance, which effectively froze him out of what he called the ‘grand 
dessein’, apparently only rendered the prince-bishop nervous and 
angry.76 Finally, in 1672, the bishop joined an alliance to go on the 
offensive against the Dutch with France and Cologne that secured 
him 13,000 écus, for which he had to provide nine thousand troops, 
while Max Heinrich committed a contingent of around eight thousand 
for 11,000 écus.77 Münster and Cologne did not enter the war as 
distant proxies but operated closely together with the French army. 
Being in a subsidy alliance with France also meant that Münster 
was expected to provide supplies, mainly ammunition, for the entire 
coalition army.78
Christoph Bernhard von Galen’s alliance was widely rejected in 
the empire. His own chapter would generally have approved of 
subsidies for an armed neutrality or defensive warfare, but it was 
staunchly opposed to an offensive campaign with the French that 
endangered the safety of the bishopric.79 Dealing with his own 
chapter also led the bishop (in opposition to the earlier English 
74 Kohl, Christoph Bernhard, pp. 255–256; Tessin, ‘Formationsgeschichte’, 
p. 93. 
75 Korff-Schmising to Christoph Bernhard, Paris, 13 December 1669, in Akten 
und Urkunden, vol. 2, p. 181; Korff-Schmising to Christoph Bernhard, 
Paris, 13 December 1669, in Akten und Urkunden, vol. 2, p. 182.
76 Friedrich Korff-Schmising to Christoph Bernhard, Paris, 24 March 1670, in 
Akten und Urkunden, vol. 2, pp. 221–222; Verjus to Louis XIV, Bielefeld, 
13 June 1671, in Akten und Urkunden, vol. 2, p. 289; Kohl, Christoph 
Bernhard, p. 334.
77 Kohl, Christoph Bernhard, p. 354; Braubach, Fürstenberg, pp. 219–222.
78 Französisch-münsterische Konvention, Ostendorf, 22 January 1672, in Akten 
und Urkunden, vol. 2, p. 357; Louvois to Christoph Bernhard, Rumigny 
en Thiérarche, 30 April 1672, in Akten und Urkunden, vol. 2, p. 397. 
79 Protokoll des Domkapitels zu Münster, Münster, 8 March 1672, in Akten 
und Urkunden, vol. 2, p. 367; Protokoll des Domkapitels zu Münster, 
Münster, 12 March 1672, in Akten und Urkunden, vol. 2, p. 369. 
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alliance) to emphasize more decidedly the confessional nature of 
the military action he was about to join.80 Consulting his ‘conscience 
counsellor’, the Jesuit Theodor Körler, the bishop inquired if his 
duty, born out of an allegiance to the pope as a protector of church 
possessions, the opportunity of a triumphant victory over heresy, 
and his Christian conscience, compelled him to wage an aggressive 
war alongside the ‘roi très chrétien’ and a fellow ecclesiastical prince. 
Fashioning the Dutch War as a religious conflict in this respect also 
served more opportunistic purposes, as von Galen also inquired 
whether it was then permissible to completely ignore his chapter 
in the decision to enter the war.81 While Pater Körler generally 
approved of guarding and eventually regaining Catholic territory, 
he found neither the imagined papal commission nor the conscience 
argument convincing.82
The chapter continued to disapprove of an offensive war in a 
French alliance. This could not be changed, either by religious 
justifications or by constructing a ‘preventive war’ against the Dutch 
who, allegedly, were about to attack the bishopric and other parts 
of the empire, which meant that stopping them in their tracks would 
be an act of patriotism and guarantee of peace towards the bishopric 
and the empire.83 Likewise, Pope Clement X himself repudiated any 
military adventure in the Netherlands with regard to Christoph 
Bernhard.84 All of this eventually caused Christoph Bernhard to 
send his army into the field without any further consultation.
There was also more fierce resistance to Christoph Bernhard’s 
action, particularly by his fellow imperial estates and by Emperor 
Leopold I, who sent one of his generals and diplomats, the marquis 
de Grana, to the bishopric to formally reprimand von Galen for his 
offensive alliance.85 With the gradual involvement of the emperor and 
80 Christoph Bernhard explored a confessionally homogeneous subsidy alliance 
by the end of 1666, see Denkschrift 1666 [late 1666], in Akten und Urkunden, 
vol. 2, p. 41.
81 Braun, Princeps, p. 340. 
82 Gewissensvotum des P. Körler, early 1672, in Korrespondenz Christoph 
Bernhard, pp. 453–456.
83 Christoph Bernhard to the Münster Chapter, St Ludgersburg, 30 March 
1672, in Akten und Urkunden, vol. 2, p. 376.
84 Clement X to Christoph Bernhard, 30 April 1672, in Korrespondenz Christoph 
Bernhard, pp. 449–450. 
85 Ferdinand von Fürstenberg to Christoph Bernhard, Neuhaus, 8 April 1672, 
in Akten und Urkunden, vol. 2, pp. 387–388; Marquis de Grana to Leopold 
I, Lennepp, 13 April 1672, in Akten und Urkunden, vol. 2, pp. 388–389.
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an increasing number of imperial estates in the conflict following the 
initial phase of the Dutch War, the role of the political framework 
of the empire and its impact on patron–client relations and military 
entrepreneurship in foreign services changed. Such warlike subsidy 
alliances were now treated no longer as infractions of the Peace of 
Westphalia in a larger sense or as hazards in relation to territorial 
security and religious peace but increasingly as treason or breaches 
of fealty towards emperor and empire. With no unified procedures 
in place that could put the empire in a formal state of war, a 
Reichskrieg against France was cumulated through a subsequent 
combination of legal measures in 1673–1674.86
This development was accompanied by a series of violent acts 
which were ostensibly aimed at disrupting the peace negotiations 
under way in Cologne and included the singling out of Wilhelm 
von Fürstenberg as the main promoter of treasonous subsidy alliances 
and armaments.87 Fürstenberg was eventually kidnapped and 
imprisoned by a band of imperial officers as a corrupt traitor and 
defector. Keeping his regiment in French service while allegedly 
ignoring an imperial mandate to withdraw to the empire weighed 
particularly heavily in these accusations88 While Fürstenberg’s own 
contradictory assemblage of identities between affiliations in France 
and the empire turned against him during the Dutch war, in effect 
this also blocked any penal consequences for Fürstenberg and made 
his eventual release an important point d’honneur for the French 
during the peace negotiations in Nijmegen.89
Not unlike Fürstenberg’s treatment, an act of spectacular violence 
was also planned and approved by some officials in Vienna to 
counter Christoph Bernhard’s collaboration with France. Even before 
the empire had started to enter the war, a young officer, Adam von 
der Kette, was dispatched to Münster to assassinate von Galen.90 
Even though these plans were revealed at an early stage, Christoph 
Bernhard appeared scared at the prospect of being treated as a rebel 
86 See Christoph Kampmann, ‘Reichstag und Reichskriegserklärung im Zeitalter 
Ludwigs XIV’, Historisches Jahrbuch 113 (1993), pp. 41–59.
87 For the failure and Habsburg disruption of the peace talks in Cologne, 
see Marie-Felicia Renaudin, ‘L’échec du congrès de Cologne: De la fête au 
drame’, Revue d’histoire diplomatique 118 (2004), 223–249. 
88 Käthe Spiegel, Wilhelm Egon von Fürstenbergs Gefangenschaft und ihre 
Bedeutung für die Friedensfrage 1674–1679 (Bonn: Röhrscheid, 1936); 
Haug, Ungleiche Außenbeziehungen, pp. 430–450.
89 Paul Otto Höynck, Frankreich und seine Gegner auf dem Nymwegener 
Friedenskongreß (Bonn: Röhrscheid, 1960), pp. 21–22. 
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and an enemy by the emperor, and his resolve to fight in the French 
coalition began to crack. Yet, only after two disappointing campaigns 
in the Netherlands, von Galen decided to switch sides and join a 
ragtag coalition of imperial troops and allied princes. This decision 
was born not solely out of a strong desire for his own security or 
feelings of what might be called imperial patriotism but also out 
of the failure of his French allies to secure his territories against 
Dutch reprisals and, on a regular basis, provide the guaranteed 
subsidies for his large army.
Still acting as a minor prince turned military entrepreneur, 
Christoph Bernhard would not commit his troops to the imperial 
coalition in the German north-west without securing for himself an 
extraordinarily advantageous monthly rate of subsidies of 15,000 
reichstaler (after an immediate payment of 40,000 reichstaler) and 
a very generous command over the army.91 Nevertheless, Christoph 
Bernhard’s stance toward subsidy alliances turned even more ‘entre-
preneurial’ as the excruciating war dragged on and frequently led 
him to lend out his troops to, for instance, the king of Denmark, the 
countess of Frisia, and other members of the anti-French coalition.92
Conclusions
The cases presented in this chapter have shown that subsidy alliances 
not only provided major European powers with what would today 
be called boots on the ground and the necessary infrastructure for 
pursuing military campaigns; they also afforded minor princes the 
chance to promote their interests in territorial security or expan-
sion, as well as possibly providing them with a military asset of 
symbolic value to enhance their status on the larger European stage. 
Brokering such alliances between asymmetrical partners was often 
undertaken with the help of cross-border networks or clients of 
90 For a more comprehensive account of this attempt, see Eberhard Wiens, 
‘Beiträge zur Geschichte der Verschwörung des Adam von der Kette gegen 
das Land und Leben des Fürstbischofs von Münster, Christoph Bernhard 
von Galen’, Westfälische Zeitschrift 4 (1841), 289–321; see also André 
Krischer, ‘Eine grausame und gefehrliche Verräterey und Conjuration: Der 
versuchte Anschlag auf den Münsteraner Fürstbischof Christoph Bernhard 
von Galen 1673’, in Höllische Ingenieure – Attentate und Verschwörungen 
in kriminalitäts-, entscheidungs- und sicherheitsgeschichtlicher Perspektive, 
ed. by Tilman Haug and André Krischer (Constance: UVK, forthcoming).
91 Kohl, Christoph Bernhard, pp. 409–416.
92 Ibid., pp. 475–478.
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foreign powers in the empire, who inserted their own interests and 
prospects for rewards into these negotiations. In other cases, such as 
the English alliance with Münster, the lack of functional ‘lubricants’ 
for communication and military coordination as well as a certain 
susceptibility to Dutch ‘counter-patronage’ significantly impaired 
the subsidy alliance.
While the political framework of the empire and its internal system 
of alliances explicitly allowed for external alliances for security and 
peacekeeping purposes, these factors also placed some constraints 
on subsidy alliances; examples include the ways in which the Rhine 
alliance put the duke of Neuburg’s armament into question or pre-
sented offensive alliances as a danger to the contemporary order 
of peace. With the more active involvement and transformation of 
the empire into an actor of foreign power politics during the Dutch 
War, French subsidy alliances came close to treason, while other 
foreign subsidies remained crucial to keeping actors like Christoph 
Bernhard von Galen in the war. Thus, foreign subsidy alliances after 
the Peace of Westphalia provided new political opportunities for 
German potentates to impose themselves on the European stage; but 
their asymmetrical alliances not only reveal a multiform diplomatic 
game with multiple loyalties and ambiguous negotiators, they also 
show that the princes’ affiliation to the empire as a political body 
remained a significant norm of reference with which they sought 
to align their alliances in one way or another.
9
The ‘fiscal-military hub’ of Amsterdam: 
intermediating the French subsidies to 
Sweden during the Thirty Years’ War
Marianne Klerk
Much scholarly attention has been paid to early modern subsidy 
practices on an interstate level, as arrangements and transfers of 
military resources between states. Subsidies are often portrayed 
as financial tools of alliances by which a powerful state lured a 
weaker one into its sphere of influence with the promise of money, 
a much-needed resource in this period of increasing military conflict 
in Europe.1 One of the most notorious examples is the French 
financial support to Sweden during the Thirty Years’ War. It has 
been described as turning the Scandinavian monarchy into virtually 
‘a French Satellite’ and forming a significant part of the Swedish 
state revenue, especially after the lucrative Prussian licences came 
to an end in 1635. At the Peace of Stuhmsdorf that year, Sweden 
was forced to return its recent conquests in Prussia to Poland, 
including the right to levy tolls on shipping to and from Prussian 
ports.2 Influenced by the ‘contractor state’ debate, historians (as 
testified by Svante Norrhem and Erik Thomson in the Introduction, 
above) have recently pointed to the pivotal role of private contrac-
tors and agents who could transfer subsidies across the boundaries 
1 See, for example, Peter Claus Hartmann, Geld als Instrument europäischer 
Machtpolitik im Zeitalter des Merkantilismus (Munich: Kommission für 
bayerische Landesgeschichte, 1978); Flattering Alliances: Scandinavia, 
Diplomacy, and the Austrian–French Balance of Power, 1648–1740, ed. 
by Peter Lindström and Svante Norrhem (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 
2013).
2 Sven-Erik Åström, ‘The Swedish Economy and Sweden’s Role as a Great 
Power 1632–1697’, in Sweden’s Age of Greatness 1632–1718, ed. by Michael 
Roberts (London: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 79–100 (p. 94).
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of states through their contacts. However, such studies still focus 
on individual contractors supplying their ‘own’ domestic states. 
Following the Tilly thesis regarding war-making and state-making, 
a particular emphasis is thereby placed on the formative power of 
foreign subsidies in building up the modern, sovereign state and 
the European state system.
This chapter offers a different perspective on the study of subsidies 
by looking beyond the interstate level, adding a new dimension to our 
understanding of the development of the state system. Not only were 
subsidies arranged by state and non-state agents; this contribution 
argues that subsidies along with other war-making resources were 
organized in specific urban European centres, here referred to as 
‘fiscal-military hubs’. The growing scale of early modern military 
conflict in Europe launched a flourishing industry in war-organization 
across Europe. States became increasingly dependent on private 
entrepreneurs and their extensive European business networks to 
pay and/or cash their foreign subsidies, to supply them with human 
resources, weaponry, provisions, and transport, and to provide them 
with credit. In cities working as hubs within a wider fiscal-military 
system, merchants, bankers, financiers, and agents gathered to buy 
and sell military resources, ranging from credit to cannons and 
from soldiers to fully equipped ships. Neither the location nor the 
status of political capital defines a fiscal-military hub, but rather 
the presence of an elite of merchant-financiers with expertise and 
elaborate networks in the business of war. Whereas, for instance, 
the production of weaponry was decentralized – executed in small 
workshops spread over large, regional areas – the organization and 
distribution were centralized by these elites in the hubs to meet 
large-scale demand from states or contractors.3 The three most 
important hubs were Amsterdam, Hamburg, and Genoa. Other 
centres with less centrifugal fiscal-military power included Paris, 
Vienna, and Danzig. The hubs were connected through the complex 
and strong business networks of private military entrepreneurs and 
together these constituted a ‘fiscal-military system’ in Europe. This 
system emerged parallel to the European state system, as the nascent 
states tapped into its resources from the 1560s onwards, and broke 
down in the 1860s when warfare had become nationalized. It may 
be seen as a paradox of history that early modern European conflict 
3 David Parrott, The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military 
Revolution in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), p. 214.
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was possible only through co-operation between states and between 
state and non-state actors.4
The fiscal-military hub of Amsterdam and how the hub transferred 
French subsidies to Sweden during the Thirty Years’ War form the 
case study of this chapter. Both parties signed the Treaty of Bärwalde 
on 23 January 1631 guaranteeing the latter French sponsorship for 
five years (an annual 400,000 taler). In turn, Gustav II Adolf accepted 
Richelieu’s conditions, in particular to conclude no separate peace 
with third parties.5 The dominant themes in the existing literature 
on the French subsidies encompass the influence gained by France 
in relation to Swedish policy, the exact amounts of the payments 
and who administered these, the negotiations between Richelieu 
and Oxenstierna, and to what extent the payments were part of 
the actual war finances of Sweden.6 Research on private entrepreneurs 
and how they transferred resources mainly focuses on particular 
financiers working for specific states, such as the banker Hans de 
Witte for the Austrian Habsburgs, the financier Philip Burlamachi 
for England, and the Amsterdam-based arms merchants Louis de 
Geer as well as Elias and Pieter Trip for Sweden, and Jean Hoeufft 
for France and the Dutch Republic.7 An excellent study following 
international flows of resources was executed by Julia Zunckel, 
who uncovered the transnational networks of arms dealers from 
Genoa, Hamburg, and Amsterdam during the Thirty Years’ War, 
an issue which was brought up by David Parrott in his brilliant 
4 On the fiscal-military system, see Peter Wilson, Chapter 3 above.
5 ‘Traicté de Bervald entre le Roy de France et de Suede (…)’, AE Suède 2 
fols 2–5 and Swedish National Archive, ASRA OT Frankrike n° 2A.
6 On Franco-Swedish relations discussed in this manner, see Geoffrey Parker, 
The Thirty Years’ War (London: Routledge, 1984); on the Swedish war 
finances, see Christoph Kampmann, Europa und das Reich im Dreißigjährigen 
Krieg: Geschichte eines europäischen Konflikts (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 
2008), pp. 77–82; Sven Lundkvist, ‘Svensk krigsfinansiering 1630–1635’, 
Historisk Tidskrift 83 (1963), 1–38.
7 Anton Ernstberger, Hans de Witte: Finanzmann Wallensteins, Vierteljahrschrift 
für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Beiheft 38 (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1954); 
Arthur V. Judges, ‘Philip Burlamachi: A Financier of the Thirty Years War’, 
Economica 6 (1926), 285–300; Erik Thomson, ‘Jan Hoeufft and the Thirty 
Years War: An Essay on Diplomatic History’s Limits’, working paper presented 
at the Historical Department at Umeå University (16 March 2013); Regina 
Schulte, ‘Rüstung, Zins und Frömmigkeit: Niederländische Calvinisten als 
Finanziers des Dreißigjährigen Krieges’, Bohemia: Zeitschrift für Geschichte 
und Kultur der böhmischen Länder 35 (1994), 46–62.
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book The Business of War.8 A reason why early modern financial 
transfers in particular attract little attention might be the absence 
of easily accessible private business sources. The financial trade, for 
example, was less controlled by the States-General in the Dutch 
Republic than the trade and production of weaponry. The export 
of arms was licensed and requests for export can be traced back in 
the state archives. On the whole, historians interested in the intersec-
tion between government and the private sector tend to rely on 
state sources. While identifying the individual agents and their 
correspondents is frequently not particularly challenging, reconstruct-
ing how their businesses actually operated and following the money 
represents a more difficult task.9
A useful source offering insight into the dealings of these business-
men, however, is the notarial records of Amsterdam, as we shall 
see in this chapter. When conflict arose between merchants over a 
specific deal, a payment, or other forms of transfers, a merchant 
could bring in a notary who would officially appeal to the accused 
merchant. Other merchants would mediate as a panel of judges in 
these disputes. Besides state sources, official correspondence, and 
fragments of private business archives, these records provide an 
entry point into the inner workings of the fiscal-military hub of 
Amsterdam while transferring the French subsidies to Sweden. The 
objective of this chapter is to explain the nature of the Amsterdam 
fiscal-military hub and how it functioned by looking into the Franco-
Swedish subsidy transfers, as well as to emphasize the fundamentally 
interacting elements of the fiscal-military hub of Amsterdam: credit, 
commerce, and the highly transnational and elaborate connections 
of the Amsterdam-based military entrepreneurs.
8 Julia Zunckel, Rüstungsgeschäfte im Dreißigjährigen Krieg: Unternehmer-
kräfte, Militärgüter und Marktstrategien im Handel zwischen Genua, 
Amsterdam and Hamburg (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1997); Parrott, 
The Business of War.
9 As stated by Richard Harding and Sergio Solbes Ferri, ‘Introduction’, in The 
Contractor State and Its Implications, 1659–1815, ed. by Richard Harding 
and Sergio Solbes Ferri (Las Palmas de Gran Canaria: Universidad de Las 
Palmas de Gran Canaria, 2012), pp. 9–19 (p. 12); and by Roger Knight 
and Martin Wilcox, ‘War, Government and the Market: The Direction of 
the Debate on the British Contractor State’, in The Contractor State and 
Its Implications, 1659–1815, ed. by Richard Harding and Sergio Solbes 
Ferri (Las Palmas de Gran Canaria: Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran 
Canaria, 2012), pp. 175–198 (pp. 175–176). 
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The Amsterdam market for murder: credit, commerce, and 
connections
The first payment of the French subsidies was personally transferred 
from Paris by the Swedish financial agent Erik Larsson von der Linde. 
He was commissioned by the Swedish king to co-ordinate the war 
subsidies in Amsterdam. The next payments were handled by his 
son Lorens.10 Most of the subsidies were remitted through bills of 
exchange, a proportion of which was transferred in Amsterdam. 
The other Swedish agent in Amsterdam, Melchior von Falkenberg, 
wrote to Oxenstierna in January 1631 that he and Larsson needed 
help from the highly placed Amsterdam merchant-regent Samuel 
Blommaert to cash the bills of exchange: ‘neither I nor Erik Larsson 
could get any money on bills of exchange without the assistance 
of his factor Samuel Blommaert, who has been the caution for 
all the letters of exchange I have drawn on Hamburg and Danzig 
until this point’.11 Two things need to be highlighted here. First 
is the mention of the use of bills of exchange, which were orders 
(not legal promises) to pay and functioned both as instruments of 
credit and as instruments of remittance and currency conversion.12 
Together with other manners of loans and debts, bills of exchange 
were crucial financial instruments of the fiscal-military system, by 
which large sums of money could be transferred across Europe.13 
Second, Falkenberg draws a link between Amsterdam, Hamburg, 
and Danzig in his dealings with the French subsidies. The symbiotic 
relationship between these three fiscal-military hubs, as contended 
in this chapter, structured the payments of the French subsidies to 
Sweden during the Thirty Years’ War.
Following the generic explanation of how bills of exchange were 
exchanged, we may argue that Larsson or Falkenberg served as the 
so-called ‘deliverer’ lending money from the ‘taker’, who in turn 
supplied the deliverer with a bill of exchange. The credit was 
denominated in the currency of the place of payment or in an 
international currency such as the florin. Blommaert was the ‘taker’ 
in Amsterdam, supposing that was what Falkenberg meant by 
‘assistance’. The bill of exchange was drawn on his particular 
10 Thomson, ‘Jan Hoeufft and the Thirty Years’ War’, p. 7.
11 Translated by Erik Thomson, ibid., p. 7.
12 Pit Dehing, Geld in Amsterdam: Wisselbank en wisselkoersen, 1650–1725 
(Hilversum: Verloren, 2012), p. 198.
13 See Peter Wilson, Chapter 3 above.
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correspondent in Hamburg or Danzig, also called the ‘drawee’ 
(payer). The latter paid in the specific currency or international 
coinage to the ‘payee’ or the Swedish agent of Larsson or Falkenberg 
in Hamburg or Danzig. This is certainly an oversimplified account 
of the transfer business of subsidy payments, but it may give a 
clearer image of the basic actions needed to transfer subsidies. The 
reality was far more complex. Besides the fact that a bill of exchange 
was a negotiable document (to be bought and sold to other parties), 
the actual transfer of subsidies involved numerous contacts as well 
as multiple bills drawn on various cities simultaneously or in sequence 
– first a bill was drawn on Amsterdam from which another was 
drawn on Hamburg, payments were delayed or not paid at all by 
the French crown, or simply spread out by the financier, whose 
remittances could also involve other transfer deals or portions of 
the subsidy payments.14
With this money, Sweden could finance its troops in the Holy 
Roman Empire, of which 70 per cent went to the army in the 
German lands, 8 per cent was spent on the embassy in Osnabrück, 
and 6 per cent on diplomats, residents, and correspondents.15 The 
Swedes organized their military campaigns in the Empire from 
Hamburg, not only for its geographical position but as the city 
itself was a mighty fiscal-military hub and was outshone only by 
Amsterdam from the 1650s onwards.16 Danzig was located on the 
eastern side from where the Swedish troops moved into the German 
lands. Additionally, the Baltic port city was a nodal point in the 
Hanseatic trade network and functioned as a fiscal-military hub in 
the Baltic region. This identifies the co-operation not only between 
state and private agents but also between fiscal-military hubs 
themselves. Hamburg dealers in fiscal-military resources needed their 
Amsterdam connections and vice versa. The Swedish agents in 
Hamburg and the French agents in Paris needed the assistance of 
the merchant-financiers in Amsterdam as well as their own representa-
tives setting up shop in the Dutch city.
14 See Erik Thomson, Chapter 10 below.
15 Gottfrid Lorenz, ‘Schweden und die französischen Hilfsgelder von 1638 
bis 1649’, in Forschungen und Quellen zur Geschichte des Dreißigjäh-
rigen Krieges, Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der Neueren 
Geschichte e.V., 12, ed. by Konrad Repgen (Münster: Aschendorff, 1981), 
pp. 98–148 (p. 99).
16 Hermann Kellenbenz, ‘Hamburg und die französisch-schwedische Zusam-
menarbeit im 30jährigen Krieg’, Zeitschrift der Vereins für Hamburgische 
Geschichte 49/50 (1964), 83–107.
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This brings us to the core question of this chapter: why would 
the French and Swedish agents involved not simply transfer the 
subsidies through the fiscal-military hub of Hamburg alone? What 
could Amsterdam offer them that Hamburg could not? The answer 
lies in three interrelated aspects fundamental to the efficacy of the 
Amsterdam market for murder in the seventeenth century: first, the 
city was the financial centre of Europe; second, it was the continent’s 
entrepôt; and, third, very importantly, it housed an elite of merchant-
financiers with extensive, transnational networks and the utmost 
expertise in the fiscal-military business.
Financial centre
At the beginning of the seventeenth century, Amsterdam became 
the leading centre of financial exchange in Europe. Historians point 
to various causes behind this emergence, notably the migration of 
banking experts from the south of the Netherlands at the end of 
the sixteenth century fleeing the hardships of war and religious 
persecution by the Catholic Habsburgs. Antwerp had become the 
key centre for foreign exchange (parallel to its expansion into a 
commercial hub) in the early sixteenth century; however, in combina-
tion with this migration, the centre of gravity gradually moved to 
Amsterdam. The migrants took their capital, expertise, and European 
networks with them and introduced Antwerp practices of financing, 
banking, money-exchange, maritime insurance, and financial report-
ing. This was enhanced by financial institution-building, innovations 
such as the Bank of Exchange (1609), Bank of Credit (1609), the 
Stock Exchange (1602), set up by the East India Company to exchange 
its printed stocks, and the West India Company (1674). The Bank 
of Exchange secured, advanced, and enlarged (long-distance) transfers 
of money. A variety of instruments of credit and capital purchase, 
such as the issuing of shares, were developed for harmonizing money 
transfers. Amsterdam created an excellent reputation for the business 
of credit. The market of invested capital grew massively. Amsterdam-
based financiers invested and participated in foreign enterprises, 
and international commercial networks were becoming more and 
more interconnected through Amsterdam credits. At the end of the 
century, Amsterdam had become the centre of a complex network 
of credit stretched out across Europe.17
17 Dehing, Geld in Amsterdam, pp. 199–200.
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Above all, Amsterdam was the preferred city in Europe for bor-
rowing funds. Most of the bills of exchange drawn in Amsterdam 
were from other cities in Europe rather than from Amsterdam itself. 
Many merchants involved in the international trade positioned their 
power base in Amsterdam, from which they could transfer money 
to their business partners (mostly relatives) abroad or lend them 
credit by offering to draw a bill on themselves. If a merchant-financier 
had no family relations in a certain city, he would make use of 
agents who mediated the transfers for him. An important reason 
why foreign merchants drew on Amsterdam was that it had the 
lowest real and relatively stable interest rates.18 Knowledge of the 
money-transfer business was invaluable for the Amsterdam elite, 
as demonstrated by a 1662 textbook on trade, in possession of the 
family of the famous fiscal-military entrepreneur Louis de Geer. The 
examples seem to be taken from reality: ‘I have to pay 4,000 taler 
to Liebert Wolters in Hamburg and since I have no money for that 
there, I accorded with Jacomo Roulandt here in Amsterdam, who 
has money there at Egidio Roulant, on whom he gives me an exchange 
that I have sent to Liebert Wouters to receive from the same Egedio 
Roulant 4,000 taler.’ 19
The use of bills of exchange greatly increased in the seventeenth 
century rather than the actual movement of coins. Newly instituted 
banks acted as clearing banks for the bills, harmonizing the issue 
of the quantity and quality of coinage and stabilizing the transfer 
market. The Amsterdam Bank of Exchange was the most important 
institution designed for this purpose. During the Thirty Years’ War, 
Amsterdam became the centre of European merchant banking; and, 
as the war continued, an increasing amount of transfers not related 
to the Dutch Republic were exchanged through the Bank of Exchange. 
In 1635, the flow of money to Amsterdam had created a financial 
bubble that burst, which meant that the subsidies had to be trans-
ported in barrels of coins accompanied by a passport for export 
18 Pit Dehing, ‘Geld als Water? Amsterdam en de internationale kapitaalstromen 
(1600–1730)’, in De Republiek tussen zee en vasteland: buitenlandse invloeden 
op cultuur, economie en politiek in Nederland 1580–1800, ed. by Karel 
Davids, Marjolein ’t Hart, Henk Kleijer and Jan Lucassen (Leuven and 
Apeldoorn: Garant, 1995), pp. 229–249 (pp. 229–235).
19 Joan Römelingh (ed.), Een rondgang langs Zweedse archieven: Een onder-
zoek naar archivalia inzake de betrekkingen tussen Nederland en Zweden 
1520–1920 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986), p. 468.
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granted by Louis XIII.20 A similar bubble of bills of exchange drawn 
on Amsterdam burst during the War of the Spanish Succession.21 
Although many exchanges were still executed privately between 
merchants and agents, bills over 600 florins and payable in Amster-
dam had to go through the bank. France made extensive use of the 
Amsterdam exchange business to pass money to its troops in foreign 
territories or to transfer subsidies across Europe. The French crown 
would contract bankers to remit the subsidy payments.22
In the case of the Swedish subsidies, France initially signed a 
contract with the financier Claude Charlot for the advancement 
and transfer of the subsidies. Charlot then commissioned the Swedish 
agent Erik Larsson in Amsterdam, from where he (together with 
his son Lorens and Samuel Blommaert operating with various other 
Dutch merchants) transmitted the money to Hamburg or Danzig. 
When Charlot went bankrupt, the French government contracted 
the arms dealer and merchant-financier Jean Hoeufft in 1633. From 
Paris, he arranged the transfer with his nephew in Amsterdam or 
directly to, for instance, the banker Lucas von Spreckselen in 
Hamburg, which was then cashed by the Swedish resident Johan 
Adler Salvius, a relative of von Spreckselen.23 There was a lot of 
money to be made in the remittance of subsidies; but it was also a 
risky business, partly because payments might be delayed or not 
paid at all – as was often the case with the French subsidies – but 
also for other reasons than a mere lack of money. A fine example 
is the conflict between Salvius and the French resident Claude de 
Meulles, who withheld the bill of exchange of 240,000 reichsthaler 
in the summer of 1644 as France disagreed – to say the least – with 
the Swedish invasion of Denmark at that time. Salvius travelled to 
Münster to speed up the payment, but, as he had no luck in doing 
20 Thomson, ‘Jean Hoeufft and the Thirty Years’ War’, p. 12; Nationaal 
Archief (The Hague), 1.01.08 Staten Generaal, 12587–54. The passport 
explained: ‘qu’a cause de l’Interruption du commerce les correspondances 
des negotiants ont cesse, De Lorre qu’il leur feroit tres difficille de tirer de 
ce Royaume par lettre de change le million de liures que nous leur avons 
payé, nou suppliant de permettre a Jean Heuft qui a ordre pour la remisse 
dud. Million en Hollande de faire transporter a diverses fois.’ All translations 
are by the author unless otherwise stated.
21 Guy Rowlands, Dangerous and Dishonest Men: The International Bankers 
of Louis XIV’s France (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 144–165.
22 Ibid., pp. 33–83.
23 Thomson, p. 253 below.
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so, his wife travelled to Hamburg to advance the war payments to 
the Swedish troops from her own affluent funds.24
While diplomatic and other state sources reveal the contracts 
signed with financiers and describe the complications of certain 
transfers, reconstructing the exact remittance business is rather 
difficult, even elusive, as Erik Thomson argues.25 There is the 
complexity of the business itself and the lack of private business 
sources pertaining to the key figures, such as Jean Hoeufft, as well 
as the misfortune of the absence of the ledgers of the Amsterdam 
Bank of Exchange prior to 1644 owing to a fire in the old city hall 
in 1652.26 In particular, the difficulty with bills of exchange is that 
they are ‘invisible transfers’, as described by Leos Müller.27 Snippets 
are sometimes found in books of accounts, as in those from Elbing, 
Danzig, and Hamburg on the years 1634–1636 accounting for the 
supplies of food and money by Pieter and Isaak Spiering to the 
Swedish troops in the Empire. The Dutch brothers Spiering thrived 
in the Baltic barley market, collecting the Livonian tolls for Sweden, 
and between 1637 and 1652 Pieter served as the Swedish ambassador 
to the Dutch Republic. Their ledgers mention four bills: a bill of 
exchange of 18,000 taler from Danzig commissioned by Isaac Spiering 
drawn on Mattheus Hoeufft in Amsterdam; a bill of 15,000 taler 
commissioned by Pieter and Isaac Spiering drawn on Jacques 
Verpoorten Adriansson in Hamburg; a bill (not naming the amounts) 
commissioned by Isaac Spiering drawn on Abraham Willemsen van 
Beijerlandt in Amsterdam and Jacques Verpoorten Adriansson in 
Hamburg; and a bill for Mattheus Hoeufft in Amsterdam to pay 
5,000 taler to the Lord High Chancellor of Sweden Axel Oxenstierna. 
Thus, for the supplying of the Swedish troops, the Spiering brothers 
used the money transmitted through Hamburg as well as Amsterdam, 
the latter being used as an intermediate hub – perhaps for its favour-
able exchange rates – but it also seems as if the Swedish subsidies 
were cashed in Amsterdam. Why would the Spiering brothers – if 
24 Kellenbenz, ‘Hamburg und die französisch-schwedische Zusammenarbeit 
im 30jährigen Krieg’, 96–97.
25 Thomson, p. 252 below.
26 Oscaer Gelderblom, Zuid-Nederlandse kooplieden en de opkomst van de 
Amsterdamse stapelmarkt (1578–1630) (Hilversum: Verloren, 2000), p. 
268.
27 Leos Müller, ‘The Dutch Entrepreneurial Networks and Sweden’, in Trade, 
Diplomacy and Cultural Exchange: Continuity and change in the North 
Sea area and the Baltic c. 1350–1750, ed. by Hanno Brand (Hilversum: 
Verloren, 2005), p. 66.
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they needed to supply the Swedish army in the German lands – cash 
bills of exchange in Amsterdam and not directly in Hamburg? The 
answer lies in the other element of the Amsterdam market for murder: 
its function as an international entrepôt.
Amsterdam entrepôt
Seventeenth-century Amsterdam was the commercial centre of Europe, 
a centre which developed in parallel to the volume and complexity 
of its financial business. These two features were of mutual importance 
for the efficiency of the fiscal-military hub, since finance and commerce 
were strongly linked to each other under the pressure of warfare. 
Historiography has emphasized how in the Dutch Republic trade 
was stimulated and, in some ways, even shaped by warfare, notably 
its own revolt against Habsburg Spain (1568–1648). The cutting-off 
of most of the Iberian trade connections, for instance, stimulated 
Dutch merchants to explore commercial possibilities overseas, which 
also meant seizing Iberian trading posts and colonies. The States-
General assigned the Dutch East India Company (VOC) a war-making 
mission and a semi-sovereign authority: to declare war, form alliances 
and contracts, raise troops, and name governors and officers. The 
result was extremely lucrative ‘rich trades’ in high-value textiles 
and spices, and new ways of managing capital and credit flows, 
such as the establishment of the Stock Exchange by the VOC in 
1609. However, historians have added that Dutch trade would 
probably have been even more prosperous without the hindrance 
of warfare, as would be shown in relation to the economic boom 
during the Twelve Years’ Peace (1609–1621).28 Yet another important 
side note is that war was particularly favourable for the merchant 
groups of Holland rather than the inland provinces and the rural 
communities of the Dutch Republic, not least because of the fact 
that the war against Spain was fought outside of Holland’s territory 
from 1576, and for the influx of wealth, expertise, and connections. 
The economy and standards of living rose rapidly in Holland as 
trade and industries expanded and diversified to even higher levels 
28 See, for instance, Geoffrey Parker, ‘War and Economic Change: The Economic 
Costs of the Dutch Revolt’, in War and Economic Development, ed. by Jay M. 
Winter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 49–71; Jonathan 
Israel, Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585–1740 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1989), pp. 12–120; J. Leslie Price, Dutch Culture in the Golden Age 
(London: Reaktion Books, 2011), pp. 34–38. 
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than before the war. Moreover, new industries came into being 
during the war, such as the very prosperous arms industry. Rising 
demands from the army, navy, colonial companies stationing town 
soldiers, militias, fortifications, private men, and foreign buyers 
made this industry an essential part of the economy within two 
decades, making up at least 5 per cent of the Dutch GNP. 29
A reason why the war subsidies were transferred and cashed 
in the Amsterdam hub relates to the arms business, one of the 
most flourishing trades of the city. Cash was needed for particular 
purchases, such as weaponry and munitions, and Amsterdam was a 
vital weapons arsenal in Europe, where foreign agents collected the 
military gear for wars fought far beyond the Dutch borders. Hamburg 
formed another key centre of the arms trade, interconnected by the 
interests of its arms dealers to those in Amsterdam. The Hanseatic 
and free imperial city was a significant supplier of war material 
to Spain, yet its merchants often purchased the weaponry in Amster-
dam before delivering it to the Habsburgs. The Amsterdam weapons 
trade – excluding the cannon trade – was based on a growing, 
comprehensive arms industry in the Dutch Republic supplied by 
raw materials through the city’s entrepôt. Additionally, Amsterdam 
arms dealers could rely on the Dutch army arsenals if they ran out 
of stock. Consequently, the arms market in Amsterdam offered 
foreign buyers flexibility and velocity. One of the most far-reaching 
innovations was the sale of package deals in which merchants acted 
as intermediaries between arms producers, sources of raw materials, 
and foreign buyers to provide a regiment with all the equipment 
needed.30
At the start of the Swedish war preparations, Dietrich von 
Falkenberg, the marshal of the royal court of the Swedish king, 
signed a contract with the wealthy arms dealer Elias Trip in Amster-
dam on 17 May 1629. The size of the sold goods (package deal) 
and the promised delivery time exemplifies the adeptness of the 
29 Marjolein ’t Hart, The Dutch Wars of Independence: Warfare and Commerce 
in the Netherlands 1570–1680 (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), 
p. 181.
30 Peter Wilson, ‘War Finance, Policy and Strategy in the Thirty Years’ War’, in 
Dynamik durch Gewalt? Der Dreißigjährige Krieg (1618–1648) als Faktor 
der Wandlungsprozesse des 17. Jahrhunderts, ed. by Michael Rohrschneider 
and Anuschka Tischer (Münster: Aschendorff, 2018), pp. 229–250; Peter 
W. Klein, De Trippen in de 17e eeuw: Een studie over het ondernemerschap 
op de Hollandse stapelmarkt (Assen: Van Gorchum, 1965), pp. 205–208; 
’t Hart, The Dutch Wars of Independence, p. 184.
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Amsterdam arms market: 40,602 muskets, 4,602 casques, 3,456 
pieces of armour, 3,456 pikes, 72 drums; 100 halberds, 24 partisans, 
500 cuirasses, 4,500 units of gunpowder, 4,500 fuses, 4,500 musket 
balls, and 8,058 rapiers. Within two weeks, almost half the material 
would be delivered and the rest within three weeks or one month 
after that. Von Falkenberg would order and commission an ‘express 
man’ in Amsterdam, a man to whom Trip delivered the arms and 
ammunition. Within nine days after delivery, von Falkenberg would 
pay Trip 190,000 guilders ‘in banco’ (banking money from the 
Bank of Exchange).31 Six days after signing the contract, Sweden 
placed a request to the Dutch States General to export 8,000 pounds 
of gunpowder, 8,000 pounds of fuses, and weaponry for nine 
thousand men. The material would most probably be transported 
to the troops in the Holy Roman Empire instead of Sweden. At 
first, the request was granted on the precondition that Sweden would 
pay the usual duties; but, after the States-General ran into a conflict 
with von Falkenberg during the summer, a conflict concerning the 
Swedish recruitment of soldiers at the Dutch frontiers (and apparently 
also illegitimately by way of the Swedes’ contractors in the Republic), 
the duties were lifted as a concession to Sweden.32
Another reason why the subsidies were transferred through 
Amsterdam is the intrinsic link between the financing of war and 
trade, between credit and commerce, which the city facilitated 
exceptionally well. Between 1628 and 1633, the Swedish crown 
commissioned Erik Larsson and Conrad Falkenberg (the brother 
of the other Swedish agent in Amsterdam, Melchior Falkenberg) to 
sell the Swedish copper and manage other financial operations, such 
as the sale of Swedish grain in Amsterdam. The Dutch merchant 
Samuel Blommaert brokered the sale of copper, parallel to inter-
mediating in the transfer of the subsidies.33 The copper trade made 
31 Contract printed: ‘Contract tusschen Elias Trip en Diderik van Vackenburgh, 
over de levering van wapenen aan Gustaaf Adolf. 17 mei 1629.’, Kroniek 
van het Historisch Genootschap VI 31 (Utrecht, 1876), pp. 151–154.
32 See Resolutions 4, 23 May 1629 and for the conflict 1, 13 April 1629; 
1, 31 May 1629; 3/5, 6 June 1629; 3, 7 June 1629; 3/21 12 June 1629, 
Resolutiën Staten-Generaal 1626–1630, ed. I.J.A. Nijenhuis, P.L.R. De 
Cauwer, W.M. Gijsbers, M. Hell, C.O. Van Der Meij, and J.E. Schonneveld-
Oosterling, Huygens Instituut Online Publications, available at http://
resources.huygens.knaw.nl/. 
33 Gerhard W. Kernkamp, ‘Brieven van Samuel Blommaert aan den Zweedschen 
Rijkskanselier Axel Oxenstierna 1635–1641’, Bijdragen en Mededeelingen 
van het Historisch Genootschap 29 (1908), 24–29, 67–131. 
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up a large part of the Swedish military finances, and Amsterdam 
was the main market for the sale of Swedish copper, which was 
often used as collateral for credit. Lübeck in particular used to be 
a major buyer of Swedish copper, and the city had an important 
copper industry. However, Sweden moved its copper business to 
the growing staple market of Amsterdam. In 1613, the Swedes 
negotiated with the States-General for credit that would be paid from 
the frequent copper shipments. Johannes van Dillen asserted that 
the amounts the States-General could collect were not substantial, 
although the credit had risen to more than 750,000 guilders by 
1618.34
Since the credit business was profitable, Dutch entrepreneurs 
stepped in. One of them was Louis de Geer who had gained expertise 
in the French copper industry, was an arms dealer, and already had 
connections with Swedish entrepreneurs. In 1618, de Geer formed 
a consortium to provide King Gustav II Adolf with 250,000 guilders.35 
Although the king granted the entire transfer of copper to the 
States-General, Lübeck and Hamburg continued to be important 
trading-places for Swedish copper until 1627, when the remaining 
copper in these cities was shipped to Amsterdam. The firm of the 
Trip family received the commission to organize the Swedish copper 
business. In 1629, the relatives Dietrich and Conrad von Falkenberg 
signed a contract with two members of the Trip family to transfer 
the copper credit business from Pieter to his (distant) uncle Elias 
Trip – the latter being the brother-in-law of Louis de Geer. The 
advance payment by Pieter Trip to the Swedish crown had amounted 
to 566,411 guilders, 4 stuivers and 8 pennies. Because of the low 
copper price, an amount of 1,368 Swedish shipping pounds of raw 
copper and 2,389 Swedish shipping pounds of copper was not (yet) 
sold.36 The second contract with Elias alone stated that Swedish 
copper was only to be transferred to the Trip merchant, who had 
to sell the copper ‘for cash money and nothing else’; but the Swedish 
king was free to transport and sell cannons made from copper to 
34 Johannes G. van Dillen, ‘Amsterdamsche notarieele akten betreffende den 
koperhandel en de uitoefening van mijnbouw en metaalindustrie in Zweden’, 
Bijdragen en Mededeelingen van het Historisch Genootschap 5 (1973), 
211–301 (p. 214).
35 Ibid., 215.
36 Ibid., 233–235: ‘Contract tusschen Diederick en Conrad von Falckenberg, 
gemachtigden van den koning van Zweden, en Pieter en Elias Trip. 1629 
Mei 16, Not. Arch. 700. Not. J. Warnaertsz.’ 
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whomever he preferred.37 This contract ended in 1632, and by that 
time Louis de Geer had returned from his travels abroad and re-
entered the copper trade. Together with Falkenberg, de Geer tried 
(but failed) to persuade Trip to transmit the deposited copper. In 
1634, Trip seized a transport of copper to de Geer in Amsterdam. 
He argued that the shipment was his, since Sweden had not paid 
him its interest on time.38
The seizure of goods from the competition was a recurrent 
phenomenon. Private entrepreneurs also seized subsidy transfers 
in case of a commercial conflict with one of the states involved. 
Time and time again, Louis de Geer (as well as Trip) failed to be in 
agreement with the Swedish agents in Amsterdam. On 11 December 
1632, a notarial appeal was sent to Louis de Geer on behalf of 
Conrad von Falkenberg.39 He claimed that Louis de Geer had seized 
40,000 taler of the transfer of Dutch subsidies to Sweden (a total 
of 60,000). The cunning merchant had settled two years of interest 
with the States-General that he still had to pay for the Swedish 
king based on a previously procured credit from the Republic to 
Sweden. Falkenberg was enraged. This old debt should not, he 
felt, be used to seize and stall the (rest of the) subsidy payment for 
over one year. Falkenberg thought de Geer should have paid the 
interest from the Swedish copper trade, although that trade suffered 
from low prices at the time, as copper had flooded the market in 
Amsterdam.40 The Swedish agent bitterly described the consequences 
of the unpaid subsidies: ‘His Majesty would suffer great hindrance 
and harm, because not only would he under protest have to withdraw 
several bills of exchange, but he would have to let various garrisons 
be not-provisioned and unsupplied.’ 41 The conflict continued well 
into the spring of 1633, with notarial calls sent back and forth 
and de Geer defending his actions in a letter to Oxenstierna. De 
37 Ibid., 235–238: ‘Contract tusschen Diederick en Conrad von Falckenberg, 
gemachtigden van den koning van Zweden, en Elias Trip betreffende de 
beleening en verkoop van koper. 1629 Mei 19, Not. Arch. 700. Not. J. 
Warnaertsz.’
38 Ibid., 216–217; Klein, De Trippen, pp. 379–399.
39 Van Dillen, ‘Amsterdamsche notarieele akten’, 248–254: ‘Notarieele aanzeg-
ging namens den vertegenwoordiger van den koning van Zweden aan Louis 
de Geer, benevens het antwoord van laatstgenoemde. 1623 December 11, 
Not. Arch. 406 f. 453. Not. Nic. Jacobs.’
40 Ibid., 218.
41 Ibid., 249.
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Geer claimed that he had used the sums to stop the price drop of 
copper, which he had done in the interest of the Swedish crown.42 
His correspondence contains other instances of seizing the French 
subsidy transfers to Sweden in Amsterdam (or requesting to do 
so).43 De Geer’s wealth stemmed from his role as ‘an intermediary 
between Amsterdam credit and staple markets and the Swedish 
Crown’.44
Networks and expertise
Amsterdam thus offered a wide variety of military resources to be 
bought, sold, drawn credit from, and exchanged within the city walls 
itself. Resource mobilization was built on a system of multiplied 
credit: to obtain credit in order to obtain even more credit and to 
pay off interest. Yet another important reason why Swedish and 
French agents exchanged the subsidies through Amsterdam was the 
presence of a fiscal-military elite. The city harboured an elite with 
an extremely high level of expertise in fiscal-military matters and 
transnational business networks, which is a specific element of a 
fiscal-military hub since various activities of resource mobilization 
clustered around such an elite.45 It seems as if, in the early stages 
of the fiscal-military hub of Amsterdam, a considerable portion 
of the fiscal-military entrepreneurs came from a Flemish Calvinist 
background (notably from Antwerp and Liège) or was heavily 
intertwined in the Protestant diaspora in Europe. As mentioned 
before, the migration of many merchants from the south of the 
Netherlands to Amsterdam conveyed advanced financial instruments 
and expertise, while also furthering the Amsterdam commerce and 
connections to trade routes. Amsterdam developed into a financial 
centre in conjunction with an emerging staple market of global 
proportions, which attracted numerous foreign tradesmen, bankers 
as well as state agents and diplomats, who set up shop to organize 
42 Ibid., 254–255: ‘Notarieele aanzegging namens den vertegenwoordiger van 
den koning van Zweden aan Louis de Geer. 1633 Januari 15. Not. Arch. 407 
f. 29. Not Jac. Jacobs.’; ibid., 256–262: ‘Notarieele aanzegging names Louis 
de Geer aan de vertegenwoordiger van den koning van Zweden benevens 
diens antwoord. 1633 Februari 22, Not. Arch. 407 f. 130. Not. Jac. Jacobs.’
43 Gerhard W. Kernkamp, ‘Brieven van Louis de Geer’, Bijdragen en Med-
edeelingen van het Historisch Genootschap 29 (1908), 259–260, 265–267, 
306–308, 308–309, 311–313.
44 Müller, ‘The Dutch Entrepreneurial Networks and Sweden’, p. 69.
45 Parrott, The Business of War, pp. 212–213.
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their commerce and credit. The business of war represented a vital 
part of their dealings.46
What were the requirements for becoming a successful war-
entrepreneur? A relatively small group of merchant-financiers could 
enter the business of mediating subsidies between states. With some 
exceptions, such as the Amsterdam merchant-financier Philip Calan-
drini, many entrepreneurs possessed no specific financial-banking 
expertise. However, examples of Amsterdam-based financiers tell us 
that they had already gained extensive knowledge during commerce 
with the states involved in the subsidy business, as was the case 
with de Geer and Sweden and with Jean Hoeufft and his Franco-
Dutch dealings. Access to the subsidy-transfer business could, in 
turn, consolidate into a firm foundation for taking up banking.47 In 
particular, many Amsterdam-based merchant-financiers during the 
Thirty Years’ War had dealt in arms and munition before engaging 
in the organization of war finance, such as the aforementioned 
Louis de Geer, the Trip family, and Jean and Mattheus Hoeufft, as 
well as the brothers Gabriel and Selius Marselis financing Denmark 
and Philip Calandrini transferring finances for England through his 
brother-in-law based in London, Philip Burlamachi.48 During the 
1620s, Jean Hoeufft specialised as a weapon merchant supplying 
France with artillery and naval vessels.49 Together with his brother 
Dirck/Diederick (whose sons Mattheus and Jan Jr Hoeufft took over 
the business in Amsterdam after his death in 1634), Jean Hoeufft 
ordered the building (and arming) of a warship in Amsterdam in 
1620, designed for Charles de Gonzaga, the duc de Nevers, and 
his private crusading order of the ‘Christian Militia’.50 The affairs 
46 Schulte, ‘Rüstung, Zins, und Frömmigkeit’, 45–62; Ole Peter Grell, Brethren in 
Christ: A Calvinist Network in Reformation Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011). 
47 Michiel De Jong, ‘Staat van oorlog.’ Wapenbedrijf en militaire hervorming in 
de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden, 1585–1621 (Hilversum: Verloren, 
2005), pp. 328–332. 
48 Hans Vogel, ‘Lijst van wapenhandelaren 1600–1650’, in Het arsenaal van de 
wereld: Nederlandse wapenhandel in de Gouden Eeuw, ed. by Jan Piet Puype 
and Pien Van Der Hoeven (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij de Bataafsche Leeuw B.V., 
1993), p. 76; Michael G. de Boer, ‘Een Amsterdamsche “Lorrendraayer”, 
Celio Marselis’, Jaarboek Amstelodamum 38 (1941), 48–67. 
49 Raphaël Morera, ‘Du commerce aux finances: La fortune de Jean Hoeufft 
(1578–1651), entre la France et les Provinces-Unies’, Revue d’histoire moderne 
et contemporaine, 63.1 (2016), 7–29. doi:10.3917/rhmc.631.0007.
50 Stadsarchief Amsterdam, not. S. Cornelisz (NA 5075, inv. 24–645), 24 
Maart 1620; Thomson, ‘Jean Hoeufft and the Thirty Years’ War’, pp. 5–6; 
Parrott, The Business of War, p. 38.
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of the fiscal-military entrepreneurs ran through family connections 
with relatives based in most of the hubs across Europe (including 
Hamburg) and otherwise through their agents. These family con-
nections secured the fundamental trust needed for transferring large 
sums of money. A subsequent requirement was high liquidity – which 
was often provided through arms trade (and banking) – in order to 
make advance payments. The list of the 250 richest people of the 
Dutch Golden Age (commissioned by the Dutch Rijksmuseum and 
the magazine Quote) includes various fiscal-military entrepreneurs, 
such as Louis de Geer with a fortune of 1,500,000 florins (number 3), 
Elias Trip with 1,000,000 florins (number 8), Mattheus Hoeufft with 
1,000,000 florins (number 11) and Gabriel Marselis with 750,000 
florins (number 29).51
Additionally, the entrepreneurs were closely connected to the 
government and some even held political office. Samuel Blommaert 
was the director of the Dutch West India Company from 1622 to 
1629 and from 1636 to 1642, and Jean Hoeufft became the official 
representative of France in the Dutch Republic as well as the Dutch 
representative in France during the 1630s. The strong entanglement 
of the merchant elite and the magistracy is an important theme in 
the literature on the Dutch Republic.52 Yet it must be stressed that 
the early private business of war was conducted in the open, instead 
of hiding in the shadows as the present-day private military sector 
does. It was a prestigious business, since warfare had been one of 
the essential tasks of the nobility. The mounting demand for resources 
from the sixteenth century and onwards now opened up new pos-
sibilities; financier-merchants could associate with the noble business 
of war, and they proudly did so. The house of the Trip family – built 
by order of the two sons of Elias – was the largest private residence 
in seventeenth-century Amsterdam and consisted of two houses 
hidden behind an impressive seven-window-wide facade embellished 
with cannons, cannonballs, and mortars as well as olive branches, 
since war brought peace. As argued by David Parrott, the business 
of war provided the fiscal-military entrepreneurs with social standing 
and cultural validation.53
51 Kees Zandvliet, De 250 rijksten van de Gouden Eeuw: kapitaal, macht, 
familie en levensstijl (Amsterdam: Rijksmuseum Publishing, 2006), p. XL.
52 See in particular Pepijn Brandon, War, Capital, and the Dutch State 
(1588–1795) (Leiden: Brill, 2015), pp. 41–82.
53 Parrott, The Business of War, pp. 249–259.
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The presence of a fiscal-military elite and their specific expertise 
and connections influenced the choice of remittance location. In the 
Treaty of Bärwalde (1631), the French stipulated as a condition to 
the Swedes that the subsidies had to be remitted in Paris or Amster-
dam while later treaties named Amsterdam and Hamburg. This 
might be related to the fact that France had already had subsidy 
payments running through Amsterdam for decades. As early as 
1593, Dutch subsidies (a total of 1,600,000 guilders) flowed to 
France and ended in 1598. From then onwards, the subsidy flow 
reversed to the Republic until 1609, at the beginning of the Dutch 
Twelve Years’ Truce with Spain, and restarted in 1621 at the resump-
tion of the conflict. The first contractor for the advancement and 
transfer of the subsidies was Pieter van Beeck until 1626, when 
Gereard van Schoonhoven and Joost Brasser took over up until 
1630, when Willem van Borselen and Cornelis Spiering arranged 
the transfers until 1631, after which Jean Hoeufft entered the transfer 
business until 1646. Michiel de Jong estimated that Jean and Mattheus 
transferred at least 14,170,000 guilders.54 As Erik Thomson explains, 
with the signing of the Treaty of Bärwalde, Hoeufft seized the 
opportunity of handling the war subsidies to Sweden as well. In 
1633, he was officially commissioned by the Swedish crown.55 Thus, 
the existing infrastructure of the Dutch subsidies through Amsterdam 
was used and extended to transfer the Swedish subsidies. Herman 
Kellenbenz argues that Hamburg was not generally speaking of any 
great interest to France during the Thirty Years’ War prior to the 
late 1630s, at which point the semi-neutral city of Hamburg came 
to form a perfect hub as a port city between the north of the 
Netherlands and the French harbours for the French operations 
along the Rhine.56
The importance of personal connections is also exemplified by 
the fall of Erik Larsson as a Swedish agent for the transfer of 
subsidies. King Gustav II Adolf suspected Larsson of misusing his 
office for personal profit and of being too closely and dangerously 
connected to the merchant elite of Amsterdam. His displacement, 
however, meant the loss of his networks and subsequently the 
favourable conditions resulting from these. The new agents had to 
54 De Jong, Staat van Oorlog, pp. 327–328.
55 Thomson, p. 243 below.
56 Kellenbenz, ‘Hamburg und die französisch-schwedische Zusammenarbeit 
im 30jährigen Krieg’, 86–90.
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co-ordinate the Swedish credit as well as to inspect Larsson’s dealings, 
which, according to Erik Thomson, was an impossible task subse-
quently leading to a drop in Swedish financial credit.57 This formed 
the larger context of de Geer seizing the Dutch subsidies to Sweden 
in Amsterdam in 1632.
Conclusions
Research into the early modern business of subsidy transfers faces 
many obstacles and limitations when seeking to ‘follow the money’. 
For now, it is possible to make a few suggestions and conclusions. 
Further research is required before it can be assessed to what extent 
the subsidy business contributed to Amsterdam’s overall economic 
development. However, by following the money through chains of 
negotiations and brokerage, we are able to identify those involved 
in the business, and by studying them we can calculate the proportion 
of these fiscal-military businessmen. In this way, their place in the 
wider economic activity of the city can be evaluated. Amsterdam 
attracted a variety of fiscal-military entrepreneurs seeking high profits 
and even social standing. Because of its elite of merchant-financiers 
and its highly developed financial and commercial markets, the 
fiscal-military hub of Amsterdam was a relatively safe bet to invest 
in. It seems as if money and agents remained in Amsterdam as well 
as even some material resources, only changing owners and value 
within the city walls. The function of a fiscal-military hub may be 
compared with that of a central airport or other transport facility 
from which most services operate, combined with that of a stock 
exchange facilitating the asset trade in continuous action from a 
central location (floor of exchange) and, in doing so, altering the 
value of the transacted assets. For this reason, the term ‘hub’ is an 
apt choice. In a way, one could argue that the hub itself – its agents, 
traders, shippers, bankers, financiers, etc. – arranged and transferred 
resources for the military campaigns. Additionally, while research 
on particular financiers brings us insight into the complex connections 
and activities of subsidy transfers, the focus on a particular person 
might lead to the danger of overstating the significance of such a 
fiscal-military entrepreneur. Their activities should be compared to 
others in a broader context; that is, these individuals not only had 
personal networks but were also tied within the European system 
57 Thomson, ‘Jean Hoeufft and the Thirty Years’ War’, p. 7.
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of hubs containing numerous entrepreneurs who handled large sums 
of money and/or organized package deals. This chapter suggests 
shifting the focus from entrepreneurs to fiscal-military hubs in order 
to obtain further insights into resource mobilization, in particular 
the relationship between the business of war and European state 
formation.
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Jean Hoeufft, French subsidies, and the 
Thirty Years’ War
Erik Thomson
Historians of early modern Europe have emphasized the importance 
of entrepreneurs and private contractors to governance, ascribing 
particular importance to the merchants and bankers who lent money 
to crowns, organized chartered companies, and equipped and 
provisioned armies, as well as to the officers who recruited, armed, 
and led military units.1 Although Guy Rowlands has charted some 
of the operations of international remittance bankers during the 
reign of Louis the XIV in a recent book, historians have generally 
neglected the role of bankers and merchants in diplomacy during 
the Thirty Years’ War.2 Yet bankers and merchants played crucial 
roles in early modern diplomacy, drawing upon contacts, financial 
techniques and institutions, and sources of coin and capital to make 
possible the payment of subsidies and other diplomatic gifts and 
expenditures that the chapters in this volume suggest were crucial 
to relations among sovereigns.3
1 David Parrott, The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military 
Revolution in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012); The Contractor State and Its Implications, 1659–1815, ed. 
by Richard Harding and Sergio Solbes Ferri (Las Palmas de Gran Canaria: 
Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, 2012); and War, Entrepreneurs 
and the State in Europe and the Mediterranean, 1300–1800, ed. by Jeff 
Fynn-Paul (Leiden: Brill, 2014). 
2 Guy Rowlands, Dangerous and Dishonest Men: The International Bankers 
of Louis XIV’s France (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
3 Immediately relevant exceptions include: Sune Lundgren, Johan Adler 
Salvius: Problem kring freden, krigsekonomien och maktkampen (Lund: 
Lindstedts, 1945); Claude Badalo-Dulong, Banquier du Roi: Barthélémey 
Hervart, 1606–1676 (Paris: Ségur, 1951); and the same author’s Mazarin 
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Cardinal Richelieu, in his Testament politique, praised Louis’ 
actions in ‘taking up the purse and not the sword’ before 1635, 
when after a formal declaration of war the king of France would 
brandish his sword in one hand while dispensing funds from the 
purse in the other.4 Subsidy payments involved complex transactions, 
as financial intermediaries were obliged by treaty to provide large 
sums of money in a specified currency, at a given date and location, 
while war strained European financial markets and bankers. During 
the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, emissaries often took 
on the payment of subsidies alongside their other tasks, sometimes 
in conjunction with merchants.5 As early as 1626, Richelieu recog-
nized the peculiar demands of subsidy payments when he noted 
that any anti-Spanish alliance would require that ‘those who enter 
into it would each provide a solvent banker who would respond 
and oblige themselves’.6 The French historians Jacques Bottin and 
Raphaël Morera have shed light on the until-recently obscure but 
absolutely crucial figure of Jean Hoeufft, by suggesting the importance 
of examining the relations between mercantile activity, financial 
et l’argent: Banquiers et prête-noms (Paris: École des Chartes, 2002). The 
late, great harpsichordist Gustav Leonhardt’s erudite Het huis Bartolotti en 
zijn bewoners (Amsterdam: Meulenhoff, 1979) is also excellent. Diplomatic 
historians often neglect the importance of financers, who do not appear, for 
example, in Madeleine Haehl, Les affaires étrangères au temps de Richelieu: 
Le secréteriat d’État, les agents diplomatiques (1624–1642) (Paris: Direction 
des Archives, Ministère des affaires étrangères, 2006). 
4 ‘Si c’est un effet d’une prudence singulière d’avoir occupé dix ans durant 
toutes les forces des ennemis de vostre Estat par celles de vos alliez en 
mettant la main à la bourse et non aux armes.’ Testament politique, ed. 
by Françoise Hildesheimer (Paris: Société de l’histoire de France, 1995), p. 
74. 
5 Thus Jacques Bongars uses his contacts with Nikolas Malapert, Caesar 
Calandrini, and Daniel van der Meulen to make payments; see Ruth 
Kohlndorfer-Fries, Diplomatie und Gelehrtenrepublik: Die Kontakte des 
französischen Gesandten Jacques Bongars (1554–1612) (Tübingen: Max 
Niemeyer, 2009). Benjamin Aubery du Maurier supervised subsidy payments 
to the Dutch; see Mémoires de Benjamin Aubery du Maurier (1566–1636), 
ed. by Claire Martin (Geneva: Droz, 2010), pp. 132–135. 
6 ‘Advis sur les affaires présentes qu’a le Roy en février 1626’ in Les papiers 
de Richelieu: Section politique Intérieure …, ed. by Pierre Grillon (Paris: 
Pedone, 1975–), vol. I, No. 41, p. 298, ‘Quelque traicté qu’on fasse, il faut 
que ceux qui y entreront donnent chacun un banquier solvable qui responde 
et s’oblige de faire tenir en tous les lieux où sera l’armée les monstres de 
chaque prince.’
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activity, and arms dealing drawing upon Hoeufft’s Dutch kin.7 Morera 
rightly notes that Hoeufft was essential to the foreign policies 
associated with Cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin by procuring 
weapons and naval vessels, and to French diplomacy by paying 
subsidies to the United Provinces. If anything, Morera understates 
Hoeufft’s importance and the importance of subsidies to Hoeufft’s 
business.8 Hoeufft remitted subsidies not only to the United Provinces 
but also to many of France’s other allies during most of the Thirty 
Years’ War, including Sweden, Hesse-Cassel, and Transylvania.9
In this chapter, I focus on Hoeufft’s role as the organizer of 
subsidy payments from the king of France to most of the French 
king’s allies. I will touch upon other aspects of his career as a 
merchant of ships, grain, arms, and munitions, a banker engaged 
in royal finances, a committed Calvinist with distinct religious beliefs, 
a patron, and as an actor with an important role in diplomatic 
negotiations and information networks, only to the extent that is 
necessary in order to place his role with regard to subsidy payments 
in its appropriate context. This reflects not only the subject of this 
book but also the fact that subsidy payments were absolutely crucial 
7 Raphaël Morera, ‘Du commerce au finances: la fortune de Jean Hoeufft entre 
la France et les Provinces Unies’, Revue d’Histoire moderne et contemporaine 
63.1 (2016), 7–29, and L’assèchement des marais en France au XVIIe siècle 
(Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2011), pp. 114–122. See also the 
comparison between Hoeufft and Louis de Geer by Jacques Bottin and Pierre 
Jeannin, ‘Entre conviction et réalisme: deux hommes d’affaires protestants 
du premier XVIIe siècle’, in D’un Rivage à l’Autre: Villes et Protestantisme 
dans l’Aire Atlantique (XVIe–XVIIe siècles), ed. by Guy Martinière, Didier 
Poton, and François Souty (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1999), p. 158. See 
also Eduard de Dienne, Histoire du desséchement des lacs et marais de 
France avant 1789 (Paris: Champion, 1891), and Fritz Redlich, The German 
Military Enterpriser and His Workforce: A Study in European Economic 
and Social History (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1964–1965), pp. 407–408.
8 I presented a working paper which set Hoeufft’s work in a diplomatic context, 
‘Jean Hoeufft and the Thirty Years War: An Essay on Diplomatic History’s 
Limits’, at Umeå University, 16 May 2013, available at www.cedar.umu.se/
digitalAssets/120/120438_joint-seminar-with-guest-researchers.pdf. accessed 
14 October 2018. The current chapter draws on several summers of archival 
research to develop a small aspect of that earlier paper. I thank Svante 
Norrhem and the Winnipeg RH foundation for supporting this research. 
9 The subsidies to Transylvania were remitted by way of Lyon and Venice, 
and thus through different networks from those described here. See Paris: 
Archives Diplomatiques (AD), Correspondance Politique (CP), Allemagne, 
27, fol. 284, Mazarin to D’Avaux and Servien, and fol. 376. 
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to Hoeufft’s success as an entrepreneur. Subsidies were vital to 
foreign and military affairs, and arguably even important to the 
early seventeenth-century macro-economy.
As Marianne Klerk and Peter Wilson argue in Chapters 9 and 3 
above, early modern warfare and diplomacy depended upon access 
to fiscal-military ‘hubs’, with financial institutions and markets for 
armaments, munitions, food, capital, and even armies. Hoeufft 
benefited from occupying what the social network theorist Ronald 
Burt has called a ‘structural hole’, profiting from his relations with 
kith and kin to bind together fiscal-military hubs and networks that 
otherwise had few connections, such as Richelieu’s and Mazarin’s 
creatures, French financiers, Dutch and Hamburg merchant groups, 
and members of the Dutch political elites of different factions.10 
Burt and others suggest that it is rare for an entrepreneur to be able 
to profit from such structural holes for long, as others usually offer 
themselves as alternative and cheaper ways of performing those 
functions of brokerage, unless political power protects the broker’s 
status.11 Obtaining the official position of remitter of subsidies, 
however, allowed Hoeufft and his network to profit from a version 
of what the Dutch economic historian P.W. Klein has called a 
‘monopoly game’, and to reinforce his unique position as a broker 
between networks and add others to his networks, such as Swedish 
fiscal officials.12 Rather than using ties to a crown to attempt to 
corner the market in copper or another commodity, as Klein argues 
was the intent of such major Amsterdam arms dealers as the Trip 
brothers and Louis de Geer, Hoeufft’s role as the broker of subsidy 
payments gave him unique access to high-quality assignations from 
the French crown while giving him an unparalleled ability to extend 
10 Ronald S. Burt, Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992). See also Ray E. Reagans 
and Ezra Zuckerman, ‘Why Knowledge Does Not Equal Power: The Network 
Redundancy Trade-off’, Industrial and Corporate Change 17 (2008), 903–944, 
and their ‘All in the Family: Reply to Burt, Podolny, and van de Rijt, Ban 
and Sarkar’, Industrial and Corporate Change 17 (2008), 979–999. 
11 Ronald S. Burt, ‘Bridge Decay’, Social Networks 24 (2002), 333–363, 
and Mark Granovetter, Society and Economy: Framework and Principles 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017), pp. 106–126. 
12 P.W. Klein, ‘A 17th Century Monopoly Game: The Swedish–Dutch Trade in 
Tar and Pitch’, in Wirtschaftskräfte in der europäischen Expansion (Stuttgart: 
Klett-Cotta, 1978), pp. 459–471, and his classic De Trippen in de 17e eeuw: 
een studie over het ondernemersgedrag op de Hollandse stapelmarkt (Assen: 
Van Gorcum, 1965). 
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credit to a wide variety of merchants, bankers, generals, and diplomats 
throughout northern Europe.
Hoeufft’s establishment as a merchant-banker
Jean Hoeufft’s family was originally from Roermond, a town between 
Aachen and Eindhoven. His parents converted to Calvinism and 
fled to Liège, where Jean was born in 1578. Liège probably played 
a crucial part in his development, as wealthy merchants developed 
new ways of combining their capital with investment from Antwerp 
to fund the exploitation of mines, blast furnaces, and arms manu-
factories.13 Hoeufft’s youth coincided with a significant disruption 
to Liège’s trade, for the closing of the Scheldt and weakening of 
Antwerp as a commercial centre caused many of these entrepreneurs 
to leave Liège. A striking number of these émigrés – Jean Curtius, 
Louis de Geer, and the Trip brothers, for a start – became central 
figures in the European arms trade.14 It might be useful to think of 
the Liège diaspora who were central actors in the financing and 
arming of the French and Protestant coalition in the Thirty Years’ 
13 As Bas van Bavel notes, ‘more recent in-depth studies on this interesting 
sector are lacking’, Manors and Markets: Economy and Society in the Low 
Countries, 500–1600 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 252, n. 
34. But see Jean LeJeune, La formation du capitalisme moderne dans la 
principauté de Liége au XVIe siècle (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1939); Myron 
P. Gutmann, Toward the Modern Economy: Early Industry in Europe, 
1500–1800 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), pp. 48–83; and 
Brian G. Awty, ‘The Development and Dissemination of the Walloon Method 
of Iron Working’, Technology and Culture 48.4 (October 2007), 783–803.
14 Marjolein t’Hart, ‘From the Eighty Years War to the Second World War: 
New Perspectives on the Economic Effects of War’, Tijdschrift voor Sociale 
en Economische Geschiedenis 11 (2014), 261–279, and The Dutch Wars 
of Independence: Warfare and Commerce in the Netherlands (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 170–190; Pepijn Brandon, War, Capital 
and the Dutch State (1588–1795) (Leiden: Brill, 2015); Julia Zunckel, 
Rüstungsgeschäfte im Dreißigjährigen Krieg: Unternehmerkräfte, Militärgüter 
und Marktstrategien im Handel zwischen Genua, Amsterdam und Hamburg 
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1997); L.F.W. Andriaenssen, ‘De Amsterdamse 
geschutgietereij: Over het Oorlogsindustriële ondernemingschap van de 
Stedelijke overheid’, Amstelodamum 49 (2002), 44–89; The Arsenal of 
the World: The Dutch Arms Trade in the Seventeenth Century, ed. by 
Jan Piet Puype and Marco van der Hoeven (Amsterdam: Batavian Lion, 
1996); and Regina Schulte, ‘Rüstung, Zins und Frömmigkeit: Niederländische 
Calvinisten als Finanziers des Dreißigjährigen Krieges’, Bohemia: Jahrbuch 
des Collegium Carolinum 35 (1994), 45–62. 
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War as forming a ‘business group’, in Mark Granovetter’s term, 
whose members co-ordinate their activities while competing for 
individual pieces of business.15
While much of his kindred moved to the United Provinces, Hoeufft 
himself moved to Rouen in 1600 and received a letter of naturalization 
the next year.16 He began to trade in a range of goods, to supply 
ships including those in the VOC (Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, 
Dutch East India Company), and to invest in voyages to Brazil, 
Canada and Virginia.17 At least annually from 1609 to 1615, Hoeufft 
in partnership with his brother Diederick and the merchant Pieter 
van Beeck began to charter roughly a dozen ships of an average of 
slightly less than 120 tonnes to carry salt from Brouage to Rouen 
and other French ports, presumably reflecting engagement with 
French finances.18 He also began to engage in exchange transactions, 
15 Mark Granovetter, ‘Coase Revisited: Business Groups in the Modern 
Economy’, Industrial and Corporate Change 4 (1995), 93–130.
16 Michel Mollat, Le commerce maritime Normand à la fin du Moyen Age: 
Étude d’histoire économique et sociale (Paris: Plon, 1952); H. Lapeyre, Une 
famille de marchands: les Ruiz (Paris: Armand Colin, 1955); Philip Benedict, 
‘Rouen’s Foreign Trade during the Era of the Religious Wars (1560–1600)’, 
The Journal of European Economic History 13 (1984), 29–74; and Gayle 
K. Brunelle, The New World Merchants of Rouen, 1559–1630 (Kirksville, 
MO: Sixteenth Century Journal, 1984). 
17 Jacques Bottin, ‘Négoce et crises frumentaires: Rouen et ses marchands dans 
le commerce international des blés, milieu XVIe–début XVIIe siècle’, Revue 
d’histoire moderne et contemporaine 45 (1998), 558–588 (pp. 579–585). 
He remained involved in foreign trade, sending a ship to Virginia in 1621; 
Amsterdam Stadsarchief, Not. Arch. 547, fol. 304, 16 November 1621. 
See also Cornelius Jaensen, ‘Champlain and the Dutch’, in Champlain: The 
Birth of French America, ed. by Raymonde Litalien and Denis Vaugeois 
(Montreal: Editions de Septentrion / McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004), 
p. 239.
18 For Van Beeck, see Amsterdam Stadsarchief, 30452: Archief van S. Hart: 
(gedeeltelijke) toegang op de notariële archieven, 91, ‘Heuft’. For comparison, 
the 1640 fleet conveying salt under the so-called Gabelle monopoly was 
composed of 58 ships, mostly of 50–60 tons. See Marcel DelaFosse and 
Claude Laveau, Le commerce du sel de Brouage aux XVIIe et XVIIe siècles 
(Paris: Armand Colin, 1960), p. 90, and Daniel Dessert, L’argent du sel: 
le sel de l’argent (Paris: Fayard, 2012). If the surviving register is correct, 
Hoeufft’s chartered ships represented 8.75 per cent of the total tonnage 
arriving in Rouen from 26 January to 11 December 1614. See Pierre Dardel, 
Le traffic maritime de Rouen aux XVIIe et XVIII siècles: Essai statistique 
(Rouen: Laine, 1946), p. 24. 
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with merchants of Antwerp among others.19 Roughly at the time 
of the outbreak of the Bohemian revolt, and certainly by the expiry 
of the Twelve Years’ Truce, Hoeufft began to deal in arms and 
munitions much more intensively, particularly with the French. He 
exported saltpetre from Lorraine to the Netherlands, and in 1629 
shipped over one hundred shiploads of grain from France to the 
Netherlands at the behest of the States-General to ease a shortage 
caused by disruptions in the Baltic.20 Above all, he provided large 
numbers of weapons and naval vessels to the French monarchy, 
drawing upon supplies from the Netherlands. Morera claims that 
Hoeufft was probably the single greatest provider of vessels to the 
French navy as well as the largest single supplier of artillery to the 
French crown. Other members of the Liège diaspora watched his 
progress, and considered their own commercial opportunities in 
relation to the French, with a hint of scepticism. When writing to 
his partner Pieter Trip to tell him to stop extending credit to the 
French in 1627, Louis de Geer commented, ‘I know that French 
court all too well. Hoeufft hasn’t got much from there. He would 
have made a lot, if the profits counted as they stand in the book, 
and not in the cassa.’ 21
Subsidies, risk, and assignations
On the face of it, taking on the role of remitter of subsidies should 
have increased Hoeufft’s exposure to financial risks from the French 
19 See Amsterdam, International Institute of Social History, Bijzondere collective 
van het Nederlandsch Economisch-Historisch Archief, No. 144, ‘Franstalig 
journal van een wissel- en diamanthandelaar te Antwerpen over de period 
1609–1613’, entry for 12 February 1611. 
20 See 27 September 1619, No. 1679, and 13 October 1620, No. 4103, in 
Resolutiën der Staten-Generaal, ed. by J.G. Smit and J. Roelerink (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), Nieuwe reeks, vol. 4, pp. 252 and 626. 
Hereafter RSG. RSG 29 May 1621, No. 1044, RSG, 5, p. 165, 21 June 
1621, No. 1185, RSG, 5, p. 186, and 1 July 1621, No. 1274, RSG, 5, 
200. For the grain, see Baugy to Richelieu (18 June 1629), Paris: Archives 
Diplomatiques, Correspondance politique, Hollande, 12, fol. 105, Brasset 
to Villiers Hotman (15 April 1630), fol. 373. 
21 Minute of Louis de Geer to Pieter Trip (14/29 [April] 1627), in Louis 
de Geers Brev och Affärshandlingar, 1614–1652, ed. by E.W. Dahlgren 
(Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt, 1934), No. 72, 119, ‘Ick kenne het fransche 
hof te wel. Heuft moet er noch al veel van hebben, heeft hij der veel bij 
gewonnen, die proffijten achte al int boeck staen, ende niet in cassa.’ All 
translations are by the author unless otherwise stated.
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crown. After Christian IV’s defeat, those who remitted French 
subsidies to the Danish were not paid the money they advanced.22 
Hoeufft had difficulty trying to get paid for loans to the Dutch 
ambassador in Paris, Gideon van den Boetzelaer, heer von Langerak, 
in 1630.23 His family had already begun to involve him more closely 
in affairs with and financing of other Protestant powers. Diederick 
Hoeufft, together with Gerhart Thijns (Gerdt Thiens) (unhappily) 
lent the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel 50,000 guilders in 1626.24 Thiens 
was the brother-in-law of the Bewindhebber of the Dutch West 
India Company and great merchant Samuel Blommaert, who also 
shared kin relations to Hoeufft through the Coijmans.25 In 1631 
Jean Hoeufft entered into a contract to transfer the French subsidies 
to the United Provinces, in conjunction with his Amsterdam-based 
nephew Mattheus. They stepped into the role abandoned by a shifting 
consortium of financiers that had replaced his old partner Pieter 
van Beeck, who had repeatedly failed to have adequate funds to 
cover delays in payment.26 Perhaps the previous contractors had 
been rattled by the liquidity problems of one of their counterparties, 
the financier Philip Burlamachi, which would lead to his bankruptcy 
a year and a half later.27
22 AD, CP Danemark, 1, fol. 146, lists debts in 1630. The ambassador Zobel 
complained to Richelieu that he had still not been paid on 1 August 1630, fol. 
241. Zobel was engaged in French finances. See Paris: Archives Nationales 
(AN) MC ET/CV/444.
23 Den Haag, Nationaal Archief, Staten Generaal, 1.01.02. 6762, Jean Hoeufft 
to States General, 16 May 1630, 31 July 1630. The draft response, dated 
4 October 1630, temporizes. 
24 RSG, digital edition, 38/03/1626; 1, 21/03/1626, 14; 31/03/1626, 7; 
23/03/31, 6 available at www.historici.nl/Onderzoek/Projecten/BesluitenStaten-
generaal1626-1651/silva/sg/resoluties/ . . ., accessed 27 October 2017.
25 Klein, De Trippen in de 17e eeuw, pp. 326–327, n. 17. 
26 Michiel de Jong, ‘Staat van oorlog’: Wapenbedrijf en militaire hervorming in 
de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden, 1585–1621 (Hilversum: Verloren, 
2005), pp. 310–336, and ‘Kooplieden en hun belangen in de Overheidsfi-
nanciën van de Republiek: Bilaterale subsidies en leningen als “case-study”, 
1615–1630’, in Ondernemers & bestuurders: Economie en politiek in de 
Noordlijke Nederlanden in de Late Middeleeuwen en Vroegmoderne tijd, 
ed. by Clé Lesger and Leo Noordegraaf (Amsterdam: NEHA, 1999), pp. 
277–297.
27 A.V. Judges, ‘Philip Burlamachi: A Financier of the Thirty Years War’, 
Economica 18 (November 1926), 285–300, and Ole Peter Grell, Brethren in 
Christ: A Calvinist Network in Reformation Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), pp. 92–101.
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Equally, the payment of French subsidies to the Swedes promised 
by the 1631 treaty of Bärwalde hardly went smoothly. In Paris, the 
subsidies were entrusted to the financier Claude Charlot, who would 
rapidly go bankrupt.28 Charlot advanced the subsidies to the Swedish 
agent Erik Larsson (von der Linde), who in conjunction with his 
son Lorens and his factor Samuel Blommaert co-ordinated the actions 
of a group of merchants in Amsterdam. That group included the 
unfortunate Pieter van Beeck, who failed to remit money promptly 
to the Swedes, just as he had previously failed to do for the Dutch, 
and died without having paid the subsidies fully in the summer of 
1631.29 The Swedish King Gustav II Adolf grew suspicious that 
Larsson was in collusion with Dutch merchants and overly interested 
in his own profit. He attempted to replace him with new factors 
who were not as well connected in Amsterdam, and were given the 
impossible task of auditing Larsson’s activities, separating the crown’s 
obligations from merchants whom the king distrusted and maintaining 
the crown’s credit (on these developments, see also Marianne Klerk, 
Chapter 9 above). Even before Gustav II Adolf’s death at Lützen 
these disputes caused Swedish credit to plummet, and the Swedes 
complained repeatedly to the French about the delays in receiving 
the subsidy money.30
28 Charlot’s bankrupcy was well advanced by 17 May 1634, when the Council 
ordered the seizure of all his papers. See Paris, Archives Nationales, E*117A, 
fol. 353. On Charlot’s business, see Françoise Bayard, Le monde des financiers 
au XVIIe siècle (Paris: Flammarion, 1988), pp. 154–155, 160, 272, 275, 
281, 284–287, 289, 326, 355, 367, and 372, and Dessert, L’argent du sel, 
pp. 34–42.
29 Instruction for Erik Larsson (16 January 1631), in Arkiv till upplysning om 
svenska krigens och krigsinrättningarnes historia (Stockholm: 1854–1861), 
vol. I, p. 305, Gustav II Adolf to Axel Oxenstierna (16 January 1631) in 
Rikskanslern Axel Oxenstiernas skrifter och Brevväxling [AOSB], vol. II, 1, 
No. 500, pp. 682–684, and Lars Ekholm, ‘Kontributioner och krediter: Svensk 
krigsfinansiering 1630–1631’, in Det kontinentala krigets ekonomi: Studier i 
krigsfinansiering under svensk stormaktstid (Uppsala: Scandinavian University 
Books, 1971), pp. 181–183. Melchior Falckenberg to Axel Oxenstierna (27 
January 1631), Stockholm, Riksarkivet [RA], Oxenstiernska Samlingen, E 
597b, ‘här till haffwer hwarken iagh eller Erich Larßon kunnadt få penningar 
på wexell, uthan hans factors Samuel Blommaerts tillhielp, hwilken haffwer 
warit borgen för alla waxlar som båda Erich Larßon och iag haffwar dragit 
båda på Dansick och Hamborg allt här till.’ Charnacé to Chavigny, 17 April 
1631, AD, CP Suède, 2, fol. 50.
30 Georg Wittrock, Svenska handelskompaniet och kopparhandeln under 
Gustaf II Adolf (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1919), pp. 145–149; see also 
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Hoeufft tentatively began to approach the Swedish subsidies in 
1631. Perhaps the French emissary Hercule de Charnacé suggested 
that Hoeufft might remit the Swedish subsidies as well, for he noted 
in his diary in 1631 that he had met ‘Mr Hoeufft the Flemish 
merchant who resides at Paris’ to talk of affairs shortly after refusing 
to receive a diamond-encrusted portrait of Gustav II Adolf from 
Erik Larsson.31 Things grew even more pressing after the death of 
the Swedish king in November 1632. The Swedish Chancellor Axel 
Oxenstierna, directing Swedish affairs in the Holy Roman Empire, 
had to settle the finances of the German war.32 Hoeufft began to 
correspond directly with Oxenstierna.33 At the same time, he worked 
closely with French financial officials to obtain good assignations 
for the Swedish subsidy payments, as well as to lobby for a missed 
subsidy payment from before Gustav II Adolf’s death.34 On 28 May 
1633, Oxenstierna gave Hoeufft the formal charge to collect the 
French subsidies to the Swedish army and provided a commission 
to present to Louis XIII.35
Ekholm, ‘Kontributioner och krediter’, p. 232, and Conrad Falkenberg to 
Axel Oxenstierna, 5/15 June 1632 and 6/16 October 1632, AOSB, vol. II, 
11, Nos 32–33, 612–616.
31 AD, CP, Suède, 3 fol. 75v, Journal de Charnacé, 8 September 1631. 
32 Roland Nordlund, ‘Krig genom ombud: De svenska krigsfinanserna och 
Heilbronnförbundet 1633’, in Det kontinentala krigets ekonomi, pp. 271–451. 
See also Peter H. Wilson, The Thirty Years War: Europe’s Tragedy (London: 
Penguin, 2009), pp. 549–553. These problems are not dealt with by Gottfried 
Lorenz, ‘Schweden und die Französischen Hilfsgelder von 1638 bis 1649: ein 
Beitrag zur Finanzierung des Krieges im 17. Jahrhundert’, in Forschungen 
und Quellen zur Geschichte des Dreißigjährigen Krieges, Schriftenreihe 
der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der Neueren Geschichte e.V., 12, ed. by 
Konrad Repgen (Münster: Aschendorff, 1981), pp. 98–148. 
33 RA, Oxen. Sam E 622a (29 April 1633, 17 April 1633, 10 June 1633). 
34 Hoeufft’s large correspondence with the Bouthilliers, extant in the eighteenth 
century, appears to have vanished. Jacques LeLong, Bibliothèque historique 
de la France, contenant le Catalogue des Ouvrages, imprimés & manuscrits, 
qui traitent de l’Histoire de ce Royaume, ou qui y ont rapport; avec des 
notes Critiques et Historiques (Paris: Jean-Thomas Herissant, 1769–1778), 
vol. III, p. 97, No. 30743, ‘Ms. Lettres de M. Hoeufft, Banquier, employé 
par le Roi en Hollande, depuis le 15 Novembre 1635 jusqu’au 11 Octobre 
1645. Ces quatre recueils [étoient] dans la Bibliothèque de M. Bouthillier, 
ancien Evêque de Troyes: le premier 0.4, le second, L. 4; le troisième, V.5; 
& le quatrième X.5’. 
35 Axel Oxenstierna to Hoeufft (28 May 1633) and Louis XIII (same date), 
in AOSB, vol. I, 8, Nos 326–327, 731–733.
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From 1633, Jean Hoeufft occupied a unique position as the 
financial intermediary formally responsible for assuring the punctual 
remittance of subsidies from France to its allies. His financial role 
also gave him a political role, where he lobbied French officials on 
behalf of the Dutch and Dutch statesmen on behalf of the French. 
Hoeufft was asked, for instance, by Cardinal Richelieu and Louis 
XIII himself to propose political and military actions to the prince 
of Orange and other notables in the United Provinces.36 Hoeufft 
used this position to ensure that he would be paid punctually, 
representing his credit as essential to the functioning of the alliance, 
and his claim was often accepted by French statesmen. Hoeufft 
worked extremely closely with superintendent Claude de Bullion, 
who noted that ‘I’ve done everything imaginable to persuade M. 
Euf [Hoeufft] to accept the assignations. He does not want to oblige 
himself to furnish money in Amsterdam if I don’t give him cash in 
this town.’ 37 This circumstance rested in part on close personal 
connections; Hoeufft took up residence in Paris on rue Mauconseil, 
a seven-minute walk from Bullion’s palace on the other side of St 
Eustache. Bullion frequently notes in letters to Richelieu that Hoeufft 
had told him some news, or that Hoeufft was present.38 As Bullion 
noted in a letter to Secretary of State Chavigny,
I showed Monsieur Hoeufft that the assignations for the million 
given to him are good and payable within the year. He wanted some 
changes to some of them. I came to an agreement with him. And in 
order to advance the payment, I promised him some interest so that 
he will presently furnish My Lords of the States-General a notable 
sum on his credit.39
36 Den Haag, Nationaal Archief, Collectie Van Wijn, 1.13.20, bestanddeel 
330, Jean Hoeufft to Frederik Hendrik, Prince of Orange, Paris, 23 June 
1634.
37 AD, Mémoires et documents, France, 822, fol. 2. ‘J’ay faict tout ce qui 
est imaginable pour persuader M Euf pour prendre des assignations. Et ne 
veult s’obliger a faire fournir l’argent dans Amsterdam si je ne luy donne 
content en cette ville.’ See similar observations in David Parrott, Richelieu’s 
Army: War, Government and Society in France, 1624–1642 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 263.
38 AD, Mémoires et documents, France, 822 (MDF) fol. 105. Bullion to Richelieu 
(23 October 1636): ‘Je commenceray cette lettre par une bonne Nouvelle 
de M Euf qui m’asseure’, AD, MDF, 826, fol. 87, Bullion to Richelieu, 30 
January 1637, ‘Pour satisfaire au commandement de VE j’ay parlé a M. Euf 
luy disant que je desirois parler a un anglois nommé Jaric ou Vanderlay’, 
and Hoeufft reports finding him on fol. 103 (1 February 1637). 
39 AD, MDF, 827, fol. 113, Bullion to Chavigny (16 June 1637), ‘J’ai faict 
voir a Monsieur Euft que les assignations du million qui lu en esté donnees 
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Hoeufft did receive favourable assignations; shortly after Chavigny 
met him at Bullion’s house at eight in the morning to straighten 
out some remittances to Hamburg, the Council issued an assignation 
that would automatically turn to a provision to receive coin directly 
from the treasury should the funds not otherwise be available.40
He occasionally faced problems with officials who did not treat 
him so scrupulously, and on those occasions Hoeufft might write 
to Richelieu, appeal to the Dutch ambassador, and even procure a 
letter from the States-General asking that he be paid for the good 
of the alliance.41 Indeed, the 1639 treaty for 1,200,000 livres of 
additional subsidies prescribed, in the treaty’s second article, that 
‘the French king would provide for the said money assignations 
which will be good, and to the contentment of him whom it would 
please the said Lords of the States-General to authorize in France’.42 
This right to judge the assignations would be repeated in subsequent 
treaties.43 Nevertheless, on the payer’s side of the bill of exchange 
Hoeufft was not simply given cash, but had to judge whether 
assignations and other assets would allow him to maintain his 
liquidity.
Contracts and cost of exchange
Although Hoeufft eventually received commissions both from the 
United Provinces and the Swedish crown to act as their financial 
sont bonnes et payables dans cette annee. Il desire quelque changement de 
quelqu’unes d’eux. Je suis demeuré d’accord avec luy. Et affin d’avancer le 
payement je luy ay promis quelque interest affin qu’il fournisse a Messieurs 
les Estats pnt:mt une notable somme sur son credit.’ 
40 AD: MDF, 828, Chavigny to Richelieu (20 November 1637); the assignation 
is in the AN, E*114B, fol. 327, 26 Novembre 1637. 
41 All these in AD, CP Hollande, 20, Hoeufft to Richelieu (10 Avril 1637), 
fol. 70; Guillaume de Lyere to Richelieu (18 April 1637), naming Hoeufft 
officially commissionaire, 29 May 1637, fol. 111; Charnacé informs Richelieu 
that the States-General sent a deputation to him (29 May 1637), fol. 113; 
States-General demand payment (29 May 1637); Richelieu’s secretary 
Charpentier noted that the Cardinal has pledged that the assignations were 
good, and promised Hoeufft an additional 20,000 livres in interest, ‘Du 
xxvii jan 1638’, fol. 376. 
42 Den Haag, Nationaal Archief, Staten Generaal, 1.01.02, 12587.71, treaty of 24 
March 1639, signed for France by Bullion and Bouthillier, not coincidentally 
the two surintendants de Finance. 
43 Den Haag, Nationaal Archief, Staten Generaal, 1.01.02, 12587–75, 14 
February 1641, 1.01.02, 12587.79A, 8 March 1642, 1.01.02, 12587.85, 
30 March 1643, and 1.01.02, 12587.91, 29 February 1644. 
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agent in France, he played a different role in each case because of 
the different stipulations about the payment of subsidies in treaties 
between France and these two powers. Treaties with both powers 
differed from those with the Swiss, for example, in that they did 
not specify – with the minor exception of 50,000 livres to be dis-
tributed to officers in the French regiment in the United Provinces 
at the discretion of the French ambassador – pay for individual 
officers, or the disposition or use of the subsidy money.44
The first article of the 1630 treaty between France and the 
United Provinces specified that France would pay 1,000,000 livres 
per year payable every six months as long as the war continued.45 
In the 1630 treaty no place of payment was specified, though Paris 
would be designated at a later date. The States-General formally 
received the subsidy from the king of France in Paris, and thus the 
States-General entered into a contract with Hoeufft for the costs of 
exchange and transfer of the money to the United Provinces. The 
States-General allowed costs of 2 per cent for ‘provision and risk of 
the exchange’, though they also made allowances for extraordinary 
costs.46 Treasurers scrutinized Hoeufft’s accounts and extra costs 
regularly.47 In 1639, the States-General formed a committee to 
examine his accounts, which informally put the Hoeuffts’ contract 
up for bidding.48 Mattheus Hoeufft claimed that the States-General 
could not find any other merchants to take up their remittances 
on the same conditions as the Hoeuffts when a committee rejected 
other expenses in 1647.49 Two per cent was a significant reduction 
44 AN, K 114B, No. 44, the ‘Estat de la recepte et depence’ for the Swiss 
pensions. 
45 I follow Den Haag, Nationaal Archief, Staten Generaal, 1.01.02.12587–42, 
treaty of 17 June 1630. 
46 See Extracts from resolutions about Hoeufft’s accounts in Den Haag, Nationaal 
Archief, Staten Generaal, 1.01.02. 12475.75.2; this one is from 3 July 1634. 
47 Den Haag, Nationaal Archief, Staten Generaal, 1.01.02. 6762. Jean Hoeufft 
to Staten Generaal, 29 October 1632, ‘heb ick gesonden aen Ewe Hoog: 
Moog: de Rekening van mine administratie der achthondert dry en sestich 
dusent vier hondert gulden so ick vant twede million, ent handen van min 
heer den Ambassad. Langerack ontfangen heb’.
48 Den Haag, Nationaal Archief, 1.01.02, 3198, registers van ordinaris resoluties 
van de Staten-Generaal, 1639. Committee formed, fol. 48v, 7 July, Hoeufft’s 
accounts scrutinized, fol. 348, and again on 14 July, fols 364–365. Hoeufft 
complains about their examination on fol. 435v, 17 August, and fol. 612r, 
10 November. 
49 Den Haag, Nationaal Archief, 1.01.02, 6269, Matthieu Hoeufft to Staten 
Generaal, 29 January 1647. 
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in exchange costs over previous rates: Michiel de Jong estimates 
that rates on subsidy payments fell from 8 or 9 per cent to 6.25 per 
cent between 1595 and 1630, and Pit Dehing suggests that exchange 
rates from Amsterdam to Paris were above 4 per cent in the 1630s, 
though they fell below that in the 1640s.50 One important unknown, 
then, is what the States-General actually allowed the Hoeuffts in 
‘extraordinary’ costs.
The treaty of Bärwalde allowed the Swedes to choose whether 
the subsidies would be paid in Paris or Amsterdam, and specified 
1,000,000 livres tournois or 400,000 reichstaler.51 Later subsidy 
treaties allowed payment either in Amsterdam or in Hamburg. Thus, 
the French were responsible for the costs of the exchange and 
remittance of the funds. Hoeufft did not enter into a long-term 
contract with the French state for these transfers; but, since he had 
been given a commission by the Swedes, French officials could not 
negotiate with other bankers to make the exchange. In 1638, Bullion 
noted to Richelieu that
[a]s soon as I received Your Eminence’s order I sent for Monsieur 
[Hoeufft] who did not want to furnish the portion in Amsterdam 
except during next August … He demands for the charge of money, 
for the interest, and for the exchange on the order of 28 livres per 
hundred. I have not been able to get better conditions up to the 
present moment.52
Bullion’s letter suggests that Hoeufft charged the French 28 per cent 
for the costs of exchange, significantly more than he charged the 
50 De Jong, ‘Staat van oorlog’, p. 332; Pit Dehing, Geld in Amsterdam: Wis-
selbank en wisselkoersen, 1650–1725 (Hilversum: Verloren, 2012), p. 370. 
51 Traktat mellan konung Gustav II Adolf och konung Ludvig XIII af Frankrike 
om förbund för fem år, subsidier för Sveriges deltagande i tyska kriget, m. 
m. Bärwalde, 1631, januari 13, g. st., in Sverges traktater med främmande 
magter: jämte andra dit hörande handlingar, ed. by O.S. Rydberg and Carl 
Hallendorff (Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt & Söner, 1903), vol. V, I (1572–1632), 
p. 349, ‘Rex Galliae quadringenta millia thalerorum Imperialium, id est 
millionem librarum Turonensium quotannis contribuito, eiusque summae 
mediam partem decimoquinto mensis Maji, alteram decimoquinto Novem-
bris Lutetiae Parisiorum, uel Amstelodami in Batavia, prout Regi Sueciae 
commodius acciderit, deputatis ad id Regis Sueciae commodius acciderit, 
deputatis ad id Regis Sueciae ministris infallibiliter numerato ac tradito.’
52 AD, Bullion to Richelieu, MD France, 830, fol. 274. ‘Aussi tost que j’ay 
receu l’ordre de VE envoyé querir Monsieur Euft lequel ne veult fournir la 
partie a Amsterdam que dans le mois d’Aoust … Il demande pour la taxe 
des monnoyes, pour l’interest et pour le change a raison de xxviii ll pour 
cent jusques a present je ne luy peu avoir a meilleure condition.’ 
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States-General for similar transactions – from 2 to perhaps 5 per 
cent, allowing for extraordinary charges. While Bullion implies that 
these costs were high, other orders seem to suggest that they were 
not extraordinary, although surviving evidence is spotty. One order 
from later in the year directed the royal treasurer to pay Hoeufft 
640,000 livres in cash for the first term of the Swedish subsidy, 
140,000 livres or 18.75 per cent for the costs of exchange. Another 
allowed him 40 per cent (120,000 livres) to send another 300,000 
livres of the Swedish subsidy to Hamburg, so that the extraordinary 
ambassador Claude de Mesmes, count of Avaux, in Hamburg would 
deliver it to the Swedish representative Johan Adler Salvius.53 Both 
of these payments involved Hoeufft receiving cash in hand from 
the treasurer, so in this case there should not have been interest to 
cover time waiting for poor or tardy assignations. It seems likely 
that the difference between the costs paid by the States-General and 
the French for similar exchange transactions represented a profit 
for the Hoeuffts and their associates.
Banks and bills of exchange
Historians of banking and finance have called attention to the manner 
in which war finance fostered institutional developments in the first 
half of the seventeenth century such as the chartered companies 
and exchange banks, for instance the Amsterdam Wisselbank.54 
Merchants, including those who partially engaged in war finance, 
combined the use of these innovatory institutions with older forms 
of finance, such as the direct funding of mercantile activities and 
drawing bills of exchange.55 The Hoeuffts were certainly familiar 
53 AD: CP, Suède, 5, ‘Ordonnance pour pension du Suède, 5 May 1637[8]’, 
fol. 67, ‘Ordonnance pour les suedois ___ nov 1638’, fol. 108. 
54 Lucien Gillard, La Banque d’Amsterdam et le florin européen au temps 
de la République néerlandaise (1610–1820) (Paris: Éditions de l’École des 
Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 2004); Pit Dehing, Geld in Amsterdam; 
Stephen Quinn and William Roberds, ‘An Economic Explanation of the Early 
Bank of Amsterdam, Debasement, Bills of Exchange and the Emergence 
of the First Central Bank’, in The Origins and Development of Financial 
Markets and Institutions: From the Seventeenth Century to the Present, 
ed. by Jeremy Atack and Larry Neal (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), pp. 32–70, and the essays in The Bank of Amsterdam: On the 
Origins of Central Banking, ed. by Marius van Nieuwkerk (Amsterdam: 
Sonsbeek, 2009). 
55 Oscar Gelderblom, Joost Jonker, and Clemens Kool, ‘Direct Finance in the 
Dutch Golden Age’, Economic History Review 69 (2016), 1178–1198. 
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with these developments. Jean Hoeufft, to judge from the inventory 
after his death, engaged in extensive banking in Paris, as well as in 
investments in rentes and other forms of government obligations; 
Mattheus Hoeufft was among the most active account holders in 
the Wisselbank, receiving and forwarding funds to clients who 
included most of the prominent arms dealers and financiers.56
Yet despite regulations that mandated that bills of exchange over 
600 florins (and from 1643 over 300 florins) had to be settled in 
the Wisselbank, the Hoeuffts organized the payment of subsidies 
and other remittances using bills of exchange outside the Wisselbank. 
Apart from assignations and the risk of tardy payment by the French, 
the Hoeuffts’ remittance network probably faced difficulties of 
payment stemming from the size of the subsidy payments, com-
pounded by the monetary complications of wartime. The size of 
the payments might have strained the payment capacity of the 
Wisselbank. From 1633 to 1648, Hoeufft relayed 1,000,000 and 
eventually 1,200,000 livres of regular subsidies to the United 
Provinces, and another 1,000,000 and more to the Swedes. By most 
measures, this payment itself would be substantial. It was roughly 
the value of the foreign currency in the Trésor royal in March 1636, 
for instance.57 To this could be added extraordinary subsidies, such 
as 1,000,000 livres for the siege of Breda in 1637, subsidy payments 
to Hesse, Weimar, and other allies, other payments for diplomatic 
expenses and armies in the Holy Roman Empire, and purchases of 
armaments, munitions, and naval vessels. Hoeufft also extended 
credit to other agents associated with the French crown, such as 
56 Morera, ‘Du commerce au finances’, 23, and AN, MC/ET/XV, 148, Inventaire 
de Jean Hoeufft, lists roughly 183,000 livres of loans to over eighty differ-
ent people. Mattheus Hoeufft’s inventory contains no records of financial 
assets, as opposed to household possessions and real estate. See ‘Inventaris 
van silverweerck … naegelaten by den Heer Mattheus Hoeuft’, Den Haag, 
Haags Gemeentearchief, Notarissen ter standplats ’s-Gravenhage, 281, Martin 
Beeckman, fol. 351r–370v, 23 July 1669. Mattheus Hoeufft first appears in 
the index to the ledgers of the Wisselbank in 1631, with reference to two 
ledger pages. Stadsarchief Amsterdam, 5077, Archief van de Wisselbank, 
2.4.2.1. Index op de grootboeken, 696 ‘DD’. In the next surviving index, 
he had 11 ledger pages (697, ‘ZZ’). By the time of the first surviving ledger, 
in 1644, the index listed eight pages, from 1 February to the end of August 
(698). The same period the following year also required eleven pages (700). 
57 Jérôme Jambu, Tant d’or que d’argent: La monnaie en Basse Normandie à 
l’époque moderne (XVIe–XVIIe siècle) (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de 
Rennes, 2013), p. 334. 
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Alphonse Lopez, when they were without other funds.58 Without 
complete records of all his transactions, one can nevertheless safely 
conclude that from 1633 until 1648, they included the annual 
remittance from France to the Netherlands of a bare minimum of 
3,000,000 livres, or roughly 2,000,000 Dutch guilders. This was a 
significant amount of money, more than half the total metal reserves 
of 3,474,527 guilders of the Amsterdam Wisselbank of Amsterdam 
in 1634; and although deposits in the Wisselbank grew to over 
5,000,000 in the late 1630s and more than 8,000,000 in 1640 and 
1641, the Hoeuffts’ exchanges would always have involved significant 
proportions of the bank’s liquidity.59 Certainly Mattheus Hoeufft’s 
Wisselbank account balance rarely exceeded 200,000 guilders. While 
this was a substantial sum, it would not have sufficed to make the 
subsidy payments, and transactions in the account rarely exceeded 
20,000 guilders.60
Jean Hoeufft occasionally described how financial and monetary 
problems frustrated his activities. Louis XIII granted Hoeufft 
permission to export 400,000 livres’ worth of foreign coins from 
France in June 1635, allegedly because the war had so perturbed 
the bill-of-exchange market that no one would accept bills for the 
subsidy.61 Jean Hoeufft wrote to Chavigny in 1641 that though the 
subsidy money was ready in Amsterdam, ‘there is no possibility of 
drawing letters of change from Amsterdam for Hamburg, as there 
is even less coin there, because Messieurs of the Bank of Amsterdam 
will not spend a single reichsthaler owing to the transport that 
the English do with them’.62 The subsidies themselves may have 
58 Paris: AD, CP, Hollande, 21, Lopez to Richelieu, Amsterdam 13 February 
1640, fol. 458v. On Lopez, see Françoise Hildesheimer, ‘Lopez (Alphonse)’ 
in Dictionnaire Richelieu, ed. by Françoise Hildesheimer and Dénes Harai 
(Paris: Honoré Champion, 2015), pp. 221–222. 
59 J.G. van Dillen, Bronnen tot de geschiedenis der wisselbanken (Amsterdam, 
Middelberg, Delft, Rotterdam) 1603–1820 (’s-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1925), 
vol. II, p. 963. 
60 There are lacunae in the books. See, for example, Stadsarchief Amsterdam, 
5077, Archief van de Wisselbank, 2.4.2.1 Groteboeken, 50, februari-augustus 
1644, 25. 
61 Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, 1.01.08, Staten Generaal, 12587.54: ‘Een 
copie authentijck van en paspoort voor Sr. Jan Heuft tot transport van 
400000 lvr in vreemde specien van 10:e junij 1635’. 
62 Paris: AD, CP, Hollande, 23, Hoeufft to Chavigny, Paris, 27 June 1641, fol. 
182. On these shortages, see J.G. van Dillen, ‘Oprichting en Functie der 
Amsterdamse Wisselbank in de zeventiende Eeuw, 1609–1686’, in Mensen 
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contributed to the difficulties of the exchange market. Although 
figures for balances of trade are notoriously unreliable, by one 
estimate Hoeufft’s subsidy payments would have been worth nearly 
half of the value of all Dutch imports from France.63 Frank Spooner 
called attention to the way in which ‘the brutal decline in the course 
of French exchange rates coincided with the inflation of circulation 
in the kingdom, and the volume of credit, which was determined 
in part by the financial operations of Richelieu and his politics of 
subsidies to allies, above all to Sweden: a flow of bills of exchange 
went the way of Amsterdam’.64 As the Swedish economist Knut 
Wicksell argued, balance-of-payment surpluses in wartime often 
cause a disproportionate decline in exchange rates and interest 
rates.65 Hoeufft’s remittances were more than half Holland’s and 
the Generality’s annual debt purchases during the period.66 It does 
not seem outside the realm of possibility that the French subsidy 
money contributed to the excess capital that caused low interest 
rates in the late 1630s and 1640s, leading to the increased deposits 
in the Wisselbank, sometimes dramatic increases in the price of 
assets such as tulips and housing, and Dutch merchants seeking to 
invest outside of the Netherlands, for instance Hoeufft’s wetland 
drainage projects in Poitou.67
en achtergronden: Studies uitgegeven ter gelegenheid van de tachitigste jaardag 
van de schrijver (Groningen: J.B. Wolters, 1964), pp. 360–362; M.S. Polak, 
Historiografie en economie van de ‘muntchaos’: de Muntproductie van 
de Republiek (Amsterdam: NEHA, 1998), pp. 178–187, and Quinn and 
Roberds, ‘An Economic Explanation’, pp. 56–59.
63 See S. Groenveld and H.L.Ph. Leeuwenberg, De bruid in de schuit: De 
consolidatie van de Republiek, 1609–1650 (Zutphen: De Walburg Pers, 
1985), pp. 160–161. 
64 Frank C. Spooner, L’Économie mondiale et les frappes monétaires en France 
1493–1680 (Paris: Armand Colin, 1956), p. 311. For quoted exchange rates, 
see Markus A. Denzel, Handbook of World Exchange Rates, 1590–1914 
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), p. 65.
65 Knut Wiksell, ‘Växelkursernas gåta’, Ekonomisk tidskrift 21.4 (1919), 87–103. 
On the use of this, see Magnus Andersson, Den europeiska varu- och 
kreditmarknaden under 1700-talet: Handel och sjöfart med Göteborg som 
utgångspunkt (Gothenburg: Gidlunds förlag, 2016), p. 17. 
66 Jan de Vries and Ad van der Woude, The First Modern Economy: Success, 
Failure and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500–1818 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 116–117.
67 See the monetarist explanation of the Tulipmania, for example, in Doug 
French, ‘The Dutch Monetary Environment during Tulipmania’, Quarterly 
Journal of Austrian Economics 9 (2006), 3–34, and James E. McClure and 
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Jean Hoeufft often insisted that it took considerable time to 
prepare the remittance of money, which suggests that the matter 
was not as simple as writing a letter of exchange. I believe that 
Hoeufft attempted to spread out the payments – both in time, by 
turning some of the bills of exchange for longer periods, and by 
forming a payment consortium to spread the capital demands out 
to some extent. The Hoeuffts had previously organized large syn-
dicates of people to lend money to potentially risky borrowers. The 
‘Staet van de geaccepteerde Wisselen’ of 1630 detailed how Mattheus 
Hoeufft, on behalf of Jean, arranged the debts of the Dutch Ambas-
sador Gideon van den Boetzelaer, heer von Langerak, in 1630.68 In 
total, Langerak owed 40,424 ‘Croonen’, divided into thirty-seven 
bills of exchange from Amsterdam, fourteen from Rotterdam, four 
from Delft, two from Dordrecht, and seven from Middelburg. Seven 
of the bills for roughly 15 per cent of the total debt were drawn 
on Mattheus. Such techniques reduced the risk from default or 
delay in payment.69
Although the evidence remains incomplete, the remittance of 
subsidies and other moneys involved a smaller group of people. 
One Colbert70 who was dispatched to Hamburg in order to act as 
a treasurer for the French emissary Melchior Mitte de Miolans, the 
marquis de Saint-Chamond, prepared accounts of his receipts and 
expenses for the king’s service in 1637. In total he received 1,906,526 
David Chandler Thomas, ‘Explaining the Timing of Tulipmania’s Boom and 
Bust: Historical Context, Sequestered Capital and Market Signals’, Financial 
History Review 24.2 (2017), 121–141. The price of housing in Amsterdam 
rose, through a few severe plague outbreaks, until shortly after the signing of 
the Peace of Westphalia. Clé Lesger, Huur en conjunctuur: de woningmarkt 
in Amsterdam, 1550–1850 (Amsterdam: Historisch Seminarium van de 
Universiteit van Amsterdam, 1986), pp. 46–47, and Piet M.A. Eichholtz, 
‘A Long Run House Price Index: The Herengracht Index, 1628–1973’, Real 
Estate Economics 25 (1997), 175–192. 
68 Den Haag, Nationaal Archief, Staten Generaal, 1.01.02. 6762. Elias Trip and 
Tallemant also appear on the list, as does Jean Hoeufft’s brother Diederick 
from Dordrecht.
69 Oscar Gelderblom, Joost Jonker, and Clemens Kool, ‘Direct Finance in the 
Dutch Golden Age’, Economic History Review 69.4 (2016), 1178–1198. 
70 I agree with Anja Victorine Hartmann that this is either Jean Baptiste-Colbert 
(1590–1663) or his son Nicolas. See Les papiers de Richelieu: Section politique 
extérieure: Correspondance et papiers d’État: Empire Allemand, ed. by Anja 
Victorine Hartmann (Paris: Pedone, 1999), vol. III, p. 106, n. 7. 
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livres.71 He was first given a bill of exchange for 305,860 livres 
from Jean Hoeufft for Pieter Spierinck, the Swedish resident in The 
Hague. This money was intended for a portion of the subsidy payment 
from 1632 that the French had not delivered after Gustav II Adolf’s 
death and other moneys to be paid after the ratification of the 
Treaty of Wismar.72 Two letters of change were drawn on one M. 
Sarin and on one M. Delf in Amsterdam, worth 200,000 livres in 
total.73 Another letter of change for 166,666 livres was written by 
‘Messieurs Lumague’, a family of Parisian bankers, on Guillaume 
Bartolotti of Amsterdam. Four letters of exchange were drawn by 
Jean Hoeufft on Mattheus Hoeufft, totalling 630,000 livres. One 
letter for 500,000 livres was drawn by Jean Hoeufft on Lukas van 
Sprekelsen of Hamburg. The final letter for 100,000 livres was 
drawn by Jean Hoeufft on either Mattheus Hoeufft or van Sprekelsen. 
In other words, in 1637, Jean Hoeufft and his nephew handled the 
remittance of at least a third of the French money. This money was 
principally used to pay 1,250,000 livres to the Swedes, and 540,000 
livres to the landgrave Wilhelm of Hesse-Cassel; other uses included 
French agents’ salaries and travel costs, diplomatic gifts, and 
additional exchange charges of 1,557 livres to Mattheus Hoeufft 
for costs of an extra bill of exchange from Amsterdam to Hamburg.
These transactions reveal not only the credit available to the 
Hoeuffts but also how much these transactions reflected a ‘reinforced’ 
structural hole, not just Hoeufft’s ‘natural’ position in kinship 
networks. The Hoeufft family had a long history of business with 
the Lumagues and Bartolotti, who probably also had the capital 
and contacts required to take on the Hoeuffts’ role as remitter of 
subsidies. Hoeufft’s connection to Pieter Spierinck, however, was a 
consciously cultivated tie. Spierinck came from a famous tapestry-
weaving family in Delft who had, as a result of an inheritance 
dispute, come to Sweden early in Gustav II Adolf’s reign in order 
to seek assistance in forcing Danzig’s town council to provide 
71 ‘Estat du maniment faict par le Sieur Colbert des deniers qui luy ont esté 
mis entre les mains pour les affaires d’Allemagne en l’année mil six cens 
trente sept’, AD, CP Allemagne, 14, fols 422–428. 
72 Sverker Arnoldsson, Svensk-fransk krigs- och fredspolitik i Tyskland 
(Gothenburg: Erlanders, 1937), p. 7 et passim, and Tor Berg, ‘En fransk 
subsidieutbetalning till Axel Oxenstierna 1636’, Historisk Tidskrift 74 (1954), 
64–68. 
73 I could not identify these two. 
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satisfaction. In the 1620s, Pieter Spierinck and his brother took on 
the administration of the war tolls or ‘licences’ that the Swedish 
crown levied on shipping into Danzig and other harbours on the 
coasts of Prussia and Livonia. The Swedish Chancellor Axel Oxen-
stierna came to depend upon Spierinck’s financial acumen; Spierinck 
retained control over the Swedish and Livonian sea tolls, Sweden’s 
other major reliable source of international currency, when he was 
appointed resident to the Netherlands.74 In early 1635 Peter Spierinck 
travelled to France, where he met Hoeufft to assure the reliable 
payment of French subsidies, leaving his book-keeper Peter Heltscher, 
who would subsequently become chief Livonian toll-administrator, 
in Paris to establish relationships.75 (The new Swedish ambassador 
Hugo Grotius had to ask the Superintendent of Finances Claude 
Bouthillier to release Spierinck from jail in Calais, where he had 
been incarcerated when trying to leave for Holland; Grotius noted 
that Spierinck, ‘knowing he had enemies, which those who administer 
finances never lack, had found it advisable to travel incognito through 
Germany and while crossing France’.)76
Swedish connections helped Hoeufft broaden his contacts in 
Hamburg, allowing him not only to remit subsidies but also to pay 
French armies operating in northern Germany.77 While serving as 
Swedish resident in Hamburg in the period immediately after Gustav 
II Adolf’s death, Johan Adler Salvius had formed close connections 
with Hamburg’s merchants. Indeed, he threatened the Swedish 
74 See Badeloch Noldus, ‘An “unvergleichbarer Liebhaber”: Peter Spierinck, 
the Art-dealing Diplomat’, Scandinavian Journal of History 31 (2006), 
173–185. This article neglects the financial side of Spierinck’s activity, for 
which see Einar Wendt, Det svenska licentväsendet i Preussen (Uppsala: 
Almqvist & Wiksell, 1933). 
75 Spieringk to Axel Oxenstierna from Delft (1/11 March 1635), RA: Oxen. 
Sam. E727, Peter Heltscher to Axel Oxenstierna, 11 March 1636, RA: 
Oxen. Sam. E697, and Spieringk to A.O. (28 January 7 February 1635), 
5/15 March and 2_/3_ [May] 1635), RA: Oxen Sam. E727.
76 Grotius to Claude Bouthillier (25 February 1635), Briefwisseling van Hugo 
Grotius, vol. V, No. 189, 329, ‘sçachant qu’il a des enemies, qui ne manquent 
jamais à ceux qui administrent les finances, avoit trouvé bon de passer 
incognu par l’Allemagne et traversant la France s’embarquer à Calais’. See 
also Axel Oxenstierna to Paul Strassburg (10 March 1635), AOSB, vol. I, 
13, Nos 70, 182. 
77 Stephan Michael Schröder, ‘Hamburg und Schweden im 30-jährigen Krieg 
– vom potentiellen Bündnispartner zum Zentrum der Kriegsfinanzierung’, 
Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 76.3 (1989), 305–331. 
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minority government that need was driving him out of crown service, 
and ‘to provide for myself in private as a merchant’.78 Hoeufft’s 
correspondent Lukas van Sprekelsen was related to Johan Adler 
Salvius.79 Even if Jean and Mattheus Hoeufft’s own correspondence 
with Axel Oxenstierna could not be characterized as warm, being 
able to maintain good relations with the Hoeuffts was viewed as 
meritorious by other Swedish statesmen. For example, a young 
Swedish emissary in Amsterdam, Harald Appelboom, who openly 
voiced hopes of succeeding Pieter Spierinck as ambassador in Sweden, 
wrote in some detail to Adler Salvius – at this point one of the 
Swedish plenipotentiaries at the Westphalian peace – who had 
instructed him to meet Mattheus Hoeufft and ask about remittance 
of the subsidy to Hamburg. Appelboom described to Salvius how 
Hoeufft had told him that the letters were just being sealed, where-
upon Hoeufft had observed that he would be pleased to pay 
Appelboom any salary that was assigned to him and offered to 
intercede with Salvius so that Appelboom would be paid 3,000 
reichsthaler of back pay which he was owed.80 Rather than merely 
profiting from a naturally occurring spot between networks, the 
Hoeuffts actively cultivated connections, using the opportunity that 
the subsidy payments presented.
Conclusion
The Hoeuffts’ ability to profit from being the payer of French subsidies 
to the monarch’s allies in the United Provinces and Sweden, and to 
princes of the Holy Roman Empire, existed only as long as the 
French monarch had funds and allies which France was obliged to 
pay as long as it maintained an army in the field. In 1648, these 
two factors ceased to exist. For the first time, Hoeufft agreed to 
lend money for subsidy payments; his heirs would claim – and Jean 
Baptiste Colbert would accept – that Hoeufft had never been repaid 
these advances of more than 3,600,000 livres for letters of exchange 
78 Lundgren, Johan Adler Salvius, pp. 72–73, ‘Nöden driver mig ur tjänsten 
och till att på köpmansvis livnära mig in privato.’
79 Heiko Droste, ‘Johan Adler Salvius i Hamburg: Ett nätverksbygge i 1600-talets 
Sverige’, in Mare Nostrum: Om Westfaliska freden och Östersjön som ett 
svenskt maktcentrum (Stockholm: Riksarkivet, 1999), pp. 243–256. 
80 Appelboom to Salvius, Amsterdam, 22 April 1645. RA: Johan Adler Salvius 
och hans sekreterare Georg Kellers samling, vol. 12. I would like to thank 
Heiko Droste, who brought this reference to my attention. 
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for the service of the king in foreign countries.81 After the representa-
tives of the United Provinces signed the Peace of Münster, merchants 
began to doubt that those involved in the French financial networks 
would still maintain their credit. Doubts principally focused on 
Jeremie Calandrini, who had begun to participate in the consortia 
of people who remitted the French subsidies to the Swedes. In early 
June, the Amsterdam banker Julien Lansson confronted Calandrini, 
asking him whether he intended to honour an obligation for 26,000 
guilders which he entered into on behalf of Abel Servien, one of 
the French plenipotentiaries at the Westphalian peace contract.82 
The acting French resident in the Hague, Henri Brasset, wrote to 
Servien noting that Mattheus Hoeufft could not persuade people 
in Amsterdam or Hamburg to honour Calandrini’s credit, observing 
that ‘all the bankers are in a confusion, and the cause of this is the 
things going on in Paris, God willing there will be a prompt resolution 
to those affairs’.83 As a result, the French agent Claude de Meulles, 
who had replaced Colbert in Hamburg, had trouble collecting part 
of the Swedish subsidies because of Calandrini’s bankruptcy.84
Jean Hoeufft had perhaps already gained what he hoped for. In 
1648, in response to a letter telling about his move to the new 
81 ‘Mémoire des héritiers du sieur Hoeft, hollandais, à l’ambassadeur de Hollande 
…’, Paris: Bibliothèque nationale de France, Mélanges de Colbert 119–119bis, 
fol. 966v. They thank Colbert for a favourable response in the ’Mémoire 
présenté à l’ambassadeur de Hollande en France’, Paris: BNF, Mélanges de 
Colbert 120–120bis, fols 173–174v. 
82 Stadsarchief Amsterdam, 1648 Juli 16: Nots. Arch 1690/1221 Nots Pieter de 
Bary. Merchants holding the obligation included Julien Lanson en Zoonen, 
Jan Daniel de Haz, Jan Daniel Rosa, Advocaat Cloeck, Nots. Tielmans, and 
Dirck de Keijser. See Hermann Kellenbenz, ‘Hamburg und die Französisch-
Schwedische Zusammenarbeit im 30-jährigen Krieg’, Zeitschrift des Vereins 
für hamburgische Geschichte 49/50 (1964), 102–103. 
83 Brasset to Servien, 6 July 1648, fol. 209v. ‘C’est que aujourd’huy les banquiers 
sont tous en confusions es en ala a cause de ce qui se se passe a Paris. 
Dieu veut qu’il y est bien tost une prompte composition des affairs la’. For 
Hoeufft’s inability to save Calandrini, see 17 August 1648, fol. 299. Paris: 
AD, CP Hollande, 47. 
84 Paris: AD, CP Hambourg, 2, Meulles to Salvius, 16 April 1648, fol. 139v, 
Meulles to ‘Monseigneur’ [Avaux?] (28 August 1648): ‘le principal que je 
puisse dire a present est que nostre banquier de cette ville ma dit que ces 
messieurs d’Amsterdam qui doivent fournir la premiere moitié du subside 
ont remis si peu de chose que cella ne veut pas le parler’, Copy of Meulles’s 
protest to Calandrini, 9 October 1648, fol. 215, and more discussion of it 
13 November 1648, fol. 224. 
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Academy at Breda, Hoeufft thanked the Huguenot theologian André 
Rivet for telling him of the States-General’s plans to banish ‘popery 
and idolatry’ from Breda, the siege of which in 1637 he had extended 
his credit to fund. He hoped that ‘God would unite and bless [the 
members of the States-General], if they continue to take his cause 
into their consideration, without which our hopes are all vain’. He 
recounted victories of the ‘confederates’ from Bavaria to Brazil, 
anticipating a final victory over the Spanish. Hoeufft closed his 
letter by thanking Rivet for moving to Breda to teach, noting that 
‘[y]ou will be contented in your old age nourishing young plants 
to serve the Church of God in edification’.85 He did not seem to 
take a very active role in the Fronde – on either side – and died in 
the autumn of 1651. Mattheus Hoeufft lived until 1669, but he 
withdrew from banking and, seemingly, from the world of diplomacy, 
notifying the French in early 1652 that he intended to move from 
Amsterdam to The Hague, and that the man he was leaving to see 
to his affairs would not accept even a letter without payment in 
advance.86
Even if it were possible to calculate the costs and profits from 
the remittance work, the Hoeuffts’ work on the subsidies should 
not be seen in isolation. The connections they established could be 
exploited for monetary gain; Jean Hoeufft proposed that Louis de 
Geer should partner with him to exploit a concession to mint copper 
coin in France, only to abandon it, explaining that ‘cabals and 
oppositions have formed against the licence’.87 Morera was entirely 
right to say that French foreign policy would not have functioned 
without Jean Hoeufft, who provided the French monarchy with 
85 Leiden, Leiden University Library, Special Collections, Letters, BPL. 2211. 
Jean Hoeufft to André Rivet, Paris, 18 July 1648. ‘J’espere que Dieu les 
unira et benira, s’ils continuent d’avoir sa Cause en Recommendation sans 
quoy touz nos esperances sont vaines … Au rest, j’ay este resjouy lors que 
j’entendiz que vo:s allez vous employer dans l’academie de Breda. Vo:s au:e 
ce Contentem:t de nourrir des jeunes plantes dans v:re veillesse po:r servir 
a l’Eglise de Dieu en edification.’
86 BNF, Clairambault, 438, fol. 4. Les heritiers de Jean Hoeufft to Brienne, 2 
March 1652. 
87 Stockholm: Riksarkivet, Leufsta Arkivet, Jean Hoeufft to Louis de Geer, 
from Paris, 30 November 1641, and Jean Hoeufft to Louis de Geer, from 
Paris, 21 December 1641, ‘Il c’est [sic] forme des oppositions et aultres 
brigues et comme vous cognoissez les mutations et variété du monde, c’est 
pourquoy je suis d’advis … vous ne fassiez rien jusques a autre de mes advis 
et ordre.’ 
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connections enabling France to procure the metal, cannons, muskets, 
saltpetre, and naval vessels necessary to wage war that lay at the 
heart of the cardinals’ policies. So too Hoeufft managed to be the 
banker that Richelieu thought was a necessary part of alliances, 
and he managed the fiscal side of the alliances with only small flaws 
for the best part of two decades. Yet it is also true that the cardinals’ 
foreign policy, and particularly the payment of subsidies, enabled 
Hoeufft’s entrepreneurial strategy, allowing his family to profit from 
occupying a unique position in European commerce and politics.
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